

WHERE IS THE FUNDAMENTAL DISAGREEMENT BETWEEN NAIVE REALISM AND INTENTIONALISM?

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Abstract: This paper aims to reveal the source of the dispute between naive realism and intentionalism. To accomplish this task, it examines Adam Pautz's challenge to naive realism, according to which a naive intuition about visual phenomenology, which is the only workable case for naive realism, is problematic. It argues that naive realists can address the challenge from Pautz by rejecting his assumption that naive realists and intentionalists agree on *the nominal definition of visual phenomenology*. The paper then argues that the reason naive realists want to preserve the naive intuition is its *irresistibility rather than its reliability*. Given this, it concludes that the disagreement between naive realism and intentionalism is rooted in what philosophical projects they tackle. Naive realists are engaged in the philosophical project of *delineating a coherent view of the actual world in which the irresistible naive intuition can be true*; the intentionalist philosophical project differs from it.

Keywords: naive realism, disjunctivism, intentionalism, representationalism, theories of perception, consciousness.

Introduction

There are two dominant views in the debate over the phenomenology of visual perceptual experience: *naive realism* and *intentionalism* (or *representationalism*).¹ Roughly speaking, naive realism states that the phenomenology of veridical visual experience is fundamentally explained in terms of the subject's perceiving environmental objects with visible properties. In addition to this explanatory thesis, naive realists typically endorse the ontological thesis that the phenomenology of veridical visual experience is (at least in part) constituted by the environmental objects that the subject perceives.² In contrast, *intentionalism* states that the phenomenology of visual experience is fundamentally explained in terms of the subject's representing the complex of visible properties or propositions involving such

¹ This paper does not discuss perceptual experiences of other modalities.

² Advocates of naive realism include Brewer (2011), Campbell (2002), Fish (2009), and Martin (2002, 2004). For a general review of the debate over naive realism, see Genone (2016) and Soteriou (2016).

visible properties.³ Because naive realism holds only for *veridical* visual experience, proponents of naive realism need to give a distinct account of *nonveridical* experiences. Naive realists are thus committed to *disjunctivism*, according to which the phenomenology of visual experience is explained in terms *either* of perceiving environmental objects (veridical cases) *or* of something different (nonveridical cases).

Adam Pautz (2010) provides a detailed argument aiming to show that intentionalism is superior to Naive Realist disjunctivism. He first argues that the only theoretical advantage of Naive Realist disjunctivism over intentionalism is the compatibility with a naive intuition about visual phenomenology, and then claims that the intuition is dubious. By adding to this that intentionalism is theoretically simpler than Naive Realist disjunctivism, Pautz concludes that intentionalism is superior to Naive Realist disjunctivism. Since the key claim in this argument is that there is no significant advantage of naive realism, I call this argument the “no-advantage argument.”

By critically examining the no-advantage argument, I hope to reveal the fundamental disagreement between Naive Realist disjunctivism and intentionalism. In section 1, I roughly set out the background to Pautz’s (2010) no-advantage argument. In section 2, I delineate in detail one part of the no-advantage argument, which argues that the naive intuition about visual phenomenology motivating Naive Realist disjunctivism is dubious. In section 3, I argue that there is an unjustified assumption in the part of the no-advantage argument that states that disjunctivists and intentionalists agree on the *nominal definition* of visual phenomenology; removing this assumption, we can see that there is a non-dubious naive intuition about visual phenomenology in favor of Naive Realist disjunctivism over intentionalism. In section 4, I examine why the naive intuition should be respected and conclude that it is because the philosophical project naive realists tackle presupposes the intuition. In contrast, intentionalists are not committed to this project. Given this, section 5 argues that the disagreement between Naive Realist disjunctivism and intentionalism is rooted in what philosophical projects they tackle. From this, I conclude that the conflict between naive realism and intentionalism can be settled *in the second-order, metaphilosophical level* rather than in the first-order, philosophical level.

1. No-Advantage Argument

This section aims to set out the background to Pautz’s no-advantage argument. According to Pautz, the question with which both naive realists

³ Advocates of intentionalism include Dretske (2003), Pautz (2007, 2010), and Siegel (2010).

and intentionalists are concerned is the *phenomenal question* “What determines the phenomenology of visual experience?” (Pautz 2010, 255). To make sense of this question, we need to grasp what “the phenomenology of visual experience” means. The meaning should be neutral in the sense that it does not rule out naive realism or intentionalism from the beginning, since any argument on the basis of a non-neutral understanding of “visual phenomenology” begs the question.

