

Continuity in Leibniz and Deleuze: A Reading of *Difference and Repetition* and *The Fold*

Hamed Movahedi University of McGill

Abstract

The status of continuity in Deleuze's metaphysics is a subject of debate. Deleuze calls the virtual, in *Difference and Repetition*, an *Ideal continuum*, and the differential relations that constitute the Ideal imply the *continuity* of this field. But, Deleuze does not hesitate to formulate the same field by the affirmation of divergence (impossibility) that can be regarded as a form of *discontinuity*. It is, hence, unclear how these two ostensibly contradictory accounts might reconcile. This article attempts to reconstitute a Deleuzian theory of continuity through Leibniz whose philosophy is equally subject to a tension between the law of continuity, prevalent in his mathematics and metaphysics, and the discontinuity or absolute individuality of monads. By reorienting *The Fold* around the motif of continuity a new conceptual space is opened for continuity qua heterogeneity-*and*-inseparability. Then, enfolding the conceptual personae of *The Fold* onto *Difference and Repetition* reveals the tacit though decisive presence of different types of continuity operational in Deleuze's metaphysics that will be called divergent, intensive, torsional, and tenorsional continuities.

Keywords Continuity . Leibniz . Deleuze . heterogeneity-*and*-inseparability . divergent continuity . intensive continuity . torsional continuity . tenorsional continuity

1 Introduction

In *The Fold*, Deleuze isolates and magnifies Leibniz's scarce characterization of continuity by the *fold*, and then decenters, reorients, and reconstructs Leibniz's whole philosophy putting the fold center-stage. Leibniz's metaphysics is permeated with the persistent theme of continuity; continuity of cases, continuity of changes, continuity of the infinite worlds expressed in every individual (soul), continuity in the laws of nature, continuity of existents, continuity of concepts, and even the continuity between conscious and unconscious perception. (Jorgensen 2019) Deleuze espouses Leibniz's idea of the fold as it enables him to depict the continuous status of the world and, simultaneously, its irreducible individuals. Indeed, continuity confronts a peculiar tension, both in Leibniz and Deleuze. Leibniz, alongside continuity, is also the theoretician of the monads which imply the absolute interiority,

closure, and discontinuity. This tension between continuity and discontinuity is evident in Leibniz. But, what is less explicit, is that Deleuze is also fastened in a comparable tension when he conceptualizes a neo-Leibnizian (virtual) world constituted by the folds and characterized by continuity, and simultaneously describes it by the affirmation of divergence or impossibility, which can be construed as discontinuity. Thus, there is a *metaphysical tension* between continuity and discontinuity, which is operational in both thinkers, albeit in different manners. This research attempts to think this tension without any intention to eradicate it. It undertakes Deleuze's account of the *virtual field*, which is sometimes formulated as an Ideal *continuum*, characterized by differential relations and calculus, and sometimes described by the affirmation of divergent or *discontinuous* series. This problem will orient the movement of this research. It will be illustrated that this very paradox tends to impose itself as a decisive structural moment of many Deleuzian gestures.

For Leibniz, the problem of continuity has been ostensibly requisite for the establishment of a solid metaphysics. He explicitly announces, “no one will arrive at a truly solid metaphysics who has not passed through that labyrinth [of the continuum]” (GM VII, 326) Even Leibniz's *Monadology* is considered as a result of his earlier engagement with the problem of continuity.¹ Now the question is, whether continuity qua fold maintains a comparable status in Deleuze's metaphysics; whether the operative function of fold-continuity is also integral to the architecture of *Difference and Repetition*; and how this book would be deformed or reconfigured when viewed through the lens of *The Fold* and a reconstructed notion of continuity. Although interrogating the role of continuity in Deleuze's thought seems to be essential to illuminate his conceptual edifice, this problem is not addressed adequately in the literature, except in the works of Brent Adkins and James Williams.

Adkins and Williams consider continuity as the cornerstone of Deleuze's philosophy, whereas Arjen Kleinherenbrink regards Deleuze as a philosopher of discontinuity. In *Against Continuity*, Kleinherenbrink writes, “This book argues that the beating heart of Gilles Deleuze's philosophy is an ontology of individual and irreducible entities, and of discontinuity between such entities.” (Kleinherenbrink 2019, x) Assuming the individuality and irreducibility of entities, Kleinherenbrink suggests that Deleuze's philosophy gestures against continuity. However, Deleuze's reading of Leibniz shows that there can be a more nuanced and complicated relationship between individuality and continuity, wherein individuality is not against continuity but inseparable from it. *Against continuity*

¹ Bertrand Russell writes: “Leibniz professes to deduce the existence and nature of monads largely from the need of explaining the continuum.” (Russell 2008, 108)

suffers from employing extensively the notions of continuity and discontinuity without articulating or reconstructing them as philosophical concepts. For instance, there is neither an engagement with the development of these concepts in the history of philosophy (or mathematics), nor are these concepts extracted or reinvented according to Deleuze's thought. Instead, it seems a common sense or an empirical understanding of continuity and discontinuity is assumed, and then Deleuze's metaphysics is judged based on these inadequate concepts.

By contrast, Williams suggests that continuity has ontological primacy for Deleuze. In *The Transversal Thought of Gilles Deleuze*, Williams offers a comparative analysis of Deleuze and Bachelard in terms of continuity. He shows that their point of divergence lies in the different ontological status that they accord to continuity and discontinuity. Williams argues that, for Deleuze, this ontological priority is attributed to continuity: "For Deleuze, continuity is prior from the point of view of evolution, change, creation and relations to the future. This is because a form of ideal continuity is the condition for the transgression of actual discontinuous boundaries, in individuals, species, persons, subjects. For Bachelard, it is exactly the opposite." (Williams 2005, 55) Williams draws attention to Deleuze's account of Ideal and intensive fields, in *Difference and Repetition*, and notes, "there is no possibility of discontinuity between intensities and between Ideas; such breaks only appear when they are actually expressed." (Williams 2005, 65) Therefore, Williams stresses, intensities and Ideas, which serve as "transcendental conditions" for actual things and their variations, "cannot be finally separated from one another." (Williams 2005, 65)

