

# RESPONSIBILITY, BLAME AND CRIMINAL LIABILITY: RETHINKING THE GROUNDS OF EXCUSATORY DEFENSES IN THE CRIMINAL LAW\*

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*The question of excusing in law has been the subject of different philosophical theories of responsibility. These theories attempt to shed light on the nature and function of legal excuses and to justify their role in the criminal justice system. This paper examines the issue of excusing in law from two theoretical standpoints: the character theory and the choice theory of responsibility. The two theories differ on the kinds of causes of action they each find to provide the basis for holding people responsible. The character theory focuses on character, the choice theory on choice and the capacity to choose. Following a brief introduction in which the fundamental distinction between justification and excuse is outlined, the character theory of responsibility is explained with special attention being paid to the work of George Fletcher, which has made a significant impact on the field of criminal law philosophy in recent years. Then follows a critical discussion of the choice theory as elaborated by H.L.A. Hart, one of the most influential legal theorists of our times. The paper concludes that the character theory of responsibility, by drawing attention to what lies behind and motivates actual choices, offers a better basis for interpreting the moral significance of human actions and for explaining our actual blaming judgements regarding those actions.*

## INTRODUCTION

In criminal law liability hinges on the combination of harmful conduct (*actus reus*) with a blameworthy state of mind (*mens rea*). Criminal liability presupposes, moreover, the absence of a legal defense. However, using a single term such as ‘defenses’ can be

## 2 GEORGE MOUSOURAKIS

misleading since it suggests that there is a unitary category of such defenses with common characteristics, or general principles that absolve from liability in a similar fashion to those general principles that impose liability. But, as it is clear with respect to offenses, the relevant general principles vary from offense to offense and this is equally true for criminal law defenses. A distinction is drawn between two types of defenses: justifications and excuses. A justification-based defense challenges the unlawful character of an act that, on the face of it, violates a criminal prohibition. When such a defense is raised the argument is that, in the circumstances, an act which would normally constitute a criminal offense should be considered right or, at least, legally permissible. The circumstances of justification, in other words, are understood to alter the grounds for the moral and legal assessment of the relevant act. Self-defense and defense of another are often referred to as examples of justification-based legal defenses. Claims of excuse, by contrast, do not deny the wrongfulness and unlawfulness of the act. What these defenses call in question is the necessary internal relationship between a *prima facie* unlawful act and the actor. An accused who pleads a valid excuse cannot be held morally blameworthy and therefore culpable for having brought about the external elements of a criminal offense. Examples of this type of legal defense include insanity, duress and certain types of necessity.

Central to the theory of justification and excuse is the distinction between primary or prohibitory norms and norms of attribution. The former impose general duties of conformity with minimum standards of conduct on members of society who are required to guide their conduct accordingly if they are to avoid the sanctions provided by the law. These primary or prohibitory norms are complemented or modified by the norms of justification, which allow for exceptions to the application of the primary norms in prescribed circumstances. For example, the primary norm against committing acts of violence is complemented or modified by the provision which licenses the doing of such acts in self-defense or in defense of another. By contrast with the primary or prohibitory norms, the norms of attribution are specifically addressed to judges and juries as these norms lay down grounds for legally excusing someone who has violated a legal prohibition. Unlike claims of justification, the norms of attribution do not modify the primary norms. Their role is not to guide conduct but to allow for exceptions in ascribing moral blame as a prerequisite for legal culpability.<sup>1</sup>

### CRIMINAL RESPONSIBILITY AND MORAL CHARACTER

The principal claim of the character theory of responsibility is that when a person is convicted of a crime, society expresses a negative judgement on that person's moral worth. This means that only when the wrongful act reveals a flaw in the actor's character the imposition of criminal punishment may be morally justified.<sup>2</sup> The assumption here is that moral and legal responsibility is primarily concerned with those enduring and interrelated features which make up what we call a person's character, her emotions, values, desires, aversions, ambitions etc. These attributes of character as well as the way they manifest themselves in conduct are the result of a person's prior experience, moral education and critical self-reflection. The character theory of responsibility is

is associated with the Scottish philosopher David Hume and his doctrine of the moral sense. According to this doctrine, a form of intuitionism prevalent in eighteenth century British philosophy, the perception of certain actions or gives rise to special feelings of pleasure or pain in the observer. These feelings enable her to distinguish right from wrong actions and, at the same time, provide motives to moral conduct. But the object of the moral sense is not so much actions as such but the character reflected in them. As Hume (1949, 108) remarked, “actions are objects of our moral sentiment, so far only as they are indications of the internal character.”<sup>3</sup> Actions, the object of praise or blame, are seen as expressions of particular character traits in their authors. But judgements of blame or praise ultimately pertain not to actions as such but to the character traits or attitudes that bring them about. Such an approach to moral and legal responsibility presupposes that persons are in some way responsible for their characters.<sup>4</sup> It is assumed that persons are capable of being aware of and exercising a degree of control over those character traits and dispositions that motivate their rational choices in acting. It is precisely this assumption that makes the attribution of moral and legal responsibility possible. As Peter Arenella (1994, 257) points out:

A character-based conception of moral agency could be used to explain why moral agents possess the capacity to think, feel, interpret and behave like a reasonable person. ...[T]his character model would locate [a person’s] moral culpability in his earlier failure to do something about a character defect that clearly could impair his ability to make the right moral choice in certain circumstances. We blame him for not acting like a reasonable person because we believe he is morally responsible for not doing something about those defective aspects of his character that prevent him from acting like one.

