

# *Revisiting the Dialectic of Environment: Nature as Ideology and Ethics in Adorno and the Frankfurt School*

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## ***I. Introduction: Which Nature, Whose Frankfurt School?***

The more reified the world becomes, the thicker the veil cast upon nature, the more the thinking weaving that veil in its turn claims ideologically to be nature, primordial experience.<sup>1</sup>

Theodor Adorno

In *Dialectic of Enlightenment*, Theodor Adorno and Max Horkheimer argued that the domination of nature and interhuman domination are bound together in the same historical process, such that each form of domination needs to be addressed in the context of the other. In their account of western modernity, enlightenment and progressive rationalization become myth and ideology legitimating social irrationality and injustice, as natural and human relations are increasingly reduced to means through instrumental rationality, fetishized in consumerist culture industries through the often unconscious hegemony of symbolically reproduced values, styles, and practices, and reified and compulsively fixated in a media-driven society. Jürgen Habermas has criticized this work as a retreat from interdisciplinary social scientific and normative inquiry and the emancipatory project of critical social theory, proposing an alternative that divorces human domination from the domination of nature. In his view, this decoupling would dissolve the aporias (i.e., the irresolvable contradictions and paradoxes) of the “dialectic of enlightenment” into the transparency of the intersubjective exchange of reasons in communicative action. I argue that prioritizing

1. Theodor W. Adorno, *Critical Models: Interventions and Catchwords*, trans. Henry W. Pickford (New York: Columbia UP, 2005), p. 7.

human interaction through language and de-emphasizing material and productive relations is worse than the problem it is intended to resolve. The separation of materialistic labor and dialogical interaction, of instrumental and communicative rationalities, reiterates the metaphysical division of nature (*Natur*) and spirit (*Geist*). Habermas's discourse replicates the leveling of the "natural" to the instrumental. It reproduces the anthropocentric blindness that divides the human from the natural material world, which remains unrecognized as something other than and in excess of human rationality and communication, and reinforces the misuse and destruction of animals and environments.

By reconsidering Adorno and Horkheimer on nature and animals in light of the aporetic and disruptive dialectic of nature and society unfolded in *Dialectic of Enlightenment*, I contend that environing material "outer nature," as much as subjective human "inner nature," can interrupt systems of domination and ideology through which they are predominantly yet not fully constructed and filtered. Their analysis of human and non-human nature offers strategies for engaging the contemporary environmental crisis by correcting the anthropocentric humanism, intersubjective constructivism, and deontological idealism of contemporary discourse ethics, dialogical ethics, and social contract theory. In these dominant ethical theories, the environment is at best a background for human activity and a secondary moral issue founded on analogy and self-interest. Arguing for the interruptive and critical significance of "non-identity" (that is, alterity, difference, and otherness; the object or subject-matter irreducible to and potentially fracturing thought<sup>2</sup>) and "nature" (or the animality, materiality, sensuousness, and worldliness of human praxis and reflection), I suggest that an "indirect" and negative—or critically and hermeneutically reflective—materialism is articulated in Adorno's works.<sup>3</sup>

In Horkheimer and Adorno's early writings, "materialism" signifies resistance to metaphysics rather than another metaphysical doctrine, including the eliminative and atomistic materiality and sensation from

2. On the object, subject matter, or material content as the non-identical that fractures, interrupts, and reorients thinking, see *ibid.*, pp. 131–32, 134.

3. I take Adorno's project in the early 1930s to be a hermeneutically robust and sensitive materialism, as in his emphasis on *Deutung* (interpretation) as the orienting idea of philosophy in Theodor W. Adorno, *Philosophische Frühschriften* (Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp, 2003), pp. 334, 338. Unlike "classical hermeneutics," Adorno stresses the interpretation of intentionless actuality in contrast to intentional meaning (*ibid.*, pp. 335–36).

the Enlightenment to positivism.<sup>4</sup> Whereas it entails concrete analysis of the present social situation for the early Horkheimer, the recourse to materiality entails in Adorno's mature works not neglecting the corporeal, non-conceptual, and sensuous character of existence. In both cases, it resists a doctrinal reduction to abstract and unmediated materiality. The emphasis on materiality needs to be non-eliminative, non-reductive, and experimental in order to be attentive and responsive to the object for Adorno.<sup>5</sup> Adorno and Horkheimer's continuing relevance consists in their transformation and persistent advocacy of a "critical materialism."<sup>6</sup> While Habermas and Axel Honneth continue to diagnose the pathologies and possibilities of rationality, the priority of intersubjectivity has promoted the marginalization of the constellation or mediated nexus of history and nature central to Adorno and Horkheimer's analysis. Given the radical divergence in interpretive strategies and projects, the very category of a "Frankfurt School" extending from the initial circle in the 1920s to a set of contemporary thinkers is questionable.<sup>7</sup>

## ***II. Re-Naturalizing the Human?***

Allen Wood criticizes Adorno and Horkheimer's depiction of Kantian rationality in *Dialectic of Enlightenment*, maintaining that Kant could not have reduced reason to instrumental rationality, as Kant defended the precedence of practical reason that obligates us, as free rational agents,

4. As Max Horkheimer contended in his early essay "Materialism and Metaphysics," in *Critical Theory: Selected Essays*, trans. Matthew J. O'Connell et al. (New York: Continuum, 1982), pp. 10–46.

5. On the priority of experience for reflection, see Theodor W. Adorno, *Philosophische Terminologie* (Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp, 1973), pp. 348–49, and Adorno, *Critical Models*, pp. 13, 17. On Adorno's "modest" or "negative" materialism, see Steven Vogel, *Against Nature: The Concept of Nature in Critical Theory* (Albany: SUNY Press, 1996), p. 74. Also compare Yvonne Sherratt's argument for the constructive experiential dimension of Adorno's thought in *Adorno's Positive Dialectic* (Cambridge: Cambridge UP, 2002).

6. Deborah Cook, "Adorno's Critical Materialism," *Philosophy & Social Criticism* 32, no. 6 (2006): 719–37. On Adorno's early interpretation of natural history, see Adorno, *Philosophische Frühschriften*, pp. 354–55. This strategy can be contextualized in relation to Marx's historical materialism and Walter Benjamin's formulation of the mutuality of "natural history" and "historical nature." It is also justifiable given research in historical ecology.

