

What Is Evaluable for Fit?

Oded Na'aman

4.1 Introduction

Our beliefs, intentions, desires, regrets, and fears are evaluable for fit—they can succeed or fail to be fitting responses to the objects they are about.¹ Can our headaches and heartrates be evaluable for fit? The common view says ‘no’. I will argue: sometimes, yes.

To get a sense of what I have in mind, consider Darwin’s description of a frightened man:

The frightened man at first stands like a statue motionless and breathless, or crouches down as if instinctively to escape observation. The heart beats quickly and violently, so that it palpitates or knocks against the ribs . . . the skin instantly becomes pale, as during incipient faintness . . . That the skin is much affected under the sense of great fear, we see in the marvelous and inexplicable manner in which perspiration immediately exudes from it. This exudation is

¹ I am indebted to an extremely helpful discussion with participants of the Fit Fest Workshop, held in May 2021, most of whom contributed their own chapters to this volume. I also benefited from discussion of the chapter at a conference on ‘Reasoning and Agency’ held at Tel Aviv University and online in August 2021. For written comments and extensive conversation, I am grateful to Rachel Achs, Selim Berker, Chris Howard, and Alex Prescott-Couch.

all the more remarkable, as the surface is then cold, and hence the term a cold sweat . . . The hairs also on the skin stand erect; and the superficial muscles shiver. In connection with the disturbed action of the heart, the breathing is hurried. The salivary glands act imperfectly; the mouth becomes dry . . . One of the best-marked symptoms is the trembling of all the muscles of the body; and this is often first seen in the lips. From this cause, and from the dryness of the mouth, the voice becomes husky or indistinct, or may altogether fail.

(Darwin 1872/2009: 290–291)

My initial case against the common view asks: given that fear is evaluable for fit, why not the various bodily episodes and sensations that accompany fear? I then consider and resist various answers to this question.

The common view is usually not expressed in terms of fit, but in terms of rationality, justification, or reasons: the view is that sensations and bodily episodes are not evaluable by standards of rationality, justification, or reasons. I will eventually argue that the notion of fit-evaluability better captures the phenomenon in question, but for the sake of argument I begin by adopting the notion of *rational evaluability*.

Often, the common view makes its appearance when authors contrast states that are rationally evaluable with certain bodily episodes and sensations. Scanlon (1998: 20) contrasts belief and intention with hunger, tiredness, and distraction; Moran (2001: 114) contrasts desires we can reason to with hunger or fatigue; Boyle (2011: 22) says we can reason to belief but not to pain; Brady (2018: 81) contrasts rational emotions with experiences of coldness, tiredness, hunger, nausea, and irritation; and Neta (2018: 289) contrasts conspiring, concluding, resenting, and fearing with feeling tired, craving Doritos, and having an itch on your elbow. This is a small selection; there are many, many more examples of the common

view. That hunger, tiredness, and pains, like other bodily episodes and sensations, are not rationally evaluable is considered a truism not worth arguing for.

The common view about what is rationally evaluable has shaped contemporary discussions of fittingness, which focus on fitting *attitudes* to the exclusion of other possible candidates for fit-evaluation.² I will challenge the assumption that sensations, feelings, and bodily episodes can at most be caused by fit-evaluable attitudes and suggest that, like attitudes, they are fit-evaluable when and because they are explained by fit-evaluable narratives.

I begin, in section 4.2, by drawing the distinction between rationally evaluable items and non-rational items. I recount what is often said in order to distinguish the kinds of items that fall in each category. Then, in section 4.3, I offer an initial case against the common view: I argue that according to our evaluative practices, an accelerated heartrate is rationally evaluable when associated with one's fear. In section 4.4, I consider and reject the objection that I misdescribe our evaluative practices. In section 4.5, I argue that the common view is informed by questionable theoretical assumptions. In particular, it seems to be widely assumed that whether a physical or mental phenomenon is ever fit-evaluable is determined by the type of phenomenon it is. In section 4.6, I suggest an alternative whereby the same type of phenomenon can be fit-evaluable on one occasion but not on another. What explains the difference, I argue, is that only in the former occasion the phenomenon is explained by the agent's fit-evaluable narrative as an element of emotion.

² To be sure, some of the historical literature on fittingness seems to assume that actions (as well as attitudes) are fit evaluable. See, for example, [Broad \(1930\)](#) and [Ross \(1939\)](#) (I thank Chris Howard for this point and for the references). However, [McHugh and Way \(forthcoming\)](#) is a great example of the contemporary tendency to privilege attitudes. I say more about this later.

4.2 The common view

Philosophers distinguish (1) things that are subject to, or assessable by, norms of rationality and justification and (2) things that are not. I will refer to things falling under (1) as *rationaly evaluable items* and to things falling under (2) as *non-rational items*. How to analyse the distinction is controversial and various accounts of it have been offered, but there is a general agreement on what falls on each side of the distinction.

Consider the following lists, divided according to what I will call *the common view of the distinction*:

LIST 1. Rationally evaluable items:

Believing an online-meeting starts at 11 a.m., dreading the meeting, intending to join the meeting, joining the meeting, coming to the conclusion that the meeting had started at 10:30 a.m., regretting that you didn't double check the meeting time, and apologizing for your late arrival.

LIST 2. Non-rational items:

Feeling tired, having an itch on your chin, being hungry, experiencing a warm glow, feeling nauseous or dizzy, having a headache, digesting, sensing your heartrate accelerating, and your heartrate accelerating.

LIST 1 includes paradigmatic examples of rationally evaluable kinds, such as actions (joining the meeting), beliefs (believing the meeting starts at 11 a.m.) and intentions (intending to join the meeting). The list also includes emotions (dreading the meeting, regretting you didn't double check the meeting time). The view that at least some emotions are rationally evaluable is somewhat more controversial than the view that intentions and beliefs are rationally evaluable, and yet it is widely accepted. LIST 2 includes items that are almost universally thought to be non-rational, such as hunger, headaches, and heartrates.

My first goal is to dispute the way the distinction is normally applied, as illustrated by LIST 1 and LIST 2; I will argue that hunger, headaches, and heartrates can sometimes be rationally evaluable. My second goal is to make sense of the distinction in light of my first thesis. But first, consider what is often said of our evaluative practices in order to distinguish the kinds of items in LIST 1 from those in LIST 2. I summarize seven generally agreed upon and closely related characteristics of rationally evaluable items. With regard to each I explain how it leads to the common application of the distinction:

- a. **Rationally evaluable items are items to which we normally apply norms of rationality and justification.** It makes sense, according to our evaluative practices, to ask whether a person's belief that the meeting starts at 11 a.m. and her intention to join the meeting are rational and justified. We thus evaluate beliefs and intentions according to norms of rationality and justification. We also ask such questions and make such evaluations with respect to emotions, such as guilt, admiration, anger, pride, etc. However, it does not make sense to evaluate a person's headache or heartrate by applying to them norms of rationality and justification, so headaches and heartrates are non-rational.
- b. **Rationally evaluable items are items for which we normally seek and offer reasons-for-which explanations.** You might intelligibly ask why I dread the meeting in the specific sense of asking for the reason *in light of which* I dread the meeting.³ But it would not be intelligible to ask me for the reason in light of which I

³ I prefer the term *reasons-for-which* to *motivating reasons*. The term *motivating reasons* is often used to refer to the explanatory role of reasons as motivators of actions. A so-called *motivating reason* motivates an agent to act, as opposed to a *normative reason*, which counts towards the justification of the action. Attitudes, however, are not formed on the basis of motivations. That the bear is dangerous is not the reason that motivates my fear of the bear, it is the reason in light of which I fear the bear. It is

am tired or dizzy. Though my tiredness and dizziness can, in principle, be explained, they cannot be rationalized or justified (Neta 2018: 289). So rationally evaluable items are items that can be given an explanation of a specific kind; they may be given a *reasons-for-which* explanation.