Adkins also shares a common view regarding the status of continuity in Deleuze. In *Deleuze and Guattari's A Thousand Plateaus*, Adkins claims that if he had "to describe Deleuze's metaphysics in a single word it would be 'continuity.'" (Adkins 2015, 1) This proposal is provocative and striking since continuity is hardly seen as one of the so-called Deleuzian concepts (like difference, event, multiplicity, assemblage, ...). Deleuze does not draw heavily on continuity and does not offer a full-fledged articulation of this concept; hence, framing this notion as a single term capable of epitomizing Deleuze's metaphysics is all but obvious. Adkins justifies his claim by drawing attention to a dominant trend in Western metaphysics and showing that this philosophical tradition has been driven by the idea of *discontinuity*. He frames this discontinuity in terms of the Platonic distinction between the orders of the "sensible" and "intelligible" which has organized Western thought. Adkins notes, to establish a relation between these two discontinuous and "ontologically distinct" domains an appeal to a kind of hylomorphism (a relation of form and content between the intelligible and sensible) along with a

doctrine of analogy and resemblance has been always necessary. (Adkins 2015, 2) However, Deleuze who aims to avoid this metaphysical discontinuity and its associated hylomorphism refuses the discontinuity of the sensible and the intelligible and, instead, affirms their metaphysical *continuity*, which entails hylozoism. (Adkins 2015, 2) Adkins draws the traces of his thesis of continuity in Deleuze's corpus. In *Difference and Repetition*, this idea is tied to Deleuze's engagement with the metaphysics of differential calculus. In *Logic of Sense*, the event is "structured as a continuum" and in *Anti-Oedipus*, continuity is pronounced in the concept of "desiring-production." (Adkins 2015, 9) Finally, in *A Thousand Plateaus*, the paradox of stability and change is addressed in the continuum of "assemblage." (Adkins 2015, 10)

William's and Adkin's view of continuity, as a pivotal Deleuzian concept, is a significant insight into Deleuze's metaphysics, and one that deserves further development. Indeed, a thorough study of the nature of Deleuzian continuity seems essential. Besides affirming the continuous nature of things in Deleuze's ontology, we also need to explicate the nature of continuity itself. This recalls Deleuze's remark about difference. He noted that we usually determine the "differences of nature between things," but we need to account for the "nature of difference" itself. (DI, 32) Arguably, a similar move with respect to continuity is required. This research is devoted to this task and canvasses the nature of continuity, by restoring a Deleuzian theory of continuity and stressing its vital role in his philosophy. It will disclose, taking Leibniz's intuition seriously, that perhaps we will not have a solid metaphysics without passing through the labyrinth of the continuum.

2 Continuity and *The Fold*

In *The Fold*, the Baroque world is composed of two floors: material and spiritual folds that go to infinity in two levels. Deleuze lays out an allegory to depict the conceptual image of this world. The Baroque house with two floors: The first floor with material folds, the second floor with spiritual folds, and the third fold that enfolds the second floor onto the first. A close analysis of *The Fold* shows that these three folds can be appropriated to formulate a concept of continuity with three moments.

The first fold is that of matter, and the first moment of continuity that it portrays is an essential *inseparability*. The cartography of Leibniz's material fold discloses that the labyrinth of the continuum is not fabricated by any discontinuous "separable minima," neither indivisible atoms nor non-extended points, but rather the infinite series of inseparable folds. (LP, 8–9) This is also sketched in the passage

from the sharp contours of the Renaissance paintings to the blurred borders of the Baroque, where the transitions between flowing forms are indistinguishable, where the light and darkness are interlaced in a continuum. These intertwined objects, which cannot be easily severed from their surroundings, reflect Leibniz's world of matter, which is also constituted by an incessant intrusion and penetration; an absolute openness in a material continuum where every body is connected to all bodies in the world and is characterized by this connection.² Here, the folded entities are really distinct yet inseparable. However, for Leibniz, this folded structure is not limited to non-organic matter but is also present in the labyrinth of organic bodies and *machines of nature*, where the envelopes of other organic bodies proliferate to infinity. (L, 589) According to the first fold, continuity has a folded structure and is endowed with inseparability and indiscernibility.

The second fold with which the second floor of the Baroque house is draped reveals the second moment of continuity: *heterogeneity*. In the second floor, the Leibnizian world, which is conceptualized through a topological passage from inflection to inclusion in point of view (center of inflection), or a logical passage from predicates-events to the complete notion of the individual, has the status of a folded virtuality that is essentially implicated or expressed in the soul as its expressor. This world qua series of events is governed by compossibility and impossibility (rather than identity and contradiction), which serves as "the rule of world synthesis." (LS, 111) In Deleuze's metaphysics, the impossible or divergent worlds turn into an object of *affirmation*, "affirmed *through* their difference." (LS, 172) Thus, the second floor holds the moment of heterogeneity; divergence of the worlds, that while being affirmed, opens a heterogeneous continuity. Moreover, the second floor points to the moment of heterogeneity, since the virtual world is folded or included in the actual soul/monad; this folding is heterogeneous as it implicates two distinct orders.

The third moment of continuity dovetails the third fold, the fold between two floors, a fold between two folds, *Zwiefalt*, fold-of-two. (LP, 6) The third fold, serving as a differentiator of difference, characterizes the moment of *and*, connecting the moment of heterogeneity to inseparability. This moment is foregrounded in the third fold, whereby the second floor is enfolded onto the first, where the heterogeneous registers of matter and soul exhibit an uncanny inseparability and resonance. They resonate "like a musical salon that translates the visible movements of the lower level into sounds [in

² "In a plenum, every motion has some effect on distant bodies;" consequently, each body "feels the effects of everything that happens to them," and this communication "extends to any distance whatsoever," then, "every body is affected by everything that happens in the universe." (AG, 221)

the upper level].” (LP, 6) The inseparability of the two floors is illustrated in Deleuze’s discussion of the *actualization* of the world in the souls and its *realization* in the bodies, which discloses the co-dependence of these domains despite their disparity. The third moment adds a nuance to the notion of continuity, showing that heterogeneity is inseparable from the moment of inseparability. Continuity is a peculiar zone, wherein the heterogeneous domains become inseparable and indiscernible, such that they cannot exist without one another. Consequently, the three folds of Baroque architecture portray the three moments of continuity: heterogeneity-*and*-inseparability. Continuity is a problematic-paradoxical zone, a non-relation or non-location that enables a profound entanglement of two disparate and irreconcilable orders, which plunge into one another, like a Baroque image, without ceding their divergence; what folds the soul in matter, the virtual Idea in intensity, the expressed in the expressor, or language in the bodies.