Given this, Pautz characterizes the phenomenal question as follows: “In my view, the phenomenal question should be taken to be a question about the real definition of certain properties of people that we get a grip on through examples. Since the properties are introduced by example, no questions are begged at the outset. . . . Call such properties of people *visual experience properties*” (2010, 256). Pautz chooses the following three examples to characterize a specific visual experience property: *a veridical case* in which you have a veridical experience of a red and round tomato, *an illusory case* in which a green and oval tomato looks red and round to you, and *a hallucinatory case* in which you hallucinate a red and round tomato. Pautz maintains that there is a salient common property shared by the three experiences that determines their phenomenology, which he calls “*R*.” *R* is one instance of visual experience properties.

Pautz’s idea can be summarized as follows: (1) we should *nominally* define “the phenomenology of visual experience” as denoting a salient property that is shared by veridical, illusory, and hallucinatory experiences of the same type (for example, of a red and round tomato) and (2) we explore the *real* definition of that salient property in addressing the phenomenal question. Here it is important to distinguish between nominal and real definitions of visual experience properties. Whereas the real definition of *X* describes the nature of *X*, the nominal definition of *X* specifies the referential target of *X*, namely, what we talk about when using “*X*.” Pautz nominally defines *R* as the property that is commonly instantiated in the veridical, illusory, and hallucinatory experiences of a red and round tomato and that determines their phenomenology, and then claims that the debate over naive realism and intentionalism lies in the real definition of *R*.⁴

Provided this formulation of the phenomenal question and the nominal definition of *R*, Pautz (2010, secs. 4 and 5) argues that an intentionalist account of the phenomenology of *hallucinatory* experience is the most plausible. According to this account, in the hallucinatory case one has *R* “owing to sensorily entertaining a content involving redness and

⁴ It is not the case that this nominal definition of “visual experience property” rules out disjunctivism in the first place. Even though a veridical perception and a hallucination share *R*, the *grounds* of *R* may differ. Disjunctivism can be regarded as a view claiming that while the *R* of veridical perception is grounded in perceiving environmental objects, the *R* of hallucination is grounded differently. For more details, see sections 2 and 3.

roundness” (2010, 283). For the sake of argument, I shall assume that this is correct.

Pautz (2010, sec. 6) then compares *common factor intentionalism* and Naive Realist disjunctivism of the sort that adopts the intentionalist account of hallucinatory experiences. Common factor intentionalism states that having *R* is sensorily entertaining a content involving redness and roundness, whether it is a veridical, illusory, or hallucinatory (V/IH) case. In contrast, the intentionalist sort of Naive Realist disjunctivism states that having *R* consists *either* in perceiving a red and round tomato (veridical cases) *or* in sensorily entertaining a content involving redness and roundness (nonveridical cases).

Pautz distinguishes between disjunctivism of the V/IH version that takes illusions and hallucinations to be in the same (bad) disjunct and the VI/H version that takes veridical perceptions and illusions to be in the same (good) disjunct, and then provides distinct arguments against these two versions of Naive Realist disjunctivism of the intentionalist sort. Following his naming, I shall also call the V/IH version “disjunctive intentionalism” (2010, 291). Disjunctive intentionalism states that having *R* consists *either* in perceiving a red and round tomato (the case of veridical perception) *or* in sensorily entertaining a content involving redness and roundness (the cases of illusion and hallucination).

The no-advantage argument aims to argue against disjunctive intentionalism in favor of common factor intentionalism. The structure of this argument is as follows. (1) There is a naive intuition about visual phenomenology in favor of disjunctive intentionalism, but the intuition is dubious. (2) The naive intuition is the only workable case in favor of disjunctive intentionalism over common factor intentionalism. (3) Common factor intentionalism is theoretically simpler and more unified than disjunctive intentionalism. (4) Therefore, common factor intentionalism is more favorable than disjunctive intentionalism.

This paper argues against the first part of the no-advantage argument, namely, the claim that a naive intuition about visual phenomenology in favor of disjunctive intentionalism is dubious. Before moving onto the examination of that claim, I should make one terminological remark for clarification. By “intuitions” Pautz simply means “claims that we have some pretheoretical reason to accept” (2010, 265). Given this usage of “intuitions,” to say that *S* has an intuition that *X* is *F* is to say that it seems to *S* that *X* is *F* for some pretheoretical reason. Although the nature of intuitions has been the object of much discussion, this paper leaves it open.

2. Against Naive Intuition

What is the intuition that is thought to motivate disjunctive intentionalism? Pautz first takes the “general naive intuition,” which states that

“having *R* is identical with seeing the redness and roundness of something” (2010, 291).⁵ Note that it is incoherent to claim that having *R* is identical with seeing the redness and roundness of something *only* in the veridical case, as *R* is *nominally defined* as being commonly instantiated in the veridical, illusory, and hallucinatory cases. If the identity relation holds between *X* and *Y*, then there is no case in which *X* is not identical with *Y*. The general naive intuition thus applies not only to the veridical case but also to the illusory and hallucinatory cases.

