Abstract
After reviewing the compelling case for separability (`social welfare is a separable function of individual utilities'), an argument is advanced for utilitarianism (defined as `social welfare is the unweighted sum of individual utilities'). Basically, a compelling individualism-type axiom leads us to (social welfare as an) unweighted sum (of individual utilities), given separability.
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Ng, YK. From separability to unweighted sum: A case for utilitarianism. Theory and Decision 49, 299–312 (2000). https://doi.org/10.1023/A:1026432128221
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1023/A:1026432128221