

# CHAPTER FOUR

## Temporal Being and the Authentic Self

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The central issue raised here concerns whether *Being* as explored by Martin Heidegger in *Being and Time* is constituted spatiotemporally. As such this project has two interlinked objectives. One objective is to supply conceptually plausible answers to Heidegger's unanswered questions regarding the temporality of *Being*, which he raised at the very end of *Being and Time*. In response I argue that each individual human being is constituted as a Space-Time-Event-Motion (STEM) containment-field embodied entity. Heidegger situates *Dasein* (human existence) in a temporal stream moving towards the nothingness of death but all the while separating being and time as two distinct phenomena rather than coexistent. I demonstrate why this was a crucial error in Heidegger's thinking. The second objective deals with the sense of authentic being developed by Heidegger. The spatiotemporal nature of one's life for Heidegger is understood from the standpoint of Being-in-the-world, as an engaged participant, coexistent with the world, so that contextually it is through this engagement in recognition of this facticity or thrownness that one may come to recognise one's own authentic self. Yet there is a tension between the individualistic sense of authentic self and the coexistent Being-in-the-world they-self (*Das Man*) that emerges from Heidegger's analysis. Somewhat problematic then is the coexistent phenomenological recognition that one does not live in isolation and as such one may question what of the contingent, constraining and influencing factors that shape one's sense of self particularly against the backdrop of self-other relations. This project is situated methodologically within Process Philosophy, and it is from this perspective that draws attention to the role of human agency in which individuals are spatiotemporally construed in terms of Space-Time-Event-Motion (STEM) entities.

### Introduction

Heidegger, in Division 1 of *Being and Time*, posits two categories of Being: *Zuhandensein* (readiness-to-hand) and *Vorhandensein* (presence-at-hand). *Zuhandene* things are available things in the world assigned with human values and significances (Brandom, 2007: 214). In this way what we encounter

as being-in-the-world he calls 'equipment', so described since through our actions we are mainly engaged in tasks. 'The readiness-to-hand of a piece of equipment (like a hammer) consists in its having certain significance' based on its 'appropriateness for various practical roles and its inappropriateness for others' (Brandom, 2007: 217). For example, appropriate for hammering a nail into wood yet inappropriate for slicing bread. *Vorhandene* things do not have a worldly determination, as it seems they are objective, person-independent, causally interacting subjects, as in natural scientific inquiry. The term *Vorhandene* refers to the occurrentness of things rather than through their use as tools or functional relations. *Dasein* stands as the third category 'in whose structure the origins of the two thing-ish categories are to be found' (Brandom, 2007: 214). As such the being of the ready-to-hand has in itself the character of *having been assigned or referred* (Brandom, 2007: 218). To reiterate each and every one of us is *Dasein*.

For Heidegger 'moods' reveal significant details about the fundamental structure of the world and also our way of Being-in-the-world in two subtle ways. 'Moods assail us', says Heidegger, disclosing that we are 'thrown' into a world not of our making, in that we find ourselves firstly in the world. Secondly, moods indicate something shared and essentially not always inner and private by tuning us into the world. Things in the world, like events and situations, therefore exude a quality that resonates with us as mood. Since for Heidegger Being-in-the-world reveals that we find ourselves in the world in a particular way such that we have a 'there', a meaningfully oriented situation in which to act and exist; hence we are disposed to things in ways that matter to us. Heidegger says that 'Disposedness' is an 'attunement' (Hubert, Dreyfus, & Wrathall, 2007:5). In other words an affective condition in so far as it discloses what matters to us when tuned in to things in the world. Feeling playful attunes one to the playfulness dimension of others. 'Mood', ontologically speaking, as a way-of-being, can be physiologically regarded as a transmittable dynamical medium construable in terms of communicable information (molecules/electromagnetic fields, usually visually enactive but most importantly viscerally as well) receivable by others (feedback/feedforward). This explains the inherent receptive capacity we humans exhibit that enables sharing, the dynamics of affective social tuning via certain moods (e.g. genuine smiles attract smiles; group dynamics at a musical concert, etc.).

