Abstract
An influential thesis in contemporary philosophy of mind is that subjectivity is best conceived as inner awareness of qualia. (Purple Haze: The Puzzle of Consciousness. Oxford University Press, London, 2001) has argued that this unique subjective awareness generates a paradox which resists empirical explanation. On account of this “paradox of subjective duality,” Levine concludes that the hardest part of the hard problem of consciousness is to explain how anything like a subjective point of view could arise in the world. Against this, I argue that the nature of subjective thought is not correctly characterized as inner awareness, that a non-paradoxical approach to the first-person perspective is available, and that the problem about subjectivity should be distinguished from the perennial problem of qualia or phenomenal properties.
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Notes
This is a very incomplete list, naming only a few of the recent and salient contributions. Over the last century and more, the structure of the first-person has also been given extensive analysis by philosophers on both sides of the Atlantic including Husserl, Wittgenstein, Anscombe, Heidegger, Sartre, Merleau-Ponty, Evans, and Santayana.
Roughly, the best account of the first-person perspective is that what makes an experience an experience for-x consists in the way it is architecturally connected to x (Perry 2002; Campbell 1999). This distinctive variety of mental representation, grounded in x’s dedicated perceptual systems and particular embodied organization, is the key to a naturalistic approach to subjectivity (Neisser manuscript in press).
With respect to the problem about qualia (the qualitative content of experience), one of the first two options may yet turn out to be the best.
Not all representationalists construe representations as information functions, and representational theories of mind need not be naturalist or materialist by any means. But in contemporary cognitive science the information-theoretic approach to representation is the default position and it is the approach for which consciousness, qualia, and subjectivity present explanatory problems.
In addition to Levine’s text, the discussion in this paragraph and the next is partly drawn from a helpful conference session with qualophile and Levine collaborator Kelly Trogden of Virginia Tech University.
The epistemology of subjectivity is also heavily emphasized in the literature on the so-called Knowledge Argument (Jackson 1982).
The awareness requirement for qualia cannot be satisfied by just any conscious representation. That is, it is not sufficient that we be aware of something or other. The intrinsic qualitative content is said to be determinate, and this is precisely what renders inner awareness paradoxical. So not just any arbitrary awareness will do, on pain of making the awareness relation an extrinsic and indeterminate one. More below, and in section four, including a discussion of the self-representational view of subjectivity (Kriegel 2009).
At this point in a prior version of this paper I introduced what I called the Cartesian Exception to the representational theory of mind. The Cartesian Exception is that even though we might be wrong about how things are, we cannot be wrong about how things seem. That is, if I am wrong about reality, at least I am “right” about the appearances. In this way, Descartes held that ideas cannot be “materially false” (Descartes 2008 [1641]). With this, the epistemological trap of subjective duality is already laid for materialists. The truth-bearing content of the idea is treated as partly constitutive of the idea itself (the vehicle), as part of its “material.” In Sect. 1.3, immediately below, I pick up this historical thread with Berkeley and then Moore.
Moore (1903) believed that he had shown that at least there is no reason to think that this idealist slogan is true (p. 435). Even this is probably claiming too much, but Moore’s work does contain some telling critical insights, on which I draw presently.
This is a significant point of at which Levine parts company from Strawson (2006), Chalmers (1996), and others who offer panpsychist property dualism. On the latter views, although the existence of phenomenal properties does entail the existence of some being that has them, this certainly does not mean that these qualia must be known or perceived in any sense like that required by Levine’s formula about subjectivity.
At this point in the exposition it is usual to introduce a distinction between transitive and intransitive consciousness, such as the one found in Rosenthal (2000) and elsewhere. However, because this section specifically concerns the idealist lineage of Levine’s paradox, I will work with Moore’s terminology. Moore’s language will also connect more directly with the discussion of the Transparency Thesis in section three, below.
Some philosophers therefore advocate a self-representational account of subjective consciousness, in which states are subjectively conscious when they represent themselves in the right way (e.g., Kriegel 2009. See also Levine 2007). In the present context it is possible to regard self-representationalism as a variant of the well-known phenomenal-concepts strategy for explaining knowledge of qualia. See section four, below.
