

Editorial Note

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We have to start with an apology. The attentive reader may have noticed that Geoffrey Scarrre’s paper ‘On Taking Back Forgiveness,’ although mentioned in the Editorial Note, was, for reasons unknown to us, not included in the previous issue.

The meta-ethical and theoretical-ethical contributions are brought together in the first part of this issue. In the first paper, *Daniel Eggers* argues that at least the official version of early expressivist Richard Hare’s theory can be qualified as what is now called “hybrid expressivism,” holding that moral sentences express *both* beliefs *and* desire-like states. This version of Hare’s theory faces serious difficulties, resulting from the possibility of unknown speaker standards. According to Eggers, a modern reconstruction of Hare in terms of ‘*de dicto* beliefs’, though in principle possible, will not allow us to solve the Frege-Geach problem, as was argued by John Eriksson. In the next, brief, paper *Andrew T. Forchimes* and *Robert B. Talisse* state that a new kind of debate about the normative error theory has emerged. Whereas longstanding debates have fixed on the error theory’s plausibility, this new debate concerns the theory’s *believability*. Bart Streumer (2013) is the chief proponent of the error theory’s unbelievability. Forchimes and Talisse argue that Streumer’s argument prevails against extant critiques, and then press a criticism of their own. The following paper by *Alex Rajczi* deals with the incoherence objection to rule-utilitarianism. According to their critics, rule-utilitarians are committed to an “act-utilitarian” view of practical reason by their arguments for their theory, while the theory itself commits them to a contradictory view—at least if an action’s being wrong is a reason not to do it. For a long time many philosophers felt this incoherence objection was a decisive objection to rule-consequentialism. Rajczi argues in his paper that Brad Hooker has offered a response to this objection that defeats traditional forms of the incoherence objection. However, another version of the problem remains that does not constitute a fatal objection to rule-consequentialism but instead highlights a theoretical

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drawback in the theory which must be taken into account during a more holistic evaluation of rule-consequentialism and its rivals.

There are at least two basic normative notions: rationality and reasons, says *Adam Cureton* in his paper. The nowadays dominant normative account of reasons, which he calls primitive pluralism about reasons, holds that some reasons are normatively basic and there is no underlying normative explanation of them in terms of other normative notions. By supposing that there is a plurality of primitive reasons, Cureton argues that primitive pluralism about reasons lacks sufficient normative unity and structure. The aim of his paper is to suggest that if Kantian constructivism about reasons were built on a substantive, rather than merely formal, conception of rationality then it would stand a better chance at unifying the particular reasons we would endorse on due reflection.

Michael Milona's paper offers a qualified defence of a historically popular view that he calls sentimental perceptualism, holding that emotions play a role in grounding evaluative knowledge analogous to the role perceptions play in grounding empirical knowledge. Milona defends sentimental perceptualism against objections of András Sziget and Michael Brady who concede that emotions have some important epistemic role to play, but then go on to argue that understanding how emotions play that role means that there must be some alternative, emotion-independent route to obtaining knowledge of value. *Sune Holm* examines in his paper two strategies that rights theorists may follow in response to an influential criticism of a rights-based morality that a right against risk-imposition will paralyse all ordinary activities. The first strategy introduces a threshold for when a risk-imposition is a rights violation. The second strategy drops the claim that rights are absolute and maintains that all rights infringements generate compensation duties. Holm argues that both strategies face significant practical problems of their own and that the Paralysis Problem seems fatal for a right against risk-imposition in the absence of an adequate account of the morally relevant threshold risk.