- c. **Rationally evaluable items are items we normally expect to align with the agent's judgements.** Rationally evaluable items are answerable to the agent's judgements: their presence or absence is impacted by the presence or absence of the relevant evaluative judgements (Moran 2017: 144). My belief that the meeting starts at 11 a.m. should change when, after joining the meeting, I come to the conclusion that the meeting had started at 10:30 a.m. Similarly, I should change my intention to join the meeting if I judge that there is no reason for me to attend it after all. By contrast, it is not a rational failure on my part that my headache persists despite my judgement that it is bad nor do we expect my heartrate to drop simply because I cannot explain its sudden acceleration. Sometimes this point is put by saying that rationally evaluable items are 'judgement sensitive': they depend on a rational agent's judgements about normative reasons (Scanlon 1998: 20).

also the reason in light of which I run away. So the term *reasons-for-which* captures the explanatory role of reasons in the formation of both actions and attitudes. Moreover, I might have motivations that explain my action or attitude but are not the reasons in light of which I perform an action or form an attitude. My shyness can motivate my decision not to ask a question without being a reason in light of which I decide not to ask a question. So the term *reasons-for-which* is adequately broader but also adequately narrower than the term *motivating reasons*. I therefore think it more precisely picks out the relevant reason-explanation of rationally evaluable items. Thanks to Selim Berker for discussion.

d. **Rationally evaluable items are items we can normally reason to.**

Rationally evaluable items need not result from reasoning but they can, in principle, be reasoned to, and if challenged one should be disposed to provide the reasoning that leads to them (e.g. [Smith 2005](#); [McHugh 2017](#)). My apology upon realizing that I was late to the meeting need not result from a process of practical reasoning, but if someone asked why I apologized I should be able to provide the reasoning that leads to my apology, or to my decision to apologize. Pamela Hieronymi captures this point by saying that ‘an intention to ϕ embodies one’s answer to the question of whether to ϕ ’, which makes one vulnerable to ‘questions and criticisms that would be satisfied by reasons that (one takes to) bear positively on whether to ϕ ’ ([Hieronymi 2009](#): 138–139). When a person is tired or hungry there can be no similar pressure because such states cannot be reasoned *to*. To be sure, one can reason to the *intention to bring about* or *prevent* states of tiredness and hunger, but one cannot reason to tiredness and hunger directly. Conor McHugh makes a similar point about the relation between belief and the reasoning that supports it:

If your visual experience causes you to acquire the belief that the wall is white, but you are in no way disposed to reason from the belief that the wall looks white to the belief that it is white—should your belief that it is white be challenged, say—then you don’t count as basing the latter belief on the former, and thus as responding to the putative reason given by its content. ([McHugh 2017](#): 2757)

e. **Rationally evaluable items are normally attributable to the agent.**

Rationally evaluable items reveal the agent’s evaluative point of view and therefore reveal something about the agent’s mind or self ([Hieronymi 2014](#): 16). My dread of the meeting reveals that I view it as threatening and my intention to join the meeting

reveals that I view it as worth joining despite the threat I take it to pose. Similarly, although I say that the dog is not dangerous, my fear can reveal that I view it as dangerous indeed. Moreover, even if I sincerely judge that the dog poses no danger, the fact that my fear persists indicates a failure of rationality due to a conflict within my evaluative perspective. Thus, our rationally evaluable attitudes express our evaluations of their objects. As such, they are *attributable* to us in a way that non-rational items are not. An itch, perspiration, or a rash, do not reveal a person's evaluative perspective nor anything else about the person's mind or self. In this respect, non-rational sensations and bodily episodes are like any other event or condition that is not attributable to an agent: the rotation of the earth, the sunlight entering the room through the window, the room temperature, the breaking of the glass, the stain on the carpet. In some of these cases, agents can be held responsible for bringing about or not preventing these events and conditions, but these events and conditions are not *of* an agent in the way that the intention to bring them about or prevent them is.

- f. **Only attitudes are fundamentally rationally evaluable.** The recent focus on attitudes in philosophy of normativity is sometimes accompanied by the proposal that all rationally evaluable items are explained by rationally evaluable *attitudes* (and only rationally evaluable attitudes are not explained by other kinds of rationally evaluable items). This is the thesis that *only attitudes are fundamentally rationally evaluable*. Actions, for example, are said to be rationally evaluable only when and because they are expressions of rationally evaluable intentions, which are, of course, rationally

evaluable *attitudes*.⁴ So the distinction between what is rationally evaluable and what is non-rational is often described as a distinction between *rationally evaluable attitudes* and *non-rational attitudes, feelings, moods, sensations, and bodily episodes*. It is important to note here that according to this view, nothing physical—no movement or occurrence in the body—is itself rationally evaluable; physical movements and occurrences are only rationally evaluable as guises of rationally evaluable attitudes. Moreover, many mental states are also non-rational. So there is a question about which mental states fall on either side of the distinction.⁵

- g. **Rationally evaluable items are items that are fit-evaluable.** Rationally evaluable attitudes can be fitting or unfitting to what they are about—they can be evaluable for fit. Fit is a normative relation between an attitude and what it is about. Different types of attitudes are individuated by the kinds of things that *merit* them or that they are *fitting* to. Fear is fitting to (or is merited by) what is fearsome, admiration is fitting to (or merited by) what is admirable, belief is fitting to (or merited by) what is credible, and desire is fitting to (or merited by) what is desirable. It is generally assumed that all rationally evaluable items are fit-evaluable and, given (f), it is further assumed that most if not all fit-evaluable items are attitudes.⁶ However, sensations,

⁴ Gibbard (1990: 38–9), Scanlon (1998: 21), Portmore (2011: 63), Smith (2013: 60), and Hedden (2015: ch. 6) endorse this view. Recently, McHugh and Way (forthcoming) have argued for this view at length.

⁵ Nolfi (2015) offers an answer to the question which mental states are rationally evaluable. However, Nolfi shares the assumption I will later question, namely, that rational evaluability is a property of *types* of items.

⁶ Howard (2018) suggests actions can be evaluable for fit.

pains, and conditions such as fatigue or thirst are neither fit-evaluable nor rationally evaluable.

These are the seven commonly invoked characteristics of rationally evaluable items. As we saw, it is commonly thought that, when considered in light of our evaluative practices, these characteristics apply primarily to attitudes and not to bodily episodes and sensations, which are, therefore, non-rational.

4.3 The initial case against the common view

The correct description of our evaluative practices—of our normal expectations and dispositions—does not, by itself, settle the question of which items are rationally evaluable. However, if we normally treat a certain item as rationally evaluable this is strong *prima facie* reason to hold that it is in fact rationally evaluable. To argue that, contrary to our practices, the item in question is non-rational, one must provide some strong reason against the apparent force of our practices. Alternatively, one can dispute the accepted interpretation of our evaluative practices and argue that we do not treat the item in question as rationally evaluable after all.