Continuity is a zone of indiscernibility, in which it is indistinguishable “*where the sensible ends and the intelligible begins,*” (LP, 88–9) a Baroque zone of blurred contours, with a structural “encroachment” (*empiètement*) (LP, 134) and intrusion of the distinct regimes that makes the borders indiscernible. But, the peculiarity of this zone is that despite its profound inseparability and indiscernibility, retains the divergence or heterogeneity of folded orders which pertain to “entirely different regimes,” regimes of expression and impression, vertical immanent causality and transitive horizontal causality, final causes and efficient causes. (LP, 134) It animates the indiscernibility of boundaries without making its constituents homogenous or convergent. Hence, continuity turns into a com-*plicated* concept, also operational in *Difference and Repetition*; a zone of indiscernibility, wherein the borders perish between the Idea and intensity, virtual and actual, expressed and expression. This zone of continuity is heterogeneous, a disjunctive synthesis that does not compromise the heterogeneity of its terms. Continuity oddly makes the heterogeneities indiscernible without correcting, curing, suppressing, alienating, or alleviating their bifurcation. Besides, it retains this irrevocable divergence without erecting two worlds (eschewing transcendence); the disparate regimes are the two floors of the same world. Continuity refers to the univocity of being and immanence, a coincidence of difference-*and*-repetition.

Interestingly, Daniel W. Smith describes Deleuze’s treatment of the history of philosophy through a zone of indiscernibility. He notes, while reading Deleuze’s monographs on Spinoza, Kant, Bergson, Nietzsche, or Leibniz, “one has the distinct impression of entering a ‘zone’ in which Deleuze’s own project and that of the author at hand seem to become indiscernible. They constitute what Deleuze

himself calls a ‘zone of indiscernibility:’ on the one hand, there is a becoming-Deleuze of the thinker at hand, as it were; and on the other hand, there is a kind of becoming-Spinoza on Deleuze’s part, for instance, or a becoming-Leibniz, [...]. This is what Bakhtin called a ‘free indirect style’ of writing, which ‘testifies to a system which is always heterogeneous [...]. (MI, 73)’” (Smith 2012, 20) This zone of indiscernibility is a continuum, where two distinct series (Deleuze and Leibniz) meet; where a becoming-Leibniz of Deleuze and a becoming-Deleuze of Leibniz become indiscernible without slipping into an identity. Smith develops this zone also in “Sense and Literality:” “In a becoming, [...] each term encounters the other, and the becoming is something that passes between the two, outside the two.” (Smith 2019, 60) This *in-between* or *outside* is a zone of continuity; what passes here is found in none of the series, but solely in the evanescent betweenness of continuity (or *durée*) as the locus of becoming.

In *The Fold*, every individual *is* insofar as it expresses a world. And, the world is constituted by events, singularities, and inflections. Inflection is a virtual ideality, which is not in the world, but it is the World itself, the “site of cosmogenesis. (LP, 21) As Deleuze stresses, there is a passage from inflection to inclusion, which shows how inflection-events are enveloped in individuals. Inflection is determined in relation to its center and is included or enveloped in the center of inflection to which an individual/soul is attached. If we regard *Difference and Repetition* from the lens of *The Fold*, the passage from inflection to inclusion attests to the *inseparability* of the virtual Idea and intensive individual. The intensive soul is a center of inflection according to which the singularities of events and their inflections are distributed, a point of view on the virtual inflections of the event. The inflection-event evokes the fold twice. Event qua inflection is itself a continuous curve with its map of folding and unfolding, but this curve is also folded in another sense; it is folded in its center of inflection, like an angle (or an infinity of angles) folded in the center, as Leibniz maintained.³ Event is itself an inflection or fold (expressed) and is also folded in the center (expression). The first is the virtual folds of the curve of the world, and the second is the expression or torsion of this curve in a point of view. The virtual is folded inherently and is also folded in something else. This amounts to saying that the virtual is itself continuous while being continued in intensity, which is itself another continuity. The virtual is a *divergent* continuity that is continued *torsionally* in intensive continuity. Hence, the architectonic trait of two-floors-and-three-folds, in *The Fold*, is also staged in *Difference and Repetition*. As Deleuze discovers

³ “in a *center* or point, though entirely simple, we find an infinity of angles formed by the lines that meet there.” (G VI 598/AG, 207)

the proliferation of the fold in Leibniz's Baroque philosophy, one might elicit a multiplication of continuity in Deleuze's metaphysics.

2.1 Metaphysical Tension and Torsion of Expression

One of the important themes that Deleuze develops in *The Fold* is Leibniz's *metaphysical tension*. Leibniz, on the one hand, asserts the non-existence of the world outside the soul, which implies the antecedence of the individual/subject and, on the other hand, affirms the prior creation of the world (first the world is created, not Adam), which entails the antecedence of the world. This problematic simultaneous primacy of the subject and the world, in Leibniz, is reformulated by Deleuze: the world is in-the-subject while the subject is for-the-world. (LP, 35) This state of being for-the-world is also traceable in *Logic of Sense*, where the Stoic sage is *for-the-event* and the event *waits* for its subject: "Pure events ground language because they wait for it as much as they wait for us." (LS, 166) Indeed, for-the-world is for-actualizing the virtual world or event, like Bousquet's being for-the-event. God first creates the world, in which Adam sins. This is the *virtual primacy* of the Ideal event-world, which waits for the individual as it has no existence outside the individual with corporeal bodies that have *actual primacy*. There is a tension and torsion, ten(or)sion, between the world and subject, a "double antecedence." (LP, 69) The subject passes into existence *for* the world to be enveloped *in* the subject. Every individual exists by expressing or enveloping a world folded in it in a torsional way. This might be a way to construe Deleuze's ontology of sense (Being is sense). To be is to express; to express *something, aliquid*, and this something is always a world qua event-sense. Existing involves the tension of expression, a becoming-face. The face is *for* the expressed while the expressed is *in* the face, although it is not localizable in any of its elements, holding its insistent disparity and non-identity. They are continuous, *continere*, holding one another. Continuity is a peculiar domain where this problematic simultaneity, this *in-for*, is conditioned.