As this suggests, the ultimate basis for holding people culpable lies in their failure to do something about those character traits or attitudes that prompt them to engage in morally and legally objectionable conduct.

From the point of view of the character theory, the various states of mind, such as intention, recklessness or negligence, which the law requires to be proved before an accused is convicted of an offense, are taken to manifest different attitudes towards societal values or interests. Although attitudes may be short-lived or changing the law relies upon a general hypothesis that certain conduct accompanied by the requisite state of mind manifests a socially undesirable character trait or attitude. Thus, a person who commits an offense intentionally, is taken to manifest a clear desire to cause the prescribed harm and, consequently, a strong attitude towards the occurrence of that harm. A person who brings about the prohibited state of affairs recklessly, i.e. with the knowledge that her conduct involves a substantial risk that such state of affairs may occur, displays a less undesirable disposition toward the prescribed harm. She does not desire the harm to occur but is indifferent as to whether it occurs or not. Depending on the degree to which the relevant harm is likely to eventuate, the person may be said to manifest an undesirable attitude. And the more undesirable the attitude the more blame

#### 4 GEORGE MOUSOURAKIS

and, consequently, punishment the person deserves.

According to character theory, criminal liability and punishment turns on two interrelated requirements, namely just deserts and voluntariness. The requirement of just deserts relates to the assumption that the distinctive feature of criminal punishment is that it expresses moral blame. And moral blame involves something more than the formal disapproval of the wrongful act: it involves also the moral disapproval of the wrongdoer's character as manifested by her commission of an offense. In the words of George Fletcher (1978, 800), one of the chief contemporary advocates of this approach to criminal responsibility:

An inference from the wrongful act to the actor's character is essential to a retributive theory of punishment. A fuller statement of the argument would go like this: (1) punishing wrongful conduct is just only if punishment is measured by the desert of the offender, (2) the desert of an offender is gauged by his character - i.e., the kind of person he is, (3) and therefore, a judgment about character is essential to the just distribution of punishment.<sup>5</sup>

According to Fletcher, we blame a person who committed a wrongful act only if the act reveals what sort of person the actor is, that is, only if we can infer from the commission of a wrongful act that the actor's character is flawed. From this point of view, the chief aim of criminal punishment is retribution: inflicting pain on offenders who are morally blameworthy. Some retributivists offer purely deontological justifications for requiring a connection between just deserts and punishment. By adopting Kant's categorical imperative that a moral agent must be treated as an end in herself, not as a means to an end, they argue that it is 'right' to give people what they deserve, irrespective of the desirable or not consequences for society that such a practice may entail, because this is what justice demands.<sup>6</sup> Others have adopted a comparative notion of desert, which links punishment with justice in the distribution of benefits and burdens in society.<sup>7</sup> But if according to the character theory it is character traits rather than acts that is the focus of just deserts, what is wrong with punishing people directly for bad character? As Fletcher (1978, 800-801) explains:

[T]he limitation of the inquiry to a single wrongful act follows not from the theory of desert, but from the principle of legality. We accept the artificiality of inferring character from a single deed as the price of maintaining the suspect's privacy. ... Disciplining the inquiry in this way ... secures the individual against a free-ranging enquiry of the state into his moral worth.<sup>8</sup>

The character theory of criminal responsibility views just deserts as dependent upon the requirement of voluntariness. In this context the notion of voluntariness is understood as being wide enough to encompass all cases in which a person is said to be in control of and therefore morally responsible for her actions. The concept of voluntariness may be interpreted to denote either the actor's ability to control her

external conduct - i.e. to act in a strict sense - or the actor's capacity to determine freely the course of her action - i.e. to give effect to her choice of action. In the former sense voluntariness refers to intentional action as a necessary prerequisite for ascribing what may be described as *authorship-responsibility*; in the latter sense voluntariness pertains to action which is both intentional and free as required for the attribution of moral responsibility. It is moral responsibility as presupposing *authorship-responsibility* that the notion of voluntariness should be understood as referring to here.

Why criminal responsibility, as involving just deserts, hinges on the requirement of voluntariness? Simply because only voluntary action can warrant the inference from a wrongful act that the actor's character is flawed. The requirement of voluntariness indicates that a person cannot be convicted and punished for an offense unless she was capable of exercising control over her conduct. In this respect excusing conditions, by negating voluntariness, are understood to block the normal inference from a wrongful act to a flawed character, thus blocking the attribution of moral blame as a prerequisite of criminal liability. Excuses, in other words, negate moral and legal responsibility for *prima facie* wrongful actions that are not expressive of undesirable character traits. For example, an accused who, acting under a reasonable mistake of fact, brought about a prohibited harm cannot be said to have manifested, through her action, an undesirable character trait and therefore she cannot be held morally and legally responsible for the harm caused.<sup>9</sup> If, however, the accused's mistake was unreasonable, she may be found guilty of a negligence-based offense. In such a case, the accused's failure to realise that her conduct involved a substantial and unjustifiable risk of harm in a situation where she should have realised it can be said to indicate an undesirable character trait and therefore a degree of blame is appropriate. Here the accused's failure to conform to a prescribed standard of care reflects a socially undesirable attitude, namely indifference to the welfare of others. Similarly, a person who commits an offense intentionally, but only because she is compelled to do so by threats or other forms of coercion which she cannot reasonably be expected to avoid or resist, does not display a defect of character as required for the attribution of moral and legal responsibility (such a person is said to act morally involuntarily). However, if the person is found to have caused, through her own fault, the conditions of coercion or lack of self-control under which the offense was committed, her excuse may reduce but will not negate culpability for the offense. In such a case, the person's causing or failing to prevent the incapacitating condition is seen as reflecting a defect in that person's character.

