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Can There be an Epistemology of Moods?

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  08 January 2010

Stephen Mulhall
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Extract

By entitling her recent collection of essays on philosophy and literature Love's Knowledge, Martha Nussbaum signals her commitment to giving a positive answer to the question posed by the title of this paper. If love can deliver or lay claim to knowledge, then moods (the variety of affective states to which human nature is subject) must be thought of as having a cognitive significance, and so must not only permit but require the attentions of the epistemologist. As Nussbaum points out, such a conclusion runs counter to a central strand of thinking in both ancient and modern philosophy. The rational or cognitive side of human nature is often defined in contrast to its affective or emotional side, the latter being understood as having no role to play in the revelation of reality. On the contrary, where reason and the senses can combine to disclose the way things are, moods typically cloud that cognitive access by projecting a purely subjective colouration onto the world and leading us to attribute properties or qualities to it which have at best a purely personal and internal reality.

Type
Papers
Information
Royal Institute of Philosophy Supplements , Volume 41 , September 1996 , pp. 191 - 210
Copyright
Copyright © The Royal Institute of Philosophy and the contributors 1996

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References

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