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  • Graeme Nicholson University of Toronto

DOI:

https://doi.org/10.22329/p.v1i1.34

Abstract

Although the scientific method has reached deeply into our intellectual and social life, there are places where it stops short, where its limitations become evident to us all. In these cases we discover that science can go about its explanations in its usual way, but that it does not tell us anything very interesting, and especially not what we most want to know. Let us think of music and painting, drama and ballet. No doubt a scientific method can tell us something about them, but nothing very important or enlightening, perhaps something about their acoustical or chromatic materials, or some sort of evolutionary background. The scientists who try to go further than that in their explanations of the arts have earned a reputation for being reductionist in the bad sense. It is also my view that the incompetence of science becomes evident when it is applied to the interpretation of law and religion, love and many other forms of human aspiration -- but I shall not argue that point here. For what I hope to show is that the study of an elementary, fundamental human experience, seeing, is best pursued by certain philosophical methods that are not what we call scientific. The same applies to hearing. Many scientific studies have been made of seeing and hearing, but in my view they have not succeeded in the way that philosophy has in revealing the true character of these experiences. I shall devote the first two sections of this paper to outlining one philosophical approach to seeing that I regard as successful -- an approach I develop by working through key sections of Heidegger's Being and Time -- and then, in the concluding section, I point to the defects that I believe mark the approach of psychology and cognitive science.

Author Biography

Graeme Nicholson, University of Toronto

University of Toronto

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Published

2006-11-05

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Invited Articles