Abstract
Video games are a specific kind of virtual world which many engage with on a daily basis; as such, we cannot ignore the values they embody. In this paper I argue that it is possible to cause moral harm or benefit within a video game, specifically by drawing attention to the nature of the choices both players and designers make. I discuss ways in which games attempt to represent morality, arguing that while flawed, even games with seemingly superficial devices such as morality meters can attempt to promote moral reflection. Ultimately, I argue that the moral status of the actions depends on the effects of those actions on the player herself; if those actions make us less ethical then the actions are wrong. Unfortunately, it is not clear to me that players are always in a position to tell whether this is the case.
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- 1.
Of course, as Søraker notes, video games are particular states instantiated on physical devices and thus have an extravirtual component simply in terms of the bits on the machine; all of the characters, objects, and actions within the game thus have an extravirtual component in this sense. This is rarely the sort of extravirtual consequence we are concerned with from an ethical perspective, however.
- 2.
This is, presumably, the same sort of distinction we make for other art forms such as novels or films; on the one hand, it is false to say that Sherlock Holmes and Moriarty are enemies, since neither exist. However, in general when someone is making such a statement, they are actually talking about what is true within the fiction and, in this context, Sherlock Holmes and Moriarty are enemies. This distinction is discussed at length by Kendall Walton (1990) and is applied specifically to videogames by Grant Tavinor (2009).
- 3.
As Heron and Belford (2014) note, this flaw generally rules out using Kantian ethics to measure morality in the game world, as there is no seamless way to determine the intent behind the actions.
- 4.
Sicart (2013) refers to this as being morally complicit with the game and its world.
- 5.
- 6.
Indeed, the entire scheme of awarding points is reminiscent of Jeremy Bentham (1823/1996), since actions which are more harmful or greater in scope do seem to award more negative points than those which have smaller consequences. It is not a perfect representation of his hedonic calculus, but it is in the same vein.
- 7.
Of course, this is not a truly utilitarian account of morality either, since it is relativized to the game world; in some sense, neither utility nor disutility is generated by an action, since the actions are fictional. However, since such meters generally reflect what are considered good or bad consequences within the game, they are roughly utilitarian if one is engaged in the make-believe fiction of the world.
- 8.
Assuming that there is much of an effect on the gameworld; Heron and Belford (2014) criticize many implementations of morality meters because they are fairly shallow – the choices have few real consequences. This is an objection to how a system of morality is implemented in practice, however, rather than a fundamental objection to the idea of morality meters which Sicart appears to have.
- 9.
Sicart (2013) looks at this in greater detail, particularly praising Fallout 3 as an example of a game which does this well.
- 10.
Unlike many games which allow a player to save whenever he wishes, Life is Strange only allows saves at particular checkpoints; to change options after the rewind window closes, a player would have to reload to the previous checkpoint and play the game through to that dialogue or action choice again.
- 11.
Once again, this is reinforced by the fact that saving and reloading the game is somewhat constrained and thus adds a price to deciding to change one’s choices.
- 12.
This is in part because Life is Strange has a stronger narrative than many games due to its linear nature and way of handling player choices. While I agree with Tavinor (2009) that frequently games have difficulty with narrative due to gameplay constraints, Life is Strange uses moral choices to reinforce different narrative possibilities in an extremely effective manner.
- 13.
Presumably even if a game is set in a lawless dystopia, people will be annoyed if you take their belongings.
- 14.
Note that by “immersed” I simply mean that a player is deeply mentally engaged with the game, much in the same way that one can be drawn in by the fiction of a book or movie. Many games attempt to create worlds that promote this by trying to be relatively realistic (insofar as their setting allows).
- 15.
Although I would note that some research (Lange 2014) suggests that the majority of players engage with moral choice systems using their own moral code regardless of how much they identify with a character.
- 16.
Note, with Gorrindo and Groves (2010), that what we do with our avatars is not literally what we are willing to do in real life; the fact that you are willing to murder someone in a game does not imply you would murder in real life. Your avatar’s actions may are not a literal map of your actions – they at best provide insight into your personality.
- 17.
It will be interesting to see how this evolves as we have more immersive virtual worlds – will players be less willing to choose the “evil” path in a game? Will there be a point at which it simply becomes too realistic to maintain a separation between their own morality and the game’s morality? Or will we become gaming chameleons, wherein we can successfully inhabit a range of moralities, depending on the character we are playing?
- 18.
While World of Warcraft is a multi-player game, this particular example does not involve any multiplayer elements and thus is akin to a quest in a single player game.
- 19.
- 20.
Indeed, the empirical studies are decidedly mixed in their results, and I tend to agree with Coeckelbergh’s assertion that “philosophers are tempted to pick out the one or few [empirical studies] that suit their arguments best.” (Coeckelbergh, 2007, p. 220)
- 21.
This could be somewhat too restrictive if, in fact, there are non-violent actions which also negatively affect moral character. Such actions were beyond the scope of Coeckelbergh’s argument, but a broader use of his definition may require an expansion of this clause.
- 22.
- 23.
Note that this also increases the possibility of moral benefit, not simply moral harm.
- 24.
This is already being done by researchers such as Saleem, Anderson, and Gentile (2012).
- 25.
Note that we are setting aside the question of child players here – both Sicart (2009, 2013) and Tavinor (2009) explicitly distinguish players who are not adults and thus not morally-formed in order to argue for age-restrictions on games. Adults seem to be viewed as having a stronger moral center and as being more capable of reflection.
- 26.
Ultimately I think these kinds of concerns bind game designers as much as players, since building a world that encourages certain kinds of actions may make players less inclined to deliberate on the worth of those actions and thus less inclined to see how their choices are affecting their values.
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Neely, E.L. (2019). The Ethics of Choice in Single-Player Video Games. In: Berkich, D., d'Alfonso, M. (eds) On the Cognitive, Ethical, and Scientific Dimensions of Artificial Intelligence. Philosophical Studies Series, vol 134. Springer, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-01800-9_19
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