Geoffrey Scarre's paper on forgiveness forms the transition to the practical-ethical contributions. Can forgiveness be taken back, asks Scarre. When we forgive, we make a firm commitment not to return to our former state of moral resentment against the offender, replacing it by good-will. Scarre contends that a person who forgives and later takes back that forgiveness because certain negative feelings have returned either did not genuinely forgive in the first place or shows that she has not fully grasped the nature of forgiveness. In his paper, *Timothy Weidel* goes into the question: Why should the average person in the West feel morally motivated to do anything to help the poor? Various answers to this question have been constructed—and yet poverty persists. He argues that current approaches to the problem of poverty overlook that poverty not only harms the poor, it harms every human being. Drawing on Karl Marx's Aristotelian-influenced notion of our human essence as "species-being," Weidel argues that our moral impetus for acting to help the poor comes not from feelings of guilt about how poverty harms *them*, but rather from recognizing that poverty is harming *all of us*. *Alan Strudler* argues, in the next paper, that there are instances in which lying to an innocent and generally competent person respects her autonomy. While Christine Korsgaard and Onora O'Neill hold the opinion that respect for a person's autonomy requires treating her in a way consistent with the possibility of consent, Strudler contends that the possibility of consent condition is unworkable. Strudler maintains that lying can respect individual autonomy when being truthful to a person undermines her choices and lying gets her what she would reasonably see herself as having most reason to choose in the circumstances.

David Svolba critically examines Mark Rowlands' Rawlsian argument for animal rights, according to which animals have rights because we would assign them rights when deciding

on the principles of morality from behind a veil of ignorance. Rowlands' argument depends on a non-standard interpretation of the veil of ignorance, according to which we cannot know whether we are human or non-human on the other side of the veil. Rowlands claims that his interpretation of the veil is more consistent with a core commitment of Rawlsian justice—the intuitive equality principle—than either Rawls or his critics realize. Svolba argues in his paper that Rawls is not committed to the intuitive equality principle, as Rowlands articulates it, and hence Rowlands's argument is in fact only superficially Rawlsian. Furthermore, Rowlands' intuitive equality principle is dubious on its own terms, and thus a poor principle on which to base a case for animal rights. *Tom Parr* goes into an intriguing question: Are beneficiaries of an injustice other than the wrongdoer permitted to retain the fruits of the injustice? If not, who becomes entitled to those funds? After rejecting the Connection Account that holds that benefiting from injustice can give rise to a corrective duty owed specifically to the victim of the injustice, Parr develops an alternative account: the Moral Taintedness Account. This account states that, when identifying who is entitled to the fruits of injustice, the cause and the degree of the harm suffered by a victim are both relevant considerations, though it does not matter whether the victim is the victim of the injustice that gave rise to the fruits in question. This account avoids the problem associated with the Connection Account, and yields intuitive conclusions in an important range of test cases.

The concept of a corrective duty or virtue returns in *M. Victoria Costa's* paper on cosmopolitanism. She argues that cosmopolitanism is a virtue that corrects a common and dangerous tendency to form overly strong identifications with political entities such as countries, nations, and cultures. The account helps to unify the current heterogeneous collection of cosmopolitan theories and to distinguish cosmopolitans from their critics, most of whom share the cosmopolitan's commitment to respect for human rights: for example, liberal patriots, liberal nationalists and liberal culturalists. The next paper by *Uwe Steinhoff* discusses Jeff McMahan's argument that justification defeats liability to defensive attack (which would have far-reaching consequences for the ethics of war, in particular for the thesis of the moral equality of combatants). In response, Steinhoff argues that McMahan's attempt to burden the contrary claim with counter-intuitive implications fails and that McMahan's own position implies that the innocent civilians do not have a right of self-defence against justified attackers, which neither coheres with his description of the case (the justified bombers infringe the rights of the civilians) nor with his views about rights forfeiture, and is unsupported by independent argument. In the last paper of this issue, *Joshua Shaw* analyses the question: What do women deserve, ethically speaking, when they agree to gestate a foetus on behalf of third parties? Shaw argues that gestational mothers deserve a parent-like voice as well as significant care and support, conclusions that have implications for commercial surrogacy. He also argues that we should not make requests of others when fulfilling them will lead others to deserve goods we cannot reasonably expect them to receive. Based on this thesis, what he calls the "strings attached thesis," he shows that pro-life arguments in support of prohibitions on abortion commit their proponents to policies which they may not be willing to support.