

527

UTILITY AND RIGHTS IN FRANCIS HUTCHESONS'S ETHICAL THEORY

GEORGE MOUSOURAKIS

Introductory

Hutcheson describes as the "intention of moral philosophy", "to direct men to that course of action which tends most effectually to promote their greatest happiness and perfection; as far as it can be done by observations and conclusions discoverable from the constitution of nature, without any aids of supernatural revelation."¹ This approach to moral philosophy, characteristic of eighteenth century British philosophical thinking, proceeds from the assumption that ethical principles can be discovered through the observation and understanding of the facts of human nature. Hutcheson's whole ethical theory revolves around the two principles of benevolence and self-love, of which we are aware by introspection, and other such psychological facts. From this viewpoint he says that being virtuous means acting from benevolent motives. By contrast, actions which spring from self-love are seen as having no moral worth. In trying to refute the egoist theories of Hobbes and Mandeville he is at pains to show that not all our feelings stem from self-love and that benevolence should be perceived as the sole source of virtue. Indeed, his idea of the moral sense was meant to provide further support to this. According to the moral sense doctrine, a form of intuitionism prevalent in eighteenth century British philosophy, the perception of certain actions or events gives rise to special feelings of pleasure or pain in the observer. These feelings enable him to distinguish right from wrong actions and, at the same time, provide motives to moral conduct. Hutcheson is an intuitionist in this aspect of his philosophical work. With regard to this it is often said that his philosophy provides an important link between the intuitionist and the utilitarian approaches for both streams have a part in his theory.

Hutcheson owes much to Locke and his distinction between the external and internal senses, and to his own teacher Shaftesbury, whose idea of an inner moral sense he developed and systematized. He made the first systematic attempt to apply Locke's theory of knowledge to our knowledge of right and wrong, although he rejected Locke's own conclusion that the moral judgement is the work of reason. Hutcheson accepted Locke's view that all reason can do is compare ideas and deduce conclusions from premises, and showed that these powers are not sufficient to account for our moral judgements. For him moral good and evil are 'simple ideas' and are therefore perceived in acts and dispositions by a special inner sense. Right and wrong are seen as impressions from particular actions. Reasoning or intellect seems to raise no new species of ideas, but to discover or discern the relation of those received.²

Hutcheson's writings exerted a considerable influence on British philosophical thought during the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries. This influence is particularly noticeable in the philosophical works of David Hume, who was a close friend of Hutcheson's. For it was through Hutcheson that Hume learned that moral judgements cannot be justified on the grounds of reason alone, a position that Hume was to make the basis of his theory. Further, it is in Hutcheson's work that we first find a clear statement of the principle of the "greatest happiness" which, in the hands of Hume and the Benthamites was to provide the basis for utilitarianism. Although Hutcheson's ideas certainly contributed to the development of the utilitarian doctrine, his name does not appear in the writings of Bentham.³ This is most surprising, considering that Bentham, in formulating his utility calculus, employs a terminology that is almost identical to that used by Hutcheson. One might perhaps explain this on the grounds that Hutcheson's influence was indirect, in the sense that Bentham borrowed terms from Hume and other philosophers he mentions who before had adopted them from Hutcheson. For example the phrase "the greatest happiness for the greatest numbers", by which Bentham's theory is commonly identified, may very well have been taken directly from Hutcheson's *Inquiry*, or indirectly through another philosopher.

This paper will examine the utilitarian perspective in Hutcheson's ethical theory and explore the extent to which his views correspond with or diverge from what has become known as the traditional utilitarian position. It will illustrate where scholars have read into his work inferences relating to the

utilitarian viewpoint that on close examination cannot be sustained. In this context Hutcheson's analysis of the concept of rights will be considered. The paper will conclude that, notwithstanding Hutcheson's contribution to the founding of utilitarianism, he cannot be classified as belonging to the utilitarian tradition without many qualifications.

