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An antidote for hawkmoths: on the prevalence of structural chaos in non-linear modeling

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Abstract

This paper deals with the question of whether uncertainty regarding model structure, especially in climate modeling, exhibits a kind of “chaos.” Do small changes in model structure, in other words, lead to large variations in ensemble predictions? More specifically, does model error destroy forecast skill faster than the ordinary or “classical” chaos inherent in the real-world attractor? In some cases, the answer to this question seems to be “yes.” But how common is this state of affairs? Are there precise mathematical results that can help us answer this question? And is dependence on model structure “sensitive” in that arbitrarily small errors can destroy forecast skill? We examine some efforts in the literature to answer this last question in the affirmative and find them to be unconvincing.

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Notes

  1. Doblas-Reyes et al. (2013).

  2. See, for example, https://www.ecmwf.int/sites/default/files/elibrary/2013/10913-evaluation-forecasts-hurricane-sandy.pdf

  3. See for instance, Allen et al. (2002) and Orrell et al. (2010).

  4. Palmer et al. (2014).

  5. Hereafter referred to as the “LSE group”.

  6. Smith (2002); Frigg et al. (2013a, b); Bradley et al. (2014); Frigg et al. (2014); Thompson(2013). For other relevant discussions of these issues, see Werndl (2019), Winsberg and Goodwin (2016) and Winsberg (2018).

  7. Frigg et al. (2014, 45).

  8. Frigg et al. (2013a, p. 479).

  9. “If a nonlinear model has only the slightest SME, then its ability to generate decision-relevant predictions is compromised.”Frigg et al. (2014, p. 31).

  10. Frigg et al. (2013a, p. 479).

  11. “[T]he challenge stands: those using nonlinear models for predictive purposes have to argue that the model they use is one that is structurally stable, and this is not an easy task.” Frigg et al. (2014); “A further possible defence of the default position might just take our results to be inapplicable to actual modelling practices because wether and climate models are very different from our simple logistic map case....We think the burden of proof is on the proponent of the default position to show what it is that makes such models immune from our criticism.” Bradley et al. (2014).

  12. We take this definition almost verbatim from Werndl (2009) and Mayo-Wilson (2015). One small difference is that we have moved from a definition that applies to maps to one that applies to flows. (Crudely, a map is a function that we iterate to find a system’s trajectory and a flow tells us what happens after a real-numbered value of time. The difference is discussed more formally below.) Both definition 1 and 2 can be converted from a flow-based definition to a map-based definition with ease. It is worth pointing out that talking about SDIC to degree “Δ” is very weak since it says nothing at all about how fast you need to get there and since it demands only that some state y near x, rather than that almost all states y near x, have the property. We use it for two reasons. One is that we are continuing a conversation that begins with Frigg et al. (2014) and continues with a response to them from Mayo-Wilson. The second is that a maximally weak notion of SDIC is maximally favorable to the LSE group since it sets the bar maximally low for them.

  13. Note that this definition talks of “almost all” states, without there being specific mention of a measure. This is fairly standard; the reader is free to interpret them as either conditional on a specified metric or, as we more naturally intend it, as presupposing the Lebesgue measure, a standard practice in discussions of the state space of classical systems. Of course this is a significant problem, as we will see, for the LSE group, since there is no similarly natural measure on the space of evolution functions. Finally, just as the reader can easily convert either definition back and forth between a map and a flow, she can also convert them back and forth from being what is sometimes called a “strong” version (where the claim is about almost all nearby states) and a “weak” version (where the claim is about at least one nearby state). We have chosen to follow Mayo-Wilson and Werndl in giving Definition 1 a “weak” form but we have given definition 2 a “strong” form. Only strong versions of such definitions, obviously, require a measure, but only strong versions are usually taken to have strong epistemological consequences, since they are likely to produce error.

  14. Mayo-Wilson (2015) Our definition 3* is similar to and inspired by his attempt to capture one aspect of what the LSE group might mean by the hawkmoth effect, but we also emphasize that topological mixing is only one aspect of chaos. It happens not to be the feature of chaos, moreover, that is usually associated with the butterfly effect. And finally, in so far as one is looking for the lepidopteric analog of topological mixing, which is a purely topological notion, definition 3** makes the most sense, since it is also topological.