To describe Deleuze's treatment of double antecedence, a detour to his concept of expression would be instructive. In *The Fold*, Deleuze discusses the metaphysical *tension* and, in *Difference and Repetition*, he employs the term *torsion* to explain the internal structure of expression: "By 'expression' we mean, as always, that relation which involves a torsion between an expressor and an expressed such that the expressed does not exist apart from the expressor, even though the expressor relates to it as though to something completely different." (DR, 260) This formulation of expression can be regarded as a definition of continuity qua heterogeneity-*and*-inseparability. The expressed and expressor are heterogeneous, as they have distinct ontological states, the former being Ideal and the latter intensive.

In this quote, when Deleuze asserts that the expressor and expressed do “not exist apart from” one another, he is referring to the moment of inseparability, and when he notes they are “completely different,” he is foregrounding the moment of heterogeneity in continuity. The expressed is not the actual face of the Other, or reducible to it; it is not found in the actual movements, traces, shapes, and contractions of the expressing face, and does not resemble them. It is neither in the actual world nor in the actual face. It has a special status, not exhaustible in any of these actualities. Expression is a “torsion,” a *torsional continuity* between two heterogeneous yet inseparable fields, the expressed and expressor. The expressed has no other locus, it has to be embodied or enveloped in the expressor, without being melted in or reduced to it. This is the fundamental and paradoxical torsion of expression. The expressed, as Deleuze stresses, is heterogeneous with the expressor wherein it is enveloped: “By ‘possible’, therefore, we do not mean any resemblance but that state of the implicated or enveloped in its very heterogeneity with what envelops it.” (DR, 260) The expression can be characterized by the fold, as Deleuze here employs the “expression” and “implication” interchangeably. The folded and continuous state of expression evokes a fundamental heterogeneity-*and*-inseparability. Expression involves a torsional immanence-transcendence; it is an excess, never consumable or localizable in the expressor (transcendence); yet, it must be folded in the expressor, as it has no existence outside this relation of expression-implication, it must inhabit immanently in the intensive face. But it is not only the expressed that demands the expressor for its existence. An intensive face also, qua expressor, does not become a face if it does not fold the expressed in itself. This is, hence, a domain of continuity; where an impossible enfolding takes place between two divergent or discontinuous fields, where the Ideal expressed is continued torsionally in the intensive expressor, disclosing the inseparability or indiscernibility of borders—as it is not clear where the expressed ends and the expressor begins—, and simultaneously, heterogeneity of natures since their divergence is affirmed.

2.2 Reconcilability of Principles

Deleuze discusses the reconcilability of two seemingly conflicting principles in Leibniz: the principle of the identity of indiscernibles and the law of continuity. Leibniz’s principle of indiscernibles intimates the irreducible individuality of monads, whereas the law of continuity governs the world, expressed by the monad. In this context, continuity is the compossibility and *convergence* of the zones of expression for an infinity of monads, which is different from our formulation of continuity that involves divergence and heterogeneity. However, even exploring this convergent continuity is

enlightening. Leibniz's endorsement of continuity does not soak everything in a form of universal substance. He eschews this assimilated image of the world by advocating the irreducible individuality of its metaphysical unities or monads, and simultaneously regards continuity as the cornerstone of his metaphysics, hence, a tension between continuity and discontinuity. He enables an account of continuity that does not exclude individuality but is fundamentally intertwined with it. Continuity is a law that governs the curve of the world. Nevertheless, this inflection ruled by continuity necessitates the centers of inflection (according to which any inflection would be determined), governed by the principle of indiscernibles (DR, 47). The passage from inflection to inclusion is also a passage from continuity to individuality, and the continuity of the world is inseparable from the individuality of points of view. The monad can only establish its individuality by expressing a continuous (compossible, convergent) world. Hence, continuity (world) is inseparable from individuality (monads). They are not mutually exclusive (as suggested in *Against Continuity*), but are rather mutual conditions for one another; one pertaining to the *determination* of the world, and the other to the *individuation* of the soul.

Deleuze develops this reconcilability of the principle of indiscernibles and the law of continuity, however, he does not link it to his own discussion of the metaphysical tension. Establishing this conceptual link is instructive, and allows us to suggest that the metaphysical tension between the world and the subject is also a metaphysical tension between continuity and individuality. Accordingly, it might be suggested that the double antecedence of the world/subject can be translated to the double antecedence of continuity and individuality. Hence, repeating what Deleuze stresses about double antecedence, it can be said that the principles of continuity and indiscernibles are both primary at once. Continuity and discontinuity are first, though the former is virtually first and the latter intensively first. These principles are not only reconcilable but also metaphysically intertwined and interdependent. Continuity and individuality, inflection and the center of inflection, the world and monad/subject, are entangled as mutual genetic conditions for one another. What is governed by continuity and what is ruled by the identity of indiscernibles, *determination* of a world and *individuation* of a monad, establish a mutual genetic relationship. Hence, the irreducibility of individuals and the indiscernibility of continuity are not mutually exclusive but inseparable. As noted, continuity (world) is here convergent, which will be substituted by a *divergent* continuity, when the impossible worlds are affirmed. In that case, continuity and discontinuity would again establish a complicated relationship, and discontinuity (defined by divergence) would co-exist with continuity, like one of its

constitutive moments, the moment of heterogeneity. Nevertheless, referring to Deleuze's discussion of the reconciliation of the principles of indiscernibles and continuity shows that even a *convergent* continuity does not necessarily exclude individuality.