7. Thomas Wheatland rightly rejects the notion of a unified "Frankfurt School" and speaks of a "Frankfurt circle," in *The Frankfurt School in Exile* (Minneapolis: Univ. of Minnesota Press, 2009).

to recognize the non-instrumental and absolute moral value of human autonomy and dignity.<sup>8</sup> This objection misses Adorno and Horkheimer's point that Kant achieved the non-instrumental status of human dignity by dividing practical from theoretical reason, i.e., the ethical from the natural world, which encourages the instrumentalization of nature (i.e., the reduction of its meaning to means) and accordingly of human beings *as* sensuous material and *as* animal beings. The unity of pure and practical reason is the mastery of nature.<sup>9</sup> Animals and sensuous humanity are condensed into causally calculable nature, while rational humanity is exempted from nature.

In a passage regarding the lack of feeling for animals and nature in Kantian ethics, Adorno challenges the problematic categorization of nature and animals that—*notwithstanding* Kant's statements about kindness to animals in his *Lectures on Ethics* and about non-instrumental responsiveness to nature in *Critique of the Power of Judgment*<sup>10</sup>—informs Kantian practical philosophy:

A capacity for moral self-determination is ascribed to humans as an absolute advantage—as a moral profit—while being covertly used to legitimize *dominance*—dominance over nature. This is the real aspect of the transcendental claim that humans can dictate the laws of nature. Ethical dignity in Kant is a demarcation of differences. It is directed against animals. Implicitly it excludes humans from nature, so that its humanity threatens incessantly to revert to the inhuman. It leaves no room for pity. Nothing is more abhorrent to the Kantian than a reminder of the resemblance of human beings to animals. This taboo is always at work when the idealist berates the materialist. Animals play for the idealist system virtually the same role as the Jews for fascism. To revile human animality—that is genuine idealism. To deny the possibility of salvation for animals absolutely and at any price is the inviolable boundary of its metaphysics.<sup>11</sup>

8. Allen Wood, *Kantian Ethics* (Cambridge: Cambridge UP, 2007), p. 278.

9. Adorno did not only negatively analyze Kant and the Enlightenment. He praised Kant's thesis of the unity of reason to the extent that Kant recognized its aporias and contradictory dominating and reconciling functions (Adorno, *Critical Models*, pp. 11, 152).

10. Eric S. Nelson, "China, Nature, and the Sublime in Kant," in Stephen R. Palmquist, ed., *Cultivating Personhood: Kant and Asian Philosophy* (Berlin: Walter de Gruyter, 2010), p. 346.

11. Theodor W. Adorno, *Beethoven: The Philosophy of Music*, trans. Edmund Jephcott (Stanford, CA: Stanford UP, 1998), p. 80. This criticism also appears in *History and*

A primary thesis of *Dialectic of Enlightenment* is the mutuality of the human domination of nature and the domination of humans by each other. Entangled in the same integrative yet aporetic historical processes, Horkheimer and Adorno reveal how the highest ideals of modernity—enlightenment, progress, and rationalization—are performatively undermined in their practice and institutionalization. These ideals devalue themselves, becoming anti-enlightenment, through their historical realization. As Hegel recognized in *Phenomenology of Spirit*, the enlightenment is fundamentally unenlightened about itself.<sup>12</sup> Unlike Hegel, the lack of self-insight of “radical rational insight” is not due to the enlightenment’s blind assertion of abstract and formal rationality against faith, tradition, and community. Rather, because of its one-sidedness, enlightenment rationality undermines its own emancipatory promise in becoming increasingly complicit with domination. This collusion is reflected in its regression to pictorial thinking and the mythic—even if as a formal imaginary lacking the concrete images of traditional myth—that it once polemically rejected as idolatry and superstition. Modern rationality becomes myth in bureaucratic steering, instrumental calculation, and the manufactured spontaneity of consumerism and affected freedom of the culture industry. The reversion to mythology, now formalized and without fixed particular contents, is for Adorno “a second figurativeness, though without images or spontaneity.”<sup>13</sup> This “mythology of reason” does not announce radical self-actualization and redemption through reason, as in *The Oldest System Program of German Idealism*.<sup>14</sup> Disenchanted and formalized—yet all the more mythic—rationality, complicit in the facticity of the domination that it once sought to unmask, accepts and celebrates those powers as inevitable and good. It is not formalism that defies the decay of rationality if, as Adorno recognized, “[r]esistance to the decline of reason would mean for philosophical thinking . . . that it immerse itself in the material contents in

*Freedom*, trans. Rodney Livingstone (Stanford, CA: Stanford UP, 2007), pp. 209–10 (translation modified).

12. G. W. F. Hegel, *Phänomenologie des Geistes* (Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp Verlag, 1986), pp. 398–440.

13. Theodor W. Adorno, *Minima Moralia: Reflections on a Damaged Life*, trans. E. F. N. Jephcott (London: Verso, 1974), p. 140.

14. G. W. F. Hegel, *Frühe Schriften* (Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp Verlag, 1986), pp. 234–36.

order to perceive in them, not beyond them, their truth content.” Freedom of thinking is freedom in rather than from the object or subject matter.<sup>15</sup>

Humanity’s earthly dominion, or the transparency and controllability of nature for reified reason, is a defining tendency of the enlightenment from the beginning, according to Adorno and Horkheimer, and enlightenment legitimates interhuman domination because it never interrogates the human domination of nature.<sup>16</sup> If the thesis of the mutuality of natural history and human history can be upheld, such that they cannot be idealistically separated in the name of a Kantian or communicative ethics that upholds human dignity by questionably isolating it from animality and materiality, a number of implications follow for diagnosing and responding to the intensifying environmental crises of our time.<sup>17</sup>

The latest generation of the Frankfurt School has generally ignored animals and the environment, but, as social ecology and feminist and socialist environmentalism demonstrate, the bio-political contradictions of capitalism remain perilously unanswered. In contrast to social ecology, contemporary theorists who claim the Frankfurt School’s legacy have failed to give the environment sufficient attention, except indirectly through the application of their thought to environmental deliberation.<sup>18</sup> Despite their contributions to ethical and democratic thought, Habermas’s and Honneth’s works are symptomatic of a tendency that is a consequence of the primacy they confer to human intersubjectivity. In reaction to *Dialectic of Enlightenment*, they maintain that the expression “domination of nature” is at most a metaphor extended to nature from the domination between humans in misshapen relations between socially constituted human agents. Honneth remarks in *Reification* that the Western Marxist concern with the reciprocal reification of nature, society, and the self can only be reconstructed through the prism of social reification and intersubjective relations of recognition and misrecognition.<sup>19</sup> It is primarily the symbolically reproduced lifeworld of human agents that suffers from

15. Adorno, *Critical Models*, p. 134.

16. Theodor Adorno and Max Horkheimer, *Dialectic of Enlightenment*, trans. Edmund Jephcott (Stanford, CA: Stanford UP, 2002), pp. xvii–xviii, 42–43.