Heidegger claims that our *primordial* experience is a unified experience of being in the world in an inseparable way. Heidegger was particularly critical of both Husserl and Descartes for their dichotomised view of mind and body. Which explains why Heidegger moved beyond Husserl's articulation of the unfolding of 'inner time' ('impression', 'retention', 'protention') developing instead an understanding of 'human beings as a 'nexus' of lived experience ... he recognises the priority of the 'lived' world [*Lebenswelt*] ... its three temporal dimensions ... *ecstasies*, in which we, as temporal beings, exist all at once' (Ward, 2008:100) past, present and future. Indeed Heidegger recognises that 'Being is essentially temporal', in that 'Being is always understood in terms of

time explained by its temporal structure' (Blattner, 2006:14). Yet Heidegger's claim requires demonstrating how the temporal structure of Being, indeed of each *Dasein*, can be construed and understood. An endeavour remaining unanswered that Heidegger himself admits at the end of *Being and Time*.

Arguably, then, one way to achieve this end requires a greater perspective shift than that taken by Heidegger whereby one's existence is not simply observed as an entity occupying some volume of space for some duration of time but instead as being made of spacetime in a constitutional, compositional form. Heidegger, in *Being and Time*, is at pains to articulate the rather fundamental element of temporality as integral to being. My contention is that the concept of STEM containment-field as an embodying concept provides the appropriate conceptual mechanism to further ground Heidegger's endeavour.

### **The Spatiotemporal Fabric of Being**

As established in previous work the concept of Space-Time-Event-Motion (STEM) provides a framework and perspective to facilitate inquiries into human nature construed as spatiotemporal beings consistent with current physical theories. Each able-bodied STEM (human being) is a moving space-time agent, an ongoing event in and of life whose own constitution is the subject within and of the environment (e.g. epigenetic process). Each STEM agent is construed as an ecosystem, operationally a self-organising multicellular integrated system of Being. Genetics alone provide an incomplete account of the mechanisation of human existence. Characteristically human bodies are largely reciprocating organisms and the subject of ongoing compositional change particularly epigenetic chemical change, cellular change, emotional and intellectual change, hence plasticity, to say the least that exist of and along a spatiotemporal continuum. Space and time are mutually interconnected. Indeed Leibniz's principle of the *identity of the indiscernibles* holds "that no two moments of time can be identical" (Smolin, 2013:214). Consequently, there cannot be two objects in the universe that are indistinguishable yet distinct (Smolin, 2013: 214). There is no absolute space so physical properties of bodies are relational. Lee Smolin argues that "according to the *principle of the identity of indiscernibles*, our universe is one where every moment of time, and every place at every moment, is uniquely distinguishable from any other" (2013: 215).

From this perspective attention turns to Heidegger's examination regarding what he described as three existential features of *Dasein*: 'existence', 'facticity' and 'fallenness'. *Dasein*, Heidegger maintains, has no essence, yet it exists, since for Heidegger 'existence precedes essence'. *Dasein* has possibilities, whereby *Existenz* refers to a kind of *Being* relative to comporting oneself in a variety of ways that provides a sense of who one is through one's continued actions. In one sense, then, describing a process that operates cognitively as a way of answering the question: who am I? In this way when engaging and acting on our possibilities, we are no less tied into our future in terms of our

capacity to make choices (Heidegger, 1962:32-33). We live in the present, and the present is the historical movement of our own past from which the present is replete with the possibilities of actions that shape one's own future. An alternate explanation is to conceive that each one of us (each *Dasein*) is a STEM containment-field replete with the intrinsic or essential faculties and memories, the source embodiment of one's own actual and interpreted history, compositionally a temporalising self-organising Being. Primordially, as I construe, nestled factually as Space-Time-Event-Motion entities, as constituted energy-motional entities such that each life is an on-going event in temporal process i.e. Space-Time-Event-Motion (STEM) entities within an Earth STEM global environment. We do exist in a global time yet we are constituted embodied autonomic entities having some motional independence though nonetheless part and parcel of, the planet Earth extending further out on greater galactic scales. If, as Heidegger maintains existence precedes essence, then the intrinsic spatio-temporal nature of one's being requires demonstration. The spatio-temporal nexus of a being-in-the-world whilst simultaneously being interconnected to the world of motile *Beings* requires explanation. My model of STEM composition and agency fulfils the requirements to arguably resolve Heidegger's unanswered questions. The short answer is that humans are, constitutionally, spatio-temporal beings.

