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  • Emergence: Towards a New Metaphysics and Philosophy of Science by Mariusz Tabaczek
  • Samuel Murray
TABACZEK, Mariusz. Emergence: Towards a New Metaphysics and Philosophy of Science. Notre Dame, Ind.: University of Notre Dame Press, 2019. xxii + 396 pp. Cloth, $75.00

Two strong tendencies characterize ontological theorizing in contemporary Anglo-American metaphysics. One tendency is to include only physical entities at the fundamental level of one’s ontology (physicalism). Another tendency is to preserve the causal efficacy of nonfundamental entities (nonreductionism). The purported irreducibility of mental to physical entities is an example of the latter. Of course, these tendencies seemingly pull in opposed directions. For example, if mental entities have causal powers over and above the physical, how can they be composed fundamentally of physical entities? And if the fundamental level of reality consists in physical entities, how can we find any causal powers at higher levels that are not merely complexes of powers found at the fundamental level?

Some bite bullets. Reductive physicalists deny nonfundamental causality, while dualists relinquish the exclusively physical nature of fundamental reality (idealists and panpsychists are in a different sandbox). Others, however, claim to split the difference and have purely physical slices of cake while enjoying irreducibly sweet experiences. Roughly, the strategy is to introduce a relation of emergence, where distinct powers emerge at higher levels of reality from suitably structured complexes of physical entities. Of course, this gives off the appearance of magic, and the difficulty is to specify one’s ontology such that the relation of emergence is interpretable without lapsing into reductionism, dualism, or voodoo.

This is the context for Mariusz Tabaczek’s Emergence, which explains what emergence is and how emergent entities interact with lower-level entities. The book has two parts. In Part 1 Tabaczek surveys different contemporary frameworks of emergence. The upshot is that contemporary accounts of emergence fail to offer ontologically perspicuous characterizations of the relation of emergence or downward causation. Thus, in Part 2 Tabaczek examines different theories of causation to fill this gap. He rejects Humean, neo-Humean, probabilistic, transfer, and manipulation accounts of causation (the latter of which is, [End Page 417] by my count, the current darling of philosophers of science). Tabaczek’s own view is that the metaphysics of dispositionalism provides the necessary foundation for emergence and downward causation. Dispositionalism is the thesis that causal interactions can be exhaustively described in terms of substances manifesting dispositions. A disposition is, for Tabaczek, some property that “selects” for specific outcomes based on triggering conditions. However, Tabaczek claims that standard presentations of dispositionalism would do well to recover some classic Aristotelian concepts, including primary matter and virtual presence.

The notion of primary matter is central, and Tabaczek describes it as “the ultimate principle of potentiality.” This helps explain the nature of virtual presence. For Aristotelians, mid-sized organic objects (human beings, trees, and daisies, to name a few) are ontologically basic in that they have no proper parts; rather, “parts” are what they are in virtue of participating in that system. But, if you separate a part of the system, it appears to be capable of existing independently. How? Aristotelians hold that substantial forms are virtually present in parts and that, upon separation, these virtually present forms are actualized. Primary matter serves as the fundamental persisting potentiality that realizes these nested hierarchies of substantial forms. With these notions clarified, Tabaczek argues that some shortcomings of contemporary dispositionalism can be fixed. The relationship between Aristotelianism and dispositionalism is mutually beneficial. With the resources of the latter, the Aristotelian can explain the fourfold causal scheme in terms of different aspects of dispositions: They are essentially oriented toward producing particular effects (final causation) in virtue of environmental stimulation (efficient causation) as an actualization of intrinsic potentialities (formal/material causation).

This is a sweeping book, bringing historical reflection to bear on cutting edge empirical and metaphysical work. However, three notable limits stand out. First, Tabaczek shifts the standard for measuring the adequacy of different metaphysical views. At some points, ontological frameworks are assessed against a standard of plausibility (namely, how many intuitions does the framework violate?), while at other points they are assessed against adherence to strict Aristotelianism. Hence...

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