While agreeing that the general naive intuition provides a reason to reject common factor intentionalism, Pautz argues that “it [the general naive intuition] could not be used to support the acceptance of disjunctive intentionalism instead, because the disjunctive intentionalist, no less than the common factor intentionalist, rejects the general naive intuition” (2010, 293). This is because the disjunctive intentionalist also claims that, in the illusory and hallucinatory cases, having *R* consists in sensorily entertaining a content involving redness and roundness, rather than seeing the redness and roundness of something.⁶

This consequence comes in part from the fact that the general naive intuition is framed in terms of the identity relation. Pautz (2010, 293) goes on to examine another naive intuition that is framed in terms of a weaker relation, namely, the *by-virtue-of relation*. An intuition of the sort framed in terms of by-virtue-of relation concerns how visual phenomenology is grounded. As Pautz (2010, 293–94) suggests, we may have a *specific* naive intuition of this sort that *in the veridical case* the subject has *R* by virtue of seeing the redness and roundness of something. This intuition does not entail that in the illusory and hallucinatory cases the subject has *R* by virtue of seeing the redness and roundness of something. Having *R* can be *grounded* in different ways, depending on the situation.

As Pautz (2010, 294) agrees, common factor intentionalism does not fit with this specific naive intuition about the ground of visual phenomenology, since the common factor intentionalist would claim that in the veridical case the subject has *R* by virtue of sensorily entertaining a content involving redness and roundness. In contrast, disjunctive intentionalism may fit well with this intuition, because the disjunctive intentionalist could accept that in the veridical case the subject has *R* by virtue of seeing the redness and roundness of something.

⁵ This “something” does not have to be environmental objects; it can be sense data or a nonexistent object.

⁶ Pautz (2010, 293) claims that illusions of impossible scenes (waterfall illusion) and indeterminate hallucinations give us a reason to reject the general naive intuition. This is puzzling, however. As Pautz (2010, 292) himself claims, the intuition in question is supposed to be applied only to *R*, rather than to all visual experience properties. Since *R* does not involve any impossible or indeterminate scene, the possibility of such illusions does not provide any incentive to reject the general naive intuition about *R*.

Nevertheless, Pautz denies that the naive intuition about the ground of visual phenomenology can be utilized as a case for disjunctive intentionalism, claiming that the intuition is “very dubious” (2010, 296). Pautz (2010, 296–97) makes three objections. (1) The intuition is formulated in terms of an alleged by-virtue-of relation, but it is not clear that we have an intuitive grip on such a relation. (2) The specific intuition that in the veridical case the subject has R by virtue of seeing the redness and roundness of something may derive from the general intuition that R is identical with seeing the redness and roundness of something. This general intuition, however, should be defeated. (3) In nonveridical cases, no less than in veridical cases, one has a strong intuition that one has R by virtue of seeing the redness and roundness of something. Since one is not seeing such things in those cases, the intuition is false. The fact that the intuition is false in nonveridical cases shows that the intuition is generally unreliable.

3. Reformulation of Naive Intuition

In the last section, we saw Pautz’s objections to the idea that there is a non-dubious naive intuition in favor of disjunctive intentionalism over common factor intentionalism. In response to this objection, this section argues that we have a naive intuition about visual phenomenology that (1) is framed in terms of the identity relation and that (2) applies only to veridical cases. As I shall argue, this intuition supports disjunctive intentionalism and is not dubious as Pautz claimed.

As we have seen, the claim that in the veridical case having R is identical with seeing the redness and roundness of something entails the claim that in nonveridical cases having R is identical with seeing the redness and roundness of something. The reason for this is that R is nominally defined as being commonly instantiated in veridical and nonveridical cases. Why should naive realists accept this nominal definition of R ? When characterizing R through examples, Pautz includes not only veridical cases but also illusory and hallucinatory cases without justification. This sheds light on an assumption that Pautz makes: a visual experience property should be nominally defined through not only veridical cases but also nonveridical cases. Naive realists can challenge this assumption by claiming that we can provide *different nominal definitions* to each visual experience property that is instantiated in (1) veridical experiences, (2) illusory experiences, and (3) hallucinatory experiences of a red and round tomato. The visual experience property that determines the phenomenology of the *veridical* experiences should be called R_v , the one determining the phenomenology of the illusory experiences should be called R_i , and the one determining the phenomenology of the hallucinatory experiences should be called R_h . In other words, we can pick out only veridical experiences in which we see a red and round tomato to nominally define a particular visual experience

property R_v , while picking out illusory and hallucinatory experiences as of a red and round tomato to nominally define other visual experience properties R_i and R_h . Importantly, although this view holds that R_v differs from R_i and R_h in *nominal definition*, it does not entail that R_v is different from R_i or R_h in *nature*. It may turn out that these visual experience properties have the same nature. For example, it may be that these visual experience properties are all identical with sensorily entertaining a content involving redness and roundness. In this sense, the nominal definitions of R_v , R_i , and R_h do not rule out common factor intentionalism.