17. Asher Horowitz stresses the role of natural history, and its ethical import and limits, throughout Adorno’s thought, in *Ethics at a Standstill: History and Subjectivity in Levinas and the Frankfurt School* (Pittsburgh: Duquesne UP, 2008), pp. 43–167.

18. On Habermas’s significance for democratic environmental deliberation, see Graham Smith, *Deliberative Democracy and the Environment* (London: Routledge, 2003).

19. Axel Honneth, *Verdinglichung* (Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp, 2005), p. 80.

the inappropriate colonization and damaging reification by systems of bureaucratic power and market forces.<sup>20</sup> Whereas reification consists of the socially reproduced control and marginalization of the non-identical, the non-conceptual, and the dynamic in Adorno, reification is not applicable to nature for Honneth. The natural world cannot communicate even in a muted language. Nature is wordless, and the animal cry is meaningless even though it involves its own struggle for recognition. Reiterating the Kantian duality of the human and the natural that rationalizes intelligible value by irrationalizing “brute facticity,” the “domination of nature” is an analogy made from intersubjective domination and is therefore not domination at all.<sup>21</sup>

In response, it is well worth reconsidering in our altered situation the more empirical, materialist, and naturalistic point of departure of the “interdisciplinary” and pluralistic materialism of the early Frankfurt circle, which still informed Adorno’s later thought.<sup>22</sup> This approach dissolves the transcendental duality between intelligible normativity and corporeality, an abyss that no amount of pragmatic application can overcome, by exploring the natural and human worlds as historically intertwined and mutually constituting. From this perspective, Habermas’s and Honneth’s anti-naturalistic ethics of discourse and recognition appears to overly restrict the ethical to inter-human interaction, while nature, the environment, and animals are abandoned to instrumentalization. Animals and environments are either considered analogically with human life or as objects of pragmatic calculation and manipulation.<sup>23</sup> The leveling of the natural to the human

20. Ibid., p. 66.

21. In distinguishing normativity and facticity, Habermas continues the Neo-Kantian legacy of thinkers such as Heinrich Rickert, who differentiated the intelligible realm of value and validity, which oriented practical philosophy and the cultural sciences, from the brute facticity and sensuous materiality of nature and the natural sciences. Compare Rickert, *Kulturwissenschaft und Naturwissenschaft* (Stuttgart: Reclam Verlag, 1986), pp. 38–39, and his statement of the absolute difference between humans and animals (ibid., p. 43). On the history of the concept of facticity, see the introduction to François Raffoul and Eric Sean Nelson, eds., *Rethinking Facticity* (Albany: SUNY Press, 2008), pp. 1–21.

22. Philosophy must unrestrictedly experience to confront the deformation of experience, see Adorno, *Critical Models*, pp. 17, 132, 253, 269. Adorno distinguished the “full unregulated scope of experience” from its restriction and deformation in doctrinal empiricism (ibid., p. 242).

23. Angelika Krebs and Tim Hayward consider the limitations of Habermas’s approach to animals from the perspective of animal ethics in Angelika Krebs, *Ethics of Nature: A Map* (Berlin: Walter de Gruyter, 1999), pp. 89–90, and Tim Hayward, *Political Theory and Ecological Value* (New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1998), pp. 127–31.

displaces any immanent significance and resistance they might have. To this extent, Adorno's assessment of Kantian ethics remains applicable to contemporary deontological ethics; it continues to devalue the natural in offering absolute value to the human and thereby reifies and devalues both the human and the inhuman.

### ***III. Communication without Nature?***

Habermas depicts his "communicative turn" as a correction to the ostensive failures of the early Frankfurt School, contending that critical theory can escape the "hopeless dead-end" of the dialectic of enlightenment and the problem of reification through instrumental reason, by abandoning nature to objectification and technical manipulation while morally exempting intersubjective human interaction. Rejecting Adorno's construal of the sensuous-material sources of rationality and the prospect of a hermeneutics and ethics of nature and the environment, human nature alone is to be redeemed from reification and disposability for Habermas.<sup>24</sup> The domination of nature, illegitimately extended to human nature, is not in itself objectionable. The problem is resolved for Habermas if human nature is decoupled from the natural world and morally exempted from inappropriate use and manipulation.<sup>25</sup> Unlike Adorno, there is no non-identity, difference, or alterity in nature that can challenge this departmentalization of the human and inhuman as moral and extra-moral.<sup>26</sup>

In *The Future of Human Nature*, Habermas concludes that human nature ought to be normatively non-disposable for positive, in contrast to negative, and curative scientific and technological interventions, since the latter interventions undermine the symmetry and equality of human interaction, especially those between different generations.<sup>27</sup> Because nature does not consist of the reciprocity of first- and second-person intersubjective relations, who address each other as I and you, the natural world, the environment, and animals have no direct or immediate moral status. For intersubjectively defined moral philosophy, whether understood symmetrically, as in Habermas and Honneth, or asymmetrically, as in Levinas,

24. Jürgen Habermas, "'Ich selber bin ja ein Stück Natur': Adorno über die Naturverflochtenheit der Vernunft," in Axel Honneth, ed., *Dialektik der Freiheit* (Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp, 2005), pp. 23–25.

25. *Ibid.*, pp. 26, 29.

26. *Ibid.*, pp. 31–32.

