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A quantum of truth? Querying the alternative benchmark for human cognition

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  14 May 2013

Ben R. Newell ,
Don van Ravenzwaaij  and
Chris Donkin
Ben R. Newell
Affiliation:
School of Psychology, University of New South Wales, Sydney, 2052 NSW, Australia. ben.newell@unsw.edu.auhttp://www2.psy.unsw.edu.au/Users/BNewelld.vanravenzwaaij@unsw.edu.auhttp://www.donvanravenzwaaij.comc.donkin@unsw.edu.auhttp://www2.psy.unsw.edu.au/users/cdonkin
Don van Ravenzwaaij
Affiliation:
School of Psychology, University of New South Wales, Sydney, 2052 NSW, Australia. ben.newell@unsw.edu.auhttp://www2.psy.unsw.edu.au/Users/BNewelld.vanravenzwaaij@unsw.edu.auhttp://www.donvanravenzwaaij.comc.donkin@unsw.edu.auhttp://www2.psy.unsw.edu.au/users/cdonkin
Chris Donkin
Affiliation:
School of Psychology, University of New South Wales, Sydney, 2052 NSW, Australia. ben.newell@unsw.edu.auhttp://www2.psy.unsw.edu.au/Users/BNewelld.vanravenzwaaij@unsw.edu.auhttp://www.donvanravenzwaaij.comc.donkin@unsw.edu.auhttp://www2.psy.unsw.edu.au/users/cdonkin
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Abstract

We focus on two issues: (1) an unusual, counterintuitive prediction that quantum probability (QP) theory appears to make regarding multiple sequential judgments, and (2) the extent to which QP is an appropriate and comprehensive benchmark for assessing judgment. These issues highlight how QP theory can fall prey to the same problems of arbitrariness that Pothos & Busemeyer (P&B) discuss as plaguing other models.

Type
Open Peer Commentary
Information
Behavioral and Brain Sciences , Volume 36 , Issue 3 , June 2013 , pp. 300 - 302
Copyright
Copyright © Cambridge University Press 2013 

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References

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Newell, B. R. (2013) Judgment under uncertainty. In: Oxford handbook of cognitive psychology, ed. Reisberg, D., pp. 603–17. Oxford University Press.Google Scholar