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Véronique Munoz-Dardé, II—Véronique Munoz-Dardé: Equality and Division: Values in Principle1, Aristotelian Society Supplementary Volume, Volume 79, Issue 1, 1 July 2005, Pages 255–284, https://doi.org/10.1111/j.0309-7013.2005.00135.x
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Abstract
Are there distinctively political values? Certain egalitarians seem to think that equality is one such value. Scheffler's contribution to the symposium seeks to articulate a division of moral labour between norms of personal morality and the principles of justice that regulate social institutions, and using this suggests that the egalitarian critique of Rawls can be deflected. In this paper, instead, I question the status of equality as an intrinsic value. I argue that an egalitarianism which focuses on the status of equality as valuable in itself embraces a theory of value with the worst elements of utilitarianism (in particular its consequentialism) while leaving behind any of the intuitive appeal that utilitarianism has. In its place I press that we need a political conception of egalitarianism which stresses the role of equality as a political ideal without presupposing any values with which we engage beyond those found in the norms of personal morality.