Given the nominal definitions of R_v , R_i , and R_h , disjunctive intentionalism can be formulated as follows: while having R_v is seeing the redness and roundness instantiated in an actual tomato, having R_i or R_h is sensorily entertaining a content involving redness and roundness.

We are likely to have a naive intuition that having R_v is identical with seeing the redness and roundness of a tomato. What is important here is that this naive intuition applies only to the veridical cases; it does not entail the claim that having R_i or R_h is also identical with seeing the redness and roundness of a tomato, since R_v is different from R_i and R_h in the definition level. Disjunctive intentionalism thus fits with this naive intuition regarding R_v rather than the general naive intuition about R .

Furthermore, the naive intuition about R_v can avoid the three objections that Pautz makes to the specific naive intuition that in the veridical case the subject has R by virtue of seeing the redness and roundness of something. Since the first objection concerns the by-virtue-of relation, it is no objection to the naive intuition about R_v that is framed in terms of the identity relation. Likewise, the second objection does not apply to the naive intuition about R_v . Given that R_v is defined only through veridical visual experiences of a red and round tomato, there is no reason to think that the naive intuition about R_v derives from the general naive intuition that holds not only for veridical cases but also for illusory and hallucinatory cases. In addition, there is a positive reason to think that our intuition about the phenomenology of visual experience actually concerns R_v rather than R . When we consider, through introspecting on our experiences, what intuition about visual phenomenology we have, we typically use *standard veridical experiences* as data. For instance, if we want to know what intuition we have when having an experience with red-round-tomato phenomenology, we are likely to see a red and round tomato and introspect on the accompanying veridical experience; we are unlikely to try to undergo an illusory or hallucinatory experience as of a red and round tomato. It is quite difficult to make an artificial setting in which a green and oval tomato looks red and round in the same way as a red and round tomato looks red and round in a normal situation. Likewise, it seems unfeasible to selectively hallucinate a red and round tomato in ordinary life. Considering this, it is reasonable to think that our intuition about the phenomenology

of visual experience as of a red and round tomato is an intuition about R_v , rather than R , let alone R_i and R_h (see also section 4.1 below).

The third objection also fails to threaten the naive intuition about R_v . Suppose that we also have naive intuitions about R_i and R_h , according to which having R_i and having R_h are identical with seeing the redness and roundness of a tomato. These intuitions are false. This, however, would not affect the reliability of the naive intuition about R_v , as these intuitions about R_i and R_h are distinct from the naive intuition about R_v .

In conclusion, if naive realists discard Pautz's nominal definition of R and instead characterize R_v , R_i , and R_h differently, they can appeal to the naive intuition that having R_v is identical with seeing the redness and roundness of a tomato. This intuition can be regarded as motivating disjunctive intentionalism or, more generally, Naive Realist disjunctivism.

4. Why Naive Intuition?

In order to resist my argument set out in section 3, Pautz might contend that visual experience properties should be nominally defined through not only veridical cases but also nonveridical cases; otherwise the nominal definition fails to capture the visual phenomenology in which we have interest. In response, naive realists can simply deny this claim, stating that we are primarily interested in the visual experience property that is characterized through only standard veridical cases, and that it should be treated differently from the visual experience properties that are characterized through both veridical and nonveridical cases.⁷ This disagreement indicates that the root of the conflict between naive realism and intentionalism may be deeper than Pautz expects. That is to say, it may be not only the dispute over the *nature* or *ground* of visual phenomenology but also the dispute over the *nominal definition* of visual phenomenology. If this is correct, Pautz's nominal definition of visual experience properties begs the question.⁸

The question we should ask here is, which understanding of the phenomenology of visual experiences of a red and round tomato— R or the disjunction of R_v , R_i , or R_h —should we buy? The naive realist's motivation for characterizing R_v , R_i , and R_h as being different lies in part in making room for the naive intuition that having a veridical visual experience with

⁷ In the condition of accepting the naive realist conception of the phenomenology of veridical visual experience, Hellie (2010), Kennedy (2013), and Beck (2019) propose different ways to cash out the visual experience properties that are characterized through both veridical and nonveridical cases.

