Abstract
In this paper, I critically examine an important premise in theories of global distributive justice that, despite its widespread influence, has remained largely unexamined. This is the claim that state borders are morally arbitrary with respect to a just distribution of goods. I examine two common arguments for this claim, the argument that state borders are historically unjust and therefore morally arbitrary; and the argument first made by Charles Beitz that the conditions of a fair, hypothetical social contract (such as the Rawlsian original position) would not include knowledge of one's location with respect to the distribution of natural resources between state borders. I argue that there are good reasons to reject both arguments. Beitz's immense contribution to international justice can be gauged by the fact that it is difficult to find a contemporary work on global justice that does not reference his arguments in Political Theory and International Relations (Beitz, 1979). Although some authors find Beitz's cosmopolitan theory objectionable, no author has, to my knowledge, criticized Beitz's pivotal arguments that our placement in the distribution of natural resources is morally arbitrary. The aim of this paper is to do just that.
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Notes
John Rawls argued that his principles of distributive justice should be limited by state borders — principles of distributive justice are properly understood as domestic, not global principles Rawls (1999a, 1999b). Beitz and Pogge argue against this claim. See Beitz (1979, 1983) and Pogge (1989, 1992, 1994).
This kind of cosmopolitan argument is distinct from other kinds of cosmopolitan arguments for the redistribution of goods, such as utilitarian arguments made by Peter Singer (1972). For Singer and other utilitarians, everything is ‘up for grabs’ as long as we end up with the best result, morally speaking.
See Pogge (1994), Beitz (1979), Caney (2005), Kuper (2000), Jones (2001), and O'Neill (2000).
Important arguments for the position that the original position would not include knowledge of one's citizenship can be found in Pogge (1994) and Beitz (1979).
I defend an extended characterization of moral arbitrariness elsewhere in more detail.
An interesting caveat here is that concern for identity alone does not seem to ground any group claim to heretofore undiscovered resources within the territory. One cannot have an identity-forming relationship with deep oil wells if those wells are undiscovered.
Leif Wenar, for example, argues that individual members of peoples should have collective property rights to the natural resources within their territory (Wenar, 2008).
Proponents of self-determination face several objections regarding what it means to qualify as a self-determining group. Can groups be too small? Will recognizing the self-determination of too many groups encourage social fragmentation? I set these important matters aside. I merely want to argue for the position that rights of self-determination are important to individual autonomy. I place my argument against the context of globalized government and international interference in domestic affairs. Against this context, arguments for self-determination are arguments for the right of self-determination simpliciter. I therefore set aside problems regarding how to award the right of self-determination to different groups.
The problem of the dilution of the impact of participation in democratic processes is a subtle and important problem. Thomas Christiano's argument that the territorial state should be preserved because it is important for democracy does not rely on the problem of dilution. Instead, the territorial borders of a state exclude persons from participating in the democratic unit who are not part of the common world made up by the members and structure of the democratic unit. See Christiano (2006).
I do not argue here the virtues and vices of the theory that group rights have a profound impact on individual rights and well-being. One strong theoretical strand supporting this claim is liberal nationalism. For arguments against liberal nationalism, see Beitz (1983), Buchanan (1993), Gans (1998) and Jones (2001). For arguments in favor of nationalism, see Miller (1995), Tamir (1993) and Haller (1997).
One complication for my arguments in this section involves the distinction between a people and a state. It may be the case that my arguments apply to the relationship that a people has with the land, but not to the relationship that a state has with the land, and a people does not always comprise a state. I believe that my central argument still stands, even in the face of this complication. That is, I establish that a group of persons, like a community, should have a prima facie claim to the land and resources within which it is situated. If this community is not currently self-determining, that is, it does not have its own state, then several difficult issues arise, including whether or not the community should be granted territorial rights over the lands within which it is situated, or, less dramatically, if the community should be compensated for its loss of rights over these lands. However, this does not mean that they do not have a prima facie right over the land, only that that right may be difficult to articulate, and that right may be overridden by other concerns.
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Nine, C. The Moral Arbitrariness of State Borders: Against Beitz. Contemp Polit Theory 7, 259–279 (2008). https://doi.org/10.1057/cpt.2008.18
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1057/cpt.2008.18