The character theory of criminal responsibility also provides a basis for understanding the role of partial excuses in the criminal law. A person who kills another under provocation, for example, does not deserve to be branded as a murderer, for the fact that she had lost her normal self-control capacities, as any reasonable person would when faced with the same provocation, precludes the normal inference from the act of killing to such a grave character flaw as required for a conviction of murder. Nevertheless, the accused is still culpable to a lesser degree for allowing her justifiable anger at the provoker to fester to the point that it unduly interfered with her capacity to exercise self-control. The accused's criminal liability for the lesser offense of manslaughter, in such cases, is based on a character-based moral judgement about her culpability for

## 6 GEORGE MOUSOURAKIS

for allowing herself to be carried away by passion and kill.

The character theory of criminal responsibility has been criticized on the grounds that it builds upon an incomplete view of the criminal law. Modern criminal law, it is argued, is not concerned only with what is seen as immoral conduct expressive of bad character. There is an increasing number of criminal offenses in which the element of moral stigma is absent or hardly distinguishable. With respect to these offenses criminal liability is imposed merely as a practical means of regulating or controlling certain forms of social activity. The moral blame, which normally accompanies the more serious crimes (the so-called *mala in se*) is almost absent in what is referred to as 'regulatory' offenses (otherwise known as *mala prohibita*).<sup>10</sup> As far as the latter offenses are concerned moral blame - the inference from a wrongful act to a flawed character - cannot provide the test for criminal liability. These offenses therefore fall outside the scope of the present theory of criminal responsibility.

Another problem which the theory faces, according to some critics, is that the bounds of what is referred to as common or social morality, in the light of which conduct is assessed as immoral and hence as possibly illegal, is sometimes very difficult to circumscribe. Patrick Devlin argues that common morality can be defined and measured according to the strength of the feelings of ordinary people. So, if certain conduct gives rise to feelings of intolerance or indignation among ordinary members of society, this would be a sufficient indication that the conduct in question threatens common morality - and as such it may be criminalized. Devlin (1965, 22-23) proposes that common morality could be discovered by assembling a group of ordinary citizens - in the form of a jury - and asking them to consider how certain forms of conduct should be classified. But, as Devlin's critics remark, the feelings of ordinary people may not be moral in nature but, rather, an expression of prejudice. Devlin's proposed method of discovering common morality - resorting to a jury made up of ordinary members of the community - besides the fact that it does not preclude prejudice, it may also fail to lead to agreement on a number of morally disputed issues in society such as, for example, abortion or euthanasia.<sup>11</sup> With regard to criminal offenses based on conduct whose moral basis remains in question it seems difficult to say that criminal liability is imposed only because the relevant conduct reflects a flaw in the actor's character or because we disapprove of the actor as an unworthy person. Indeed, the opposite may be the case if most members of society agree that certain conduct should no longer be considered immoral and must therefore be decriminalised. On the other hand, even where there is agreement as to the immorality of certain conduct, one cannot infer from a single instance of such conduct that the actor's character is flawed. Legal blame is sometimes imposed on persons with good characters who, at a moment of weakness, have made a conscious but uncharacteristic choice to break the law. Although the commission of a criminal offense may be 'out of character' for the offender, this does not preclude criminal liability and punishment from being imposed. And, conversely, even though an act may be expressive of a bad character, this does not necessarily entail that such an act is or ought to be criminalized.

The general plausibility of the character theory of criminal responsibility cannot be denied on these grounds, however. It may be true that legal punishment is not always imposed for morally blameworthy conduct. But criminalization rests upon the application of the harm principle. According to this principle, only conduct that causes

or is likely to cause societal harm should be criminalized.<sup>12</sup> It is on the basis of the harm principle that certain forms of conduct are prescribed as criminal offenses. But the character theory is not concerned with the issue of criminalization (or decriminalization) as such. Rather, it is the quite separate question of whether a person who has caused one of the prescribed harms should be characterised as a criminal that the character theory focuses on. Its primary aim is to provide a basis for dealing with the question of culpability in the application of the criminal law in a way that accords with our common conceptions of justice and fairness. In dealing with this question, the character theory relies on the assumption that every harmful action is expressive of an undesirable character trait, irrespective of whether such action is 'in' or 'out' of character for the offender.<sup>13</sup> Thus, if a person of previously impeccable character suddenly and unexpectedly gives in to an impulse to steal someone else's umbrella, her generally good character will be irrelevant as far as that person's criminal liability for stealing is concerned.<sup>14</sup> As the character theory is concerned with bad character only to the extent that it is reflected in harmful actions, it is a mistake to think that, from this point of view, criminal punishment is imposed for bad character as such.<sup>15</sup> No matter our differences as to what constitutes immoral and therefore socially undesirable behaviour, as regards the majority of criminal offenses, moral blameworthiness remains a necessary (although not sufficient) condition for justifiable punishment. With respect to these offenses, therefore, the character-based theory is both plausible and compatible with current criminal law practice.