27. Jürgen Habermas, *The Future of Human Nature* (Cambridge: Polity, 2003).



there is no intrinsic ethical worth in the non-human. The ethical respect for the human other does not extend to animal others.<sup>28</sup> The non-human is “disposable” because it cannot even count *as* other, or as another ethically relevant “self.” Insofar as humans are worldly bodily beings, with practical material lives, it is debatable whether the non-disposability of humans can be preserved in a world where everything else is disposable.<sup>29</sup> As Horkheimer remarked of the connection between human salvation and animal suffering, addressing the complicity of anthropocentric humanism with cruelty to animals in *Eclipse of Reason*: “Only [the human] soul can be saved; animals have but the right to suffer.”<sup>30</sup>

By not recognizing the animal in the human and the ethical in the animal, so to speak, the partition of the human and the non-human devalues those forms of life that lack and/or resist this separation. In not listening and responding to animals, environments, and the materiality of the world, which correlates with not being able to address and be addressed by them, numerous human forms of life and suffering are silenced. The Kantian-Habermasian strategy of theoretically and practically domesticating and excluding the abject and subaltern—i.e., that which and those who cannot come to “rational discourse”—is consequently problematic. Whereas the young Karl Marx could speak of the reconciliation of humans and their enviroing world, and early Western Marxism addressed the reification of nature under capitalism, Habermas rejects such ways of speaking about nature and the non-human in the name of a “post-metaphysical” philosophy that is more metaphysical than previous metaphysics in how it transcendentially-pragmatically, that is, hierarchically, constructs the human in isolation from the worldly, sensual, and material contexts that it

28. There is no ethical recognition of “animal otherness” in Levinas’s story of a dog being “the last Kantian in Germany.” The dog symbolizes a humanity absent in the behavior of his fellow humans and is construed through humanity’s lack of humanity rather than the animal having a moral status of its own. For a related yet different reading, see Christina Gerhardt, “The Ethics of Animals in Adorno and Kafka,” *New German Critique* 97 (2006): 174–78. David Wood discusses Levinas’s deficits concerning animals and the environment in “Some Questions for My Levinasian Friends,” in Eric Sean Nelson, Antje Kapust, and Kent Still, eds., *Addressing Levinas* (Evanston, IL: Northwestern UP, 2005), pp. 152–69.

29. On the centrality of the body, desire, and sensuous existence in Adorno, often neglected by his readers, see in particular Lisa Yun Lee, *Dialectics of the Body: Corporeality in the Philosophy of Theodor Adorno* (London: Routledge, 2004).

30. Max Horkheimer, *Eclipse of Reason* (New York: Continuum Books, 1974), p. 104.

suppresses.<sup>31</sup> Like the patriarchal dominion of Adam, who assigns names and significance to things, it is solely the constructors, givers, and masters of meaning who partake in the ethical.

Without necessarily returning to all the premises of classical Marxism, I propose that a non-reductive, pluralistic, and praxis-oriented materialism is needed: an indirect—that is, as in Adorno, one mediated through language and conceptualization—articulation of materiality. An interpretive materialism, which is not restricted or reduced to a limited model of natural scientific inquiry or one form of human activity such as labor and production, is more suited to reflectively engaging and potentially transforming both social and natural phenomena than the reduction of things and the world to discursive and ideologically constituted constructs. By confronting the Frankfurt School's contemporary successors with this repressed moment from its past, the communicative cure is revealed to be worse than the aporetic disease diagnosed by Habermas.<sup>32</sup> Insofar as nature is abandoned to instrumental rationalization, his communicative strategy is philosophically dubious and ecologically disastrous. The failures of twentieth-century positions that one-sidedly advocate linguistic and social construction without recognition of what is other than identity and its constructs, i.e., the reductive thesis that things are merely reflections of concepts and words, demand a critical return to the role of the non-conceptual and non-discursive corporeality and sensuousness of human existence. That is, as Adorno emphasized, the non-identity of the non-constructed and non-constructible. Three moments of identification should be differentiated here: (1) the identity of mimesis as imitative enslavement, fetishism, and idolatry, or adaptation and subordination to the object and the other as master; (2) the non-identity of mimesis as an unforced and non-coercive freedom toward the object and the other, which refers to the moment of anarchy and non-identity in life, nature, and the organic;<sup>33</sup> and

31. On the metaphysical nature of post-metaphysical thinking, see Noëlle McAfee, *Habermas, Kristeva, and Citizenship* (Ithaca, NY: Cornell UP, 2000), p. 47.

32. Jürgen Habermas, *The Philosophical Discourse of Modernity*, trans. Frederick G. Lawrence (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1987).

33. On the non-conceptual that potentially interrupts conceptual and ideological systems, and which philosophy struggles to conceptualize, see Adorno, *Philosophische Terminologie*, pp. 86–87; on the senses of mimesis in Adorno, see Tom Huhn's introduction to *The Cambridge Companion to Adorno* (Cambridge: Cambridge UP, 2004), pp. 9–17; and on the implications of mimesis for ecological and environmental thought, see Bruce Martin, "Mimetic Moments: Adorno and Ecofeminism," in Renée Heberle, ed., *Feminist*

(3) by way of Adorno's critique of the domination of nature as indifference and unresponsiveness to the object, the responsive and emancipatory potential of perceptual mimesis that cannot be isolated from or exclude the labor of abstraction and conceptualization. The concept and universalization, as partially constitutive of critique and non-identity thinking, is needed if the non-conceptual and particular is not to be betrayed. As Adorno contended in his response to the student movement in the late 1960s, critical transformation is indicated not only in direct praxis or art but in theory as the "open thinking that points beyond itself."<sup>34</sup>

The sensuous physicality of things does not consist of an extra-linguistic substrate, as language is central to how the object is addressed and is not external to it.<sup>35</sup> Even as communication and rationalization do not exhaust nature, humans do not intuit or access nature "in itself" or "as such," unmediated by their own historically situated activities and constructs. Since nothing seems more natural than attempts to master nature, this includes the ideologies of nature—consisting of what conceptually and practically counts as natural—that perpetuate human subordination and ecological devastation. Adorno and Horkheimer's troublesome provocation for contemporary theory springs from their recognition of the dialectical mutuality of linguisticity and materiality, social and natural history, and, through the aporetic moment of non-identity, their potential interruption of and irreducibility to either an ideological construct or unchanging essence. This is an inherently dangerous game, as dialectical thought precariously enables both critique and apology.<sup>36</sup> Likewise, autonomous thought is inevitably bound to and cannot escape heteronomy. Given this perilous condition, in which dialectic is immanent rather than synthetic, Adorno's strategy must disrupt itself and be self-critical.<sup>37</sup> It is

*Interpretations of Theodor Adorno* (University Park: Pennsylvania State UP, 2006). For a critique of mimesis in Adorno, see Sara Beardsworth, "From Nature in Love: The Problem of Subjectivity in Adorno and Freudian Psychoanalysis," *Continental Philosophy Review* 40 (2007): 365–87. On Adorno's rehabilitation of mimesis in terms of responsiveness to the object, see Nicholas Walker, "Adorno and Heidegger on the Question of Art: Countering Hegel?" in Iain Macdonald and Krzysztof Ziarek, eds., *Adorno and Heidegger: Philosophical Questions* (Stanford, CA: Stanford UP, 2008), p. 96.

