The “sense of agency” and its underlying cognitive and neural mechanisms
Introduction
In our everyday life we often perform goal-directed actions which we normally do not reflect upon such as grasping a glass of water when we are thirsty. Actions or certain movements may happen because an intention-to-act generated a corresponding motor program in order to reach the intentional goal. But how do we know that we ourselves are the ones grasping the glass of water? An executed movement is associated with certain expected consequences, for example, feeling the arm move in a certain way or perceiving the glass in our hand. Such proprioceptive or visual reafferences as well as corresponding motor signals may not only help to adjust a given motor program but may also contribute to the feeling that we are the agents, that is, initiators and executors of our grasping the glass of water. This experience of oneself as the agent of one’s own actions—and not of others’ actions—has been described as “the sense of agency” (Gallagher, 2000) and is a central feature of the different phenomenal experiences constituting self-consciousness (as defined by Newen & Vogeley, 2003; Gallagher, 2000). Besides the endeavor to elucidate the functional basis of the sense of agency there is also a substantial interest in exploring dysfunctions of it. Disturbances might have a profound impact on an individual’s functioning in society as observed, for instance, in the pathological condition of schizophrenia. To date, a comprehensive and integrative understanding of the sense of agency, also in relation to other cognitive processes, and its underlying mechanisms is missing. With the present paper we focused on current concepts as well as empirical findings related to the sense of agency and discuss open questions in the field.
Section snippets
The sense of agency: Definition and concepts
The sense of agency has been defined as “the sense that I am the one who is causing or generating an action. For example, the sense that I am the one who is causing something to move, or that I am the one who is generating a certain thought in my stream of consciousness” (Gallagher, 2000, p. 15). As such, one can distinguish actions that are self-generated from those generated by others giving rise to the experience of a self-other distinction in the domain of action and thus contributing to
Comparator Model
The predominant account on explaining the sense of agency of our own actions has been the “central monitoring theory” or “comparator model” as a theory of motor learning and motor control (Blakemore et al., 2001, Blakemore et al., 1998, Frith, 1992, Kawato, 1999, von Holst and Mittelstaedt, 1950, Wolpert et al., 1995). Accordingly, two types of internal models are implemented in the central motor system: so-called inverse and forward models. Although the primary role of these internal motor
Neural correlates of agency
By means of functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI) and positron emission tomography (PET), several brain areas have been implicated in the sense of agency (Blakemore et al., 2001, Farrer and Frith, 2002, Farrer et al., 2003a, Fink et al., 1999, Jeannerod, 2004, Leube et al., 2003). These include brain regions known to be involved in the motor system such as the ventral premotor cortex (vPMC), the supplementary motor area (SMA and pre-SMA) and the cerebellum as well as regions such as the
Conclusion
The investigation of the sense of agency is an increasingly prominent field of research in psychology as well as cognitive neurosciences alike. Nonetheless, we still face many open questions and controversies how the distinction between one’s own and others’ behavior is drawn. Different understandings of the sense of agency and assumed different underlying mechanisms, in turn, lead to rather diverse operationalizations and results such as to differences in activation patterns between existing
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