3 Continuity and Genesis in *Difference and Repetition*: Four Continuities

Continuity is a new zone wherein the heterogeneities are affirmed and coupled, a zone of the indiscernibility of heterogeneous orders. This continuity is omnipresent, in *Difference and Repetition*; in the Ideal and intensive fields and their co-implication. Continuity qua heterogeneity-*and*-inseparability, derived from *The Fold*, enables us to discover four types of continuity that are operational in *Difference and Repetition*. They can be called *divergent continuity*, *intensive continuity*, *torsional continuity*, and *ten(or)sioanl continuity*. Divergent continuity refers to the structure of Ideal domain. Intensive continuity characterizes intensity, torsional continuity is the torsion or folding of the virtual in intensity, and tenorsional continuity is the implication of the virtual in the actual.

Continuity is often conceived through convergence, which is also aligned with Deleuze's reading of Leibniz and the continuity, convergence, or compossibility of series that synthesize a world. Nevertheless, Deleuze's affirmation of divergence suggests that a new category can be introduced, although he does not do so; a new concept which is neither convergent continuity nor discontinuity. We can call this a *divergent continuity*. Affirmation of divergence is the opening of a new space, opening of a divergent continuity, which characterizes the Ideal field. In *Difference and Repetition*, Deleuze often reserves the term "divergence" to characterize the virtual field of problem-Ideas; accordingly, "divergent continuity" shall be allotted to address the continuity of this field. Divergent continuity is a (non)-relation among impossible series or worlds, which also refers to the problem-Idea and its inherent "alterity." (DR, 24) Moreover, continuity shall not be reduced to the extensive continuum. *Intensive continuity* is also a new conceptual and metaphysical space opened between extensive continuity and discontinuity. The field of individuation is an intensive continuum, equally characterized by heterogeneity-*and*-inseparability, insofar as it is defined by the coupling of heterogeneous series. Continuity, in its third sense, is the torsional foldedness and implication of the Ideal-virtual in the intensive, a *torsional continuity*, like the *expressive* torsion that weaves the virtual expressed into the intensive fabric of the expressor. The fourth continuity is the foldedness of the virtual in the actual,

the subsistence and repetition of the Ideal-problem in the solution, the implication of the expressed in actual expression, a *ten(or)sional continuity*. It shows that the actual solution is also a continuum, a tenorsional continuity that implicates and holds the virtual Idea in the actual. These are distinct continuities. But, the thread that traverses all these continuities is a folded structure and a heterogenetic entanglement between radically disparate domains: the co-implication of divergence *and* affirmation, heterogeneities *and* coupling, Ideal *and* intensive, virtual *and* actual. Hence, continuity is perhaps this problematic, albeit creative, *and* that transgresses the law of convergence, affirms impossibility, and enacts resonance.

3.1 Continuity and Multiplicity

There is a profound affinity between continuity and heterogeneity, which is also found in Bergson's concepts of duration and multiplicity. In *Bergsonism*, Deleuze notes, "Bergson has no difficulty in reconciling the two fundamental characteristics of duration; continuity and heterogeneity." (B, 37) Duration is "both heterogeneous *and* continuous." (B, 37) As Keith Alan Robinson stresses, the Bergsonian becoming or duration is framed as "pure mobility without a self-present underlying thing or substratum that supports the change;" duration is an "indivisible continuity," and "without discrete elements there is just the continuity of flow of becoming; *durée* is "a continuity that becomes *and* a continuity of becoming." (Robinson 2018, 200) *Durée* is characterized by a *continuity of becoming* and, this continuity does not prevent it from being heterogeneous. As Robinson puts forward, "if the continuity of becoming implies creativity, novelty and the new there must be qualitative or heterogeneous differences in the continuity." (Robinson 2018, 200) In this continuity of becoming, the "absence of divisibility" shall not be confounded with an "absence of difference;" "continuity and heterogeneity" might appear as contradictory only if we regards them "mathematically," "quantitatively," or according to a certain "logical principles." (Robinson 2018, 201) This explains Bergson's interest in the example of melody, because "continuity and heterogeneity of becoming are fused in the experience of the melody surviving in the past and emerging in the present." (Robinson 2018, 201)

In *Difference and Repetition*, Deleuze calls both the Idea and intensity *multiplicities* or *manifolds*.⁴ This allows us to extract and emphasize the continuity of Bergson's temporal (qualitative) multiplicities, and then

⁴ "Ideas are problematic or 'perplexed' virtual *multiplicities*, made up of relations between differential elements. Intensities are implicated *multiplicities*, 'implexes,' made up of relations between asymmetrical elements which direct the course of the actualization of Ideas [...]." (DR, 244, my emphasis)

regard the Idea and intensity *as* continuities. The Deleuzian notion of multiplicity is inspired by both Bergson and Riemann. In *Bergsonism*, he summarizes Bergson's two types of multiplicity:

One is represented by space [...]: It is a multiplicity of exteriority, of simultaneity, of juxtaposition, of order, of quantitative differentiation, of difference in degree; it is a numerical multiplicity, discontinuous and actual. The other type of multiplicity appears in pure duration: It is an internal multiplicity of succession, of fusion, of organization, of heterogeneity, of qualitative discrimination, or of difference in kind; it is a virtual and continuous multiplicity that cannot be reduced to numbers. (B, 38)

Time as duration contrary to the spatialized time is not homogenous: "duration [...] has no moments which are identical or external to one another, being essentially heterogeneous, continuous." (TFW, 120) For Bergson, space is homogenous and the "objects in space form a discrete multiplicity," (TFW, 120) whereas, duration is a qualitative multiplicity with "heterogeneous moments" that permeate each other, forming an "organic whole." (TFW, 128) "Duration, thus restored to its original purity, will appear as a wholly qualitative multiplicity, an absolute heterogeneity of elements which pass over into one another." (TFW, 229)

Deleuze relates Bergson's notion of multiplicity to Riemann's formulation of manifolds. The Riemannian space is characterized by the curvature tensor that measures the curvature of space at every point. Riemann's space is heterogeneous. As Duffy describes, "Euclidean space is therefore homogenous, whereas Riemannian space, by virtue of having a definite and potentially different curvature at any point, is on the contrary devoid of any kind of homogeneity." (Duffy 2013, 104) Riemann's space, in the infinitesimal level, tends to an Euclidean flat space, and the whole curved or heterogeneous space is constructed by a gradual accumulation of these local spaces in the infinitesimal neighborhood of every point. Albert Lautman considers Riemann's space "an amorphous collection of juxtaposed pieces that aren't attached to one another." (Lautman 2011, 98/Duffy 2014, 104) This echoes that the heterogeneity of Riemannian spaces lies in its assemblage of local spaces that tend to flat planes in infinity and give rise to continuous curved space. Widder describes this trait by noting that Riemann's space is "infinitesimally Euclidian" and "at a larger scale [...] non-Euclidean." (Widder 2019, 9) Duffy explains it as globally continuous and "locally discrete and therefore heterogeneous." (Duffy 2013, 104) The curvature in a continuous manifold maintains this intrinsic heterogeneous character which is constitutive of continuity.