  15. “This distribution, so the argument goes, has been carefully chosen to drive our point home, but most other distributions would not be misleading in such a way, and our result only shows that unexpected results can occur every now and then but does not amount to a wholesale rejection of the closeness-to-goodness link. There is of course no denying that the above calculations rely on a particular initial distribution, but that realization does not rehabilitate the closeness-to-goodness link.” Frigg et al. (2014, p.40, our emphasis).

  16. “we expect [nearby models] to have growing relative entropy” Frigg et al. (2014, p.47).

  17. “In this article we draw attention to an additional problem than has been underappreciated, namely, structural model error (SME)...SME in fact puts us in a worse epistemic situation than SDIC.” Frigg et al. (2014).

  18. Or that the “demon” case we discuss below is a reasonable illustration of it.

  19. It might have some. A reviewer notes, for example, that different models of the Earth’s orbital parameters make a big difference in the predictability of Milankovitch cycles back in time - which has relevance for paleo-climate dating and interpretation.

  20. There are other nearby puzzles: the best model climate science could write down—that is the real true, partial-differential-equation-specified, undiscretized model—would have the form \(\phi : M \times \mathbb {R} \rightarrow M\). It might or might not meet the additional criteria for being a flow, but it is certainly not of the form ϕ : MM, which is the general form of a map. Once we start to think about a discretized model, however, the model does take the form ϕ : MM. Even if we had the perfect climate model and it were a flow, a discretization of it (in time) would necessarily have the form of a map. And no map is in the right universality class—for purposes of structural stability—of a flow. In the sense relevant to structural stability, its simply a category error to ask if a discretization of a dynamical system of the form \(\phi : M \times \mathbb {R} \rightarrow M\) is “nearby to” the undiscretized system. Climate models run on computers are all imperfect, but they don’t live in the same universe of functions as the “true” model of the climate does. Its of course true that there are no guarantees that any currently realizable model ensemble will produce realistic pdfs for a very different globally warmed planet. After all, what if there are missing processes that only kick in at higher temperatures? There are lots of reasons why discretization can lead to errors. But the only issue here is whether mathematical results from the field of structural stability are applicable. And they are only applicable when certain formal preconditions obtain. Those do not appear to obtain here.

  21. An anonymous referee suggest that there are competing definitions of structural stability for maps that do not include the diffeomorphism requirement. Robert Devaney, for example, defines a notion of C2 structural stability that does not require a map to be a bijection. But Devaney also shows that the logistic equation is C2 structurally stable for many parameter values. So adopting such a notion of structural stability does not clearly make the problem of the logistic equation being a poor illustration of absence of structural stability go away entirely. In any case, it is not clear what the logistic equation could have to do with more traditional mathematical definitions of structural stability of the kind the LSE group discuss and regarding which the theorems they reference are about.

  22. In addition to the evidence of theorem 1, we also offer the following anecdotal evidence that maximum one-step error is not a particularly robust measure of model closeness. It happens that in one of the many papers published by the LSE group on this topic, (Frigg et al., 2013(a)), they use an ever-so-slightly different version of the perturbation than they do in their other papers. In place of the function in Eq. 8 they instead used

    $$ \tilde{p}_{t + 1} = 4\tilde{p}_{t}(1 - \tilde{p}_{t}) \left[ (1-\epsilon) + \frac{4}{5}\epsilon(\tilde{p}_{t}^{2} - \tilde{p}_{t} + 1) \right] $$
    (11)

    What is interesting is that, like in Frigg et al. (2014), they report in this paper that for this different perturbation, at 𝜖 = .1, the maximum one-step error (relative to the standard logistic equation) is .005. But this is wrong. The small change in the equation makes the maximum one step error skyrocket to .04, for the same value of 𝜖. We can think of no better anecdotal demonstration of how artificial the maximum one-step error is as a metric of model distance than the fact that the authors took themselves to be presenting the same perturbation twice, and it happened to differ on that metric by a factor of 10.

  23. For example, note that both of these cases apply to our example perturbation—a sine function has different numbers of local minima and maxima than a linear function, while the derivatives of the exponential and linear functions clearly differ by arbitrarily large amounts.

  24. We thank an anonymous referee for suggesting some of these arguments.

  25. Note that there is still a similarly large discrepancy even if one folds the multiplicative factor 16/5 into the 𝜖 term for the purposes of comparison with Theorem 1.

