

Editorial Note

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The first four papers of this issue constitute a special issue on ‘The power of judgement’. Guest-editor is Annemarie Kalis of Utrecht University, The Netherlands.

In the article that opens the special issue, *Gesa Lindemann* investigates the connection between Kant’s notion of reflective—specifically teleological—judgement and Helmut Plessner’s theory. He begins by setting out the characteristics of teleological judgement, with two points being of particular importance: the temporal structure of the final cause and Kant’s reference to an understanding other than the human, that is, to an ordering power other than the human. In a second step, he then works out Plessner’s conceptualization of the spatiotemporal appearance of organisms and the way he understands the other of human understanding as nature’s—or history’s—historically evolved and mutable capacity for self-order. He arrives at these conclusions by way of a methodologically controlled process of questioning derived from Kant, which he calls the ‘principle of the open question.’ *Peter Timmerman*’s subject is the significance of perspective-taking to moral judgement. In his paper he claims that Scanlon’s contractualism provides an appealing and distinctive account of why this is so. Contractualism interprets our moral judgements as making claims about the reasons of individuals in various situations, reasons that we can only recognise by considering their perspectives. Contractualism thereby commits itself to the view that our capacity for moral judgement depends on our capacity for perspective-taking. Timmerman shows that neither utilitarianism nor Kantianism assign a similar significance to our capacity for perspective-taking. *Deryck Beyleveld* and *Paul Ziche* examine the extent to which Kant’s *Critique of the Power of Judgement (CPoJ)* can be, or otherwise ought to be, regarded as a transcendental phenomenology of hope. Kant states repeatedly that *CPoJ* mediates between the first two *Critiques*, or between the theoretical knowledge we arrive at on the basis of understanding and reason’s foundational role for practical philosophy. In other words, exercising the power of judgement is implicated whenever we try to bring together the ethical issue of strictly determining our actions on the one hand and the necessity to act in the physical world on

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the other. Beyleveld and Ziche argue that this mediating function is properly understood only if the ideations produced by self-understanding are characterized as objects of rationally required hope or fear. In the last contribution to this special issue *Dascha Düring* and *Marcus Düwell* explore what one can reasonably expect from a Kantian theory of the power of judgement. To understand the normativity of understanding oneself as a being with practical commitments at all, the aesthetic judgement is introduced by Kant: the power of judgement in its pure form of self-reflexivity. They claim that aesthetic reflection and judgement is conditional on the possibility for human beings to enter the space of reasons, and therewith for practical self-understanding as such. The paper concludes with a preliminary sketch of different conceptual possibilities in fleshing out the role of the power of judgement in its aesthetic employment in developing mixed judgements.

In the first article of the regular issue *Lisa Herzog* joins the debate about the feasibility of political theories and the role it should play in theorizing. What has, according to her, been underexplored, is how feasibility depends on the attitudes and perceptions of individuals, not only with regard to their own behaviour, but also with regard to the behaviour of others. This can create coordination problems, which can be described as ‘feasibility gridlocks.’ Beliefs about the selfish nature of human beings, however, can make feasibility gridlocks more likely. This is why what she calls ‘economic ideology’, i.e. an account of human nature as fundamentally self-interested, can be harmful. In the next article, *John Hacker-Wright* discusses the analogy between virtue and skill in recent work in virtue theory. For some virtue theorists, the analogy is superseded in favour of a claim to identity. Hacker-Wright argues that there is reason to think that the claimed identity does not exist and that the analogy is liable to lead us to overlook what is distinctive about practical wisdom. According to Aristotle and the tradition in moral philosophy that follows him a central criterion for possessing practical wisdom is having a correct conception of a worthwhile end or ends. That is, to possess practical wisdom, we must know what to aim at. *Evan G. Williams* believes that our society is unknowingly guilty of serious, large-scale wrongdoing. He offers two arguments for this thesis. First is an inductive argument: most other societies, in history and in the world today, have been unknowingly guilty of serious wrongdoing, so ours probably is too. Second is a disjunctive argument: there are a large number of distinct ways in which our practices could turn out to be horribly wrong, so even if no particular hypothesized moral mistake strikes us as very likely, the disjunction of all such mistakes should receive significant credence. Williams then discusses what our society should do in light of the likelihood that we are doing something seriously wrong.