For Heidegger's account of *Dasein*'s facticity, refers to its Being-in-the-world, which makes evident the multiplicity of ways of 'Being-in' or engaged in everyday actualising events (making, breaking, losing, finding, determining, moving-around, etc.). Heidegger indeed describes three distinguishable ways that *Dasein* encounters and realises already interconnected activities: 'idle talk', 'curiosity' and 'ambiguity'. These 'characterise the way in which, in [an] everyday manner, *Dasein* is its 'there' – the disclosedness' of expressive modes 'of Being-in-the-world' (Heidegger, 1962:219). As 'definite existential characteristics these are not present-at-hand in *Dasein*, but help to make up its Being' (Heidegger, 1962:219). All modes of our experience and activities, as Heidegger construes, are determinate ways of being-in-the-world (Sheehan, 2007:197). Critically observing here contrary to Heidegger, that each *Dasein*, phenomenologically speaking, observes their situated environment, reflecting upon past experiences from a primary and ongoing spatiotemporally oriented living event as a STEM being in activation so cognised through the myriad ways of engaging. Determinate ways of being-in-the-world as Heidegger claims are indeed ways of engagement and activities to which each *Dasein* attends but this observation espoused by Heidegger lacks the demonstrative explanatory power of detailing 'how' *Dasein* temporalises as an already existent being. Pertinently, in addition each *Dasein* it must be noted is to itself a frame of reference constituted, I argue as a STEM agent and is always already therefore a temporalising embodied observer.

Moving to Heidegger's perspective regarding the concept of 'Falling' as used primarily to refer to these ways of engaging - 'idle talk', 'curiosity' and 'ambiguity' – explaining 'there is revealed a basic kind of Being which belongs

to everydayness: ... the “*falling*” of *Dasein*’ (Heidegger, 1962:219). Yet ‘Fallenness’, for Heidegger, is not construed negatively but extends the manner in which *Dasein* may find itself ‘*alongside* the world of its concern’ (Heidegger, 1962:219). This observation is central to understanding Heidegger’s development of the authentic self because *falling* takes on the ascription of ‘inauthenticity’ as it were, it:

... has mostly the character of Being-lost in the publicness of the ‘they’. *Dasein* has... fallen away [*abgefallen*] from itself as an authentic potentiality for Being its Self, and has fallen into the ‘world’. “Fallenness into the ‘world’ means an absorption in Being-with-one-another, in so far as the latter is guided by idle talk, curiosity, and ambiguity (Heidegger, 1962:220).

Fallenness also indicates a pre-ontological mode of being (i.e. not questioning, living day to day unquestioningly) in which *Dasein* essentially fails to acknowledge its ontological condition (capacity to question) and instead ‘falls back’ to everyday inauthenticity by falling back into tasks (readiness-to-hand existence) and consequently reverting back into *das Man*. To explain this notion Heidegger claims, contra Descartes, that the ordinary self is not an individual self, nor the self of Cartesian reflection, instead it is an “anonymous” self one defined by other people. The *Das Man* self, though essential to life, is not our genuine self but a comparative self assigned by the roles we play and social categories (Solomon, 2000:62).

Heidegger provides an interesting psychological depiction of not being a genuine self though simultaneously resembling a condition of other self-making potentiality such that Heidegger’s analysis uncovers the manner of contrivance as born from social circumstance such that the ‘they-self’ construal once objectified is not a concrete or inflexible self. Essentially Heidegger’s analysis uncovers that what is highlighted from this process of phenomenological examination is the human capacity to exhibit and express different ways or modes of self-being. Witness the adoption and varied manifestation of the social-able self. Yet we are anchored by our spatiotemporal embodiment as the potential ground of authentic being in virtue of our individuated compositions, in many ways cognitively reinforced, through social or worldly community life. Counter-intuitively, it seems that the world of people in Heidegger’s analysis would otherwise be replete with no-self beings only social selves or *Dasein*’s whilst as the observational examiner nonetheless expects there exists the potential in each individual or *Dasein* to discover one’s own authentic self though only through the recognition of exiting within a world of its being.