34. On the necessity for thought, thinking as resistance, and the intimacy of critical reflection and happiness, see Adorno's "Resignation," in *Critical Models*, p. 293.

35. Adorno, *Philosophische Terminologie*, p. 57.

36. Adorno, *Minima Moralia*, p. 244.

37. Adorno, *Critical Models*, pp. 12, 133.

this materially oriented yet conceptually informed interruption that enables the analysis of the one-sidedness of constructivism, naturalism, and environmentalisms that disregard human suffering and social injustice. In an age of deepening environmental crises, narratives that romanticize the natural, idolize the religious, and celebrate the supposed irrationality of life, i.e., those that obstruct the disruptive moment of self-reflection and rationality, need to be confronted. If one mode of domination cannot be adequately addressed without the other, then there is no liberation of the natural transcending social life.

Adorno's analysis of the aporetic, contradictory, and paradoxical mediation of nature and society suggests an alternative to: (1) the contemporary ethics of discourse and recognition articulated by Habermas and Honneth; (2) accounts of critical social theory and environmentalism, such as those offered by Steven Vogel and Andrew Biro, that construe discourses of nature and naturalness as inherently essentialist and ideological social constructs;<sup>38</sup> and (3) the potentially destructive dehumanization involved in submersing the human into the construction of ideologies of pure and untainted nature, in which biocentric ecotopias—or the ecodystopias feared by detractors of environmentalism—no longer address human suffering or attend to the human as the location where humans encounter or fail to encounter organic, biological, and animal life.

#### ***IV. Nature and Domination***

Habermas portrays Adorno and Horkheimer's *Dialectic of Enlightenment* as a pessimistic work reflecting the failures of the democratic left, the rise and seemingly unlimited destructive fury of totalitarian domination in Hitler's Germany and Stalin's Soviet Union, the increasing pervasiveness of commodified life, and the decomposition of the individual subject under the hegemony of the culture industry and ideologically mass-manipulated society. In spite of Adorno's insight that the critique of enlightenment's deformations through self-reflection is its persistent renewal—and one of the first steps of such self-reflection is to "stop slandering enlightenment"—Adorno and Horkheimer have been blamed for the rise of an

38. Vogel criticizes Adorno and Horkheimer's conception of nature in "Horkheimer, Adorno, and the Dialectics of Enlightenment," in *Against Nature*, pp. 51–99; Andrew Biro wishes to purify environmentalism of nature, naturalness, and naturalism in *Denaturalizing Ecological Politics: Alienation from Nature from Rousseau to the Frankfurt School and Beyond* (Toronto: Univ. of Toronto Press, 2005).

“irrational” and “anti-enlightenment” left.<sup>39</sup> Although Habermas partly adopts the language of *Dialectic of Enlightenment* in his writings on bio- and medical ethics, he regards this work to be a retreat to a speculative philosophy of history and nature in negative form. In *The Philosophical Discourse of Modernity*, he considers it to be a flawed departure from: (1) social scientific inquiry, (2) the normative and hermeneutical foundations of social theory,<sup>40</sup> and (3) the early Frankfurt circle’s initial project of an emancipatory critical social theory conceived of as an “interdisciplinary materialism.”<sup>41</sup>

Habermas argues that the excessively close connection between nature and history forced the early Frankfurt school into a destructive aporia. Disregarding aporetic thinking’s strengths in addressing contradictory mediated conditions from Socrates to Derrida, Habermas promises to redeem the aims of critical social theory without reproducing its aporetic structures.<sup>42</sup> If this account is valid, these aporias and the questionability of modern categories of nature and history are repressed rather than resolved. Habermas’s communicative alternative decouples human domination from the domination of nature, history from nature, by categorically and systematically separating instrumental rationalization from intersubjective communicative reason. Whereas instrumental reason concerns the calculation of means for arbitrarily posited ends and the objectification of things from an explanatory third-person perspective, reflecting the irrationality of rational choice, communicative action involves first- and second-person perspectives calling for the reciprocal respect of the other in the exchange of reasons.

Continuing the anthropocentric and speciesist logic of *Theory of Communicative Action*, which severs interpersonal human interactions from

39. Adorno, *Critical Models*, p. 21. For a critique along these lines, see Stephen Eric Bronner, *Reclaiming the Enlightenment: Toward a Politics of Radical Engagement* (New York: Columbia UP, 2004), pp. 2–6, 112.

40. Habermas claims that the normative basis of critical social theory remained mostly implicit and the interpretive aspect of social inquiry inadequately worked out in the early Frankfurt School, in Jürgen Habermas, *Autonomy and Solidarity: Interviews* (London: Verso Press, 1992), pp. 56, 195–96.

41. In his “Traditional and Critical Theory,” in *Critical Theory* (New York: Continuum, 1982), and “The Present Situation of Social Philosophy and the Tasks of an Institute for Social Research,” in *Between Philosophy and Social Science* (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1993), Horkheimer formulated critical theory as an “interdisciplinary materialism” integrating philosophy and the empirically oriented social sciences.

42. Habermas, *Philosophical Discourse*, pp. 126–30.

their environmental and natural contexts, Habermas argues in *The Future of Human Nature* for the non-disposability of human nature for humans and the disposability of nature for human calculation of its worth and value. Since animals do not partake in the relational symmetry of mutual respect, “they do not belong to the universe of members who address intersubjectively accepted rules and orders to one another.” Habermas pragmatically modifies the absoluteness of this exclusion by inconsistently adding that “[a]nimals benefit for their own sake from the moral duties which we are held to respect in our dealings with sentient creatures.”<sup>43</sup> Despite his uneasiness with his own position in this passage, Habermas’s justification of morality through the recourse to intersubjective symmetry entails that human interaction with animals and the environment cannot be directly or immediately moral. Nature does not speak a human language and so cannot be heard. This silence is solidified to the degree that social history is divorced from the forces and relations of production, i.e., dialogue from labor, and its contexts or nexus in natural history. Habermas’s reasoning is ethically doubtful and creates its own aporia: either morality includes human interaction with the non-human, such that it is not exclusively symmetrical and reciprocal but involves asymmetrical responsibilities and obligations; or else it is purely symmetrical and cannot concern animals intrinsically for their own sake.