⁸ This is directly shown by the fact that some naive realists adopt eliminativism, according to which hallucinations do not have visual phenomenology (Fish 2009, chap. 4; Logue 2012). Pautz's nominal definition of visual experience properties rules out the possibility of eliminativism.

red-round-tomato phenomenology is identical with seeing the redness and roundness of the tomato. Challenging this, Pautz may claim that there is another intuition we should respect, an *experiential-commonality intuition*: R_v , R_i , and R_h are one and the same. This intuition implies that characterizing R_v , R_i , and R_h differently is unnecessarily redundant and that the intentionalist's preferred characterization is simpler and more advantageous. More important, the experiential-commonality intuition is in itself incompatible with the naive intuition that R_v is identical with seeing the redness and roundness of a tomato, as it gives rise to the false consequence that R_i and R_h are also identical with seeing the redness and roundness of a tomato. Thus, naive realists must dismiss the experiential-commonality intuition in preserving the naive intuition. In contrast, common factor intentionalism fits perfectly with the experiential-commonality intuition, while it is incompatible with the naive intuition. This suggests that common factor intentionalism may stand on a par with Naive Realist disjunctivism regarding how many of our intuitions can be accommodated; they merely differ in which intuition to secure. If this is the case and the former is theoretically simpler and more unified than the latter, it seems better to buy into the former, namely, common factor intentionalism.

How can naive realists respond to this challenge? My proposal is that naive realists can reasonably claim that they do *not* have the experiential-commonality intuition in the first place. In other words, naive realists can reasonably claim that they do not have any pretheoretical reason to accept that R_v , R_i , and R_h are one and the same. If naive realists have the experiential-commonality intuition but ignore it, the naive realists' attitude may be criticized as being unfair and unreasonably discriminatory. If, however, naive realists lack the experiential-commonality intuition, such a criticism does not work. To show that naive realists do not have the experiential-commonality intuition, I shall argue that *any possible procedure through which the experiential-commonality intuition can be acquired involves some question-begging component*.

4.1. Do Naive Realists Have the Experiential-Commonality Intuition?

The key part of my argument is that the naive intuition is *introspection based*, while the experiential-commonality intuition is *not*. Let us suppose that we want to examine what intuition we have about R_v . In order to do this, we are likely to go to a market to find a red and round tomato and attentively stare at it to undergo a veridical visual experience with R_v . There is no reason to doubt that this procedure is feasible. In having a veridical visual experience with R_v , we can introspect on R_v . *Through introspecting on R_v* , we can examine what intuition we can have about it. In this way, we can acquire the naive intuition that having R_v is identical with seeing the redness and roundness of a tomato. In the sense that the naive intuition comes from actual introspection, it is *introspection based*.

Next, let us consider how we can acquire the experiential-commonality intuition that R_v , R_p , and R_h are one and the same. In order to *introspectively* acquire the intuition, we need to *actually* undergo an illusory experience with R_i and a hallucinatory experience with R_h in addition to a veridical visual experience with R_v . It is extremely difficult, however, to find a situation in which something that is not red and round looks *exactly* like a red and round tomato. Likewise, it seems almost impossible to selectively hallucinate a red and round tomato. Thus, it is practically unfeasible to acquire the experiential-commonality intuition through introspection. Hence, the experiential-commonality intuition is not introspection based, despite the fact that it is regarding the phenomenology of visual experiences.⁹

That said, it seems undeniable that many philosophers actually have the experiential-commonality intuition. How could we acquire it without introspecting an illusory experience with R_i and a hallucinatory experience with R_h ? It seems to me that there are three possible routes. First, it may come from a specific conception of the phenomenology of visual experience. One may think that the phenomenology of visual experience is such that if a visual experience is introspectively indiscriminable from another visual experience, then these experiences have the same phenomenology. I call this conception the “indiscriminability conception of phenomenology.” Since an illusory experience with R_i and a hallucinatory experience with R_h are supposed to be introspectively indiscriminable from a veridical visual experience with R_v , it follows from the indiscriminability conception of phenomenology that R_v , R_p , and R_h are one and the same. We may thus acquire the experiential-commonality intuition through the indiscriminability conception of visual phenomenology.

If, however, the experiential-commonality intuition is based on the indiscriminability conception of phenomenology, disjunctivists can reasonably maintain that they do not have it. This is because Naive Realist disjunctivism rejects the indiscriminability conception of phenomenology in holding the ontological thesis that the phenomenology of veridical visual experience is (at least in part) constituted by the environmental objects that the subject perceives.