Consider the example of grief. Stephen Wilkinson argues that grief is non-rational by appealing to our evaluative practices (Wilkinson 2000). He claims that lack of normal grief in response to loss does not strike us as a rational failure as long as one's beliefs and desires are rational and justified. By contrast, Donald Gustafson argues that, contrary to our evaluative practices, grief is always irrational. Gustafson appeals to a theory of rationality according to which a rational state must enable the agent to realize states of affairs she desires; he then argues that grief fails to do so (Gustafson 1989). Responses to these and similar arguments contest Wilkinson's interpretation of our evaluative practices regarding grief (Jollimore 2004)

as well as Gustafson's theoretical assumptions about rationality (Cholbi 2017; Marušić 2018; Moller forthcoming).

Despite these debates—and perhaps as a result of them—the common view today is that grief is rationally evaluable and that this is supported both by our evaluative practices and by commonly accepted theoretical assumptions about rationality and justification.⁷ I, too, share the view that grief is rationally evaluable, but I think we should go even further and maintain that, for example, the headaches, sleeplessness, and loss of appetite that normally accompany grief (or that are elements of grief) are also rationally evaluable. To argue for this departure from the common view, I first dispute the common depiction of our evaluative practices and then question the theoretical assumptions that underlie it.

Start with the following example: your heartrate. According to the common view of rationally evaluable items, both the bodily episode and the feeling of your heart racing are non-rational. Consider characteristics (a) to (g) with respect to the following case:

RUNNING TO THE BUS

Your heart races after running to catch the bus.

(a) It makes little sense to *evaluate the rationality* or *justification* of your accelerated heartrate after running to catch the bus; (b) while there is a clear cause there is no *reason in light of which* your heart is accelerating in this case; (c) we should not expect your heartrate to decrease in response to changes in your evaluative judgements, so your racing heart is not *judgement-sensitive*; (d) we also do not suppose that you must be able, if challenged, *to reason to* your accelerated heartrate; (e) your racing heart is not an expression of your *evaluative point of view* nor is it attributable to you in the way your intentions or regrets are; (f) your heartrate and

⁷ But the idea that grief is rationally evaluable has also given rise to theoretical questions about the expiration of reasons and the temporality of fit. See Moller (2007, forthcoming); Marušić (2018, forthcoming); Na'aman (2021); Schönherr (forthcoming).

your experience of it are not *attitudes* and they are not explained as rationally evaluable by rationally evaluable attitudes; (g) your heartrate and your experience of it are not evaluable for fit. So far, the common view seems correct when assessed in light of the characteristics of rationally evaluable items outlined about. In **RUNNING TO THE BUS**, your racing heart as well as your sensation of your racing heart are non-rational.

Now consider a different example:

BEAR ENCOUNTER

It is a dark night and you are camping alone in the woods. As you fall asleep near the campfire, you hear a noise, turn around, and see a bear standing over you. The bear is examining you, looking you up and down. In any moment, he might strike you and it will all be over. Your heart is racing. In fact, your heart is beating at the exact same pace as it was beating after you ran to catch the bus: you are in a very different predicament but have the very same heartrate.

I begin my push against the common view by making an initial case that your accelerated heartrate upon facing the bear is rationally evaluable: it has crucial characteristics of a rationally evaluable item and gives us reason to revise other purported characteristics of rationally evaluable items. Let us consider each characteristic in turn:

(a) It should be uncontroversial that the fear you experience as you face the bear is rationally evaluable. Indeed, your fear might very well be both rational and justified since you are in fact in great danger. Your racing heart seems rational and justified in response to the bear for the same reasons that your fear is rational and justified. Had you responded in the same way to a mouse, both your fear and your racing heart would seem rationally criticizable and unjustified. That said, fear is a *kind* of item to which we normally apply norms of rationality and justification, whereas the same cannot be said of an accelerated heartrate, as demonstrated by **RUNNING TO THE BUS**. Despite this difference, in **BEAR**

ENCOUNTER the presence of the bear seems to justify and rationalize your racing heart as well as your fear. I return to this issue below.

(b) There seems to be a reason in light of which your heart is racing: you are in great danger. That you are in danger is not merely a causal explanation of your racing heart, but a reason-for-which explanation. To see this, consider the statement: ‘my heart is racing because there’s a bear approaching me.’ Now contrast BEAR ENCOUNTER with a deviant-causal-chain variant in which a bear approaches you, unseen, and steps on a button that triggers a mechanism that causes you to see a hologram of a bear, which in turn causes your heart to race. In this variant, the claim ‘my heart is racing because there’s a bear approaching me’ is only true when we switch to using a ‘because’ of causal explanation. The fact that the relevant sense of ‘because’ seems to change between the cases supports the idea that in the original BEAR ENCOUNTER case ‘because’ denotes a reason-for-which explanation.⁸

Another indication that there is a reason for which your heart is racing is the fact that it is possible to *ignore* the reason for which your heart is racing. Start, again, with fear. Suppose I’m scheduled to give a talk later today and I fear being exposed as a sham. One friend tries to reason with me. She points out, for example, that I’ve proven myself as a worthy philosopher in the past, or that this talk was received well on other occasions. I am not a sham and will not be exposed as one and therefore my fear is unjustified. Perhaps she makes good points, perhaps not. But in any case, I am not persuaded and my fear persists. A second friend tries a different approach: she offers me a tranquillizer. The tranquillizer mitigates my fear, but it ignores the reason in light of which I am afraid, namely, that I deem it likely that I be exposed as a sham. The tranquillizer has a non-rational impact on my fear. Now, as I take the tranquillizer and my fear dissipates my heartrate drops. But just as in taking the tranquillizer I ignore the reasons-for-which I fear, so I ignore the reason-for-which my heart races. The

⁸ I thank Selim Berker for this point and example.

tranquillizer has a non-rational impact on my heartrate. So there is a reason-for-which explanation of my accelerated heartrate; it is the same as the reason-for-which explanation of my fear. Had my first friend been successful in persuading me that I will do well in my talk, both my fear and my heartrate would rationally dissipate due to a change in the reasons I take myself to have.

(c) As in the case of fear, we should expect your heartrate to decrease upon judging that you are out of danger or that the bear is not dangerous after all (if, e.g. the bear turns out to be your friend in a very realistic bear costume). Your racing heart is as much a reflection of your judgement as your fear is. So your racing heart in facing the bear is judgement-sensitive.

This might seem too quick. When Scanlon introduces the notion of ‘judgement-sensitive attitudes’ he writes: ‘These are attitudes that an ideally rational person would come to have whenever that person judged there to be sufficient reasons for them and that would, in an ideally rational person, “extinguish” when that person judged them not to be supported by reasons of the appropriate kind’ (Scanlon 1998: 20). To judge that one is in danger is not to judge that one’s heartrate is supported by sufficient reason. So the fact that one’s heartrate would decrease upon judging one is out of danger does not yet show that one’s heartrate is judgement-sensitive. And if it never makes sense to ask whether one’s heartrate is supported by sufficient reason then an ideally rational agent would not make judgements about the matter and the notion of judgement-sensitivity would not apply to heartrates. So to accept the claim that one’s heartrate is judgement-sensitive in BEAR ENCOUNTER one must already accept the conclusion that this claim is meant to support, namely, that one’s heartrate is rationally evaluable.