### **CHOICE, FAIRNESS AND CULPABILITY: H. L. A. HART'S THEORY**

In his work on criminal jurisprudence Professor Hart has elaborated a theory of criminal responsibility that has received wide recognition, especially in common law jurisdictions.<sup>16</sup> Hart's theory is sometimes referred to as the 'choice' or 'fairness' theory of criminal responsibility. The starting-point of this theory is the position that the general justifying aim of the institution of punishment is the utilitarian one of general deterrence - the prevention of socially harmful conduct. This should be distinguished, however, from the principles of justice applying to the distribution of punishment. Hart distinguishes between the following three questions: a) What is the justification of the institution of punishment? b) Who may be subjected to criminal punishment? c) How severe the punishment of an offender should be? Only the first of these questions has to do with the general justifying aim of punishment - according to Hart, this is general deterrence, or the prevention of socially harmful conduct. The second and third questions pertain to the distribution of punishment. Justice in the distribution of punishment requires that the application of punishment should be restricted to those who could have avoided breaking the law.<sup>17</sup> Although Hart rejects retribution as the general aim of punishment, he considers it to be relevant to the distribution of punishment (hence he often speaks of 'retribution in the distribution' of punishment).

According to Hart the principles applying to the distribution of punishment represent values that are, to some extent, independent of general deterrence as the justify

## 8 GEORGE MOUSOURAKIS

ing aim of the institution of punishment. The chief function of these principles is to ensure that justice or fairness to the individual citizen is not sacrificed in the pursuit of utilitarian aims - such as general deterrence. And it is against justice to use individuals as a mere means for achieving certain social aims, no matter how important the latter may be, unless they have the capacity and fair opportunity to comply with the law. From Hart's point of view, just punishment presupposes striking a balance between the pursuit of general deterrence and the need to protect the individual from being used as a means to achieving general social goals. It is precisely the application of the generally accepted principles of justice, especially the one requiring that only those who break the law voluntarily should be punished, that distinguishes punishment from other measures, e.g. the compulsory isolation of people infected with certain contagious diseases, in which these principles do not apply. Hart recognises, however, that in certain exceptional cases the principle of fairness to the individual may be overridden by the need to promote or safeguard an important societal interest. He points out (1968, 12), nonetheless, that when we think it right to set aside the constraints laid down by the requirement of fairness to the individual "we should do so with the sense of sacrificing an important principle. We should be conscious of choosing the lesser of two evils, and this would be inexplicable if the principle sacrificed to utility were itself only a requirement of utility."

Hart views criminal responsibility as being dependent upon two interrelated requirements, namely fairness to the individual and voluntariness. The basis of his understanding of fairness to the individual is a conception of society as a form of voluntary co-operation for mutual advantage among free and equal individuals. All members of such a society have a right to mutual forbearance from certain kinds of harmful behaviour. According to Hart (1968, 22-23), society warrants that right by offering individuals:

...the protection of the laws on terms which are fair, because they not only consist of a framework of reciprocal rights and duties, but because within this framework each individual is given a fair opportunity to choose between keeping the law required for society's protection or paying the penalty. From this point of view the actual punishment of a criminal appears not merely as something useful to society (General Aim) but as justly extracted from the criminal who has voluntarily done harm; from the second it appears as a price justly extracted because the criminal had a fair opportunity beforehand to avoid liability to pay.

Within such a framework, Hart maintains, individual freedom is guaranteed, and the citizen's life protected from excessive interference on the part of state officials, for punishment may be imposed only for failures to comply with the fair demands of society. And only failures to conform to the demands of the law that are the outcome of a free choice warrant society's interference into a person's life. As Hart puts it, society needs a "moral licence" to punish, and this presupposes that those charged with offenses have had the capacity and fair opportunity to comply with the law. As Hart



(1968, 39-40) points out:

One necessary condition of the just application of a punishment is normally expressed by saying that the agent “could have helped” doing what he did, and hence the need to inquire into the “inner facts” is dictated not by the moral principle that only the doing of an immoral act may be legally punished, but by the moral principle that no one should be punished who could not help doing what he did. This is a necessary condition ...for the moral propriety of legal punishment and no doubt also for moral censure; in this respect law and morals are similar. But this similarity as to the one essential condition that there must be a “voluntary” action if legal punishment or moral censure is to be morally permissible does not mean that legal punishment is morally permissible only where the agent has done something morally wrong.<sup>18</sup>

As this statement suggests, the moral principles of justice that apply to the distribution of punishment are independent of the moral or not character of the unlawful act at stake or the morality or immorality of the particular legal provision under which punishment is imposed. If a morally evil law is applied even to those who have not broken it voluntarily, this is seen as an added wrong inflicted by the law. According to Hart, it is the moral principle of fairness to the individual that necessitates making criminal liability and punishment conditional on the requirement of voluntariness.<sup>19</sup> The chief claim of the choice theory is that an accused is excused for committing an offense because at the time she did so she did not have the capacity or opportunity to choose to do otherwise. Moreover, where, under the circumstances, the exercise of choice is made very difficult, even though not impossible, a person may rely on a mitigating excuse, i.e. an excuse that will only reduce, although not totally negate, culpability. But this is as far as the inquiry goes. Under the choice theory, one does not need to go beyond the issue of choice and into the question of whether one’s choices manifest a fault in the actor’s character. The argument in support of the present theory is that while a choice always evidences the possession of a will, it is not necessarily representative of the actor’s character as a whole. Thus, a wrongful act may render the actor morally and legally responsible, if it is the result of a free choice, even though it may be ‘out of character’, i.e. not expressive of the actor’s general state of character.