  26. Some of these questions are very similar to the ones posed by Mayo-Wilson in Mayo-Wilson (2015).

  27. Essentially, for sufficiently “well-behaved” functions, the maximum value.

  28. That is, the suprema are finite.

References

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Acknowledgments

We would like to thank Mathias Frisch, Blaine Lawson, Seung-Yeop Lee, Connor Mayo-Wilson, Jessica Williams, the audience members at talks in London, Ontario and Chicago, and our anonymous reviewers for helpful comments on earlier drafts as well as many useful discussions of mathematical questions. Responsibility for any remaining errors is of course our own!

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Appendices

Appendix A: Proof of Theorem 1

Theorem 1

Suppose we are given a difference equation of the form

$$ x_{n + 1} = f(x_{n}), $$
(13)

where \(x_{i} \in \mathbb {R}\) and f : AB is an arbitrary function from the bounded interval \(A \subset \mathbb {R}\) into the bounded interval \(B \subset \mathbb {R}\). Then given any function g : AB and 𝜖 > 0, there exists δ > 0 and η > 0 such that the maximum one-step error of

$$ x^{\prime}_{n + 1} = \eta f(x^{\prime}_{n}) + \delta g(x^{\prime}_{n}), $$
(14)

from Eq. 9 is at most 𝜖 and xn+ 1B.

Proof

Set δ and η such that

$$|\delta| \leqslant \left|\frac{\epsilon}{2\sup\{g(x_{n})\}}\right| \quad \text{and} \quad |\eta-1| \leqslant \left|\frac{\epsilon}{2\sup\{f(x_{n})\}}\right|,$$

where sup{f(x)} denotes the supremumFootnote 27 of f over all \(x \in \mathbb {R}\). Note that the suprema existFootnote 28 because f and g are bounded. Since the one-step error is

$$\begin{array}{@{}rcl@{}} |x^{\prime}_{n + 1} - x_{n + 1}| &=& |\eta f(x_{n}) + \delta g(x_{n}) - f(x_{n})| \\ &=& |(\eta - 1)f(x_{n}) + \delta g(x_{n})|, \end{array} $$

by the triangle inequality, the maximum one-step error is

$$\begin{array}{@{}rcl@{}} \sup\{|x'_{n + 1} - x_{n + 1}|\} \!&=&\! \sup\{|(\eta - 1)f(x_{n}) + \delta g(x_{n})|\} \\ \!&\leqslant&\! \sup\{|\eta - 1||f(x_{n})| + |\delta||g(x_{n})|\} \\ \!&\leqslant&\! \sup\left\{\left|\frac{\epsilon}{2\sup\{f(x_{n})\}}\right||f(x_{n})|\right\} + \sup\left\{\left|\frac{\epsilon}{2\sup\{g(x_{n})\}}\right||g(x_{n})|\right\}\\ \!&=&\! \left|\frac{\epsilon\sup\{f(x_{n})\}}{2\sup\{f(x_{n})\}}\right| + \left|\frac{\epsilon \sup\{g(x_{n})\}}{2\sup\{g(x_{n})\}}\right| \\ \!&=&\! \frac{\epsilon}{2} + \frac{\epsilon}{2} \\ \!&=&\! \epsilon, \end{array} $$

as desired. □

Appendix B: Proof of Theorem 2

Theorem 2

For all 𝜖 > 0 and1 > δ > 0, there exists an infinite set of polynomials g : [0, 1] → [0, 1], written

$$g(x) = \alpha_{n}x^{n} + \alpha_{n-1}x^{n-1} + {\cdots} + \alpha_{k + 1}x^{k + 1} + \alpha_{k}x^{k},$$

such that

$$ \min\{|\alpha_{k}|, |\alpha_{k + 1}|, \ldots, |\alpha_{n}|\} \geqslant 1 - \delta \quad \text{and} \quad \sup|g(x)| < \epsilon. $$
(15)