However, Scanlon’s characterization of judgement-sensitive attitudes is ambiguous with regard to the content of the relevant judgements. On the first, narrow reading of Scanlon’s statement, a judgement-sensitive attitude is sensitive only to the judgement <there is/is not

sufficient reasons for this attitude>. This is the reading the objection presupposes. On the second, broad reading of the statement, a judgement-sensitive attitude is also sensitive to the judgement <fact r obtains> where r constitutes sufficient reason for this attitude, or <fact r does not obtain> where the absence of r implies that this attitude is not supported by reasons of the appropriate kind.

To see that the broad reading is more plausible, consider the following. An ideally rational person who judges < p is credible> would believe p even if she does not make the further judgement <there is sufficient reason to believe p >. Similarly, an ideally rational person who judges <I ought to ϕ > would have the intention to ϕ even if she does not make the further judgement <there is sufficient/decisive reason to intend to ϕ >. And, finally, an ideally rational person who judges <the bear is dangerous> would fear the bear even if she does not make the further judgement <there is sufficient reason to fear the bear>. It is therefore more plausible that an item's judgement-sensitivity includes an item's sensitivity to a person's judgements about facts that constitute reasons for the item; the item is not merely sensitive to judgements about whether the item is supported by reasons. So the fact that your heartrate drops when you judge that you are no longer in danger can be an indication that your heartrate is judgement-sensitive in this case.

(d) If your fear is challenged, you should be able to reconstruct the reasoning that leads to it— e.g. the bear is only a few feet away and might kill me in one stroke, so I'm in great danger. Adopting Hieronymi's terminology, we can say that just as an intention to ϕ embodies one's answer to the question of whether to ϕ , fear of the bear embodies one's answer to the question of whether the bear poses a danger to oneself. We form a rationally evaluable attitude by answering a question about its content. It is arguable that one's racing heart in response to the bear is *also* an embodiment of one's answer to the question of whether the bear poses a

danger. If that is so, then you can reason to your racing heart in the very same way that you reason to your fear.

(e) We *are* inclined to view your racing heart in this case as an expression of your evaluative point of view and to attribute it to you in the same way we attribute your fear to you. Just like your fear, so your perspiration, shivers, and racing heart express your understanding and appreciation of your predicament. Another indication that we attribute these responses to you is the fact that if your shivers, perspiration, and racing heart continue after the bear has gone away, we might appropriately *reason with you* to persuade you that you are no longer in danger. Since we take your physical symptoms to be justified in response to perceived danger, and we take you to be rational, we expect these symptoms to go away once you judge that you are out of danger. We would not have the same expectation if your heartrate were drug-induced.

(f) It is true that your racing heart and your sensation of it are not themselves attitudes. However, the fact that they bear crucial characteristics of rationally evaluable items and that in the bear encounter case they are closely associated with the attitude of fear, suggests that there is a connection—perhaps an explanatory connection—between the rational evaluability of bodily episodes and sensations and the rational evaluability of attitudes. I consider this connection in section 4.6. Perhaps, it might be suggested, the connection is merely causal—your rationally evaluable fear causes your heart to race—and the appearance of rational evaluability is illusory? However, at this stage in the argument, I am only concerned with how things appear to be. I consider this proposal and offer reasons against it in the next section (section 4.4).

(g) If only attitudes are fit-evaluable then your racing heart, which is not an attitude, is not fit-evaluable. However, in light of the fact that your racing heart bears many characteristics of fit-evaluable items, the following possibilities should be considered. First, it is possible that things other than attitudes are fit-evaluable. Second, perhaps bodily episodes and sensations

are fit-evaluable when and because they stand in a certain relation to attitudes that are fit-evaluable. Again, more on this in section 4.6.

This concludes my initial case for the claim that our evaluative practices treat at least some bodily episodes and sensations as sometimes rationally evaluable. It is worth noting that the example we have been considering is by no means an outlier. Our rationally evaluable attitudes are often accompanied by bodily episodes, conditions, and sensations that seem to be as rationally evaluable as the attitudes they accompany. In our daily life, we do not normally draw the distinction, commonly drawn by philosophers, between attitudes and other mental and physical states and events. It is therefore striking that the expansive philosophical literature on rationally evaluable attitudes rarely considers such cases and assumes that only attitudes are rationally evaluable. By considering objections to my initial case, we will find a possible explanation for this widespread neglect.

4.4 A response on behalf of the common view

As far as I can tell, the only discussion in the recent literature of cases such as BEAR ENCOUNTER appears in Angela Smith's work.⁹ In formulating her rational relations account of responsibility for attitudes, Smith argues that 'nonintentional mental states, such as physical pains, sensations, and physiological conditions such as hunger or thirst . . . are not rationally sensitive to our evaluative judgements or our wider cognitive and evaluative commitments' (Smith 2005: 257). Smith goes on to consider a possible objection:

One might object here that many of these physical states do, in fact, seem to be directly connected to our evaluative judgments. The nausea that I feel

⁹ But see fn. 11, where I mention Jennifer Corns's related discussion of the rational evaluability of pleasantness and unpleasantness (Corns 2019).

before having to speak in public, for example, seems to be a direct result of my evaluative judgment that such public performances are both important and also fraught with opportunities for failure. The butterflies that I feel in my stomach before boarding a roller-coaster also seem to be a direct result of my evaluative judgment that such a ride is scary and somewhat dangerous. Does it follow on my account, then, that these physical states are also attributable to me for purposes of moral assessment? (257–258)

In response, Smith insists that ‘The relation between a person’s physical states and her evaluative judgments is purely causal’ and therefore our responsibility for these states ‘flows from the responsibility we have for the evaluative judgments which constitute their causal triggers’ (258). Smith proposal is an example of characteristic (f) above: we can be responsible for our physical states only *indirectly*, in the way that we can be responsible for other states of affairs, that is, via our *direct* responsibility for our evaluative judgements.

This explanation of the phenomenon makes it compatible with the view that only attitudes are fundamentally rationally evaluable but it does not constitute a reason to endorse this view. Why explain away the apparent rational evaluability of physical episodes and sensations? More specifically, given that certain physical episodes and sensations seem to have the characteristics of rationally evaluable items, what reason do we have to insist that they are merely caused?

Smith specifies characteristics of rationally evaluable items that, she claims, physical states lack. She points out that when the causal connection between our evaluative judgements and our physical states fails, we are not thereby open to rational criticism. However, where regret, guilt, or remorse are fitting, distress—with its mental and physical components, such as accelerated heartrate—is fitting as well. To feel fitting fear of the bear

without feeling distress is to be vulnerable to rational criticism; to feel fitting remorse about one's crime without feeling distress is to be vulnerable to rational criticism.

In response, Smith might argue that, due to the strong causal connection between fear and remorse, on the one hand, and distress, on the other, it is hard to believe or even to imagine that one experiences fear or remorse without experiencing distress. The absence of distress is therefore not rationally criticizable itself but is a strong indicator of the rationally criticizable absence of a rationally evaluable attitude. But, again, we must ask whence the insistence that the relation between distress and our evaluative judgement is merely causal? Whether distress is a component of fitting emotions or a distinct phenomenon (a point which I will come back to in section 4.6), our evaluative practices indicate that we sometimes view it as fitting in the same way and for the same reasons we view the relevant emotions as fitting.¹⁰ Thus, judging that I've done you wrong, it is not enough that I apologize and change my ways, I should also regret the wrong and, in regretting, be distressed by it.

