Abstract
Several possible approaches can be applied by the state when it responds to religious conscientious objections. These approaches compare the response to religious-conscientious objections with that to non-religious objections. If the content of the objector’s conscience is significant when deciding to grant conscientious exemptions, three approaches to the practice of granting conscientious exemptions are possible: First, a non-neutral liberal approach that takes into consideration the content of the conscience but not its religiosity as such; second, a pro-religious approach; and third, an anti-religious approach. This paper contends that the non-neutral liberal approach and the pro-religious approach should be rejected in favor of an anti-religious approach to granting conscientious exemptions. The proposed anti-religious approach is as follows: (1) unjustified intolerance should not be tolerated; (2) empirical evidence links religion and intolerance – that is, people’s responses to measures of religion and intolerance are closely related; (3) theoretical evidence links (some) religions and intolerance; and (4) the religiosity of conscience gives the state a reason to refuse to grant conscientious exemptions.
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Thanks are due to Joseph Raz, Nicholas Bamforth, Leslie Green, Maleiha Malik, Marie Failinger and Douglas Husak, all of whom helped improve this paper beyond all measure.
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Nehushtan, Y. Religious Conscientious Exemptions. Law and Philos 30, 143–166 (2011). https://doi.org/10.1007/s10982-010-9088-4
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s10982-010-9088-4