Honneth modified Habermas’s emphasis on communicative rationality by introducing the affective and social-psychological dimensions of recognition.<sup>44</sup> Honneth proposes a richer moral attitude toward animals and the environment, yet also concludes that such moral considerations are indirect extensions of human intersubjectivity. Finding that Adorno and Horkheimer’s intense meditation on the domination of nature can only be an analogy, an image, and a metaphor established on interhuman domination, Honneth misconstrues the role that the domination and reification of nature play throughout their works, including their remarks on the direct moral significance of animal life and suffering.

In contrast to Honneth’s anthropocentric conception, Adorno’s articulation of non-identity is (1) a break with the absorption and interruption of mastery and (2) the precondition of a genuinely unforced reconciliation.<sup>45</sup> As Adorno did not restrict this moment of non-identity to the human,

43. Habermas, *Human Nature*, p. 33.

44. Honneth, *Verdinglichung*, pp. 37–38.

45. Adorno, *Minima Moralia*, p. 116; cf. Adorno, *Critical Models*, p. 247.

“reconciliation with nature” remains an indefinite promise. Such reconciliation is not seen in the ideologically formed images of idyllic nature. It is rather, Adorno contends, indicated in the nightmares of the monstrous, the mutated, and the archaic—like King Kong and the Loch Ness Monster—which express both human fear of nature and “the hope that animal creation might survive the wrong human beings have done it.”<sup>46</sup> For Honneth, such alterity and otherness no longer signifies the non-identity that it did for Adorno. It is distinctively the human other such that Honneth reproduces, rather than challenges, the classical hermeneutical distinction between inter-human understanding and objectifying natural explanation.<sup>47</sup> Fear of a return to a romantic *Natur-* and *Lebensphilosophie*, with their ambiguous political entanglements, leads Honneth to reject teleological, metaphysical, and vitalistic conceptions of nature but also the possibility of an ethics and hermeneutics of nature, as is suggested by Horkheimer.<sup>48</sup>

The dominant model of critical social theory in Honneth and Habermas approaches nature through the forced either/or of romantic or scientific naturalism, which is genealogically dismantled in *Dialectic of Enlightenment*. Their dyadic strategy undialectically resolves the aporias of the dialectic of enlightenment in communicative rationality, or reciprocal interaction and recognition, by abandoning nature to the abjection of disenchantment and instrumentalization. It consequently disavows human dependence on the animality and materiality of life, a life that is presupposed by the theorist even as it is rejected. This solution reinforces the Baconian vision of the equation of knowledge and power that is achieved in mastery over nature and other humans. This supposedly enlightened vision is oblivious to the natural environing world as something more than a projection of human rationality and symmetrical communication.

If the dignity of the human cannot be bought with the abjection of nature without undermining itself, then the communicative paradigm is inadequate to its own goals. This problem is exposed through Horkheimer’s claim that the more nature is reduced to mastered material, the

46. Adorno, *Minima Moralia*, p. 115 (translation modified).

47. Honneth, *Verdinglichung*, p. 78.

48. “Instrumentalized subjective reason either eulogizes nature as pure vitality or disparages it as brute force, instead of treating it as a text to be interpreted by philosophy that, if rightly read, would unfold a tale of infinite suffering. Without committing the fallacy of equating nature and reason, mankind must try to reconcile the two” (Horkheimer, *Eclipse of Reason*, p. 126).

emptier the mastering subject becomes.<sup>49</sup> Adorno similarly describes how the Kantian “transcendental subject is nothing but the internalized and hypostatized form of human domination of nature. This always comes into being through the elimination of qualities, through the reduction of qualitative distinctions to quantitative forms.”<sup>50</sup>

Communicative ethics restores the mastery of a formalized “quasi-transcendental”—which remains too transcendental—subject in collective intersubjective form, emptied of qualitative content yet, as Nietzsche wrote of Kant’s categorical imperative, still evocative of past and present violence, reproducing rather than questioning the radical deficits concerning animals, ecology, and the natural world of the existing order. These failures need to be addressed by (1) rethinking and extending the ethical from the inter-human and symmetrical to the asymmetrical, as Peter Singer among others have argued; and (2) articulating the differences, affinities, and inseparable interdependence of the natural and the human. This indirect and experimental materialist prospect reconnects with the organic basis of animal and human life, and in the bodily vulnerability, suffering, and happiness that binds them together.<sup>51</sup>

### ***V. The Historical Mediation of Nature***

In *The Philosophical Discourse of Modernity, Dialectic of Enlightenment* is described as a totalizing and aporetic critique undermining rationality and the possibilities for emancipatory change. Adorno and Horkheimer are engaged, Habermas claims, in an “ambiguous attempt at a dialectic of enlightenment,” and while they “would still like to hold on to the basic figure of enlightenment,” “it is no longer possible to place hope in the liberating force of enlightenment.”<sup>52</sup> Contrary to his evaluation and the abandonment of “nature” in the name of reciprocal and symmetrical intersubjectivity, the emancipatory hopes of critical theory—of an experimental hypothesis that aims beyond description and explanation at social transformation—cannot be based on neglecting: (1) the differences and

49. Horkheimer, *Eclipse of Reason*, p. 93.

50. Theodor W. Adorno, *Kant’s Critique of Pure Reason*, trans. Rodney Livingstone (Stanford, CA: Stanford UP, 2001), p. 173; note his remark on Kantian synthesis (*ibid.*, p. 196).

51. Philosophy is experimental in that it searches for its object rather than possesses it, tenuously striving to say what does not let itself be said (Adorno, *Philosophische Terminologie*, p. 82).

52. Habermas, *Philosophical Discourse*, pp. 105, 118, and 106 respectively.



affinities of nature and reason suppressed in the communicative turn, (2) the aporetic dialectic of nature and society characteristic of modern capitalist societies, and (3) its ecological and environmental crises.