In another appeal to our evaluative practices, Smith claims that it makes sense to ask a person to defend or justify 'her shame, jealousy, fear, or admiration' but it does not make sense to ask her to defend or justify her nausea (258). But consider the kind of nausea a guilt-ridden person might feel. The person might say, 'I'm sick to my stomach thinking about what I've done,' meaning it quite literally. 'What justifies this reaction?' a friend might respond, 'as far as I can tell you've done nothing wrong'. Or consider a case where the guilt-ridden person describes her sensations and feelings without realizing she is feeling guilty. Her friend might help her identify these sensations and feelings *as guilt*. The friend might say: 'what you're feeling is guilt, but what do you have to feel guilty for?' and this might be a first step towards

¹⁰ Corns (2019) argues in detail for a similar claim—specifically, that the pleasantness or unpleasantness associated with a wide range of mental phenomena is rationally evaluable. She calls this 'hedonic rationality'.

helping the guilt-ridden person see that her nausea, irritation, and sleeplessness, are not non-rational but rationally evaluable, and that there is no justification for them. Maybe once she recognizes these facts, the feelings and sensations she's been suffering from will rationally dissipate. Alternatively, they might be reinforced by the realization that they are justified indeed.

Of course, we do not expect people to defend claims about the fit of their bodily episodes and sensations. But the same is true of guilt. In justifying her guilt, the guilt-ridden person would explain what she had done and why it was wrong to do so. Such explanation would be sufficient to justify her guilt given that guilt is a fitting reaction to the fact that she committed the wrong in question. She need not, in defending her guilt, also argue that guilt is a fitting response to the fact that she committed a wrong. It is easy to see this in the case of belief. In defending her belief that p , a person need not argue that belief is a fitting response to the fact that p is credible; she needs only to defend her judgement that p is credible. Similarly, in defending her nausea in response to the wrong she committed, a person need not defend the claim that her nausea is fitting in response to the wrong. Rather, she is expected to offer the same reasoning she would offer in defence of her guilt. The fact that she committed a horrible wrong—e.g. that she had ruined someone's life—is the reason for her guilt as well as her nausea.

In light of the above, I think it is difficult to make a case only on the basis of a survey of our actual evaluative practices that, as the common view holds, our evaluative practices treat all bodily episodes and sensations as non-rational. However, there are theoretical assumptions that seem to provide strong reason to accept that sensations and bodily episodes must be non-rational. These assumptions might also explain why philosophers have generally interpreted our evaluative practices as drawing a clear line between attitudes, on the one hand, and sensations, feelings, and bodily episodes, on the other.

4.5 A theoretical presupposition of the common view

The idea that sensations, feelings, and bodily episodes can be rationally evaluable might seem implausible to anyone who assumes that such items lack intentionality and that intentionality is a necessary condition for rational evaluability. Thus, Smith writes:

[P]art of the reason that it would make no sense to demand justification in the case of sensations and other nonintentional mental states is precisely because they are not directed upon an object or state of affairs, and hence the idea of “getting it wrong” or “being justified” in the experiencing of the state does not really have application. Directedness upon an object, or intentionality, then, seems to be a necessary condition of direct responsibility in the sense I am trying to capture. (Smith 2005: 258)

Plausibly, for an item to be rationally evaluable it must have intentionality—it must be *about* something.¹¹ Your fear is about the danger the bear poses and can therefore be rationally evaluable; since your racing heart is not about anything it cannot be rationally evaluable. I believe this thought underlies much of the discussion of rationally evaluable attitudes and I wish to consider it more carefully.

¹¹ However, actions seem to pose a counterexample. While an intention to eat dinner is about eating dinner, eating dinner does not seem to be about anything and therefore lacks intentionality. But since eating dinner is rationally evaluable, intentionality cannot be a necessary condition for rational evaluability. However, if the reason for eating dinner is the reason to intend to eat dinner—as [McHugh and Way \(forthcoming\)](#) argue and Smith seems to hold—then actions are not themselves rationally evaluable except as expressions of intentions. Nevertheless, the theory of intentionality and fit-evaluability that I propose in the next section can account, I believe, for the intentionality of actions.

To begin, if intentionality is indeed a necessary feature of rationally evaluable items, then what is distinctive of rationally evaluable items is not that we can demand and provide reasons for them, but that they are fit-evaluable. Let me explain. Fit-related reasons are reasons that count in favour of an item being fitting to its object: fit-related reasons for a belief in a proposition count in favour of the proposition being credible, fit-related reasons for an intention to ϕ count in favour of ϕ -ing being worth doing. Therefore, fit-related reasons presuppose that the item they support or oppose has intentionality: the item is about something with respect to which it can succeed or fail to be fitting.

Many believe we can have value-related reasons (or ‘wrong-kind reasons’) for fit-evaluable attitudes such as belief, intention, amusement, shame, regret, etc.¹² These value-related reasons do not bear on the fittingness of an attitude but on the value of having it. If believing that I will do well on the exam improves my chances of doing well, then I have a reason to believe so; the value of having the belief explains my value-related reason. If intending to drink poison will win me a great sum of money, then I have reason to intend so; the value of intending to drink the poison explains my value-related reason.

Now note that it can also be valuable to digest, to experience a pleasant sensation on one’s skin, or to have fever in response to infection, although such states are not fit-evaluable. But if we can have reasons to be in valuable conditions independently of fit, it would seem that we can have reasons to be in valuable conditions that are not fit-evaluable. So alongside value-related reasons to have fit-evaluable items (e.g. belief), we can have value-related reasons to have items that are *not* fit-evaluable (e.g. fever). To block this implication, we would

¹² Examples of defenders of fit-unrelated reasons: [D’Arms and Jacobson \(2000\)](#); [Rabinowicz and Rønnow-Rasmussen \(2004\)](#); [Danielsson and Olson \(2007\)](#); [Rosen \(2015\)](#); [Howard \(2016, 2019\)](#); [Leary \(2017\)](#).

need an explanation of why the arguments that support fit-unrelated reasons for fit-evaluable items do not work in the case of items that are not fit-evaluable.

If, as Smith and many others maintain, rationally evaluable items are necessarily evaluable as *justified with respect to their objects*, then rationally evaluable items are necessarily fit-evaluable, because for an item to be fit-evaluable is for it to be evaluable as justified with respect to what it is about. It follows that the fact that an item is such that we can demand or offer reasons for it does not determine whether the item is rationally evaluable or non-rational. Since we can have value-related reasons for items that lack intentionality, we can have reasons for non-rational items. Therefore, what is crucial for rationally evaluable items is not that we can demand and offer reasons for them, but that they are fit-evaluable.

To be sure, there are those who are wrong-kind-reasons sceptics: they deny that there are normative value-related reasons.¹³ For them, all reasons are fit-related reasons, so there is no problem in appealing to reasons in order to distinguish rationally evaluable items. I do not wish to take a stand on whether there are value-related reasons. For my purposes, it is only important to remember that rationally evaluable items are necessarily fit-evaluable and therefore responsive to fit-related reasons, whether fit-related reasons exhaust the space of reasons or not.

In light of the claim that rationally evaluable items are fit-evaluable, Smith's objection to the apparent rational evaluability of sensations and bodily episodes might be reconstructed thus:

The argument from fit-evaluability:

1. Rationally evaluable items are necessarily fit-evaluable. In other words, if an item is not fit-evaluable, then it is non-rational.