Building on this point Heidegger’s sense of authenticity involves the somewhat foundational notion of ‘care’. Heidegger’s notion of the term ‘care’ (*Sorge*) is extensively construed to imply being involved, of being ‘concerned’, specific to having ‘ends and purposes’ entwined with *Dasein*’s potential (Solomon, 2000:62). The term ‘care’ captures ‘being engaged in the world’ and

in our own lives, particularly with respect to our possibilities. We concern ourselves with the things around us and the situations we confront; and in doing so, “we do not just stand in indifferent or inert relations to them” (Blattner, 2006:44). For *Dasein* then, the concept of care reveals itself in a significant way such that all our activities and who we are, is suffused with caring (Heidegger, 1962:274).

Accordingly when examined from the standpoint of Being-in-the-world Heidegger observes that ‘everydayness reveals itself as a mode of temporality’. In other words our lives always involves time, it pervades every aspect of our lives since everything we do inevitably involves time. Indeed Heidegger subsequently advances a conditional argument: “if temporality makes up the primordial meaning of *Dasein*’s Being and this entity is one for which, in its Being, this very Being is an issue, then care must use ‘time’ and therefore must reckon with time” (Heidegger, 1962:278). Significantly on closer examination Heidegger equates one sense of time by which “entities within-the-world are encountered-time as “within-time-ness” (1962:274). Through the “uncovering of the inner-time-consciousness of *Dasein*’s Being-in-the-world” the endeavour to penetrate the ‘inner heart of time’ sees the project move from the Being of time to the time of Being” (Ward, 2008:101). Heidegger contends that the “primary item in Care is the “ahead-of-itself” (living in the present yet simultaneously in a future direction) however explaining that “*Dasein* exists for the sake of itself” (Heidegger, 1962:279). Reckoning that “[A]s long as it is” “right to its end, it comports itself towards its potentiality-for-Being”. The ‘ahead-of-itself’ as an item in the structure of Care discloses that in *Dasein* something is left outstanding, “not yet become actual” (1962:279).

Heidegger’s construal of this analysis is in terms of *Dasein* achieving ‘wholeness’ though in doing so he incorrectly inferred would otherwise liquidate its Being-in-the-world as capable of being experienced as an entity (1962:280). Ontologically the quest consequently became characterising *Dasein*’s being-at-an-end and of achieving an “existential conception of death as an existential projection of an authentic Being-towards-death” (1962:281). Though this observation is very significant and not to be undermined it however ushers in a phenomenological shift. In summary my contention is that to be a ‘being-there’ (*Dasein*) as a Being-in-the-world is to be an actualising temporal being hence a STEM embodiment first and foremost. Even Heidegger did not believe that time was a thing in and of itself independent of the world and specifically not independent of *Dasein*. Moreover Heidegger claims that “[B]ecause *Dasein* as temporality is ecstatic-horizontal in its Being, it can take along with it a space for which it has made room, and it can do so factually and constantly” (Heidegger, 1962: 420ff). This is equivalent to saying that the ecstasies inherent in Being – living through past, present and future temporalities involves the space we inhabit. In Heidegger’s analysis where *Dasein* takes in space relates to the engagement with equipment relative and limited to a fallen state; such to bring something closer (e.g. in its use) one moves the thing from its “thence” and as such “making-present forgets the

yonder”. But this analysis also demonstrates what is crucially lacking in Heidegger’s overall analysis and that is the perspective of embodied space. Instead Heidegger seems transfixed on the *ecstatico-horizonal* temporality as developed in those following pages of *Being and Time*.

Heidegger endeavours to analyse the coupling of space and time but never really captures the conceptual, let alone the ontological understanding, that being can be thought of as the spatialisation of time (spacetime) and together the enactment of the process of existence within the world/universe. Space and time are interconnected as Einstein’s theory of relativity has resoundingly demonstrated. One need only look out into the night sky at the distant stars to realise one is also looking back in time.