Adorno and Horkheimer emphasize that the “domination of nature” is an actual historical process in the assertion of human mastery and control over the instrumentalized natural world, and thus not merely a metaphor *pace* Honneth. Despite the strangeness of this proposition to discourses that conceptualize the control of nature as material progress and human self-realization, Adorno and Horkheimer are closer on this point to the early Marx and the young Lukács in maintaining that nature can be an object of reification and that sensuous embodied existence is the subject of domination and liberation. Honneth is correct to claim that Adorno was suspicious of the romanticism and metaphysics of nature implicit in Lukács, rejecting the conflation of objectification with reification.<sup>53</sup> It does not follow from this disambiguation that nature cannot be reified and dominated. A number of passages in Adorno indicate that “external nature”—like human “inner nature”—consists of practices of domination that can be potentially interrupted. Although the resistance and interruptive power of nature, which Horkheimer described as its “revolt,”<sup>54</sup> cannot be described as resistance in any sense that presupposes a choosing agent or teleological subject, it does intimate a fuller and more appropriate critical model of nature than a strategy that abandons the natural world and denies any inherent immanent value to it for the sake of morally reinforcing the intersubjective reciprocity of human relations.<sup>55</sup> Ways of life are formed by how—or the ways in which—humans encounter, engage, and respond to their world. As enmeshed in the facticity and material conditions of existence, ways of life presuppose and entail much more than the forms of communication, deliberation, and recognition highlighted by Habermas and Honneth.

Adorno and Horkheimer did not reject the hopes of humanism and the traces of liberation at work in enlightenment rationality, including transformative projects of increasing freedom, solidarity, and social justice. For the sake of the betrayed hopes of the past, they skeptically examined the ways in which the realization of these hopes has remained incomplete and become complicit with the regime of the calculative subject that reduces

53. Honneth, *Verdinglichung*, p. 80.

54. Horkheimer, *Eclipse of Reason*, ch. 3, in particular p. 94.

55. Horkheimer, for example, provides a strategy for articulating the intrinsic value of nature without falling into a reified and reactionary image of nature in *ibid.*, pp. 101–4.

others, nature, and itself to objects of technical management and propagandistic and media-driven steering. Given these circumstances, the promise of enlightenment and liberation can barely be enunciated in the context of the enlightenment's self-ruination: "Enlightenment, understood in the widest sense as the advance of thought, has always aimed at liberating human beings from fear and installing them as masters. Yet the wholly enlightened earth is radiant with triumphant calamity."<sup>56</sup> As might be recalled from Hegel's *Phenomenology of Spirit*, the realization of freedom can be its destruction and the rational moral law can become irrational terror.<sup>57</sup> Enlightenment produces its opposite, returning to mythic violence in Hegel's analysis of the French Revolution, when a state terrorizes a people in the name of destroying superstition and achieving its freedom, and the early Frankfurt school's analysis advanced capitalism's material and political "progress." Freedom from mythic nature itself becomes mythic, as the higher powers are less easy for Odysseus—e.g., the prototype of the individual bourgeois agent—to trick and master. Individuality is lost unless it conforms to the ideology of individualism, as the mass-produced and officially sanctioned "pretense of individualism . . . necessarily increases in proportion to the liquidation of the individual."<sup>58</sup>

Maintaining the affinity of myth and enlightenment ("myth is already enlightenment: and enlightenment reverts to mythology"<sup>59</sup>), Horkheimer and Adorno's account of the dialectic of myth and enlightenment is only comprehensible from the perspective of the question of how humans relate to nature through them: "Myth becomes enlightenment and nature mere objectivity. Human beings purchase the increase in their power with estrangement from that over which it is exerted. Enlightenment stands in the same relationship to things as the dictator to human beings. He knows them to the extent that he can manipulate them."<sup>60</sup> Contrary to the narrative of returning to the primitive and archaic, myth is already a form of enlightenment attempting to distance itself from and control nature. Enlightenment itself has mythical tendencies and, in conjunction with the unfolding cultural and material forces of modern societies, is forced to revert to myth: "Humans believe themselves free from fear when there is

56. Adorno and Horkheimer, *Dialectic of Enlightenment*, p. 3; compare Theodor W. Adorno, *The Culture Industry*, ed. J. M. Bernstein (London: Routledge, 1991), p. 92.

57. Hegel, *Phänomenologie des Geistes*, pp. 431–40.

58. Adorno, *The Culture Industry*, p. 35.

59. Adorno and Horkheimer, *Dialectic of Enlightenment*, p. xviii.

60. *Ibid.*, p. 9.

no longer anything unknown. This has determined the path of demythologization, of enlightenment, which equates the living with the nonliving as myth equated the nonliving with the living. Enlightenment is mythical fear radicalized.<sup>61</sup> Myth and enlightenment attempt to subdue the uncanniness and fear of existence, first compensated for in myth, and drive the development of enlightenment from myth to reason. Each step brings about a greater dominion over nature and the greater loss of the possibility of self-knowledge. Enlightenment is instrumentality tied to ends structured by violence and fear and resulting in domination.

As Adorno's assessment of Richard Wagner's contrived and romanticized naturalism demonstrates, the natural is an ambiguous and contested concept that both supports and potentially interrupts ideology. Despite the ideological occultation of natural phenomena in society and the reification of socially constituted phenomena as if they were actually nature and human nature,<sup>62</sup> processes that are rooted in exchange-value and commoditization, the phenomena designated by "nature" are not disclosed in just one way, such that nature or its idea can be eliminated in the name of social progress. For Adorno, the fetishism and reification of the natural is equally human alienation from the natural that subjects abject nature in exalting it.<sup>63</sup> The dominion over nature is at the same time subjugation by nature, and freedom from nature, nature's liberation.<sup>64</sup> As a result of the non-identity and determinate negation destabilizing all mediation and synthesis, there is neither nostalgic return to nature as essence and origin nor the overcoming of nature by spirit—or a linguistic-social construct to be effortlessly removed through good intentions. Adorno notes in his study of Kierkegaard how Kierkegaard's separation of spirit from nature and the body leads to their revenge on spirit as spirit cannot escape from what it desires to subjugate.<sup>65</sup>

If Adorno contends that reflection must break with absorption in nature, and with nature's exaltation as an inhuman power and destiny blind to human suffering, it is because this break equally interrupts human mastery of nature, revealing possibilities for an unforced recognition of

61. *Ibid.*, p. 11.

62. Theodor W. Adorno, *In Search of Wagner*, trans. Rodney Livingstone (London: Verso, 1981), pp. 86–87.

63. Cf. *ibid.*, pp. 93–94, 97, 115–16.

64. *Ibid.*, p. 137.