Block (2007, 1995) notoriously argued for a related thesis, namely, that phenomenal consciousness can outstrip access consciousness. Block’s work is important but problematic, and space does not allow me to engage the extensive literature on this topic. Suffice it to say that if Block is right (or on the right track) then the paradox of subjective duality is undermined. And it is for precisely this reason that philosophers such as Kriegel (2009) reject Block’s arguments, holding instead that intrinsic inner awareness is what makes a mental state conscious (subjective) to begin with. I address this debate in detail in my forthcoming book The Science of Subjectivity (Neisser, manuscript in press). See also Neisser (2006).
In general I do not object to the use of philosophical intuition as a method. In fact I accept, on intuitive grounds, the (different) view that there really are phenomenal properties. This view can only be justified on intuitive grounds. But I question whether the immediacy intuition is decisive ground for holding to the doctrine of Russellian Acquaintance. When it comes to our grasp of qualitative character I remain unconvinced because this further step requires an inference from phenomenological immediacy to epistemological immediacy, which does not follow. Also note that the immediacy intuition is the reverse of the equally misleading “transparency intuition” that guides the Transparency Thesis discussed in section three below. Cf Prinz (2012), p. 14.
One reviewer objects that this is needlessly strong, asking, “can we never directly know or grasp the contents of our experience?” In short, the answer is no, we never can. The idea of immediate subjective knowledge is what sustains the paradox. But to clarify, I do agree that there is another, legitimate sense in which subjective thought should be understood as “direct” in a way that distinguishes it from other forms of representation. The first-person perspective is immune to error through misidentification. But this is a subtly different matter. The sort of immunity displayed by the first-person emphatically does not accrue to the content or object of first-person judgment (in this case, to the judgment about the nature of the quale), but only to the prior issue of whether “I” am the subject making the judgment. See Campbell (2002, 1999), Pryor (1999), Moran (2001, 1999), Shoemaker (1997), Evans (1982). Also see the end of section four, below.
If introspection is modeled as a self-scanning mechanism that generates a metacognitive representation of one’s own mental states, then this representation can certainly be mistaken. For more on the idea that introspective awareness is a form of metacognition, high-order thought (HOT), or high-order perception (HOP), see e.g., Rosenthal (2000), Koriat (2000). Lycan (1997), Armstrong (1980). Also relevant is Block’s (2007, 1995) important but problematic distinction between phenomenal consciousness and access consciousness. See footnotes 15, 20.
See also Rorty (1974).
See again Block (2007, 1995). For the record: Block’s notion of phenomenal-only consciousness is a great idea, but it ultimately suffers from a variant of the same vacuity problem that afflicts the inner awareness approach to subjectivity. Just as it is empty to insist that subjects must be “aware” of all their qualia but needn’t be held to any epistemic standard for “awareness,” so too it is pointless to call phenomenal-only mental states “conscious” states. The trick, instead, is to distinguish for-me subjectivity from awareness/consciousness (Neisser in press).
That is, the seemingly transparent nature of consciousness makes it appear as though blueness itself is not a mental fact. Hellie (2007) provides a nice historical exegesis of Moore’s argument, showing that Moore did not in fact hold the Transparency Thesis but rather something close to the opposite. In short, Moore held that although consciousness seems transparent it isn’t, and that this is a finding which can be corroborated by careful phenomenology or introspection. The object/property distinction is the key to Moore’s larger argument, where it is employed to reject the tempting but false Transparency Thesis.
The phrase coined by Douglas Adams (1995 [1982]).
This is roughly the same move attempted by U.T. Place in his seminal piece on the central state identity theory, “Is consciousness a brain process?” (1956). According to Place, there is a “Phenomenological Fallacy” in supposing phenomenal properties to be properties of consciousness. In context, Place is clearly attempting to relieve identity theory of the burden of phenomenal qualities.