Morality, Utility and the General Good

The basic elements of the utilitarian philosophy have been known and woven into ethical theories since the ancient times, but utilitarianism as a distinct school of philosophy was first put forward in a thorough-going manner by Jeremy Bentham and was developed further by John Stuart Mill. The utilitarian doctrine proceeds from the idea that pleasure and the absence of pain are the only things which are desirable as ends. Of course there are other things which are desirable, such as virtue or beauty, but only as a means to happiness; and when they do lead to happiness they also become, in some mysterious way, part of the end. According to Bentham happiness can be measured by reference to the "intensity" and "duration" of pleasure and pain. And pleasure and pain are nothing but aspects of a person's conscious experience when her needs, wants or interests are satisfied or frustrated. From this viewpoint human welfare is interpreted as a balance of pleasure over pain. According to utilitarians, for each alternative course of action it is possible to measure all the amounts of pleasure which that action produces for different persons and to add these up. By the same token, it is assumed that it is possible to measure and then add up all the amounts of pain that an action produces. In this respect the right action is the action which would result in the greatest positive or the least negative balance of pleasure over pain. By contrast with Bentham, Mill and other later utilitarians sought to develop a theory based on a more "objective" conception of human happiness, by drawing a distinction between higher, and therefore more permanent, and lower desires or preferences. Thus, although Mill regards pleasure as a necessary condition for goodness, he speaks of goodness as being dependent upon qualities of experience other than pleasantness and unpleasantness. Despite their differences, utilitarians agree that it is the production of happiness that provides the ultimate criterion of the morality of actions. The principle of utility -- the greatest happiness for the greatest numbers -- is proposed as the standard by which actions, decisions and institutions are to

be evaluated. Thus consequentialism constitutes an essential feature of the utilitarian approach, for whether actions are to be seen as right or wrong depends on their consequences -- right actions tend to produce happiness, wrong ones tend to the reverse.

As the utilitarian philosophy had not been formulated in Hutcheson's time, we cannot find in his writings a distinct theory which we could classify as "utilitarian". Hutcheson's main concern was to refute Hobbes and the egoists by developing his theory of the "moral sense", and any ideas which he introduces and which may be called utilitarian, should be read in the context of and as providing support for this theory. As was indicated before, in Hutcheson's writings we find a great deal of the phraseology now associated with classical utilitarianism. Probably the most striking example of this is his use of the phrase "that action is best, which produces the greatest happiness for the greatest numbers", a phrase which later became the hallmark of the utilitarian philosophy. He says :

"In comparing the moral quality of Actions, in order to regulate our Election among various Actions propos'd, or to find which of them has the greatest moral Excellency, we are led by our moral Sense of Virtue thus to judge, that in equal Degrees of Happiness, expected to proceed from the Action, the Virtue is in proportion to the Number of Persons to whom the Happiness shall extend: and here the Dignity, or moral Importance of Persons may compensate numbers; and in equal Numbers, the Virtue is as the Quantity of the Happiness, or natural Good; or that the Virtue is in a compound Ratio of the Quantity of Good and Number of Enjoyers: And in the same manner, the moral Evil, or Vice, is as the Degree of Misery, and Number of Sufferers; so that, that Action is best, which accomplishes the greatest Happiness for the greatest Numbers; and that worst, which, in like manner, occasions Misery."⁴

This statement is seen as utilitarian in its basis, as it appears to make happiness the criterion of virtue and at the same time draws attention to the importance of extending happiness to as many people as possible. Bentham appears to agree with Hutcheson that the spread of happiness is important, but rejects his idea that the dignity or moral importance of the individuals concerned may compensate for numbers -- an indication of the prevalence of the idea that all men are equal in Bentham's time.

In the next paragraph Hutcheson deals with the question of how actions entailing both pleasurable and painful consequences are to be assessed in characteristically utilitarian terms:

“Again, when the Consequences of Actions are of a mix'd Nature, partly Advantageous, and partly Pernicious, that Action is good, whose good Effects preponderate the evil, by being useful to many, and pernicious to few; and that, evil, which is otherwise. Here also the moral Importance of Characters, or Dignity of Persons may compensate Numbers; as may also the Degrees of Happiness or Misery: for to produce an inconsiderable Good to many, but an immense Evil to few, may be Evil; and an immense Good to few, may preponderate a small Evil to many.”⁵

For Bentham happiness can be measured by considering, among other things, the intensity and duration of pleasure. Although Hutcheson does not use the same terms, his use of the words “immense”, “inconsiderable”, “small” in reference to good or evil suggests a similar approach.