According to *David Zoller*, while it is well recognized that many everyday consumer behaviours, such as purchases of sweatshop goods, come at a cost to the global poor, it has proven difficult to argue that even knowing, repeat contributors are somehow morally complicit in those outcomes. After discussing some recent approaches, Zoller argues that the harm that agents do through knowing contributions to distant collective harm actually builds on the morally sparse agential phenomenology of everyday purchases and decisions: contributors who knowingly disregard distant harms, rather than being reckless or negligent about consequences they should have foreseen, very directly perpetuate the moral invisibility and the lack of recognition from which the global poor generally suffer. This provides agents with clearer moral reasons to refrain from knowing participation in unstructured collective harms, and clearer reason to bear them in mind in acting. Recent research in experimental psychology and the neurosciences, says *Christopher Freiman*, indicates that our moral judgements are allegedly the product of morally-insensitive evolutionary processes. These findings have led moral

theorists such as Peter Singer and Joshua Greene to doubt the credentials of our so-called ‘deontological’ intuitions. If our ordinary moral judgements are to do the strategic work Greene wants them to do, Freiman argues, he needs to endorse full-fledged Sidgwickian self-effacement for at least some areas of micro-level decision making. By the lights of some of Greene’s own arguments, people must accept the correctness—and not simply the *usefulness*—of the relevant intuitions in their personal conduct to satisfy utilitarian standards. Freiman states that he is making an argument about where Greene’s own psychological and philosophical commitments should take him. According to *Brent Daniel Mittelstadt*, *Bernd Carsten Stahl*, and *N. Ben Fairweather*, empirical research into the ethics of emerging technologies raises significant epistemological challenges by failing to explain the relative epistemic status of contentious normative claims about future states. This weakness means that it is unclear why the conclusions reached by these approaches should be considered valid, for example in anticipatory ethical assessment or governance of emerging technologies. In their article the authors explain and respond to this problem by proposing an account of how the epistemic status of uncertain normative claims can be established in ethical and political discourses based on Jürgen Habermas’ discourse ethics.

Luke Gelinis discusses Jason Hanna’s argument that a particular type of susceptibility to framing effects—namely, the tendency to reverse one’s choice between certain logically equivalent frames—invalidates actual tokens of consent. Gelinis argues that this claim is false: proneness to choice-reversal per se between the relevant types of frames does not invalidate consent. Proneness to *choice-reversal itself* does not suffice to render actual tokens of consent invalid, even between the seemingly simple logically equivalent frames Hanna has in mind, since such reversals may be based on asymmetries in subjective understanding that render them rational. In a methodological milieu characterized by efforts to bring the methods of philosophy closer to the methods of the sciences, one can find with increasing regularity, says *Abraham D. Graber*, meta-ethical arguments relying on scientific theory or data. The received view appears to be that not only is it implausible to think that a scientific vindication of a non-mentalist moral semantics will be forthcoming but that evidence from a variety of sciences threatens to undermine non-mentalist views. In his article, Graber aims to push back against this apparent consensus. The well-established phenomenon whereby moral judgements influence our attributions of putatively purely descriptive properties has come to be known as the Knobe Effect. Joshua Knobe has attempted to explain this surprising phenomenon by arguing that our folk psychological judgements are partially constituted by moral judgements. Drawing on an argument originally offered by Moore, Graber argues that if some instantiation of Knobe’s explanatory strategy is accurate, we have good reason to believe that mentalist moral semantics are untenable. *Ben Bramble* states that according to welfarism about value, something is good *simpliciter* just in case it is good *for* some being or beings. In her recent Presidential Address to the American Philosophical Association, ‘Good-For-Nothings’, Susan Wolf argues against welfarism by appeal to great works of art, literature, music, and philosophy. Wolf provides three main arguments against this view, which she calls The Superfluity Argument, The Explanation of Benefit Argument, and The Welfarist’s Mistake. In his article, Bramble reconstructs these arguments and explains where, in his view, each goes wrong. In the article that closes this issue, *Sebastian Nye* states that so-called ‘realists’ have argued that political philosophers should engage with real politics, but that mainstream ‘non-realist’ political philosophers fail to do so. Perhaps surprisingly, many of the discussions between realists and their critics have not drawn much on debates in metaethics. Nye argues that this is an oversight. There are important connections between the realism/non-realism debate and

certain controversies in metaethics. Both realism and non-realism come with metaethical baggage. By considering several arguments that could be made for and against both positions, each of which rests on contested views about the metaphysics and epistemology of value, Nye outlines exactly which metaethical claims realists and nonrealists must defend in order to make their position tenable.