¹³ Examples of sceptics about value-related reasons: [Hieronymi \(2005\)](#); [Skorupski \(2010\)](#); [Parfit \(2011\)](#); [Way \(2012\)](#).

2. For an item to be fit-evaluable it must have intentionality, i.e. it must be directed to, or be about an object, broadly construed.
3. But ‘sensations and other non-intentional mental states’ lack intentionality, they are not directed to and are not about anything.

Conclusion: Sensations and other non-intentional mental states are non-rational.

I do not take issue with (1) and (2).¹⁴ My issue is with (3). Smith’s argument targets sensations—which she takes to be non-intentional—and non-intentional mental states. Insofar as she is only concerned with non-intentional phenomena, I have no disagreement with the argument. But the question is whether all bodily episodes and sensations are non-intentional and whether the mental states she considers to be non-intentional are in fact so.

Smith believes that the nausea she feels before having to speak in public and the butterflies she feels in her stomach before boarding a roller-coaster are non-intentional—that is, they are not about anything, they lack representational content. In particular, her nausea is unlike her fear and hope, which are directed towards the danger that the public performance poses and the promise it holds. Fear and hope are therefore fit-evaluable while nausea and butterflies in one’s stomach are not. But why does Smith assume this? Why does she take for granted that her nausea or the butterflies in her stomach are not about the objects of her fear and hope?

¹⁴ [Döring \(2008\)](#) argues for (2). In defending the claim that hedonic tone (i.e. pleasantness or unpleasantness) is rationally evaluable, Jenifer Corns argues that either hedonic tone is reducible to something representational or some rationally evaluable mental phenomena are non-representational ([Corns 2019](#): 244–245). The latter disjunct is a rejection of (2) above. The suggestion I go on to make is along the lines of Corns’s former disjunct, but there is a crucial difference. I do not think that the intentionality of a mental or physical phenomenon must be explained by the kind of phenomenon it is or by the kind of phenomena it is reducible to.

One possible thought is that nausea is often non-rational; it often occurs without being about anything at all. It might therefore seem that nausea is not *the kind of state that has intentionality*. Similarly, since headaches can occur without being about anything, one might conclude that headaches that are associated with grief do not share the intentionality of grief. And, finally, since your heartrate can accelerate merely due to the fact that you were running to catch the bus, your accelerated heartrate during fear might seem to lack fear's intentionality.

The underlying assumption is that if a given item has intentionality, it must have it due to the type of item it is. Belief and intention are *essentially* intentional, they are types of attitudes that have representational content. Since nausea (like headaches and racing hearts) can lack intentionality, it is not the *type* of item that has intentionality, so any instance of nausea must also lack intentionality.

The idea that intentionality is determined by the type of mental or physical phenomenon under consideration leads to the following inference:

Intentionality by type

If there are tokens of phenomenon of type *m* that lack intentionality, then there are no tokens of *m* that have intentionality.

I propose that our evaluative practices give us at least *prima facie* reason to doubt **intentionality by type** and the assumptions that underlie it. One and the same type of item can be fit-evaluable on one occasion but not on another, where in the first instance it has intentionality and in the second it does not. In section 4.5 I propose a possible explanation for this phenomenon.

4.6 A narrative account of fit-evaluability

I have argued that rationally evaluable items are fit-evaluable and that to be fit-evaluable they must have intentionality. I have also argued that we treat sensations and bodily episodes as sometimes fit-evaluable, sometimes not. The question I wish to consider in this section is how can the same type of sensation or bodily episode be fit-evaluable (and therefore have intentionality) on one occasion and not fit-evaluable (because lacking intentionality) on another? My aim is to find a theory that can answer this question. The theory I will adopt and elaborate on cannot be fully worked out within the confines of this chapter and the task of defending it will also have to wait for another occasion. However, the fact that our evaluative practices suggest it is a reason in its favour.

Let us return to the examples of heartrates. What might explain the fact that your accelerated heartrate after running to catch the bus is not fit-evaluable but the same heartrate while facing the bear is? And how can the same heartrate be about nothing at all in one case and about the danger you are facing in the other? The clue to answering these questions should be clear by now: when you are facing the bear your heartrate is associated with your fear and both seem to share the same intentional object. It is implausible that both your heartrate and your fear just happen to be about the same object; it is more likely that they have the same object because they are systematically related. A theory that answers our question would (1) describe a single element that explains, at once, the object of your heartrate *and* the object of your fear in BEAR ENCOUNTER, and (2) claim that a similar kind of explanation is lacking in RUNNING TO THE BUS.

A natural view of the systematic relation between accelerated heartrate and fear is that the former is an element of the latter. Consider, for example, Peter Goldie's description of the complexity of emotions:

An emotion is complex in that it will typically involve many different elements: it involves episodes of emotional experience, including perceptions, thoughts,

and feelings of various kinds, and bodily changes of various kinds; and it involves dispositions, including dispositions to experience further emotional episodes, to have further thoughts and feelings, and to behave in certain ways.

(Goldie 2000: 12–13)

To be sure, Goldie is here describing a richer and more enduring phenomenon than a short-lived emotional episode, such as the fear in BEAR ENCOUNTER. However, as Darwin's depiction of fear makes clear, short lived emotional episodes are often quite complex and involve various bodily occurrences and sensations. Thus, whether as a short-lived reaction or as a more enduring state that involves patterns of sensations, imaginings, thoughts, and motivations, fear is a complex phenomenon that, arguably, includes a person's accelerated heartrate as one element.

This does not yet answer the question of intentionality and fit-evaluability. While many theorists of emotion allow that emotions are complex, most deny that all the ingredients of an emotion share its intentional object. Rather, many assume that emotions must have some essential ingredient that is itself intentional and thus explains the intentionality and fit-evaluability of the emotion. To name two leading families of view, judgemental theories of emotions assimilate emotions to evaluative or normative beliefs or judgements,¹⁵ while perceptual theories construe emotions as perceptual experiences of evaluative properties.¹⁶ On many of these views, the bodily episodes that are elements of fear lack intentionality, but fear has intentionality because it is, at its core, a judgement or a perceptual experience of danger. These prominent views would deny that an accelerated heartrate is fit-evaluable when it is a component of fear.

¹⁵ For example: Solomon (1976); Greenspan (1988); Nussbaum (2001).

¹⁶ For example: Johnston (2001); Döring (2007); Tye (2008); Tappolet (2016).

Other views, however, take a more holistic approach. Deonna and Teroni, for example, argue that emotions are ‘distinctive types of bodily awareness, where the subject experiences her body holistically as taking an attitude towards a certain object’ and that we should ‘move away from the curiously atomistic approach to bodily sensations implicit in many accounts of their role in emotions and recognize that, in emotions, these sensations are typically aspects of a whole pattern that constitutes a world-directed attitude’ (Deonna and Teroni 2012: 79). Deonna and Teroni elucidate the relevant patterns of bodily sensations in terms of action-readiness. Thus, ‘fear of the dog is an experience of the dog as dangerous, precisely because it consists in feeling the body’s readiness to act so as to diminish the dog’s likely impact on it (flight, preemptive attack, etc.), and this felt attitude is correct if and only if the dog is dangerous’ (81). On this view, one’s racing heart is fit-evaluable when it is part of fear’s pattern of action-readiness.