Despite their apparent similarities, however, Hutcheson's calculus is fundamentally different from that of Bentham. Bentham was primarily concerned with measuring the happiness resulting from different situations. Hutcheson, on the other hand, was concerned with determining the amount of benevolence exhibited by the agent whose actions were considered. And benevolence, which together with self-love constitute the two basic forms of human motivation, is the quality of human nature that provides the basis of moral judgement. On the other hand, terms such as “benevolence” and “self-love” are not found in Bentham's scheme, for these pertain to the motives involved and not to the actual results produced.

For Hutcheson “the greatest happiness for the greatest numbers” principle is part of his theory of the moral sense which, he says, approves of actions conducive to this. Bentham and Mill, on the other hand, speak of pleasure and the absence of pain as the only things desirable as ends, all other things being desirable only as means. The utilitarians maintain that it is possible for us to distinguish a right action, i.e. an action which tends to produce the greatest amount of happiness, from a wrong one, i.e., an action which tends to the opposite. But they are not concerned with explicating the process by which we distinguish between the two. Hutcheson, by contrast, offers an elaborate theory

*of how this distinction becomes possible based upon his conception of an inner sense by which virtue is apprehended and found pleasurable in itself.⁶ He points out that:

“The Pleasure in our Sensible Perceptions of any kind, gives us our first Idea of natural Good, or Happiness; and then all Objects which are apt to excite this Pleasure are called immediately Good. Those Objects which may procure others immediately pleasant, are called Advantageous; and we pursue both Kinds from a View of Interest, or from Self-Love.”⁷

Our desire for pleasure springs from pleasurable experience and our moral sense, our faculty for detecting moral properties, calls that which gives us pleasure “good”. So far Hutcheson’s doctrine is similar to that of the egoistic psychological hedonists, for it involves little more than a factual statement of the way in which people act. But, in delineating the aims of his inquiry, he refers to the possibility of discovering an entirely different principle of action from self-love or desire of private good. This principle of benevolence, as he calls it, is closely connected with the moral sense, in that it excites in us the approval of itself when we observe it in other people. In Hutcheson’s words:

“By a Superior Sense, which I call a moral one, we perceive pleasure, in the contemplation of such [i.e. good] actions in others, and are determined to love the agent (and much more do we perceive pleasure in being conscious of having done such actions ourselves) without any view of further natural advantage from them. [W]hat excites us to these actions, which we call virtuous, is not an intention to obtain even this sensible pleasure, much less the future rewards from Sanctions of laws or any other natural good which may be the consequence of the virtuous action, but an entirely different principle of action from self-love.”⁸

Further, the object of the moral sense is not so much actions as such but the character reflected in them - “the love, humanity, gratitude, compassion, a study of the good of others and a deep delight in their happiness.”⁹ This Hutcheson calls the Benevolent character, and it is really this that gives the perception of pleasure, since, in his own words, “the most useful action imaginable loses all appearance of Benevolence as soon as we discern that it only flowed from Self-Love or Interest.”¹⁰ In explaining the extent and scope of benevolence he points out that:

“We may see what actions our moral Sense would most recommend to our Election as the most perfectly Virtuous, viz. such as appear to have the most universal unlimited Tendency to the greatest and most extensive Happiness of all the rational Agents to whom our Influence can extend.”¹¹

Hutcheson's theory focuses upon the ideas of benevolence and self-love, rather than happiness as such, as for him what matters most is not the “materially good”, i.e. that which “tends to the interest of the system...whatever were the affections of the agent”,¹² but the “formally good”. According to him “an action is formally good, when it flows from good affections in a just proportion”.¹³ Self-love brings together particular affections as pertinent to pleasure and pleasure only, what Hutcheson calls the *natural good*. By contrast, benevolence has to do with the moral good, which pertains not to individual pleasure but to the happiness of the whole. This brings in the distinction between the material or objective goodness and the formal goodness of an action -- a distinction that lies at the centre of Hutcheson's theory.