This discussion of Riemannian continuous manifolds and its corresponding significance of *curvature* can be mapped into the role of *inflection* in *The Fold*. In *The Fold*, the world is a virtual inflection-event

that is actualized in the soul, and in *Difference and Repetition*, inflection is restored in the curvature of the Riemannian continuous manifold that characterizes the virtual Idea. Inflection, with its singularities and differential relations, is the abstract form of the event; it is actualized in the soul and realized in the body, suggesting how the fold characterizes both the second floor and the first floor. In *Difference and Repetition*, Ideas are also characterized by folds, as they are Riemannian continuous manifolds or multiplicities.

Moreover, it is noteworthy that Bergson regards space as a discrete and homogenous multiplicity in contrast to time as a continuous and heterogeneous multiplicity, whereas, for Riemann, space can be continuous and heterogeneous. However, what is interestingly common in both thinkers is that continuous multiplicity, either in the Riemannian or the Bergsonian sense, is always *heterogeneous*. Continuous multiplicity, for Riemann, is a heterogeneous space and, for Bergson, a heterogeneous time or duration. And, it seems, what Deleuze takes from both Bergson and Riemann is a notion of multiplicity that entails space *and* time, informed by continuity and heterogeneity. Hence, he regards the virtual multiplicity to characterize a specific space-time in the Idea, that is then actualized and incarnated in every individual-world. Likewise, while continuous multiplicity is qualitative for Bergson and quantitative for Riemann, for Deleuze, multiplicity includes the element of quantifiability (how many?) and qualitability (how?). Now, since this heterogeneous continuity characterizes the Deleuzian multiplicity, and since Ideas and intensities are conceived, by Deleuze, as multiplicities, the Ideal and intensive fields can be regarded as (distinct) continuities, divergent and intensive continuums.

3.2 Play of Continuities and Genesis

Now we can turn to the proposed four types of continuity, and recount the Deleuzian genesis. Every individual *is* insofar as it expresses. In *The Fold*, the expressed is the world and, in *Difference and Repetition*, the expressed is the Idea. Now, if we enfold *The Fold* onto *Difference and Repetition*, we observe every individual-intensity expresses a world-Idea. It is noteworthy that although the expressed has a virtual status in both *The Fold* and *Difference and Repetition*, the expressors have different states in these books, being actual in *The Fold* and intensive in *Difference and Repetition*. Here, we regard the expressor as intensive individual. The expressed worlds imply their own space-times, distinct and sometimes incommensurable spatio-temporal structures. But, none of these worlds are excluded, contra Leibniz, and none of them is the original, contra Plato. There is no best world; all proliferating worlds co-insist or complicate in chaosmos, they are all affirmed and are all simulacra. consequently, they can be impossible or divergent; they form many bifurcating paths and their affirmation signals a *divergent*

continuity. Affirmation of divergence is an Ideal or divergent continuity that characterizes the virtual. However, these worlds (qua virtualities) cannot encounter or coincide by themselves, they need to be embodied in an intensive field of individuation. The individuals interact, communicate, and synthesize, and it is through these couplings that their folded-expressed worlds also collide (this is why intensity is first, as Deleuze notes, because the collision of worlds requires an intensity). When the folded worlds of these encounters between individuals are impossible, a rupture disrupts the existing order, but the affirmation of divergence and the endeavor to perform the impossible disjunctive synthesis of bifurcating paths opens a space of divergent continuity with the complete determination of a new problem-Idea (at the level of the expressed). This coincides with the formation of an intensity (at the level of the expressor) or *intensive continuity*. Indeed, intensity is nothing but this new continuum or the edge between two coupled individuals, the metastable border of their encounter (the “dash” in $E - E'$). This edge or intensive continuity incarnates or expresses the new problem that was itself determined through the divergence of folded worlds. Intensity is defined by coupling heterogeneities ($E - E'$) (DR, 222), that are in the course of individuation, in the midst of a paradoxical entanglement, expressing a problem, so they are called embryonic intensity or larval subjects. Intensive continuity refers to this metastable edge or “-” between E and E' . Ultimately, considering that this intensive edge incarnates, expresses, or envelops a disjunctive synthesis of impossible worlds, refers to another continuity, namely, the *torsional continuity*. The latter is a torsional foldedness and envelopment of the virtual world-Idea in intensity, like the torsion of expression that weaves the virtual expressed into the fabric of intensive expressor. These continuities are distinct as they have different modes of being. The mode of being for divergent continuity is *problematic*, for intensive continuity is *implication* and for torsional continuity is *expression*. Divergent continuity is a virtual heterogeneous continuum, determined by differential relations and singularities of divergent worlds; intensive continuity is the edge of heterogeneous coupling, with a folded implicating/implicated structure, and torsional continuity is the fold or torsion of the virtual into the intensive. Torsional continuity shows that different continuities (divergent and intensive) are themselves *inseparable* despite their heterogeneity, so they also have to form a third continuity, a continuity between other continuities, echoing the third fold, in *The Fold*, a fold between folds.

The fourth continuity is very close to torsional continuity but not exactly identical to it. It is the enfolding of the virtual on the actual rather than the intensive. This is a distinct folding since Deleuze sometimes employs the couple virtual-actual and sometimes virtual-intensive. The virtual-intensive

forms a torsional continuity, and the virtual-actual a *ten(or)sional continuity*. It shows that even after actualization, the solution is again a continuum, insofar as it carries once more a heterogeneous order folded into itself, as the subsistence of the virtual problem in the solution, or the implication of the expressed in expression. Tension and torsion, in both books, refer to the relationship between the expressed and expressor, whereas the fourth continuity shall refer to the relation between the expressed and actual expression. Besides, the expressor is intensive in *Difference and Repetition* and actual in *The Fold*. We define tenorsion as a tension-torsion between the virtual and actual, through which a differential virtuality is incarnated and covered over by its actual solutions, having also in mind that the terms *tenor* and *tenōr* refer to continuity, tone of the voice, and sense, and *tenēre*, to hold.