Deonna and Teroni’s view is compatible with a view of emotions that appeals to narrative (83). According to Goldie, the different elements of a given emotion are structured as a recognizable emotion-type by a narrative in which they are embedded (Goldie 2000: 13). This suggestion follows Ronald de Sousa’s idea that narratives, and specifically ‘paradigm scenarios’, define the character of our emotions:

We are made familiar with the vocabulary of emotion by association with *paradigm scenarios*. These are drawn first from our daily life as small children and later reinforced by the stories, art, and culture to which we are exposed. Later still, in literate cultures, they are supplemented and refined by literature. Paradigm scenarios involve two aspects: first, a situation type providing the characteristic *objects* of the specific emotion-type . . . and second, a set of characteristic or “normal” *responses* to the situation, where normality is first a

biological matter and then very quickly becomes a cultural one. (de Sousa 1987: 182, emphasis in original)

According to de Sousa, emotion types are patterns that involve bodily episodes, affects, sensations, thoughts, and motivations, and are determined by paradigm scenarios or narratives. We draw on these familiar narratives to interpret situations we face and how we interpret these situations explains our emotional reactions to them.

Drawing on this picture, my proposal is that emotion-patterns inherit their fittingness from the fittingness of the narratives in which they are embedded. To unpack this idea, I will first explain what I take fitting narratives to be and then explain how they determine the fittingness of emotions.

Very roughly, and without getting into various controversies about the nature of narrative, we can characterize narrative as a representation of a series of events and of the people involved in them, delivered from a certain perspective or perspectives. Moreover, narratives attribute to the events they depict a certain coherence and meaning, as well as evaluative and emotional import. Employing this brief characterization, we can identify ways in which narratives can succeed or fail to be fitting.

To begin, note that narratives are *representations* of sequences or processes. In general, the events and things depicted in a narrative are not themselves a narrative. So a life-narrative is a narrative *of* a life, not a life that *is* a narrative; a self-narrative is a narrative *of* a self not a self that *is* a narrative (Goldie 2012: 153–154).

Since narratives are representations they might also *misrepresent*. Narratives can misrepresent in various ways: they might distort facts and causal connections, fail to note relevant information, etc. I will call such misrepresentations *factual misrepresentations*. The first way in which narratives can fail to be fitting is by including factual misrepresentations.

There is, however, an important caveat with regard to factual misrepresentation in narrative. Some narratives do not purport (and are not expected) to faithfully represent things as they are, e.g. fictional narratives. The representation of facts in such narratives is not true, but it is not a *misrepresentation* either. Therefore, fictional narratives cannot fail to be fitting due to factual misrepresentation.

Another way in which narratives can misrepresent concerns the reactions they elicit or invite. Narratives are typically engaging—they engage the emotions and evaluative judgements of the audience. Thus, a narrative can misrepresent by eliciting or calling upon emotional and judgemental reactions that are not fitting to the events it depicts. For example, a narrative can falsely present an action as shameful, thereby eliciting the unfitting judgement that it is shameful, or it might falsely present an action as contemptible, thereby eliciting unfitting contempt for it. I will call such misrepresentations: *emotional and evaluative misrepresentations*. The second way in which narratives can fail to be fitting is by including emotional and evaluative misrepresentations.

Emotional and evaluative misrepresentations are possible even in fictional narratives, which do not purport to depict the truth. For example, a fictional narrative about a serial killer might elicit an unfitting reaction to the violence it depicts if it elicits, e.g. admiration for the killer. Of course, whether such reaction is indeed unfitting is debatable, but the fact it might be unfitting is sufficient to show that fictional narratives can, in principle, misrepresent in this way.

A narrative that includes no factual, emotional, or evaluative misrepresentations is a *completely fitting narrative*.¹⁷ Narratives can be more or less fitting given the degree of accuracy and the quality of their representation.¹⁸

¹⁷ As noted above, a fictional narrative does not include any factual misrepresentations because it does not purport to depict facts at all. So a fictional narrative can be perfectly fitting.

Drawing on the narrative view of emotion described above, I propose that bodily episodes and sensations can have intentional objects and be fit-evaluable when and because they are explained as elements of fit-evaluable emotional reactions by the agent's fit-evaluable narrative representation of the situation. This dense formulation is meant to invoke three explanatory connections. First, the fact that the agent represents the situation by a fit-evaluable narrative explains the occurrence of the agent's bodily episodes and sensations. Second, these bodily episodes and sensations have intentionality and are fit-evaluable because the narrative that explains their occurrence portrays the reaction pattern they are part of as fit-evaluable. Finally, the fittingness of the agent's narrative explains the fittingness of the agent's bodily episodes and sensations.¹⁹ Thus, the proposal is that my fit-evaluable narrative in BEAR ENCOUNTER explains the occurrence of my fast heartrate, my fast heartrate is about something because the narrative that explains it portrays the fear of which it is part as being about something, and my heartrate is fitting when the narrative that explains its occurrence as part of fear is fitting.

Suppose you take a pill that makes your heart accelerate and then you encounter a bear. As you face the bear your heart races but this bodily episode is independent of your understanding of the situation. In such a case, your accelerated heartrate is non-rational even if you actually fear the bear. This is explained by the fact that your racing heart is not explained by your narrative representation of the situation. In BEAR ENCOUNTER, all that is mentioned is that you encounter a bear and that your heartrate accelerates, so we

¹⁸ Although I acknowledge that whether fittingness is gradable is a controversial issue. See Berker in this volume.

¹⁹ My proposal is in line with [Neta's \(2018\)](#): 'A series of events or states in the agent can amount to the agent's being committed to something only by virtue of the agent's representing those very same events or states as appropriately responsive to, or expressive of, that commitment' (298).

assume that your heart races because of how you represent the situation to yourself—that is, as having a certain meaning and significance, relating your recent past (setting up camp in the forest) to the present moment (facing the enormous bear) and your immediate future (dying or surviving the bear encounter). The narrative understanding we attribute to you leads us to think that your heartrate is an element of your fit-evaluable fear.

To illustrate the role of fit according to my proposal, let me introduce another example. Stuck in traffic on my way home from work, I scratch my chin. A fellow driver mistakes my hand movement for an insult and responds with anger. I cannot hear him but I see his facial expressions and hand movements through the windshield. If I didn't know better, I might think he is having some kind of seizure. However, given my understanding of the story he must be telling himself, his frantic movements strike me as elements of anger. Thus, the fact that he represents the situation as he does explains his sensations and bodily episodes as elements of anger. Moreover, his bodily episodes and sensations have intentionality and are fit-evaluable because they are explained as such by his fit-evaluable narrative, according to which I intentionally insulted him. However, his fit-evaluable narrative is not fitting: it misrepresents my intention and the evaluative significance of my hand movement. Since his narrative is not fitting, the anger explained by his narrative—which includes his racing heart, his facial expressions, his hand movements, and all the rest—is not fitting either.

There is, however, also the possibility that I am mistaken in my interpretation of the situation. Maybe the driver is not angry at all but is, in fact, having a seizure. In this case, the driver's bodily episodes are non-rational because they are *not* explained by his fit-evaluable narrative representation of the situation. In fact, my own narrative representation of the situation is unfitting.