The material goodness of an action is determined by the fact that it actually causes the “greatest happiness for the greatest numbers”. The formal goodness of an action, on the other hand, springs from good affection in a just proportion, and the moral sense provides the guide and often our motive to formal goodness. The moral sense leads to benevolent actions which he regards as entirely disinterested in motive. In his words: “If there is no moral Sense, which makes rational actions Appear Beautiful, or Deformed; if all Approbation be from the Interest of the approver, what's HECUBA to us, or we to HECUBA?”¹⁴ In rejecting egoistic hedonism Hutcheson puts forward the argument that our moral sense approves of benevolent actions in others even if they could not possibly have been to our advantage. For him happiness resulting from self-love is nothing but a sum of individual pleasures without any reference to the connection between the individual and the universe to which he belongs. By contrast, the happiness which benevolence leads is pertinent to the union of the system as a whole. By acting out of self-love alone the individual cannot reach perfection, since his relation to the system as whole is destroyed, while, by acting out of benevolence he realises his union with the system as a condition of his perfection.¹⁵

Hutcheson's view is that it is through reason that we discover the proper object of moral judgement. First we identify moral-looking conduct by calculating the consequences of the relevant action in terms of the greatest happiness principle. Then we attempt to reconstruct the motivation behind such conduct by drawing upon our own experience. Hutcheson's approach seems to be at odds with the utilitarian view that an action is morally right only because it leads to the maximization of happiness. For him, moral judgements represent something clearly distinct from the pleasures which moral conduct may entail for the agent as well as for the spectator. However, John Stuart Mill and others in the utilitarian tradition would appear to agree with Hutcheson in drawing distinction between higher and lower pleasures -- in drawing attention not only to the quantity but to the quality of the pleasurable experience. It is beyond the scope of this paper to consider the various arguments put forward in support of these views. What needs to be noted here is the acceptance by Mill of Hutcheson's idea that we approve of some pleasures more than others because they are of a higher quality and not simply because they are in themselves more pleasurable. But Mill does not go as far as to recognize, like Hutcheson does, that there are other things besides pleasure desirable as ends. Mill, like Bentham, continues to treat pleasure as a unitary concept capable of accounting for all objects and goals of human desire.

Hutcheson points out that "when we are ask'd the Reason of our Approbation of any Action, we perpetually allege its Usefulness to the Public and not to the Actor himself."¹⁶ He then goes on to suggest that actions which appear harmful only to ourselves do also affect general welfare "by making us incapable of performing the good Offices we could otherwise have done, and perhaps would have been inclin'd to do."¹⁷ This suggests that, although it does not always appear so, in the long run actions which tend to promote the general good are consonant with our own private interest. In Hutcheson's words, for a person "his constant pursuit of public good is the most probable way of promoting his own Happiness. ...Without knowledge of that Truth he does not act reasonably for his own Happiness, but follows it by Means not tending effectually to this End: and must frequently, from the Power of Self-Love, neglect or counteract his other End, the public Good."¹⁸ By doing actions motivated by the principle of benevolence, rather than by self-love, we also bring the greatest possible happiness to ourselves. Hutcheson attributes this to God who

has "made a connexion in the event at last between our gratifying our generous affections and our own highest interest."¹⁹

As was said before, for Hutcheson it is not the instinct of self-love that constitutes the source of virtue. Morally good actions stem, rather, from our instinct of benevolence. He points out that the two instincts -- benevolence and self-interest -- are capable of working together in harmony, and it is only our indulgence in our distorted desires that upsets the balance. It is in our nature that the perception of certain actions or events arouses in us distinctive feelings of pleasure and pain and these natural feelings, the basis of our moral sense, enable us to distinguish morally right from morally wrong actions. This view of ethics may lead to the conclusion that moral goodness is determined on a subjective basis and that the conception of the common good may vary with men's feelings. But Hutcheson has such a firm belief in the stability of the system, as it exists, and in man's role as pre-determined by God's wisdom, that he discounts the possibility of one's own interest being in conflict with the general good.