Following a different path however Heidegger in *Being and Time*, claimed that *Dasein’s* *existence*, *facticity* and *falling* reveal themselves in the phenomenon of death (or Being-towards-the-end) (1962:293). *Falling*, in this sense as Heidegger describes, is a kind of fleeing in the face of death such that being-towards-the-end has a ‘mode of evasion’ in the face of it, significantly for this examination, which takes the ascription of *inauthenticity*. *Dasein*, we recall is constituted by ‘disclosedness’, an understanding equated with a state-of-mind such that to ‘comport’ oneself towards death is “Being towards a possibility of *Dasein* itself, as the possibility of authentic existence” (1962:307). It follows that the manner in which one comports oneself is central to achieving authenticity. Not surprising that the characterisation of being-towards-death involves anxiety (a state-of-mind) and ordinarily anxiety is directed towards cowardness. Interestingly, however, Heidegger sees this construal of anxiety as a perverted state (1962:311). *Dasein’s* selfhood is taken formally as a ‘way of existing’ and not as an entity present-at-hand. Heidegger claims that the ‘I’ for most part is not the ‘who’ of *Dasein*, he says instead “the ‘they-self’ (or *Das Man*) is its who” (1962:312). Heidegger contends that “Authentic Being one’s Self takes the definite form of an *existentiell* modification of the ‘they’ (that is, as defined by what one does or whatever designation, baker, waiter, candlestick maker, etc.) announcing that this modification must be defined existentially” (1962:312). However, it seems that this way of understanding the self makes it a relative term, perhaps, as intended. For when *Dasein* brings itself back from the “they” (i.e. the socially assigned self), the “they-self” is modified ... it becomes authentic Being-one’s-Self. Apparently, since *Dasein* is *lost* in the “they” (simply conforming to the social self in an unquestioningly manner), it must first find itself and it can find itself only because it has already in itself, possible authenticity (1962:313). Most significantly what still remain undiscovered through this analysis are the substantive (factual) constitutive elements against which the relative authentic *Dasein* rests and not arguably the adapted version of the juxtaposed *Das man* self or ‘they self’.

As we see for Heidegger the “I” is rather the subject of logical behaviour of binding together, such that “I think”, means I bind together. “All binding together is an ‘I bind’ together” (Heidegger, 162:367). I bind together from the factual state as I contend enabled only as a constituted STEM. Heidegger

believes that the *subjectum* is ‘consciousness in itself’, not a representation but rather the ‘form’ of representation. The ‘I think’ says Heidegger, “is not something represented, but the formal structure of representing as such, and this formal structure alone makes it possible for anything to have been represented” (1962:367). Essentially Heidegger is contending that the ‘I’ as articulated as the *res cogitans* is not pointing to a substance as present-at-hand but instead to a process as “I think something” (1962:367). *Dasein* becomes essentially *Dasein* in so far as authentic existence constitutes itself as anticipatory resoluteness; and as such resoluteness, as a mode of authenticity of care, is thought to contain *Dasein*’s primordial Self-constancy and totality (1962:370). This of course contrary to Heidegger’s insistence is an attitudinal shift in terms of self-reflection and self-examination. However, if this primordial nature is not construed in any substantial manner what is not clear in this analysis is whether there is a distinction between mind as ‘I’, and mind as *Dasein*, though not an ‘I’ substantively construed but nonetheless recognisable simply, as Heidegger insists, a process?

In one sense we are told it is ‘consciousness in itself’ as the ‘form of representation’. Yet in another sense somewhat conflated what is recognised is a process; but of what, consciousness? Surely one does not need to completely disengage from the world to be able to disengage from the constructive process of the ‘I’, of thought. Heidegger says ‘I binds’ and as such what he identifies is the process of it grasping, seizing, in making meaning by constantly attaching to objects in the world in an identifiable manner of which he himself distinguishes two categories of Being (readiness-to-hand and presence-at-hand). Detaching from the mind that is to say not focusing on the content of one’s thought as when in deep state meditation for example, is however not a detachment from existence. Instead it can be a full emersion of authentic being, an understanding that has a long history in many Eastern meditative traditions. Given that Heidegger’s analysis of the conscience is consistent with the idea of nullity (no-thing-ness) that nonetheless in-forms as the ‘call of conscience’, arguably is equiprimordially of what I have previously argued is one’s unique Signature-Energy-Frequency (SEF) (Principle of Individuation) (Naimo, 2011). An analysis quite consistent with Heidegger’s analysis of *Dasein*’s Being-in-the-world but in this case expanding the conceptual description of *Dasein* in terms of embodied STEM agency.