65. Theodor W. Adorno, *Kierkegaard: Construction of the Aesthetic*, trans. Robert Hullot-Kentor (Minneapolis: Univ. of Minnesota Press, 1989), pp. 52–53, 104–5.

and reconciliation with nature.<sup>66</sup> Such prospects, which Adorno identifies with the promise of happiness, are radically distorted in the fascist use of the beauty and sublimity of nature, when “[n]ature, in being presented by society’s control mechanism as the healing antithesis of society, is itself absorbed into that incurable society and sold off.”<sup>67</sup> Distorted nature is more than an epistemic mistake. It is, according to Adorno’s analysis of images of animals and nature in Wagner, a projection of domination, even as it functions at the same time as “the only gap in an all-encompassing prison.”<sup>68</sup>

The natural and biological context of human life is socially-historically configured, and as the material basis of human life and activity that is inevitably more than an image or model, material nature is irreducible to any one social system. It is accessed through language, history, and the sciences while being irreducibly non-identical with its appropriation, interpretation, and explanation through them. If nature was purely a social or ideological construct, it would disappear in its domination by “spirit,” or the coercive integrating totality of the existing order and the calculations of instrumental rationality, such that a crisis of the environment could not even appear.

“Nature” is not a univocal concept but a complex mediation. The multiplicity of phenomena associated with the category of the natural—or with the animal, as Derrida has argued—does not appear in one homogeneous and invariable manner.<sup>69</sup> The natural reveals itself in myriad different and incommensurable guises, some terrifying and fateful, others liberatory and redemptive for the fragile historically and organically embodied subject joined through its biological life with the life of the world. Nature appears under the oppressive guise of fate and destiny, assigning bodies to abjection and death via physical characteristics associated with race, gender, and class. Nature can be ideologically manipulated in perpetuating injustice and inequality, it can become visible in scientific inquiry, it can function as an uncritical refuge from an alienated and artificial civilization, or it can be voiced through traces of the non-identical and redemptive. Since such traces are mediated even in their appearance of immediacy and spontaneity,

66. Adorno, *In Search of Wagner*, p. 125; Adorno, *Critical Models*, p. 148.

67. Adorno and Horkheimer, *Dialectic of Enlightenment*, p. 119.

68. Adorno, *In Search of Wagner*, p. 152.

69. Jacques Derrida, *The Animal That Therefore I Am*, trans. David Wills (New York: Fordham UP, 2008), pp. 47–48, 52, 62.

they can themselves be fixated and fetishized in the betrayal of the utopian, messianic, and new in the idolatrous instant of their adulation.

Human domination appears to be solely an issue of intersubjective recognition, culture, and communication for one dominant model in contemporary critical theory.<sup>70</sup> Habermas rejected the Marxian paradigm of the primacy of production for failing to differentiate the development of the forces and relations of production from processes of intersubjective recognition. For Habermas, the inability to distinguish labor, driven by need, fear, and the desire for control, from intersubjective interaction, a different form of praxis oriented toward mutual understanding, is the deepest failure of Marxism.<sup>71</sup> However, the justifiable rejection of direct realism and reductive materialism, such as economism and orthodox Marxism, need not entail the elimination of facticity and materiality, especially if the global rejection of materialism leads to a form of linguistic or communicative idealism that prioritizes validity claims and fatefully neglects the bodily entanglement of humans with animals and environments. Instead of being a residue of metaphysics, Adorno analyzes the loss of the distinction between cultural and empirical reality as part of their commercialization and commodification.<sup>72</sup>

Adorno and Horkheimer transformed classical Marxism without abandoning the model of a critical and oblique materialism for which the domination of humans by one another cannot be solved exclusively in its own terms, purely “humanistically” or “communicatively” by separating human beings from natural and material relations. Instead, issues of human justice and injustice cannot be removed from critical reflection on and engagement with both “external” and “internal” nature. It is this possibility of a different relationship with nature that informs the direction of *Dialectic of Enlightenment*, since human domination draws nature into its equation via the bodily and material basis of human life. The question of the domination of nature is accordingly not derivative of human intersubjectivity, as Honneth asserts in *Reification*. The opposite is true

70. On the problematic character of the politics of recognition, see Fraser’s contributions to Nancy Fraser and Axel Honneth, *Redistribution or Recognition? A Political-Philosophical Exchange* (London: Verso, 2003); and Claudia Leeb, “The Politics of ‘Misrecognition’: A Feminist Critique,” *The Good Society* 18 (2009): 70–75.

71. Jürgen Habermas, *Knowledge and Human Interests*, trans. Jeremy J. Shapiro (Boston: Beacon Press, 1971), pp. 52–63; and *Theory and Practice*, trans. John Viertel (Boston: Beacon Press, 1973), pp. 168–69.

72. Adorno, *The Culture Industry*, p. 53.

if the human mis-relation with nature results in human domination of other humans.<sup>73</sup> Concerning the authoritarian irrationalism of contemporary culture, Adorno describes in *Minima Moralia* how—after millennia of enlightenment and progress—humanity’s “control of nature as control of humans far exceeds in horror anything humans ever had to fear from nature.”<sup>74</sup>

If *Dialectic of Enlightenment* is interpreted according to a non-reductive materialist logic of non-identity, as reconfirmed in Adorno’s later works, traces of the other of that domination can be heard even as vigilance should be exercised against a cult of the new and the other in which, as the commoditization of the modish and exotic, nothing new or other reveals itself.<sup>75</sup> Rather than *Dialectic of Enlightenment* being a pessimistic speculative effort, void of hope and critical potential, it offers insights for engaging the present and the contemporary environmental crisis. First, this work suggests a correction to the anthropocentrism and humanism of the ethics of discourse and recognition, which at best observe the environment as a background for human activity and a secondary concern based on self-interest. Second, it challenges varieties of environmental thinking that interrogate the domination of nature without questioning human domination of humans or that reenact a cult of irrational life celebrating vital power and the struggle for existence.<sup>76</sup> What passes for naturalistic is furthest from it, the socially produced and violence-distorted image of “nature.”<sup>77</sup> Yet in the midst of domination and exploitation, something otherwise is still indicated.

73. Theodor W. Adorno, *Prisms*, trans. Samuel and Shierry Weber (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1981), p. 67.

74. Adorno, *Minima Moralia*, p. 239.

75. *Ibid.*, p. 233.

76. *Ibid.*, pp. 77, 97.

77. *Ibid.*, pp. 95–96.