Let me briefly conclude. I claimed that sometimes bodily episodes and sensations seem to have the characteristics of *fit-evaluable items*. I also suggested that suspicion of this initial

impression might be explained by the assumption that intentionality, which is necessary for fit-evaluability, is type dependent. For instance, fear, belief, and desire are *types* of items that have intentional objects and therefore they satisfy a necessary condition for fit-evaluability. Since bodily episodes and sensations are not types of items that have intentionality, no bodily episode or sensation has intentionality and therefore none is fit-evaluable. I responded to this line of reasoning by rejecting the assumption that intentionality and fit-evaluability are type dependent and developing a preliminary theory that explains why bodily episodes and sensations are *sometimes* fit-evaluable. The theory is that bodily episodes and sensations can have intentional objects and be fit-evaluable when and because they are explained as elements of fit-evaluable emotional reactions by the agent's fit-evaluable narrative representation. Thus, I believe that narratives should play a more central role in our philosophical theorizing about fit and practical reason more generally.

References

- Boyle, M. (2011) 'Making up your mind' and the activity of reason. *Philosophers' Imprint* 11/17.
- Brady, M. (2018) The rationality of emotional and physical suffering. In *Philosophy of Pain: Unpleasantness, Emotion, and Deviance*, ed. D. Bain, M. Brady, and J. Corns. London: Routledge. 81–94.
- Broad, C. D. (1930) *Five Types of Ethical Theory*. London: Routledge.
- Cholbi, M. (2017) Grief's rationality, backward and forward. *Philosophy and Phenomenological Research* 94, 255–272.
- Corns, J. (2019) Hedonic rationality. In *Philosophy of Suffering* ed. D. Bain, M. Brady, and J. Corns. London: Routledge. 229–250.
- Currie, G. (2010) *Narratives and Narrators: A Philosophy of Stories*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

- Danielsson, S. and J. Olson. (2007) Brentano and the buck-passers. *Mind* 116, 511–522.
- D’Arms, J. and D. Jacobson. (2000) Sentiment and value. *Ethics* 110, 722–748.
- Darwin, C. (1872/2009) *The Expression of the Emotions in Man and Animals*. Intro and commentary by P. Ekman. London: Harper Perennial.
- De Sousa, R. (1987) *The Rationality of Emotions*. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.
- Deonna, J. and F. Teroni. (2012) *The Emotions: A Philosophical Introduction*. London: Routledge.
- Döring, S. (2007) Seeing what to do: Affective perception and rational motivation. *Dialectica* 61, 363–394.
- Döring, S. (2008) Conflict without contradiction. In *Epistemology and Emotions*, ed. G. Brun, U. Kuenzle, and D. Dogoughlu. Farnham: Ashgate. 83–104.
- Gibbard, A. (1990) *Wise Choices, Apt Feelings*. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.
- Goldie, P. (2000) *The Emotions: A Philosophical Exploration*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Goldie, P. (2012) *The Mess Inside: Narrative, Emotion, and the Mind*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Greenspan, P. (1988) *Emotions and Reasons*. London: Routledge.
- Gustafson, D. (1989) Grief. *Noûs* 23, 457–479.
- Hedden, B. (2015) *Reasons without Persons*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Hieronymi, P. (2005) The wrong kind of reason. *The Journal of Philosophy* 102, 437–457.
- Hieronymi, P. (2009) Two kinds of agency. In *Mental Actions*, ed. L. O’Brien and M. Soteriou. Oxford: Oxford University Press. 138–161.
- Hieronymi, P. (2014) Reflection and responsibility. *Philosophy and Public Affairs* 42, 3–41.
- Howard, C. (2016) In defense of the wrong kind of reason. *Thought* 5, 53–62.
- Howard, C. (2018) Fittingness. *Philosophy Compass* 13, e12542.
- Howard, C. (2019) The fundamentality of fit. *Oxford Studies in Metaethics* 14, 216–236.

Johnston, M. (2001) The authority of affect. *Philosophy and Phenomenological Research* 63, 181–214.

Jollimore, T. (2004) Meaningless happiness and meaningful suffering. *The Southern Journal of Philosophy* 42, 333–347.

Leary, S. (2017) In defense of practical reasons for belief. *Australasian Journal of Philosophy* 95, 529–542.

Marušić, B. (2018) Do reasons expire? An essay on grief. *Philosophers' Imprint* 18, 1–22.

Marušić, B. (forthcoming) *On the Temporality of Emotions: An Essay on Grief, Anger, and Love*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

McHugh, C. (2017) Attitudinal control. *Synthese* 194, 2745–2762.

McHugh, C. and J. Way. (forthcoming) All reasons are fundamentally for attitudes. *Journal of Ethics and Social Philosophy*.

Moller, D. (2007) Love and death. *Journal of Philosophy* 104, 301–316.

Moller, D. (forthcoming) Love and the rationality of grief. In *The Oxford Handbook of Philosophy of Love*, ed. C. Grau and A. Smuts. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

DOI: 10.1093/oxfordhb/9780199395729.013.35

Moran, R. (2001) *Authority and Estrangement*. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.

Moran, R. (2017) Frankfurt on identification. In his *The Philosophical Imagination: Selected Essays*. Oxford: Oxford University Press. 136–157.

Na'aman, O. (2021) The rationality of emotional change: Towards a process view. *Noûs* 55, 245–269.

Neta, R. (2018) Rationally determinable conditions. *Philosophical Issues* 28, 289–299.

Nolfi, K. (2015) Which mental states are rationally evaluable, and why? *Philosophical Issues* 25, 41–63.

Nussbaum, M. (2001) *Upheavals of Thought*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

- Parfit, D. (2011). *On What Matters, vol. 1*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Portmore, D. (2011) *Commonsense Consequentialism*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Rabinowicz, W. and T. Rønnow-Rasmussen. (2004) The strike of the demon: On fitting pro-attitudes and value. *Ethics* 114, 391–423.
- Roberts, R. C. (1988) What an emotion is: A sketch. *Philosophical Review* 97, 269–274.
- Roberts, R. C. (2003) *Emotions: An Essay in Aid of Moral Psychology*. Cambridge: Cambridge University.
- Rosen, G. (2015). Real definition. *Analytic Philosophy* 56, 189–209.
- Ross, W. D. (1939) *Foundations of Ethics*. Oxford: Clarendon Press.
- Scanlon, T. M. (1998) *What We Owe to Each Other*. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.
- Schönherr, J. (forthcoming) Two problems of fitting grief. *Analysis*.
- Skorupski, J. (2010). *The Domain of Reasons*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Smith, A. M. (2005) Responsibility for attitudes: Activity and passivity in mental life. *Ethics* 155, 236–271.
- Smith, M. (2013) The ideal of orthonomous agency, or the how and why of buck-passing. In *Thinking about Reasons*, ed. D. Bakhurst et al. Oxford: Oxford University Press. 50–75.
- Solomon, R. C. (1976) *The Passions*. Indianapolis, IN: Hackett Publishing.
- Tappolet, C. (2016) *Emotions, Values, and Agency*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Tye, M. (2008) The experience of emotion: An intentionalist theory. *Revue Internationale de Philosophie* 243, 25–50.
- Velleman, D. (2003) Narrative explanation. *Philosophical Review* 112, 1–25.
- Way, J. (2012). Transmission and the wrong kind of reason. *Ethics* 122, 489–515.
- Wilkinson, S. (2000) Is ‘normal grief’ a mental disorder? *Philosophical Quarterly* 50, 289–304.