

Editorial Note

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This is a special issue in more than one sense. First of all, it is the last issue that is published under our responsibility as Editors-in-Chief. We served the journal from its very beginning in 1998. At the conference on Dimensions of Responsibility in Pavia, June 8–9 2017, organized to celebrate ETMPs 20th anniversary, we hand over our tasks and responsibilities to Thomas Schramme of Liverpool University, at this moment one of the Associate Editors, and Marcus Düwell of Utrecht University. In the 20 years of its existence, ETMP has become one of the leading international journals in ethics. We are proud of the journal's success. Our contribution to it should not be overestimated. An academic journal is also made by the Associate Editors, the Book Review Editors, by its authors and by their reviewers, and by the publisher's Editorial team. We are grateful having had the chance to guide and supervise ETMPs growth into maturity.

This issue is also special because it contains six solicited articles. The theme of this special issue is 'New Directions in Character and Virtue'. Guest-editor is Nancy Snow of Oklahoma University. The debate stimulated by the situationist challenge to virtue ethics has developed along several interesting paths. First, philosophers and psychologists have mounted vigorous defences of traditional conceptions of virtue and character and critiques of situationist claims and interpretations of social psychology. Second, philosophers have sought to defend traditional conceptions of virtue and character by drawing on the resources of empirical psychology. Third, philosophers have developed new, empirically informed approaches to virtue and character that take on board, to greater or lesser degrees, the interpretations of situationists about virtue and character. Finally, psychologists, often in partnership with philosophers, have begun to bring empirical and theoretical psychological research to bear on philosophical

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debates about aspects of virtue and character, such as development, or on philosophical theories of specific virtues, such as humility.

Four of the six articles included in this special issue exemplify the third of these trends. The article by Papish criticizes contributions to the second trend. Fleeson & Jayawickreme is an example of the fourth. All but Fleeson & Jayawickreme are by philosophers or by philosophers in collaboration with practitioners of other disciplines. That article is from a group of psychologists doing cutting-edge, philosophically informed work on virtue.

All of the articles push the boundaries of philosophical thinking on character and virtue in light of the challenges presented by situationism. The lead article is by *Christian Miller*. After a brief introduction to the situationist debate, Miller catalogues areas of the discussion which he thinks have been thoroughly investigated, then turns to those requiring further investigation. The result is a comprehensive overview of the debate, both old and new. The next two articles take differing perspectives on virtue development. *Hagop Sarkissian* argues that arranging situational variables can manipulate people in ways that promote prosocial behaviour, and illustrates this by drawing on the Confucian tradition in ethics. In the article that follows, *Lorraine Besser-Jones* takes what is essentially the opposite approach to virtue cultivation to that taken by Sarkissian. She focuses on some of the complex factors internal to the person that contribute to the development and maintenance of virtue. The two articles that follow offer unique perspectives on individual virtues. By examining the social functions of gossip and considering the differences in power dynamics in which gossip can occur, *Mark Alfano & Brian Robinson* contend that gossip may be not only permissible but virtuous, both as the only reasonable recourse available and as a means of resistance against oppression. Psychologists *William Fleeson & Eranda Jayawickreme* offer a head-on challenge to Doris (2002)'s comments on aggregation – an area which they believe has been neglected. In their article they describe an empirical approach to aggregation that they contend provides a defence of global traits. In the last article of this special issue, *Laura Papish* raises several objections to attempts by Daniel Russell and Nancy Snow in their 2009 books to use the CAPS (Cognitive-Affective Personality System) model to rehabilitate Aristotelian virtue ethics and argues that, as a result, this model has not been shown to have the promise Snow and Russell allege it has.

The regular part of this issue starts with an article by *Jeff Behrends & Gina Schouten*. They discuss if mandatory home economics education should be reinstated because of its potential to advance gender egalitarian aims. They argue first that gender-neutral home economics instruction is unlikely to advance gender egalitarian aims, and may in fact reinforce the very outcomes it is meant to disrupt. However, they further argue that a more radical home economics curriculum could avoid these difficulties. Moreover, they argue, there are good reasons to seriously consider adopting a gender *non*-neutral program in which all and only boys receive mandatory caregiving instruction. In her article, *Katharina Bauer* pleads for an elaborated ethical ideal of authenticity: the ambitious ideal of a continuous self-reflective process of 'self-authentication'. For this purpose, the ideal of being authentic in expressing and unfolding one's individual personality and characteristics will be combined with the ideal of being 'an authentic person' - whereby 'a person' is to be understood in a Kantian sense as an autonomous person who is (at least potentially) reasonable and morally responsible. The next two articles discuss paternalism. *Brian Carey* focuses on paternalistic treatment of children. Identifying a distinction between two kinds of paternalism: 'compensatory' paternalism, and 'non-compensatory' paternalism, Carey argues that compensatory paternalism is usually permissible in the case of children. Non-compensatory paternalism, however, is much harder to justify than compensatory paternalism, and because of this, it is sometimes impermissible

even when directed at children. *Evan Riley* examines if implementing the beneficent nudge program is morally permissible in worlds like ours. He argues that the cogent defence of any nudge program, relative to worlds like ours, stands in need of serious attention to its potential for fostering or sustaining epistemic injustice. A more specific point hinges on recognizing a form of epistemic injustice not enough attended to in the literature to date, which Riley calls ‘reflective incapacitational injustice’. This includes relative disadvantages in the attaining of (or opportunity to exercise) the capacity to engage in critical reason, such as the capacity to go in for potentially critical reasoned deliberation and discursive exchange concerning ends. Riley concludes that we should hence oppose the implementation of any such program until it is shown not to violate the demands of epistemic justice.

In his article, *Gideon Elford* defends luck egalitarianism against the charge that it is in fact incoherent. The putative incoherence emerges in cases where the inequalities that justice requires on the basis of individuals’ responsible choices also entail brute luck inequalities for which there are the very same grounds of justice to condemn. Here Elford argues that the charge of incoherence against luck egalitarianism fails. In service of this he clarifies the quite specific sense in which luck egalitarianism requires inequalities and demonstrate the coherence of this with its condemnation of other inequalities. In the next article, *Anthony Reeves* asks how morality determines responsibility when multiple agents are capable of contributing to or completing a moral task, and special relationships capable of generating duties with respect to the task are non-existent, insufficient as a moral response, or partly indeterminate. On one view, responsibility falls to the agents who can bear it with the least burden. He shows why this is initially attractive and mistaken. Instead, he defends an equity-based approach that accommodates the intuitions that both support and trouble the least-cost principle. In the last article, *Christopher Thompson* criticises the standard view of trust which sees trust as intimately related to reliance. On this standard view, trust is reliance plus some other factor. A significant literature has now developed that seeks to explain what factor, in addition to reliance, serves to distinguish cases of trust from cases of mere reliance. Thompson argues that this approach to the analysis of trust is misguided. Although reliance, properly understood, frequently accompanies trust, reliance is not a necessary condition of trust.

This issue has an extensive book review section. *Lanz Fleming Miller* reviews four books, all published in the same year by the same publisher (Oxford University Press) that discuss whether it is right or wrong to bring new human life into existence. Shorter reviews introduce recent books by, a.o., Cheshire Calhoun, Onora O’Neill, Martha Nussbaum, and a volume co-edited by special issue guest-editor Nancy Snow on developing virtues.