DALIA NASSAR “Idealism is nothing but genuine empiricism”: Novalis, Goethe, and the Ideal of Romantic Science U FRIEDRICH SCHLEGEL AND SCHELLING, Novalis1 did not live in Jena, and thus did not have the opportunity to meet regularly or work closely with Goethe.2 While the Schlegel brothers often sought out Goethe’s friendship and advice3 and Schelling worked closely with Goethe during his tenure in Jena,4 Novalis was living in Weißenfels (and Freiberg) and administering the salt mines. In spite of the distance and lack of interaction, Novalis, like many of his young contemporaries, revered Goethe. Unlike his contemporaries, however, Novalis considered Goethe’s genius and most important contribution to lie not in his literary work, but in his scientific experiments and writings.5 In his 1798 essay on Goethe, Novalis refers to Goethe as “der erste Physiker seiner Zeit” (the first physicist of his time), and in the Allgemeine Brouillon (1798–99), Novalis goes so far as to identify his own project with Goethe’s: “Göthische Behandlung der Wissenschaften—mein Project” (Goethean treatment of the sciences—my project) (NS 2:640; NS 3:452, Nr. 967). These claims are at first sight puzzling. Novalis has often been depicted as a poet whose otherworldly attitude evidences little interest in empirical study as practiced by Goethe. Furthermore, Goethe himself criticized Novalis and the romantics for their highly subjective poetry—poetry that did not attempt to express the world but only the self—and, especially toward the end of his life, Goethe sought to distance himself from what he saw as a negative tendency in romanticism.6 Finally, even those who have come to recognize an affinity between Goethe and Novalis continue to emphasize significant differences between the two (noting, for example, that while Goethe was undertaking scientific experiments, Novalis was only theorizing about science) concluding that the questions and goals of their projects were fundamentally distinct.7 Although these differences are significant and should not be overlooked, they do not explain Novalis’s unparalleled admiration for Goethe’s scientific work. In addition, the widespread interpretation of Novalis as a poet whose concerns lie beyond the world of the senses is simply false. Novalis’s interest in science and nature, which is evidenced in most of his work from 1797 onward, is determined by a clear empiricist turn to the world of the senses and to the faculty of observation. In fact, Novalis’s major criticism of other NLIKE Goethe Yearbook XVIII (2011) GYXVIII_TEXT.indd 67 15/12/10 19:26:20 68 Dalia Nassar idealist philosophers is based on what he perceives as a lack of empiricism in their work. Furthermore, Goethe’s own judgment of Novalis as a “subjective” poet was, as Hans-Joachim Mähl has shown, significantly skewed by the Schlegel-Tieck edition of the Novalis Schriften (1802), and thus cannot be taken as a final word on their relationship.8 The questions remain, however, as to the degree of similarity between their scientific goals and practices, and the way in which we should understand Novalis’s unequivocal praise of Goethe’s science.9 There is a very fertile ground from which to begin to answer these questions. For one, Goethe and Novalis were unique among their friends and acquaintances in that they not only had a theoretical knowledge of science but were also practicing scientists. Additionally, they both displayed brilliance in science and poetry and sought to find a common ground between the two. Furthermore, during the time that Novalis was immersed in the study of nature and intensively pursuing the idea of a systematic presentation of all the arts and sciences (his encyclopedia project), he was also engaging with Goethe’s scientific contributions and learning from Goethe’s methods and practices.10 Thus, a comprehensive understanding of Novalis’s encyclopedia project appears to require an elaboration of his interest in Goethe’s work.11 However, Goethe’s influence on Novalis’s thinking cannot be limited to the encyclopedia project, but in fact extends to encompass Novalis’s very understanding of the meaning and practice of science in general. In Goethe, Novalis found a particular manner of approaching the world that became essential for his self-understanding as a philosopher and for his understanding of the goal and meaning of the pursuit of knowledge.12 Given the fact that I am speaking about “romantic science” in a special section on Goethe and German Idealism, it seems worthwhile to mention, if only briefly, the intentions of this essay in light of the goals of the special section.13 My argument is that Novalis’s