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The Role of Kinds in the Semantics of Ceteris Paribus Laws

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Abstract

This paper investigates the interaction between semantic theories for cp-laws (roughly, laws that hold “all things equal”) and metaphysical theories of kinds in the special sciences. Its central conclusion is that cp-laws concerning kinds behave differently from cp-laws concerning non-kinds: “ravens are black” which concerns the kind corvus corax, behaves differently from from “albino ravens are white” which concerns the non-kind grouping of albino ravens. I argue that this difference is in the first instance logical: the two sorts of cp-laws give rise to different inferential patterns. I draw two further conclusions. The difference in logical behavior poses a severe problem for extant semantic theories of cp-laws, and: we cannot elucidate the distinction between kinds and non-kinds by suggesting that only kinds can appear in laws.

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Notes

  1. I qualify the claim in the main text by mentioning “substantial and unobvious background assumptions.” Several semantic theories for cp-statements interpret them as restricted universal generalizations (e.g. Hausman 1992). By adding the premise that an instance falls within the restriction, we can draw a valid conclusion. However, such a restriction is substantial and unobvious.

  2. See, e.g., Earman et al. (2002), Earman and Roberts (1999), Pietroski and Rey (1995), Lange (2002).

  3. See, e.g., Spohn (2012).

  4. A terminological note: when I speak of kinds, I do not just have in mind Lewisian perfectly natural properties (cf. Lewis 1999). As will become clear in the sequel, the distinction between kinds and non-kinds reflected in cp-statements involves a much for liberal understanding of kinds.

  5. Cf. West et al. (1997a).

  6. Cf. Carey (2009).

  7. Cf. Stearns and Hoekstra (2000).

  8. Cf. Smith and Pun (2010).

  9. See Schiffer (1991, 10) and Woodward (2002, 305).

  10. Hüttemann (2014) offers a theory of cp-laws in terms of dispositions. The argument I have just made here can be seen as lending further methodological support for treating ascriptions of dispositions as a theoretically viable subgroup of cp-laws. The two kinds of cp-laws do not exhaust the class of generalizations usually captured under the heading of cp-laws. Idealizations are a third (cf. Reutlinger, 2014, for further discussion).

  11. See, e.g., Nickel (in prep).

  12. Spohn (2002, 354). Cf. also Schurz (2002).

  13. For completeness: the inference from superset to subset does not go through either.

  14. I do not intend kind percolation to entail that there is a single taxonomic hierarchy.kind percolation only holds if the kinds involved do stand in the relevant relationship.

  15. I defend this claim in detail in other work. See Nickel (2008, 2010).

  16. One particularly clear example of this approach is Schurz (2014).

  17. It’s a further question how to account for this in a systematic semantic theory. See Liebesman (2011), Leslie (2007) for discussion.

  18. I develop a semantics that predicts these results in a formally more precise way and motivates them in Nickel (2010).

  19. Cf. Krifka et al. (1995, 11).

  20. Space constraints prevent me from pursuing this point here. For further discussion, see Nickel (in prep, chp. 6).

  21. This is not to say that these theories hold that any predicate can figure in a cp-statement. As with all laws, the predicates in cp-statements cannot be too gruesome without rendering the statement defective. However, among the viable cp-statements, these theories do not distinguish those that concern kinds and those that do not.

  22. See, for example, Schurz (2001, 2011), Woodward (2001, 2003), Mitchell (1997, 2000), and proponents of the hpc conception (such as Boyd 1999, 1992; Kornblith 1993; Wilson et al. 2007). It is also endorsed by Lange (1995, 2000, 2002), Spohn (2002, 2012). An interesting case in this respect is Schrenk (2014). He does not explicitly discuss how important broad statistical coverage is to assessing any given system of laws, so the view can perhaps be developed to be compatible with the rejection of the majority constraints.

  23. This example is taken from Wilson et al. (2007, 211).

  24. See also Matthen (2009), Ereshefsky and Matthen (2005) for further discussion.

  25. It is of course metaphysically impossible for mealworms to instantiate the antecedent of this conditional. But the proponent of the conditional strategy cannot appeal to this fact in order to block the conclusion that it’s characteristic for them that if they are as cognitively developed etc. It is also metaphysically impossible for a female to be male, yet that does not stand in the way of her having the conditional property “if male, then having testes.”

  26. Cf. Dodson (1989).

  27. Schurz (2001) draws a similar contrast in a different context between polyphenic traits and genuine polymorphisms.

  28. LF is meant to be evoke the notion of a logical form, though it’s a technical notion.

  29. See Nickel (in prep).

  30. See for example the proponents of the hpc conception of kinds mentioned in note 22, along with the new mechanists (e.g. Craver 2007, 2009; Machamer et al. 2000) and Strevens (2012). In this volume, the contrast between theories of cp-laws that are connected to mechanisms and theories that are not is represented by Pemberton and Cartwright (2014); Strevens (2014) on the mechanism side, and Roberts (2014) on the non-mechanistic side.

  31. See, for example, Strevens (2012) and Nickel (in prep).

  32. The notion of a kind-derived subgroup is a metaphysical, not a syntactic one. There are kinds that have syntactically complex names, such as Common Raven or Duckbilled platypus, and ice probably doesn’t form a natural kind on its own, though it is syntactically simple.

  33. Such dimensions are more generally determinables of the property at issue. Having two wings lies along the dimension of having some number of wings. Flying lies along the dimension of means of locomotion.

  34. A useful heuristic for evaluating what it takes for m* to be just like m is this. Begin with m, considered as a sequence of causally connected events, states, and background conditions. Do nothing until you need to alter any of the events, states, or background conditions to allow that mechanism to operate in the kind-derived subgroup. Then allow the mechanism to develop further.

  35. This is just an illustrative example. Suitability can take many different forms, even in biological contexts, and certainly beyond.

  36. Nota bene: I take it that ecology can have its own, proprietary complement of kinds, including the hunters and the prey, the migratory animals, and so on. So while it may be false that the animals as a whole form a natural kind within the context of evolutionary biology—they aren’t a species, and it may be that only species are kinds (or kind-like individuals) in evolutionary biology—they may still form a kind for the purposes of ecology. If the animals don’t form a kind, the treatment I provide in the text applies equally to particular species, and by kind-percolation, the property that characterizes species also applies to animals.

  37. Mill (1891/2002, 95). Cf. Quine (1969), Goodman (1983).

  38. See Wilson et al. (2007) for an excellent exposition.

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    Bernhard Nickel

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Correspondence to Bernhard Nickel.

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I want to thank the participants of the Workshop on the Semantics and Pragmatics of cp-clauses, where this paper was first presented, as well as the editors of this journal and two anonymous referees.

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Nickel, B. The Role of Kinds in the Semantics of Ceteris Paribus Laws. Erkenn 79 (Suppl 10), 1729–1744 (2014). https://doi.org/10.1007/s10670-014-9638-5

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