Hutcheson's Analysis of Rights

Hutcheson's account of rights should be considered in the light of his general theory of the moral sense -- as he points out, "From this Sense too we derive our Ideas of Rights."²⁰ He tells us that "Whenever it appears to us that a Faculty of doing, demanding, or possessing any thing, universally allow'd in certain Circumstances, would in the whole tend to the general Good, we say that any Person in such Circumstances has a Right to do, possess or demand that Thing. And according as this Tendency to the public Good is greater or less, the Right is greater or less."²¹ This statement provides another example of the trend towards the "greatest happiness principle" in Hutcheson's thought. Although Hutcheson would say that these rights are given to us by God, a view lying behind his overall theory, he takes it for granted that the common good is the aim at which all our rights are ultimately directed. His theory of rights proceeds from the assumption that with the principles of benevolence and self-love working together what is good for the individual cannot but be good for all.

Hutcheson draws a distinction between three types of rights. Firstly, "The Rights call'd perfect, are of such necessity to the public Good, that the universal Violation of them would make human Life intolerable, and in actually makes those miserable, whose Rights are thus violate: And on the contrary, to fulfil these Rights in every Instance tends to the public Good, either directly, or by promoting the innocent Advantage of a Part." From this it follows "That allowing a violent Defence, or Prosecution of such Rights, before Civil Government be constituted, cannot in any particular Case be more detrimental to the Public than the Violation of them with Impunity."²² In the category of perfect rights fall such primary rights as the right to life, the right to liberty and the right to the fruits of our labour. These perfect rights are such that "Society cannot subsist unless these rights are sacred. [And] No individual can be happy where such rights of his are promiscuously violated."²³ So vital are these rights for society that, if necessary, they can be maintained by the use of force. From this viewpoint, Hutcheson regards legal punishment as being dependent upon rights connected with the public good, a position commonly associated with the utilitarian theory of punishment.

Secondly, Hutcheson speaks of imperfect rights, which cannot be pursued by force for "a violent Prosecution of such Rights would generally occasion greater Evil than the Volation of them, Besides, the allowing of Force in such cases would deprive Men of the greatest Pleasure in actions of Kindness, Humanity, Gratitude; which would cease to appear amiable when Men could be constrain'd to perform them."²⁴ To the category of imperfect rights belong, for example, such things as gratitude to benefactors and charity to the poor. "The regarding and fulfilling them to everyone who has them is of great advantage and ornament to human life, and the violating or declining to fulfil them to others in many cases may be as criminal in the sight of God as the violation of perfect rights."²⁵ As this suggests, the exercise of these rights is left to the consciousness of the individual. However, by disregarding these rights, and individual shows himself to be devoid of benevolence. For Hutcheson, although one cannot be forced to exhibit benevolence, his neglect of the imperfect rights of others is a crime in the eyes of God. A person who is concerned only with his own happiness must be acting wrongly for his actions are not intended to produce the greatest possible amount of happiness for all. In Hutcheson's words, "He then who violates imperfect rights shows that his self-love overcomes only

the desire of positive good to others; but he who violates perfect rights betrays such a selfish desire of advancing his own positive good as overcomes all compassion towards the misery of others."²⁶ Hutcheson points out here that the pain caused by the violation of perfect rights is much worse morally than the prevention of pleasure that results from the violation of imperfect ones. On this point he appears to disagree with the utilitarian view that two actions would be equally evil if the amount of pain caused by the one is equal to the amount of pleasure prevented by the other. Further, according to Hutcheson, "[T]here can be no Opposition of perfect Rights among themselves, or imperfect among themselves, or between perfect and imperfect Rights. ...there can never be a Right to Force on both Sides, or a War on both Sides just at the same time."²⁷ This may be said to reflect the utilitarian position that of many possible courses of action, in pursuance of rights, there is one which will produce more happiness than any other.

Finally, Hutcheson identifies a third category of rights, which he calls "external". In defining these rights he says:

"As when the doing, possession, or demanding of any thing is really detrimental to the Public in any particular Instance, as being contrary to the imperfect Right of another: but yet the universal denying Men this Faculty of doing, possessing, or demanding that Thing, or using Force in pursuance of it, would do more mischief than all the Evils to be fear'd from the Use of this Faculty....Instances of external Rights are these; that of a wealthy Miser to recall his Loan from the most industrious poor Trademan at any time; that of demanding the Performance of a Covenant too burdensome on one side; the Right of a wealthy Heir to refuse Payment of any Debts which were contracted by him under Agem without Fraud in the Lender; the Right of taking advantage of a positive Law, contrary to what was Equity antecedent to that Law..."²⁸

Hutcheson appears to be saying here that external rights arising, for example, from contracts cannot be denied, although in some circumstances they may be outweighed by imperfect rights when the principle of benevolence is given priority.