All these manners of folding are called continuity since they evoke the proliferation of *folds*, the *impossibility* of convergence and the *must* of affirmation, heterogeneity-and-inseparability, divergence-and-indiscernibility, disjunction-and-synthesis. The domain of continuity is imbued with an insurmountable disparity, an ontological problem, but the very affirmation of difference erupts a new order, the revolutionary explosion of the solution. Continuity is characterized by this unfused excess (problem-Idea) and remainder (intensity) that cannot be subtracted or tamed; it must be only affirmed. Affirmation is a power to continue divergently, intensively, torsionally and tenorsionally, an unyielding force to install a problematic-paradoxical continuity when such a synthesis is precisely unavailable in the horizon of the existing order.

3.3 Torsional Continuity: Intensities and Ideas

This account of continuity clarifies one of the conceptual difficulties in *Difference and Repetition*, namely, the ontological status of the Ideal and intensive and their relation. Sometimes we, Deleuze's readers, tend to insist upon the affinities between the Idea and intensity and reduce one to the other, or highlight solely one of these domains, overshadowing the other one; sometimes we consider them as radical heterogeneities without foregrounding their kinship. And, this is indeed suggested by Deleuze's own language that slides to both sides: sometimes stressing upon the profound distinction of these fields, and sometimes merging them and vacillating between the language of these orders. This apparent inconsistency might persuade us to concur only with one of these positions, and stress either their conformity or their heterogeneity. The notion of continuity, defined by heterogeneity-and-inseparability is crucial to resolve this problem. Indeed, *both* of these positions must be taken seriously, for they precisely reflect the aforementioned moments of continuity, inseparability perpetually tainted with heterogeneity. Thus, when Deleuze emphasizes the irreducible distinction between Idea and

intensity, he is referring to the moment of *heterogeneity* in their (torsional) continuity, and when his language slides freely from one to the other, he is disclosing the moment of *inseparability*. Drawing on the conflictual status of *expression* that we have portrayed, the Idea and intensity too, qua expressed and expressor, manifest an inherent heterogeneity-*and*-insuperability, exhibiting a torsional continuity. Thus, isolating any of these domains, without involving the other, would amount to envisaging the expressed without an expressor, or supposing an intensive face without being endowed with the expressed. None of these scenarios are tenable.

Let us now unravel the above claim. The Ideal and intensive fields are *inseparable*, and that is why there is a structural affinity between them. In *Difference and Repetition*, Deleuze discusses three moments of the Idea, in Chapter 4 (undetermined, determinable, determination (DR, 171)), and explores three characteristics of intensity, in Chapter 5 (unequal in itself, affirming difference, implication (DR, 232–7)). An analysis of these characteristics reveals a resonance between these two fields, exposing their *inseparability*.

The first characteristic of intensity, *unequal in itself*, is related to the first moment of the Idea, *undetermined* (dx). To explain the unequal in itself in intensity, Deleuze draws on number systems that carry an inequality and, thereby, condition a new number system; this status in intensity echoes a *problem par excellence*, a problematic moment which entails an impossibility, or an impossibility within an order, where the remainder (e.g. fractions in the natural system) performs an Ideal divergence or point of bifurcation that is not *possible with* the actual order (we follow Deleuze and reserve the terms of divergence and impossibility for the virtual-Ideal field), yet will accordingly condition a new order. Indeed, we can also frame Deleuze's example of number systems in terms of problems and solutions, without, of course, being tempted to equalize the intensive and Ideal. The intensive order *incarnates* or *expresses* a problem; accordingly, this unequal or remainder (intensive) also embodies the *undetermined* (Ideal) insofar as it cannot entertain any determination in the existing order. Thus, the first characteristic of intensity resonates with the first moment of Idea, its indetermination, and the unequal in itself, this remainder, is the incarnation of dx .

The second characteristic of intensity, *affirmation of difference*, is related to the second moment of Ideas, *determinable* (dy/dx). Differential relations and reciprocal determination in the Idea involve the *affirmation* of divergent series; this affirmation of divergence in Ideas echoes the affirmation of difference in intensity. Divergence is affirmed in the Ideal half, while difference is affirmed in the intensive half. Indeed, the differential relation (dy/dx) in the second moment, is already an affirmation

of difference, and as intensity is in principle a coupling between heterogeneous series, the Ideal differential connection is also a kind of coupling or synthesis between differential elements. This is the moment of affirmation in the Idea and intensity, which animates the encounter and enacts the impossible continuity. Hence, the affirmation of difference in intensity is the incarnation or expression of differential connection and affirmation of divergence in the Idea, which incites the problematic encounter and coupling. The second Ideal/intensive moment is the affirmation of divergence and difference in the enacted encounter.

Ultimately, the third characteristic of intensity, its *implicating-implicated* roles, is related to the *complete determination* as the third moment of Ideas. This moment, wherein the problem-Idea is completely determined, coincides with *implication* in intensity, where the coupling $E - E'$ is in place. This coupling in intensity is established between heterogeneous series and, in parallel, reflects the determination of a problem. Thus, every intensity, as a coupling of heterogeneities, incarnates or expresses the complete determination of a problem-Idea. It is, thereby, a dispersed larval subject, a field of individuation, that expresses the problematic Idea, and the Idea, in turn, finds and adopts an expression by being incarnated in intensity; this problematic (Ideal) coupling (intensive), then, demands the emergence of an *entirely other*, a solution that entails the revolutionary face of actualization. Deleuze refers to Simondon to explain this:

individuation presupposes a prior metastable state—in other words, the existence of a ‘disparateness’ such as at least two orders of magnitude or two scales of heterogeneous reality between which potentials are distributed. Such a pre-individual state nevertheless does not lack singularities: the distinctive or singular points are defined by the existence and distribution of potentials. An ‘objective’ problematic field thus appears, determined by the distance between two heterogeneous orders. Individuation emerges like the act of solving such a problem, or—what amounts to the same thing—like the actualisation of a potential and the establishing of communication between disparates. The act of individuation consists not in suppressing the problem, but in integrating the elements of the disparateness into a state of coupling which ensures its internal resonance. (DR, 246)