romanticism was a form of idealism. His famous characterization of romanticism—as the activity of elevation— assumes an identity between the real and the ideal, between nature as material reality and the ideal ground that underlies and constitutes this reality. This is not to equate his idealism with any other form of idealism—he is not, as has often been argued, a Fichtean idealist,14 or a proto-Hegelian idealist;15 nor is he in complete agreement with Schelling.16 Rather, Novalis has his own brand of idealism—one, I will show, that is in significant ways inspired by Goethe’s empirical idealism. The primary aim of this essay is therefore to elaborate the meaning of Novalis’s conception of idealism and show how it developed out of his study of Goethe’s practice of science. Although there are significant differences between Novalis and Goethe—most obviously in Novalis’s goal of establishing an encyclopedia of the arts and sciences and in the fact that Novalis was a philosopher, and much more “at home” in the language and methods of transcendental idealism—these differences do not detract from the goal of this essay.17 I do not wish to identify Novalis and Goethe or to underplay their differences. Rather, my aim is to illustrate how Novalis’s particular brand of idealism is inspired by his study of Goethe’s science and, most significantly, by Goethe’s practice as a scientist. GYXVIII_TEXT.indd 68 15/12/10 19:26:20 Goethe Yearbook 69 The essay will proceed as follows: In the first section I consider Novalis’s burgeoning interest in science and trace the developments of his interest through his critique of his teacher at the Freiberg Mining Academy, Abraham Gottlob Werner (1750–1817). Section two briefly analyses Novalis’s metaphysics and his understanding of the relationship between the human being and nature. The third section investigates Novalis’s interest in Goethe’s scientific writings and considers Novalis’s estimation of Goethe’s combination of intuition and imagination in his scientific pursuits. Section four illustrates the way in which Novalis’s encyclopedia project, and his understanding of the pursuit of knowledge and philosophy in general, were shaped by his appropriation of the Goethean conception of knowledge. In Goethe’s approach, Novalis found the reconciliation of the purely idealist and empiricist tendencies in science (and philosophy), and, on the basis of this approach, went on to develop a system of knowledge which he identified as an “empirical idealism.” Section five briefly reflects upon the conclusions of this essay and examines the meaning of romanticism in light of them. 1. Novalis’s Turn to Science and the Seeds of a Romantic Encyclopedia Novalis’s interest in the natural sciences can be traced back to 1797, the time in which he began to study Schelling’s Naturphilosophie and to consider the meaning of a “system” of nature and the organization of knowledge.18 In his studies of the Dutch philosopher Franz Hemsterhuis (1797), Novalis began to formulate a conception of the organic, which reappears throughout his work, most strikingly in his Kant-Studien (1797), where he distinguishes between an “Aggregate” (aggregate) and an “organische[s] Wesen” (organic being) (NS 2:389, Nr. 1).19 The most significant difference between Novalis’s earlier thought (expressed in his 1795–96 Fichte-Studien) and his work from 1797 onward lies in his newfound interest in nature and science. Not only does he rethink the nature of the self as a being among beings, a member of the natural world, whose moral activity cannot be understood outside of the world, but he also develops an interest in the relations within nature and among the sciences.20 In his Hemsterhuis-Studien, for example, Novalis speaks for the first time of the idea of a “Weltall,” and expresses a concern with locating the unifying principle of knowledge. Throughout the Hemsterhuis-Studien, Novalis quotes Hemsterhuis on the “Coexistenz mehrerer oder aller Ideen” (coexistence of several or all ideas), and identifies it with a special capacity or intelligence. “Die vollkommenste Intelligenz würde eine gänzlich Coexistenz mehrerer oder aller Ideen hervorbringen können” (The most complete intelligence would be able to bring forth a complete coexistence of several or all the ideas) (NS 2:364, Nr. 23). In order to organize the parts into a systematic and meaningful whole, Novalis poignantly remarks, we must locate the idea that unifies and underlies the various parts. For it is only on the basis of an idea—an organizing principle—that order and organization are possible. “Ordnung im Allg[meinen] ist GYXVIII_TEXT.indd 69 15/12/10 19:26:20