In the section that follows his analysis of rights Hutcheson proceeds to apply his calculus -- "the general canon laid down above for comparing the degrees of virtue and vice in actions" -- to his theory of rights. In doing so he

puts forward fifteen axioms. The first eight, dealing with benevolence, self-interest and the foreseen or unforeseen consequences of action, are only indirectly connected with the issue of rights. According to the ninth axiom, "In general, the fulfilling the perfect Rights of others has little Virtue in it; for thereby no Moment of Good is produc'd more than was before; and the Interest engaging to the Action is very great, even the avoiding all the Evils of War in a State of Nature."²⁹ However, when perfect rights are violated the resulting evil is great, and the same may be said of the external rights with few exceptions. By contrast, "The truest Matter of Praise are those Actions or Offices which others claim from us by an imperfect Right; and generally, the stronger their Right is, there is the less Virtue in fulfilling it, but the greater Vice in violating it."³⁰ Hutcheson tells us here that where a person has a very strong claim on us there is not as much virtue in our meeting this claim as there would be if the claim was weak and we carried out what was required of us prompted by the principle of benevolence. Here, again, the emphasis is on the motive from which an action springs rather than its consequences. This point is explained further in the twelfth axiom: "In equal Moments of Good produc'd by two Agents, when one acts from general Benevolence, and the other from a nearer Tie; there is greater Virtue in the Agent who produces equal Good from the weaker Attachment, and less Virtue, where there is the stronger Attachment, which yet produces no more."³¹ The general benevolence always appears of itself a more amiable principle according to the constitution of our moral sense. From this viewpoint rights are divided into three main categories within which they are graded. In his words:

"There is plainly a gradation from the weakest claim of humanity, to the highest perfect right, by innumerable steps.... In general rights are the more sacred the greater their importance is to the public good, the greater the evils are which ensue upon violating them, the less the trouble or expense is of observing them, the greater the merit or causes of love are in the persons who have them. And the stronger the claim is, so much the greater is the crime of opposing it; and the smaller is the degree of virtue in complying with it."³²

In this passage is reflected the utilitarian view that the strongest rights are those which tend to the greatest public good. Hutcheson denies that there can be such a thing as a conflict of duties, as "the more important office is our present

duty, and the omission of the less important inconsistent office at present, is no moral evil.”³³

According to Hutcheson, peace in society depends upon our observance of the obligations associated with the primary and secondary rights. Although certain rights were recognized even in a “state of nature”, many more arose as a direct result of the formation of the “civil society”. Thus, with regard to the rights of property, Hutcheson tells us that “probably nine tenths, at least, of the things which are useful to mankind are owing to their labour and industry; and consequently, when once men became so numerous, that the natural product of the earth is not sufficient for their support, or ease, or innocent pleasure, a necessity arises, for the support of the increasing system, that such a tenor of conduct be observ’d, as shall most effectually promote industry; and that men abstain from all actions which would have the contrary effect.”³⁴ With regard to rights Hutcheson suggests that “self-love is really as necessary to the good of the whole, as benevolence”³⁵ for the actions which these motives result in tend to promote the good of the whole. Rights are conducive to general welfare as they are the best means of promoting the greatest good for the greatest numbers.

Concluding Note

In Hutcheson’s theory morality is viewed not simply a matter of maximizing happiness, but of doing so consciously and intentionally. In other words, it is one’s acting with such maximization as his governing motive that marks out the morally right action. What distinguishes Hutcheson’s moral theory from the traditional utilitarian approach is its viewing the maximization of general happiness as a consequence of a benevolent motivation of the agent. From this viewpoint, it is the motivation to moral conduct that should constitute the ultimate aim of our individual and collective efforts, especially our political and legal institutions. For Hutcheson, political society should be concerned, primarily, with the moral improvement of its members, through the inculcation of virtue or benevolent motivation, and not simply with the maximization of happiness. His conception of rights and duties hinges upon a collective view of mankind and the common good, which is linked with the individualistic morality of the inner moral sense by means of Hutcheson’s natural theology. It is in this context that

the utilitarian element in Hutcheson's philosophy should be read and understood.

