Abstract
Why have so many philosophers agonised over the possibility of valid arguments from factual premises to moral conclusions? I suggest that they have done so, because of worries over a sceptical argument that has as one of its premises, `All moral knowledge must be non-inferential, or, if inferential, based on valid arguments or strong inductive arguments from factual premises'. I argue that this premise is false.
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Nelson, M.T. Who Needs Valid Moral Arguments? (Dedicated to the Memory of R.M. Chisholm, 1916–1999). Argumentation 17, 35–42 (2003). https://doi.org/10.1023/A:1022950020703
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1023/A:1022950020703