Under the choice theory, a person can rely on an excuse where her conduct has not been caused, wholly or partly, by her choice but by factors over which she has had no control.<sup>20</sup> As Hart (1968, 152) explains:

What is crucial is that those whom we punish should have had, when they acted, the normal capacities, physical and mental, for abstaining from what it [the law] forbids, and a fair opportunity to exercise these capacities. Where these capacities and opportunities are absent, as they are in different ways in the varied cases of accident, mistake, paralysis, reflex action, coercion, insanity, etc., the moral protest is that it is morally wrong to punish because

‘he could not have helped it’, or ‘he could not have done otherwise’ or ‘he had no real choice’.

Consider the defense of necessity, for example. Necessity pertains to situations in which a person commits an offense to avoid an imminent threat of death or serious bodily harm. Unlike duress, where the danger to one’s life comes from the threats of another human being, in cases of necessity the danger arises from the circumstances in which the person or persons are placed. When the defense of necessity is raised the jury are required to consider the following questions: (a) was the accused compelled to act as she did because she had a good reason to fear (in view of the circumstances as she believed them to be) that otherwise death or serious injury would result? (b) if so, would a reasonable person of ordinary firmness, sharing the characteristics of the accused, have responded to the situation as the accused did? An accused who successfully pleads necessity is legally (and morally) excused for committing a criminal offense. Under the choice theory of responsibility, the accused’s claim in such a case may be interpreted in two, interrelated, ways. The first interpretation is that, faced with an imminent threat to her life or limb, the accused was so overwhelmed by fear that it was impossible for her to have acted in a different, non-unlawful, way. The emphasis in this reading of the excuse is on the psychological pressure the accused found herself under in the circumstances. The second interpretation of the excuse places the emphasis on how unfair the threat on her life or limb made the accused’s situation of choice as compared to that of other ordinary people normally placed. The first interpretation focuses on the person’s defective capacity; the second on her diminished opportunity to comply with the law. But, as was noted earlier, the defense would fail if it is established that the accused, through her own fault, e.g. acting negligently, brought about the circumstances of necessity, or if she did not respond as a reasonable person would have responded in the situation.

Choice theorists have had some difficulties in dealing with the question of how responsibility for negligent action is to be accounted for under the choice theory. The problem is that the negligent actor cannot be said to have chosen to do the prohibited act, as the choice theory presupposes. Hart’s answer to this problem is that the negligent actor is morally and legally responsible not for choosing to do a wrongful act, but for not exercising her capacity to choose not to do it when she had a fair opportunity to do so. In so far as the standard by which the actor’s conduct is assessed is also a subjective one, Hart (1968, 136 ff) observes that the negligent actor “could have done otherwise, given [her] capacities”, and therefore she is morally and legally responsible for her actions.<sup>21</sup> Responsibility for negligently bringing about the conditions of one’s own defense can also be explained on this basis. But how, from this point of view, could one explain the difference in blameworthiness and, correspondingly, culpability, between negligent and intentional wrongdoing? The assumption here is that a person who chooses to do a wrongful act is more to blame than one who simply fails to exercise her capacity to choose not to do it. But why is this so? The choice theory, by abstracting choice, or the capacity to choose, from the agent’s character, cannot offer a satisfactory answer to this question. By contrast, the character theory, by viewing choice, or

the failure to exercise a capacity to choose, as a manifestation of character, provides a clearer basis for understanding why intentional wrongdoings entail a higher degree of blame than negligent ones.<sup>22</sup>

As previously noted, what precludes a person from exercising choice, and hence provides the grounds for an excuse, is either an incapacitating condition in that person or the lack of a fair opportunity to use a normal, i.e. non-defective, capacity. Thus, when we say that a person could not have done otherwise this might refer either to a defect in the person's inherent capacity of choosing, or to a situation in which the person is unable to use her normal choosing capacity effectively. But how is the choosing agent to be described here? Is the choosing agent to be identified solely with the conscious will, the rational aspect of the choosing self, or should our description include emotional states, such as feelings, desires, aversions and the like? Are these largely unconscious factors part of the choosing self or should they be viewed as potential obstacles to reasoned deliberation, which the choosing self must endeavour to overcome? It is submitted that the choosing agent should be described as including both, for emotions play a part in the choosing process as both products and causes of the judgements that determine our decisions.<sup>23</sup> Thus, when a person gets angry in the face of an act of injustice, such as the infliction of undeserved punishment, her anger need not be an obstacle to reasoned deliberation and choice. As Michael Moore (1994, 209) remarks, "internal factors, like emotions, cannot be said to incapacitate our choices, except by an impermissibly narrow view either of who we are or of what our choosing agency consists." But if the choosing agent is described so as to include all those attributes that make up a person's character, then there seems to be nothing to separate the present theory from the character theory of responsibility.