Alternatively, the experiential-commonality intuition may be acquired by considering how to explain the following cases: (1) actual illusory cases in which something not F looks like an F -thing, (2) actual hallucinatory cases in which the subject mistakes the hallucinatory scene for a perceptual scene, and (3) conceivable scenarios in which an illusory or hallucinatory

⁹ This does not rule out the possibility that if we did have not only the experiences with R_v but also the experiences with R_i and R_h , then we *would* acquire the experiential-commonality intuition through introspection. I have no idea how to evaluate this counterfactual claim. This may be right, but it may be wrong. My point is that if we *actually* have the experiential-commonality intuition, it is not introspection based.

experience is introspectively indiscriminable from a veridical visual experience (for instance, the Matrix). If considering these cases naturally leads us to hold that the illusory and hallucinatory experiences in question have the same phenomenology as corresponding veridical visual experiences, we are likely to acquire the experiential-commonality intuition by engaging in the explanatory consideration.

It is dialectically inappropriate, however, to assume that naive realists are naturally inclined to accept the experiential-commonality claim in attempting to explain those cases in question. Naive realists typically provide an account of nonveridical experiences that do not imply the experiential-commonality. For instance, Logue (2012) would explain the above cases in terms of the idea that the illusory and hallucinatory experiences in question share *non-phenomenal* visual representational content with corresponding veridical visual experiences. Obviously, this explanation does not imply that the illusory and hallucinatory experiences have the same phenomenology as the corresponding veridical experiences.¹⁰ It is unlikely that naive realists are inclined to accept the experiential-commonality in explaining nonveridical cases. Therefore, if the experiential-commonality intuition is supposed to come from the explanatory consideration, naive realists can reasonably claim that they do not have it.

The third possible way to acquire the experiential-commonality intuition is to go through our imagination. Suppose that I am actually staring at a red and round tomato and thereby having a veridical visual experience. While continuing to see the tomato, I can imagine an illusory case in which the tomato I am staring at is neither red nor round but I have a visual experience with the same phenomenology. Likewise, I can imagine a hallucinatory case in which I have a visual experience with the same phenomenology but there is no tomato in front of me in reality. Through these imaginative activities, we may be able to acquire the experiential-commonality intuition.

Naive Realist disjunctivists can, however, also reasonably reject this route to the experiential-commonality intuition. When someone says that she is imagining an illusory case in which she has a visual experience with R_v but the tomato that she is seeing is neither red nor round, disjunctivists would contend that what she is actually imagining is not such an illusory case but something different. They would suggest that what she is actually imagining is either a case in which she is seeing something neither red nor round but having an experience that is introspectively indiscriminable from the experience with R_v , or a case in which she has a visual experience with R_v and wrongly thinks that the tomato that she is seeing, which is red and round in reality, is neither red nor round. The similar line of thought

¹⁰ For other sorts of explanations, see Martin (2004), Fish (2008; 2009, chaps. 4, 6), Brewer (2011, chap. 5), and Allen (2015).

can apply to the hallucinatory case as well. Thus, Naive Realist disjunctivists can reasonably deny that they acquire the experiential-commonality intuition through the imaginative activities described above.

We have seen that there are some question-begging factors in any possible procedure through which the experiential-commonality intuition can be acquired. Hence, naive realists can reasonably claim that they do not have the experiential-commonality intuition. This shows that it is not unfair for naive realists to preferentially preserve the naive intuition at the expense of the experiential-commonality intuition. In contrast, common factor intentionalists cannot use the same sort of argument to claim that they do not have the naive intuition. This is because the naive intuition is introspection based and therefore does not seem to contain a question-begging component. Thus, common factor intentionalists' attitude to the naive intuition may be criticized as being unfair or unreasonably discriminatory, while Naive Realist disjunctivists do not face such an objection.

4.2. *The Irresistibility of the Naive Intuition*

Note that my argument in the last subsection does not in itself provide any *positive* reason to preserve the naive intuition. Why should we attach great importance to the naive intuition in making a theory of visual experience? How can naive realists argue that a theory of visual experience should accommodate the naive intuition? In this subsection, I deal with this issue.

Naive realists might straightforwardly claim that a theory of visual experience ought to accommodate as many of our intuitions about visual phenomenology as possible (while claiming that they do not have the experiential-commonality intuition). We can, however, further ask why a theory of visual experience should fit well with our intuitions. Although there are many physical theories that do not fit with our intuitions about the relevant phenomena (for example, the relativity theory), we do not object to such theories, for the reason that they are incompatible with our intuitions. We admit that our intuitions about physical phenomena may be unreliable. Are theories of visual experience exceptional? If so, why? Is the naive intuition special in some sense? If so, in what sense?

