¹ Sutnma Theologiae (1270) Part I, Q.21, Art. 3., which also gives Anselm's similar but vaguer answer.Google Scholar

² Dei Delitti e delle Pene (1761). I owe the information about Filangieri to toGoogle Scholar Leslie, Sebba's ‘Clemency in Perspective’ in Criminology in Perspective, Landau, S. and Sebba, L. (eds) (Lexington, Massachusetts: Lexington Books, 1977).Google Scholar

³ Smart, A., “Mercy” in Philosophy (1968) 43, 345–359 CrossRefGoogle Scholar. Philip, Bean's Punishment (Oxford: Martin Robertson, 1981) follows Smart's line, but not very carefully (he thinks, for example that she regards “staleness’ as a reason for mercy, which she doesn't). He seems unaware of Claudia Card's objection in her article “On Mercy’ inGoogle Scholar Philosophical Review (1972) 81, 182–207, and of the underlying problem.CrossRefGoogle Scholar

⁴ Stallybrass, W. T., ‘A Comparison of the General Principles of Criminal Law in England with the “Progetto definitivo di uno nuovo Codice Penale” of Alfredo Rocco’ in The Modern Approach to Criminal Law, Winfield, P. H., (ed.) (London: Macmillan, 1945).Google Scholar

⁵ Fletcher, G., Rethinking Criminal Law (Boston: Little Brown, 1978).Google Scholar

⁶ Murphy, J. and Hampton, J. Forgiveness and Mercy (Cambridge University Press, 1988).CrossRefGoogle Scholar Kathleen, Moore's excellent history, Pardons (Oxford University Press, 1989), also relegates mercy to the sphere of transactions between private individuals, but eschews Murphy's compromise: ‘… a judge cannot exercise …mercy in an official capacity. But individuals can … in their relations with other individuals’.Google Scholar

⁷ Harrison, R. ‘The equality of Mercy’ in Jurisprudence: Cambridge Studies Gross, H. and Harrison, R. (eds) (Oxford University Press, 1992).Google Scholar

⁸ A notable example of a breach was the refusal of the then Home Secretary to recommend the commutation of Bentley's death sentence in the face of advice from his civil servants which was based on precedent.

⁹ Sebba, L., ‘The Pardoning Power: a World Survey’ in the Journal of Criminal Law and Criminology (1977), 68, 83–121.CrossRefGoogle Scholar

¹⁰ Thomas, D. A., ‘Principles of Sentencing in the Court of Appeal (London: Heinemann, 1979).Google Scholar

¹¹ The principle that punishment should be no more severe than is necessary for its purpose: see Ch. XV of Jeremy, Bentham's Introduction to the Principles of Morals and Legislation (London: Payne, 1789).Google Scholar

¹² For examples of unsophisticated scenarios see Smart, A. and Bean, P., loc. cit. in n. 3.Google Scholar