The better representational theory seems to be the one in which phenomenal properties track mind-independent properties but do not instantiate them. In order to function as a representation, of course, the stand-in need not intrinsically resemble the external property. Analogously, smoke neither intrinsically represents nor resembles fire, but it does contain information about fire. And this is also true of maps. Although some of the relational features of map representations structurally resemble the terrain mapped, the intrinsic properties of the map and the icons do not. For example, “you are here” red dots do not qualitatively resemble anything in the terrain, even while certain spatial relations with other mapped locations are preserved. Similarly, phenomenal properties may be incidental intrinsic features of our cognitive maps of the external world. They preserve some relations between represented elements, much as any map preserves structural relations in the domain represented (Churchland 2012, 2007).
A subsidiary negative thesis, just argued, is that subjectivity is also not the transparent awareness of external phenomenal properties.
Thus, the phenomenal concept strategy has been extensively discussed in the literature about Mary the color-deprived neuroscientist, featured in the Knowledge Argument (Jackson 1982).
And vice versa: If I master a public concept without having had the corresponding phenomenal experience, I will be able to employ the deferential concept but not the phenomenal concept because I will have no token of the phenomenal property that constitutes it.
Note that on this point Kriegel’s Self-Representational view is stronger that most formulations of the phenomenal concepts strategy and more faithful to Levine’s paradoxical analysis. For Kriegel as for Levine, subjective inner awareness just happens; it is intrinsic to for-me mental states per se. The requirement that the subjective state be intrinsically self-representing means that the phenomenal property is constitutive of the awareness. I argued earlier that if self-awareness is intrinsic to qualia this entails that the awareness cannot misfire or misrepresent because the very existence of the phenomenal property suffices for the awareness. Unsurprisingly, Kriegel denies that his view has this epistemic consequence. His argument that subjective self-representations can go awry runs on the following example. “This very sentence is written in New Times Roman” is a self-representing sentence that can certainly be false, if the font is not New Times Roman (2005, p. 39). This example is taken to show that there is nothing epistemically mysterious about the notion of self-representation. The problem with this example (and all examples of false self-representation) is that the representation relation in view is not an intrinsic relation of the sort required by the Self-Representational theory of subjectivity. The sentence does not represent itself in virtue of its font; the font does not constitute or establish the representational relation. The sentence’s token-reflexive interpretation is governed by the phrase “this very sentence,” an interpretation which is certainly not intrinsic to that phrase. So, even if the font in which a sentence is written can be called intrinsic to (constitutive of) the marks on the page, it is certainly not intrinsic to the content of the representation. Further, since representation in general fails to be an intrinsic relation, there can be no non-paradoxical (naturalized) theory of intrinsic self-representation.
While still defending the Transparency Thesis, Tye (2009) now holds that there are no special phenomenal concepts. One interesting reason he offers is that the phenomenal concepts strategy entails that even those who lack the requisite experiences are infallible about the content of those experiences! This is because they can’t even formulate the relevant propositions and so cannot be wrong in asserting them (Tye 2009, pp. 67–68). The phenomenal concepts strategy entails that a zombie who says, in the presence of a blue tapestry, “I see blue,” does not say something false because, by hypothesis, the concept “blue” employed in the zombie’s statement is a deferential concept that is used correctly. Tye’s point here supports the Sellarsian argument I have just rehearsed. It adds to the case that the phenomenal concepts strategy cannot deliver physicalism about the requested kind of inner awareness.
This is not the place to pursue the positive account of subjectivity. Very roughly, progress can be made by rethinking the first-person perspective as an organism’s affective engagement with its environment (Neisser manuscript in press). On such an account, subjectivity is a kind of knowing “from here” or “for-me,” but this is relational knowledge of the world, not the intrinsic self-knowing of qualia.
Thanks to Evan Fales (University of Iowa) for forcefully expressing this concern during a lively conference discussion.
See (Matthews 1977), for a nice historical treatment of this topic. See also footnote 9.
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Neisser, J. What Subjectivity Is Not. Topoi 36, 41–53 (2017). https://doi.org/10.1007/s11245-014-9256-5
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s11245-014-9256-5