NOTES

1. *System*, Book 1, Chap. 1, p.1.
2. *Illustrations Upon the Moral Sense*, Sect. 1.
3. By contrast, the names of Locke, Hume, Montesquieu, Beccaria and other are often mentioned by Bentham.
4. *Inquiry*, Sect. 3., p.p. 163-164.
5. *Ibid*, Sect. 3, p. 164.
6. Section 1 of the *Inquiry* is entitled "Of the Moral Sense by which we perceive Virtue and Vice, and approve or disapprove of them in others". (p.107)
7. *Inquiry*, Introduction, p. 103.
8. *Ibid.*, p.106.
9. *Ibid.*, Sect. 1. pp. 110-111.
10. *Ibid.*, Sect. 2, p. 129.
11. *Inquiry*, Sect. 3. p.165.
12. *System*, Book 2, Chap. 3, p. 252.
13. *Ibid.*
14. *Ibid.*, Sect. 1, p. 111-112.
15. See *Essay on the Passions*, pp. 200-203.
16. *Ibid.*, Sect.4, p.179.
17. *Ibid.*, p. 180.
18. *Illustrations upon the Moral Sense*, Sect. 1, p.225.
19. *System*, Book 1, chap. 4, p. 75.
20. *Inquiry*, Sect. 7, p. 256.
21. *Ibid.*
22. *Inquiry*, Section 7, pp. 256-257.
23. *System*, Book 2, Chap. 3, pp. 257-258.

24. *Inquiry*, Sect. 7, p. 258.
25. *System*, Book 2, Chap. 3, p. 258.
26. *Inquiry*, Sect. 7, pp. 259.
27. *Ibid*, Sect. 7, pp. 260-261.
28. *Inquiry*, Sect. 7, pp. 259-260.
29. *Ibid.*, Sect., 7, pp. 268-269.
30. *Ibid.*, Sect., 7, pp. 269.
31. *Ibid.*, Sect., 7, pp. 269-270.
32. *System*, Book 2, Chap. 3, pp. 262-263.
33. *Inquiry*, Sect. 7, p. 294.
34. *Inquiry*, Sect. 7, p. 284.
35. *Inquiry*, Sect. 7, p. 285.

BIBLIOGRAPHY

- Albee, Ernest *A History of English Utilitarianism*, London (1901).
- Blackstone, William *Francis Hutcheson and Contemporary Ethical Theory*, Athens, Ga. (1965).
- Campbell, R.D. "Francis Hutcheson: 'Father' of the Scottish Enlightenment", in R.H.Campbell and A.S. Skinner (eds), *The Origins and Nature of the Scottish Enlightenment*, Edinburgh (1982).
- Haakonssen, Kund "Natural Law and Moral Realism: The Scottish Synthesis" in M.A. Stewart (ed.) *Studies in the Philosophy of the Scottish Enlightenment*, Oxford (1990).
- Hutcheson, Francis *An Inquiry into the Original of our Ideas of Beauty and Virtue*, London (1725), Third Edition (1729).
- Hutcheson, Francis *An Essay on the Nature and Conduct of the Passions and Affections*, London (1728), Third Edition (1749).

- Hutcheson, Francis *A Short Introduction to Moral Philosophy*, Glasgow (1747).
- Hutcheson, Francis *A System of Moral Philosophy*, London (1755).
- Jensen, H. *Motivation and the Moral Sense in Francis Hutcheson's Ethical Theory*, The Hague (1971).
- Mill, John S. *Utilitarianism*, London (1947).
- Raphael, D. D. *The Moral Sense*, London (1947).
- Scott, William R. *Francis Hutcheson*, Cambridge (1900), reprinted (1966).
- Sidgwick, Henry *Outlines of the History of Ethics*, London (1949).