Egoism, the subject of this book, is of unending interest to moral philosophers. Campbell reasonably compares it to scepticism in epistemology: just as it is a touchstone of a good epistemological theory that it should show us why scepticism is unsatisfactory, so it is often taken to be a touchstone of a good moral theory that it shows us what is wrong with egoism. The parallel is imperfect in an interesting way, though; for while scarcely anyone in epistemology ends up rejecting the “touchstone” and outrightly advocating scepticism, this does happen in moral philosophy with egoism. In attempting to expose the deficiencies of egoism, we are not tilting against windmills, nor pushing over straw men. And I think it clear that inquiries such as this could have very real implications for practice as well; in this, as in many things, I concur fully with the author.