Furthermore, it is recognised that some emotions, such as fear or anger, when they get out of hand, can incapacitate choice, rendering the actor excusable. For emotions to have such an incapacitating effect on choice they must be 'blind', i.e. not caused by judgements, and intense enough to cause action directly, that is without the mediation of rational judgement and choice. The rationale of the excuse in provocation and other loss of control defenses is usually explained on this basis. But when the ability to choose is overcome by powerful emotions, how could the choice theorist explain the fact that the agent is still, to some degree, morally and legally to blame? By shifting the emphasis from choice to capacity, the answer, again, seems to be that although the agent does not choose to do the wrongful act (killing), she had the capacity and a fair opportunity to have chosen not to do it - and this implies that the agent was capable of choosing to keep her emotions in check. But the choice theorist maintains that the agent's moral culpability in such cases does not rest on a prior assumption about those aspects of her character that precluded her from exercising her capacity to control her emotions. But by leaving outside the scope of the inquiry character-related considerations the choice theorist fails to account for what really justifies our actual blaming judgements in such cases. When we hold a person morally responsible for a wrongful act that was motivated by, e.g., anger, it is because we blame her for not doing something about those aspects of her character that made it so difficult for her to control her anger and avoid engaging in morally and legally wrongful conduct.

## 12 GEORGE MOUSOURAKIS

Hart (1968, 182-183) maintains that the recognition of legal excuses, as connected with the requirement of fairness to the individual, reflects deeply rooted moral distinctions that pervade social life. As he explains:

Human society is a society of persons; and persons do not view themselves or each other merely as so many bodies moving in ways which are sometimes harmful and have to be prevented or altered. Instead persons interpret each other's movements as manifestations of intentions and choices, and these subjective factors are often more important to their social relations than the movements by which they are manifested or their effects. ... This is how human nature in human society actually is and as yet we have no power to alter it.

It is a fact of life, that people respond in different ways to harm caused by others, depending on their judgments about whether the harm inflicted was deliberate, i.e. the result of a free choice, or accidental. In this respect it is important for the law to take into account and reflect those moral distinctions by reference to which the character of human relations in society is determined. According to Ronald Dworkin (1977, 11), this suggests that "the government should treat its citizens with the respect and dignity that adult members of the community claim from each other."

Hart defends legal excuses claiming their presence within the legal system maximises individual liberty as it increases our powers of predicting and controlling law's interference with our lives. For if we were to be punished for harm we cause accidentally, or involuntarily, this would mean that we could no longer determine, by our free choices, whether or not the law will interfere with our lives. Even if it was true that our actions are causally pre-determined by factors beyond our control, as determinists argue, this, Hart (1968, 49) claims, would not remove the satisfaction which we experience from the exercise of choice, no matter what the intended consequences of our choices may be. In this respect, Hart's theory is, arguably, a version of rule-utilitarianism, for it views the system of excuses as a factor contributing to the maximisation of "the efficacy of the individual's informed and considered choice" (Hart, 1968, 46). The role of legal excuses is justified on the grounds that a system of excuses operates as a balancing factor between the maximisation of general welfare, as pertinent to crime prevention, on the one hand, and the maximisation of that other common good, individual liberty and freedom of choice, on the other. As Hart points out, however, there can be no comparison between the two social goods - crime prevention and freedom of choice - in an all-inclusive calculation of the general good, for each occupies its own, distinct area or appropriate domain. It is from this point of view that Hart argues that the principles pertaining to the maximisation of the good that is freedom of choice operate as a constraint on the maximisation of the other good, that is, the reduction of socially harmful conduct.

Hart's interpretation of the role of excuses in law departs from the traditional utilitarian understanding of excuses, as expressed by Jeremy Bentham and other representatives of utilitarianism. Utilitarians view criminal punishment as a form of harm and, as such, as detracting from general welfare. From this point of view, they argue that

punishment should not be imposed for harmless or justified conduct or when it is ineffective, i.e. when its application contributes nothing to the prevention of socially harmful conduct. Furthermore, punishment should be avoided when it is unprofitable, i.e. when the harm which it entails is greater than the harm which is prevented by it, and when it is needless, i.e. when it is not the most economical way of preventing harmful conduct. From this viewpoint, utilitarians assert, punishing a person who has a valid excuse would be pointless for, among other things, it would have no good effect on the conduct of the excusable offender. Hart (1968, 19, 43, 48, 77), in criticising the traditional utilitarian approach to the role of legal excuses, argues that although the threat of punishment may be ineffective against the excusable offender, it does not follow that the punishment of excusable offenders would not have a general deterrent effect. For that reason, the role of legal excuses cannot be justified simply on the basis of a utilitarian balancing of costs and benefits. For Hart, as was pointed out before, the recognition of legal excuses as part of our legal system draws its justification from the (non-utilitarian) principle of fairness to the individual citizen. It is only the general aim of punishment that is justified on utilitarian grounds. From this point of view Hart argues against the introduction of a system of strict liability and the resulting elimination of legal excuses. According to him such a system will undermine fairness for it will result in the individual's being punished as a direct means to the promotion of social goals. He acknowledges, however, that with respect to certain types of offenses, strict liability may be given priority over the requirement of fairness to the individual.