Heidegger suggested that temporality reveals itself as the meaning of “authentic Care” (Heidegger, 1962:376). Time goes on, he describes, and the authentic future is ‘the towards-oneself’. “*Dasein* is historical” (1962:381) and for Heidegger, this construal is significant in that its ascription identifies an aspect of being which differs from simply being part of history, as a part of some recorded event in history. Heidegger employs the term ‘Historicity’, not construed as history, but instead as the condition of being historical, of *Dasein*’s own life-history in an embodied manner. Connected to this is the understanding that *Dasein* is a being-in-time for “*Dasein* uses itself up”; that is, uses its time and in using time *Dasein* reckons with it. Reckoning with time is

constitutive for Being-in-the-world Heidegger observes (1962:382). The notion of existence against this construal is conceived in the sense in “which one’s *Dasein* exists as a coming-towards-oneself such that projection is basically futural” (1962:385). In one sense projection is the structure of understanding and so to understand something is to project it. This point of futural projection can only make sense if time is constitutive of being, more integrally, as I argue, in STEM composition. For what else could be the reference point for *Dasein*? Since for most part Heidegger construes the sense of authentic present against a counterpart inauthentic present. “That Present, which is held in authentic temporality and thus is authentic itself”, Heidegger calls the ‘moment of vision’ – understood in the active sense as *ecstasies* (rapture of three temporal dimensions co-existing) (1962:387). *Augenblick* in *Being and Time* is translated as ‘moment of vision’ taking the ascription “related to ‘sight’ or ‘insight’ [*Einblick*]. ...the *Augenblick* is the ‘vision’ into Being which reveals *Dasein* in its ownmost possibilities of Being, and through which *Dasein* can experience an extraordinary and ‘totalizing’ sense of Being” (Ward, 2008:112).

### States-of-Mind

“Understanding is never free-floating”, but is associated with some state-of-mind. The ‘there’ gets equiprimordially (is foundational) disclosed by one’s mood in every case or gets closed off by it in *falling* (Heidegger, 1962:389). Having a mood brings *Dasein* with its thrownness disclosed far more primordially in ‘how one is’”. “Existentially “Being-thrown” means finding oneself in some state-of-mind or other” and Heidegger concludes that one’s “state-of-mind is therefore based upon thrownness” (1962:389) somehow just from being there as our first realisation. One’s mood takes on the ascription of representation in realising ‘whatever may be the way in which’ one is ‘primarily the entity that has been thrown’ (1962:390). Heidegger explains:

*Bringing Dasein face to face* with the “that-it-is” of its own thrownness – whether authentically revealing it or inauthentically covering it up – becomes existentially possible only if *Dasein*’s Being, by its very meaning, constantly *is* as having been. ... the ecstasis of the “been” is what first makes it possible to find oneself in the way of having a state-of-mind”. The Understanding is grounded primarily in the future; one’s *state-of-mind* however, temporalises itself primarily in *having been*. Moods temporalise themselves – that is, their specific ecstasis belongs to a future and a Present in such a way, indeed, that these equiprimordial ecstases are modified by having been” (1962:390).

Being-in-the-world, in the most inseparable way, is rooted in the spatiotemporal domain of existence. Moods then are regarded as “fleeting experiences” which ‘colour’ one’s whole ‘psychical condition’ and because of this fleeting character Heidegger claims “belongs to the primordial constancy of existence” (Heidegger, 1962:390). Past experiences in other words act as the ground upon which the present, in living towards-the-future in act is the checkpoint for choices made. The construal that one’s state-of-mind is

grounded primarily in 'having been' means that the "existential basic character of moods lies in the *bringing one back to* something" as if to say something central about one's being, of one's core (1962:390). Genetically speaking each individual is relatable through their own unique genetic makeup. Likewise one level of analysis is the construal of an entity identifiable in terms of one's own unique signature-energy-frequency (SEF) (Naimo, 2009:191).

### **Answering Heidegger's Unanswered Questions**

*Being and Time* we know was an incomplete work to which Heidegger in the final section of the work returned to the question of the meaning of being. At the very end he raises these questions after recognising that:

"The existential-ontological constitution of Dasein's being is grounded in temporality. Hence the ecstatic projection of Being must be made possible by some primordial way in which ecstatic temporality temporalizes. 1) How is this mode of the temporalizing of temporality to be Interpreted? 2) Is there a way which leads from primordial *time* to the meaning of *Being*? 3) Does *time* itself manifest itself as the horizon of Being?"(1962:488).