Proof

Let 0 ≤ e2(nk)/𝜖 < k < n ≤ 1/δ, where e = 2.71828… is Euler’s constant, and define αk,…,αn by setting

$$ \sum\limits_{i=k}^{n}\alpha_{i} = 0, \quad |1 - |a_{i}|| < \delta, \quad \text{and} \quad |\alpha_{i + 1} + \alpha_{i}| < {\epsilon \over n-k} $$
(16)

for all kin. Then since

$$\begin{array}{@{}rcl@{}} \sup|g(x)| &=& \sup|\alpha_{n}x^{n} + \alpha_{n-1}x^{n-1} + {\cdots} + \alpha_{k + 1}x^{k + 1} + \alpha_{k}x^{k}| \\ &\leqslant& \sup|\alpha_{n}x^{n} + \alpha_{n-1}x^{n-1}| + {\cdots} + \sup|\alpha_{k + 1}x^{k + 1} + \alpha_{k}x^{k}|, \end{array} $$

it suffices to determine the extrema of gi(x) := αi+ 1xi+ 1 + αixi for all kin − 1. In that direction, note that the extrema of a function occurs either where that function’s first derivative vanishes or at the end points. Thus, the possible maxima are gi(0) = 0,

$$|g_{i}(1)| = |\alpha_{i + 1} + \alpha_{i}| < {\epsilon \over n-k},$$

by Eq. 16, and, since

$$\begin{array}{@{}rcl@{}} 0 = {dg_{i}(x) \over dx} &=& x^{i}(\alpha_{i + 1}x + \alpha_{i}) \\ &=& ix^{i}(\alpha_{i + 1}x + \alpha_{i}) + \alpha_{i + 1}x^{i} \\ &=& i\alpha_{i + 1}x^{i + 1} + (i\alpha_{i} + \alpha_{i + 1})x^{i} \\ &=& x^{i}(i\alpha_{i + 1}x + i\alpha_{i} + \alpha_{i + 1}) \end{array} $$

has solutions at x = 0 and x = −(iαi + αi+ 1)/iαi+ 1,

$$\begin{array}{@{}rcl@{}} \left| g_{i}\left( -{i\alpha_{i} + \alpha_{i + 1}\over i\alpha_{i + 1}}\right) \right| &=& \left|\alpha_{i + 1}\left( -{i\alpha_{i} + \alpha_{i + 1}\over i\alpha_{i + 1}} \right)^{i + 1} + \alpha_{i}\left( -{i\alpha_{i} + \alpha_{i + 1}\over i\alpha_{i + 1}} \right)^{i} \right| \\ &=& \left|(-1)^{i + 1}{\alpha_{i + 1}(i\alpha_{i} + \alpha_{i + 1})^{i + 1}\over (i\alpha_{i + 1})^{i + 1}} + (-1)^{i}{\alpha_{i}(i\alpha_{i} + \alpha_{i + 1})^{i}\over (i\alpha_{i + 1})^{i}} \right| \\ &=& \left|{\alpha_{i + 1}(i\alpha_{i} + \alpha_{i + 1})^{i + 1} - i\alpha_{i}\alpha_{i + 1}(i\alpha_{i} + \alpha_{i + 1})^{i}\over (i\alpha_{i + 1})^{i + 1}} \right| \\ &=& \left| {\alpha_{i + 1}^{2}(i\alpha_{i} + \alpha_{i + 1})^{i}\over (i\alpha_{i + 1})^{i + 1}} \right|. \end{array} $$

Applying (16), the definition of k and n, and the well-known inequality (1 + 1/i)ie, we have

$$\left| g_{i}\left( -{i\alpha_{i} + \alpha_{i + 1}\over i\alpha_{i + 1}}\right) \right| < {i^{i}(1 + \delta)^{i} \over i^{i + 1}\alpha_{i + 1}^{i-1}} = {(1 + \delta)^{i} \over i(1 - \delta)^{i-1}} \leqslant {(1 + 1/i)^{i} \over i(1 - 1/i)^{i-1}} \leqslant {e^{2} \over k} < {\epsilon \over n-k}.$$

Hence, after summing over all i, we conclude that sup |g(x)| < 𝜖. Since the first inequality in Eq. 15 holds by definition, and there exist an uncountable infinity of coefficients αk,…,αn satisfying (15), this yields the desired result. □

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Nabergall, L., Navas, A. & Winsberg, E. An antidote for hawkmoths: on the prevalence of structural chaos in non-linear modeling. Euro Jnl Phil Sci 9, 21 (2019). https://doi.org/10.1007/s13194-018-0244-2

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