Hart's theory of criminal responsibility, with its emphasis on the requirement that the law should be applied so as to respect the choices of individual citizens, is built upon the modern liberal conception of a social order. Within this order law both sets constraints upon the pursuance of individual preferences and, at the same time, guarantees the individuals' freedom to express and, within limits, to implement their choices. In a liberal and individualist society compliance with the law is regarded as a means to achieving a balance between different and often conflicting individual choices. The effectiveness of individual choices is seen as depending upon the legal rules being observed.<sup>24</sup> In this respect, moral blame, as a basis of criminal responsibility and punishment, pertains to the violation of the law as a condition for securing social cooperation rather than to the doing of an immoral act as such. Indeed, within the liberal order no particular moral standpoint can be given priority, for different moral standpoints are interpreted merely as expressions of individual preferences. This explains the shift in emphasis in Hart's theory from the concept of just deserts to that of fairness to the individual. As was said, at the centre of Hart's conception of fairness lies the idea that criminal punishment is morally unacceptable, unless the accused chose to subject herself to the risk of punishment by voluntarily breaking the law. It is the preponderance of liberal ideas in today's social and political life that seems to account for the importance and continuing influence of Hart's theory on criminal law doctrine.

The fairness/choice theory has been subjected to the criticism that it offers little practical guidance for criminal justice systems faced with a much less ideal world than the one Hart appears to presume. As one critic has remarked, the fairness/choice theory is built upon a 'gentlemen's club' understanding of justice.<sup>25</sup>

Furthermore, the choice theory, by placing the emphasis on the concept of rational choice capacity as the sole basis of moral and legal blame misrepresents the meaning of moral responsibility as reflected in our actual moral judgements. Choice theorists focus on a person's ability to make rational choices about her actions - choices that are logically linked with the person's attaining certain identifiable objectives. Their concern is primarily with the person's reasoning ability as a means to achieving certain ends, not with what shapes the person's desires that motivate her choice of action. This way of looking at the choosing agent has allowed choice theorists to treat the agent's ability for rational choice as a matter separate from those aspects of the agent's character, her desires, values, feelings, perceptions and goals, that are the source of her rational choices. In this respect they offer an unacceptably narrow description of the object of our moral judgements that leaves outside those important attributes of the moral character that give meaning to the agent's choices and provide the basis for holding people morally blameworthy (or praiseworthy) for their choices. When we blame someone for choosing to do a wrongful act, or for not exercising her capacity to choose to act according to the norm, it is because we hold her morally responsible for failing to do something about those aspects of her character that impair her ability to make the right moral choice in the circumstances. Similarly, when we excuse a person accused of a wrongful act, it is because we acknowledge that the wrongful conduct does not reflect a fault in that person's character as required for holding the person morally blameworthy. It is submitted that the character theory of responsibility, by drawing attention to what motivates our actual choices, provides a better basis for interpreting the moral significance of human actions and for explaining our actual blaming judgements regarding those actions. On the other hand, if one places the emphasis on the necessary connection between choosing agency and character, then the difference between responsibility for choice and responsibility for character would tend to disappear. In so far as it is recognised that a bad choice is but an expression of a fault - whether temporary or 'permanent' - in the actor's character, it shouldn't come as a surprise that the two theories overlap to a considerable extent in their treatment of legal excuses.

## CONCLUDING REMARKS

Criminal responsibility pertains to that aspect of criminal law that safeguards individuals from criminal punishment. Both theories examined in this paper proceed from the assumption that criminal responsibility is a defeasible concept: an accused cannot be held criminally liable if she successfully raises a legal excuse. Much of the discussion about criminal responsibility revolves around the notion of involuntariness as a prerequisite for excusing in law and morals. The theories give different answers to the question of how involuntariness, as the basis of excusing, negates criminal liability - answers that reflect broader philosophical differences regarding the character and objectives of a criminal justice system. The two theories differ on the kinds of causes of action they each find to provide the basis for holding people responsible. The character theory focuses on character, the choice theory on choice and the capacity to choose. According to the character theory, excuses preclude the attribution of moral and legal

blame by denying that a wrongful act reflects a flaw in the actor's character. For the character theorist, moral blame is a necessary condition of criminal liability and punishment. The choice theorist's position is that excusing conditions preclude criminal liability because, when these conditions are present, the actor does not have the capacity or a fair opportunity to make a choice to act as the relevant legal norm requires. By contrast with the character theory, the choice theory treats moral culpability requirements only as a useful side-constraint on the pursuance of general deterrence as the chief aim of criminal liability and punishment. Although both theoretical approaches have exerted, and continue to exert, a strong influence on the development of criminal law doctrine in Anglo-American jurisdictions, none seems capable of offering generally acceptable or conclusive answers to all the questions that may arise. This means that when it comes to dealing with important doctrinal issues or to deciding on matters of criminal law policy, elements of both theories enter the discussion. It is submitted that the character theory, with its emphasis on moral blameworthiness, provides a better basis for understanding the attribution of criminal responsibility and the role of legal excuses in relation to criminal offenses which also constitute moral wrongs (*mala in se*). The choice theory, on the other hand, may be given priority when considering the question of criminal responsibility in relation to criminal offenses in which the element of moral stigma is absent or minimal (*mala prohibita*), or whose moral basis remains in question.