Naive realists might appeal to the fact that the naive intuition is introspection based, claiming that although our intuitions in general may not be reliable, introspection-based intuitions are typically reliable. This claim is doubtful, however. It is implausible to think that introspection always correctly tells us about the nature of mental states or activities (Schwitzgebel 2008; 2011). Considering this, it is not plausible to think that the naive intuition is reliable *simply because* it is introspection based. I do not see any other promising argument showing that the naive intuition is especially reliable.¹¹

¹¹ I do not claim here that the naive intuition is unreliable. My claim is simply that there may be no positive reason to think that the naive intuition is reliable.

Nevertheless, even if there is no positive reason to think that the naive intuition is reliable, I do not think that naive realists should be persuaded to abandon their commitment to it. It does not seem to me that naive realists are motivated by the reliability of the naive intuition in the first place. Rather, naive realists seem to be motivated by the *irresistibility* of the naive intuition.¹² Suppose that certain arguments against naive realism (for example, the argument from hallucination) seem sound to me, and I therefore rationally suspect that naive realism is wrong. Even in this case, when I stare at a red and round tomato and introspectively consider what R_v is, I cannot resist having the naive intuition that having R_v is identical with seeing the redness and roundness of a tomato.¹³ The same sort of irresistibility holds for intuitions about phenomenal consciousness and knowledge about the external world. Even if I am almost convinced by an eliminativist argument showing that phenomenal consciousness does not exist, when I introspect on my current mental state, I cannot resist having the intuition that I have phenomenal consciousness (Kammerer 2019). Likewise, even if I do not find any deficit in a skeptical argument against our knowledge about the external world, I cannot resist having the intuition that we know much about the external world. It would be in part because of the irresistibility of these intuitions that many philosophers have been motivated to block an eliminativist argument against phenomenal consciousness and a skeptical argument against knowledge about the external world. For the same reason, I think, naive realists are also motivated to defend the naive intuition against apparently sound counterarguments. When it is irresistible to have an intuition, it is psychologically natural to go about arguing that the intuition *can* be true.¹⁴

This consideration indicates that the philosophical project in which naive realists are engaged is *to describe a coherent view of the actual world in which an irresistible intuition—namely, the naive intuition—is true*. In order to show that the naive intuition is such that it can be true in the actual world, naive realists need to counter many philosophical arguments against naive realism, such as the argument from hallucination.¹⁵ In addi-

¹² Although it seems to me that the irresistibility of the naive intuition partially consists in the fact that it is introspection based, this paper cannot further discuss the relation between the property of being introspection based and the property of being irresistible. My claim here is simply that the naive intuition is introspection based *and* irresistible.

¹³ Valberg (1992, chaps. 2, 3) discusses the irresistibility of this sort of naive intuition in great detail.

¹⁴ The fact that the naive intuition is irresistible does not show that it is likely to be true. The irresistibility of an intuition does not always correlate with its reliability. There seem to be many intuitions that are strongly irresistible but unreliable, such as the intuition in favor of the geocentric theory.

¹⁵ Such attempts include Brewer (2011, chap. 5), Fish (2009, chaps. 4, 6), Logue (2012), Conduct (2012), Raleigh (2014), and Martin (2004; 2006). For a review of how naive realists have explained subjectively indiscriminable hallucinations, see Niikawa (2019).

tion, naive realists are required to argue that a view of the actual world in which the naive intuition is true can be compatible with relevant sciences, such as vision science.¹⁶ Many naive realists have actually tackled these tasks, which can be counted as the parts of the philosophical project of delineating a coherent view of the actual world in which the naive intuition is true.

Thus, my answer to the question of why we should preserve the naive intuition is that the naive intuition is irresistible. Those who are driven by the irresistibility of the naive intuition become naive realists and tackle the philosophical project of describing a coherent view of the actual world in which the naive intuition is true.

In the next section, I first briefly discuss how common factor intentionalists may respond to this answer. By doing so, I show where the disagreement between naive realism and intentionalism is rooted. Based on this, I conclude by discussing how the conflict between naive realism and intentionalism can be settled.

5. The Conflict Between Naive Realism and Intentionalism

In response to my answer to the question of why we should preserve the naive intuition, Pautz may contend that even though the naive intuition is irresistible, we do not have to respect it, emphasizing that irresistibility does not imply reliability. Pautz may go on to claim that common factor intentionalists are not engaged in the naive realist philosophical project at all and hence they are not forced to preserve the naive intuition. Arguably, Pautz would claim that the intentionalist philosophical project is, rather, to provide the simplest and most unified account of visual experience properties of the sort that is characterized through both veridical and non-veridical visual experiences, such as *R*. This intentionalist philosophical project fits with the experiential-commonality intuition.

