

Editorial Note

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The first part of this issue contains 6 articles that make up a ‘special issue’ on the topic of recognition. Guest-editor is Hans-Christoph Schmidt am Busch. As he writes in his introduction, the philosophy of recognition is undergoing a renaissance. Contemporary philosophers of recognition with an historical interest not only study Fichte and Hegel, but also Rousseau and Marx. Central ideas from the philosophy of recognition are taken up, not only by moral and political philosophers studying multiculturalism, but also by social ontologists. Moreover, philosophers from different schools of thought make use of recognition-theoretical considerations that have been developed in other disciplines such as psychology, sociology or institutional economics.

I will only say a few words about the contributions to the regular part of the issue, foregoing the order in which they are included. In the first article, Erik Anderson discusses whether the so-called New Natural Lawyers who hold that the ability to perform sexual acts that are ‘suitable to procreating’ is a necessary condition for marriage, are consistent when they maintain that sterile heterosexual couples can marry, while denying that the same is true of homosexual couples. Two articles go into to the problem of dirty hands. David Archard discusses the sense in which politicians do get dirty hands and the degree to which a democratic public may also get dirty hands, while Stephen de Wijze examines whether those who get dirty hands should be punished. Punishment is also the subject of Bill Wringe who argues in his article that punishment must involve harsh treatment, but need not be intended to cause suffering. In his article, András Szigeti argues that emotions have a sui generis heuristics of value, but are not the highest court of appeal for the justification of axiological beliefs. Joshua May defends the rationalist view on motivation that holds that, for have an effect on what we do, beliefs about which actions we ought to do, need not have a connection with an antecedent desire. In her article, Jennifer Morton argues that agents who deliberate for a future self only have cross-temporal agential authority if the present self and the future self share a normative perspective. In her intriguing article, Mari Stenlund argues that in human rights theory, the freedom of speech and thought seems to include the right to hold delusions which should not be restricted for any reason. However, in mental health laws having delusions is regarded to justify the use of antipsychotic medication that aims to influence delusions.

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