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## NOTES

1. For a closer look at the theory of justification and excuse consider Baron (2005); Berman (2003); Dressler (1987); Hruschka (2005); Mousourakis (2018).

2. As Nicola Lacey (1988, 68) remarks, "it is unfair to hold people responsible for actions which are out of character...[and] fair to hold them so for actions in which their settled dispositions are centrally expressed."

3. And see Hume (1888, 477, 575). For an account of Hume's theory consider Bayles (1976).

4. Aristotle believed that we are responsible for our characters because we are capable of choosing to be the persons we are (*Nicomachean Ethics*, III, 1111b31-1112a17). According to a weaker version of this approach, although initially we have no control over the processes through which our characters are formed, we later on develop an ability to maintain or shape our characters through our choices. For a fuller account of this view as it relates to criminal responsibility see Pincoffs (1973).

5. A similar approach has been adopted by Feinberg (1970, 126). See also Glover (1970); Bayles (1982).

6. See, e.g., Kleining (1973, 67); Davies (1971).

7. Consider, e.g., Morris (1973).

8. According to Ronald Dworkin (1977, 11), “The government may restrain a man for his own or the general good, but it may do so only on the basis of his behaviour, and it must strive to judge his behaviour from the same standpoint as he judges himself, that is, from the standpoint of his intentions, motives, and capacities.”

9. As George Fletcher (1978, 161) remarks, “mistaken beliefs are relevant to what the actor is trying to do if they affect his incentive in acting. They affect his incentive if knowing of the mistake would give him a good reason for changing his course of conduct.”

10. In common law jurisdictions the large majority of these offenses fall in the categories of strict and absolute liability offenses, i.e. offenses requiring a minimal only degree of fault or even no fault at all on the person’s part.

11. For an evaluation of Devlin’s position see, e.g., Dworkin (1966); Hughes (1962). Consider also Sartorius (1972).

12. For a fuller discussion of the harm principle see Raz (1986, esp. ch. 15).

13. As Joel Feinberg (1970, 192) explains, “When we say that a man is at fault, we usually mean only to refer to occurrent defects of acts or omissions, and only derivatively to the actor’s flaw as the doer of the defective deed. Such judgments are at best presumptive evidence about the man’s general character. An act can be faulty even when not characteristic of the actor, and the actor may be properly ‘to blame’ for it anyway; for if the action is faulty and it is also *his* action (characteristic or not), then he must answer for it. The faultiness of an action always reflects some discredit upon its doer, providing the doing is voluntary.”

14. Depending on the seriousness of the offense committed, previously good character is usually considered as a factor in mitigation of the sentence imposed for the offense.

15. As Jeremy Horder (1992, 133) points out, “the character conception of culpability is parasitic on (a version of) the harm principle. It is therefore also focused on actions, the harmful actions proscribed under the harm principle. This naturally and properly limits the aspects of character that will be relevant to culpability.”

16. See Wasserstrom (1967).

17. A similar position is reflected in Kant’s famous dictum “ought implies can.” However, unlike Hart, Kant places the emphasis on retribution rather than deterrence as the general justification of punishment.

18. Consider also Hart (1961, 173); Morris (1973, 40-64).

19. As Hart (1968, 182) explains, “even if things go wrong, as they do when mistakes are made or accidents occur, a man whose choices are right and who has done his best to keep the law will not suffer.” Note that here ‘right choice’ means choosing to act in accordance with the law.

20. A similar approach to the matter was adopted by William Blackstone. Blackstone (1769, 20-21) remarked that “[A]ll the several pleas and excuses, which protect the committer of a forbidden act from the punishment which is otherwise annexed thereto, may be reduced to this single consideration, the want or defect of *will*. An involuntary act, as it has no claim to merit, so neither can it induce any guilt: the concurrence of the will, when it has its choice either to do or to avoid the fact in question, being the only



thing that renders human actions either praiseworthy or culpable.”

21. Some criminal law scholars have argued that moral culpability presupposes some degree of awareness of at least the risk of harm which one’s conduct entails. In this respect the negligent actor cannot be held morally culpable, for her lack of awareness of the risk precludes her from choosing to engage in conduct that involves a risk of bringing about the prohibited harm. See, e.g., Williams (1961, 122-123).

22. As Arenella (1994, 244) remarks, “By suppressing the link between character and character and choice, rational choice theorists offer an impoverished account of moral blame that does not accurately reflect the meaning of moral culpability embedded in our actual blaming practices.”

23. Consider on this issue Sabini & Silver (1987, 168).

24. From a liberal standpoint, the realisation of individual or social choices presupposes an ability to engage in a certain kind of practical reasoning. This reasoning consists, firstly, in the ordering of one’s choices according to their significance; secondly, in the soundness of the methods by which choices are translated into decisions and actions; and, thirdly, in the ability to act so as to maximise the satisfaction of those choices according to their ordering. The third condition reflects the central role of utilitarian principles in the liberal social and political theory.

25. Murphy (1979, 10).

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