This passage supports our examination of the relationship between intensities and Ideas. Deleuze is here oscillating between the vocabulary of the Ideal and intensive. He implicitly connects the intersection of two heterogeneous orders—evoking intensity—to the determination of an objective problem, which refers to the Ideal field (“An ‘objective’ problematic field thus appears, determined by the distance between two heterogeneous orders.”). Moreover, he relates the “individuation” of intensity to the “act of solving a problem,” (Ideal), and connects the “actualization of a potential” in the virtual, to the establishment of “communication between disparates,” in intensity. Ultimately, he

evokes a coincidence between individuation and intensive coupling with the affirmation of the problem and a resonance between its Ideal divergent series. This continuous shift of language is ineluctable since the Ideal and intensive form a torsional continuum and are inseparable.

However, this line of argument might run the risk of losing sight of the fact that despite these links, the Ideal and intensive are distinct and irreducible. Despite this vacillation between the Ideal and intensive, Deleuze is at pains to lay bare their divergence. These fields are associated with a different set of relations, namely, differential and asymmetrical. Also, the Idea is by nature *distinct* and *obscure* while intensity is *clear* and *confused*.⁵ This is, indeed, the incommensurability of the expressor and the expressed, the torsion of expression, through which the intensive individual (expressor) expresses a folded world (expressed). In expression Idea and intensity form a torsional continuum, where they become inseparable and indiscernible, just as it is impossible to localize the expressed in an expressive face. In a torsional continuity, one cannot discern where the Ideal ends and the intensive begins. Nevertheless, confounding them would be tantamount to ignoring the heterogeneity of the expressed/expressor and their incommensurable nature. Each of these domains is characterized by a peculiar relationship and synthesis: differential relations in the “reciprocal synthesis of the Idea” and the intensive relation in the “asymmetrical synthesis of the sensible.” (DR, 244) The mode of being of the virtual is *problematic* and that of intensity is *implication*. Ideas are differentiated and actualized, while intensities are explicated and developed. These attest to the moment of *heterogeneity* in the torsional continuity of Idea/intensity.

4 Conclusion

There is an insistent motif that repeats and returns in Deleuze’s philosophy: Two heterogeneous or divergent series (two worlds, orders, ...) encounter; they have a radical insuperable divergence, such that any connection or synthesis is impossible, a profoundly problematic encounter. However, this

⁵ Deleuze notes, “Only Leibniz approached the conditions of a logic of thought, inspired by his theory of individuation and expression. For despite the complexity and ambiguity of the texts, it does indeed seem at times that the expressed (the continuum of differential relations or the unconscious virtual Idea) should be in itself distinct and obscure: for example, all the drops of water in the sea like so many genetic elements with the differential relations, the variations in these relations and the distinctive points they comprise. In addition, it seems that the expressor (the perceiving, imagining or thinking individual) should be by nature clear and confused: for example, our perception of the noise of the sea, which confusedly includes the whole and clearly expresses only certain relations or certain points by virtue of our bodies and a threshold of consciousness which they determine.” (DR, 253) See Jeffrey Bell’s discussion of distinct/obscure and clear/confused. (Bell 2022, 50-62)

problematic-paradoxical intersection is not without consequence. This explosive event on the edge of divergent worlds has to erect a new order, and then reality is, as though, swollen with this novelty, a new plane irreducible to existing domains yet implicating them. This encounter occurs on the frontier of intensity, an intensive continuum, a milieu of individuation, where this divergence is affirmed and resonance is conditioned. The eruption of the new is like the emergence of a new space, a new dimension. This is reminiscent of the Kantian problem of incommensurable figures (e.g., right-hand and left-hand) that could not map onto one another on a two-dimensional plane; this mapping would be an impossibility if these figures lived in a two-dimensional world. The sole way to surpass this impossibility would be to pass into, or give rise to, the third dimension. Only in this way, the problem of divergent or incommensurable fields would be solved. A new dimension, like a new number system, is engendered to solve a problem and open an impasse, and this coincides with the emergence of a subject/world, enacted by this impossible synthesis. But, this new plane is itself another ten(or)sional continuity, which folds the problem in solution.

The intensive edge, in which the encounter occurs is a continuity, insofar as it holds a folded structure (implicating and implicated) and refers to the intersection of heterogeneities. When the enveloped/expressed worlds of the coupled heterogeneous series are impossible, a problem-Idea is determined. The Idea by which the individual is haunted is the *problem of the world*: how to compose a continuity by two divergent series. Every intensive being is not *in* the world but rather must solve the problem of the world and confer to a new world the expression that it lacks. The problematicity of the Idea lies in the Borgesian co-existence and affirmation of impossible worlds, in the establishment of a continuity among divergent worlds, a divergent continuity. Divergent continuity is neither pure divergence (discontinuities without communication or resonance) nor continuity in the convergent sense. It is the affirmation and problematic synthesis of divergent series, and the solution to which it leads is a new subject-world with ten(or)sional continuity. And, the intensive edge, the sole locus of events, is an intensive continuity that incarnates the divergent worlds of the enveloped elements of intensity; what it incarnates is a divergent continuity, an Ideal continuum wherein the divergent worlds resonate, but this very incarnation is itself another continuity, a torsional continuity, the torsional fold of the virtual in the intensive. An intensive continuity that expresses a divergent continuity through torsional continuity.

Abbreviations

AG	<i>Philosophical Essays</i>
ATP	<i>A Thousand Plateaus</i>
B	<i>Bergsonism</i>
DI	<i>Desert Islands</i>
DR	<i>Difference and Repetition</i>
GM	<i>Leibnizens Mathematische Schriften</i>
L	<i>Philosophical Papers and Letters</i>
LP	<i>Le pli</i>
LS	<i>Logic of Sense</i>
TFW	<i>Time and Free Will</i>

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