It is here that the fundamental disagreement between Naive Realist disjunctivism and common factor intentionalism lies. On the one hand, the naive realist aims to build a coherent view of the actual world in which the naive intuition is true. To make a room for this project, the naive realist must characterize the phenomenology of visual experiences as of a red and round tomato as the disjunction of R_v , R_i , or R_h . On the other hand, the common factor intentionalist aims to provide the simplest and the most unified account of the phenomenology of veridical, illusory, and hallucinatory experiences. This project fits with the characterization of the phenomenology of visual experience as of a red and round tomato as *R*. As Nanay (2014) argues, the characterization of perceptual experience is relative to the explanatory project. The disagreement between naive

¹⁶ For such attempts, see Campbell (2010) and Fish (2009, chap. 5).

realism and intentionalism is thus rooted in *what philosophical project they tackle*.

We can draw two important consequences from this diagnosis about the conflict between naive realism and intentionalism. First, the dispute between naive realism and intentionalism would not be settled in the first-order, philosophical level. Since naive realists and intentionalists tackle different philosophical projects, their evaluative standards may differ. For instance, while the phenomenology of hallucination must be positively explained for the intentionalist philosophical project, it may not be so for the naive realist philosophical project. This is because the phenomenology of hallucination is included in the direct explanatory targets for the intentionalist philosophical project but not for the naive realist project (since the naive intuition does not involve R_h). What is more, naive realism may even be *compatible* with intentionalism. Since Naive Realist disjunctivism aims to account for R_v and common factor intentionalism aims to explain R , these views superficially seem to differ in *explicanda*. Naive realism is incompatible with intentionalism only when the R of a veridical visual experience is substantially identical to its R_v . It is far from clear that we need to accept this identity claim. Logue (2014, 239) suggests that it may be reasonable to adopt naive realism to explain one aspect of experience and intentionalism to explain another aspect of experience. Here I want to emphasize the possibility that there are two kinds of phenomenal aspect of veridical visual experience, one that corresponds to R_v and another that corresponds to R . If the R and R_v of a veridical visual experience are distinct, it is coherent to think that the R_v is explained in the naive realist manner and the R is explained in the intentionalist manner.¹⁷

Second, naive realism and intentionalism may conflict with each other in the second-order, metaphilosophical level. We can ask which philosophical project we *should* tackle. Common factor intentionalists may object to the naive realist philosophical project by saying that it is a waste of time to construct a coherent view of the actual world in which an irresistible intuition—namely, the naive intuition—is true, since there is no positive evidence suggesting that it is likely to be true in this actual world. In response, naive realists might defend the naive realist philosophical project by saying that it is in itself philosophically valuable to examine whether or not there is a coherent view of the actual world in which an irresistible intuition is true.¹⁸ Furthermore, naive realists may object to the intentionalist philosophical project by saying that a *philosophical* theory as distinct from a *scientific* theory *should* aim to secure our irresistible intuitions. This dispute can only be

¹⁷ Hellie (2010), Kennedy (2013), and Beck (2019) can be counted as developing this view.

¹⁸ This does not mean that the naive realist philosophical project does not aim to discover the truth. If naive realists are not concerned with the truth, they do not even have to argue that the naive intuition can be *true*.

settled by considering what aim and value philosophical theories should have. This is undoubtedly a debate in metaphilosophy.

Let me now summarize this paper. In sections 1–3, I argued that the no-advantage argument that Pautz offers against naive realism is question-begging. Naive realists do not have to accept the way of nominally defining “the phenomenology of visual experience,” that Pautz presents. Instead, naive realists can characterize the phenomenology of *veridical* visual experience as being nominally distinct from the phenomenologies of illusory and hallucinatory visual experiences. The motivation for naive realists to do so is to secure the naive intuition that having a veridical experience with visual phenomenology is identical with seeing visible properties of an environmental object. In section 4, I argued that the reason naive realists want to secure this intuition is that its irresistibility motivates them to tackle the philosophical project of delineating a coherent view of the actual world in which it is true. In this present section, I have compared the naive realist philosophical project with the intentionalist philosophical project. Through this comparison, I concluded that Naive Realist disjunctivism and common factor intentionalism would conflict with each other not in the first-order, philosophical level but in the second-order, metaphilosophical level.

This whole discussion sheds light on an interesting feature of the study of visual phenomenology. Even at the stage of *nominally defining* “the phenomenology of visual experience,” we inevitably face the question of what explanatory project we shall tackle. There is no neutral characterization of visual phenomenology that is totally independent from any explanatory project. Before investigating the nature of visual phenomenology, we must decide what characterization of visual phenomenology to take, considering our research interest. Can the same be said of other sorts of phenomenology or phenomenal consciousness in general? This question is undoubtedly worthy of consideration.

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