For the first question: How is this mode of the temporalizing of temporality to be Interpreted? To answer this question I argued throughout requires a perspective shift such that space and time are regarded as mutually interdependent as in the model provided in this paper i.e. Space-Time-Event-Motion (STEM) containment-field embodiment (human being); and previous works where I have laid the foundation for this conceptualisation. The second question: Is there a way which leads from primordial *time* to the meaning of *Being*? At this stage of human development this is the most challenging question. One can however advance by inference to best explanation what is conceivably an appropriate hypothesis in the manner of a principle of individuation and identity: Signature-Energy-Frequency (SEF) principle. The evidence already exists supporting the plausibility of this account. Frequency, in the sense of resonance is fundamental in Nature associated with all forms of communications: auditory, chemical and relative energy expression.

To elaborate, matter according to relativity theory is inter-convertible to energy as was made famous by Einstein's mass-energy equation  $E = mc^2$ . The fabric of the Universe according to this observation is physical and as such is reducible to energy. I draw on the observation of Planck's constant which is a formula used by physicists to describe the constant proportionality between the energy emitted or absorbed by an atom and the frequency of emitted or absorbed light (Jibu & Yasu, 1995). Energy characterised as such is the fundamental substance of the Universe definable in terms of frequency. Here, then, is one way to think about how primordial time could lead to an

expression and to the meaning of Being as Heidegger hoped to answer. Humans are born within the world from pre-existing beings, i.e. our parents. We, as all things have evolved! Common to all materialised things is an inherent signature-energy-frequency (SEF). Developmentally through our animated conscious engagement with the external world of phenomena our observations are largely turned outward via our sensory channels whilst concurrently much of how we perceive the world happens internally. That is, as spatiotemporally embodied entities, invariably made of the same stuff that exists in the external world we inhabit, we are nonetheless intrinsically part of, in a compositional way, sensing out from within. There is a coexisting mutually interdependent external spacetime with a coexisting interdependent internal spacetime. For Being involves the inner interpretive and organisational aspects conditional upon spatiotemporal sensory modes. As animated spatiotemporal embodied beings the external world of sensory information constantly requires being transformed into sense receptive, ideational or conceptual meanings. What cannot be answered here is how the fundamental energy of the universe transforms itself into the manifold entities and elements that make up the universe.

For the third question: Does *time* itself manifest itself as the horizon of Being? I answer yes. Explaining in sum by saying ‘Being’ and ‘Time’ is the union and process of existence. Being is the spatialisation of time mutually interdependent, the relation of the enacting process of embodied existence in one’s STEM being. The horizon of projected temporality is consistent with being a STEM constituted being. Heidegger, as the title of his work exemplifies examined ‘Being’ and ‘Time’ as added, somewhat to which we exist in time, just like occupying space but only for a period of time. ‘Being-in-the-world’ was so significantly part of what it is for *Dasein* to exist that Heidegger, I believe, missed the crucial point of connecting ‘being’ ‘with’ ‘time’ so that ‘Being’ and ‘Time’ are coexistent as they are of course.

On the subject of Authenticity as developed in *Being and Time* refers to a “way of relating to our existence” described with no specific content, no universal platform issuing from every authentic *Dasein* (Carman, 2007:289). Heidegger shifts the idea of human existence understood as a unity with a phenomenological account of “Dasein owning up wholly – that is wholeheartedly – to itself in its existence” (Carman, 2007:289). Hence on this account to own up to oneself in one’s existence is to exist authentically such that the deep structure of human is revealed as *falling thrown projection* (Carman, 2007:289). As such then being authentic is to stand resolute against the *Das man* (the ‘One’), of the general everydayness. In authenticity the “public understanding of my world” is used by “projecting on my own possibilities” (Dreyfus & Wrathall, 2007:8) achievable it is contended as STEM causal agents. The role of conscience calls to turn *Dasein* into the reticence of its existent potentiality-for-Being characterised as a resonant sense of understanding equiprimordially, I argued, of one’s Signature-Energy-Frequency. Finally Heidegger’s account of authenticity remains somewhat undeveloped though providing an excellent basis to work from if

reconceptualised in the manner undertaken in this paper. The task now then is to build on this framework.

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