

# Heautonomy: Schiller on freedom of the will

Jörg Noller 

Ludwig-Maximilians-Universität München,  
Lehrstuhl I für Philosophie, Munich, Germany

## Correspondence

Jörg Noller, Ludwig-Maximilians-Universität  
München, Lehrstuhl I für Philosophie,  
Geschwister-Scholl-Platz 1, 80539 Munich,  
Germany  
Email: joerg.noller@lrz.uni-muenchen.de

## Funding information

Open access funding enabled and organized  
by Projekt DEAL.

## Abstract

In his book “Schiller as Philosopher”, Frederick Beiser laments that “contemporary Kant scholars have been intent on ignoring him. If they know anything at all about Schiller, it is only as the author of an epigram satirizing Kant”. Therefore, Beiser calls us “to consider Schiller as a philosopher, to reconstruct and appraise the arguments of his philosophical writings” (Beiser, 2005, p. vii). In this paper, I shall argue that it is Schiller’s conception of freedom of the will as “heautonomy” that stands behind his critique and modification of Kant’s ethics. However, the systematic significance of Schiller’s theory of freedom is not obvious. Its argumentative structure must first be reconstructed—as Beiser has demanded—because it is concealed by an esthetic discourse. A reconstruction of Schiller’s theory of freedom shows that he contrasts his concept of heautonomy as individual self-determination with the Kantian concept of an autonomy or autocracy of reason by the universal moral law. Schiller’s own philosophical contribution to the debate on freedom after Kant must therefore not be understood as a mere esthetic balancing and softening of Kant’s ethical rigorism. Rather, it shows serious transformations of Kant’s approach, which justifies understanding it as a critical step beyond Kant’s theory of the autonomy of reason.

This is an open access article under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial-NoDerivs License, which permits use and distribution in any medium, provided the original work is properly cited, the use is non-commercial and no modifications or adaptations are made.

© 2020 The Author. *European Journal of Philosophy* published by John Wiley & Sons Ltd.

## 1 | INTRODUCTION

*All other things must; man is the being that wills.*

(Schiller, 1963; NA XXI:38)

In his book *Schiller as Philosopher*, Frederick Beiser has criticized that “contemporary Kant scholars have been intent on ignoring him. If they know anything at all about Schiller, it is only as the author of an epigram satirizing Kant”. Therefore, Beiser calls us “to consider Schiller as a philosopher, to reconstruct and appraise the arguments of his philosophical writings” (Beiser, 2005, p. vii). So far, Friedrich Schiller's philosophy has often been interpreted as an esthetic “corrective” (Baxley, 2003, p. 494) or “completion” (Baxley, 2008) of Kant's moral psychology.<sup>1</sup> However, Schiller also made a significant contribution to the problem of autonomy in the wake of Kant, which concerns our individual freedom and choice.<sup>2</sup> In this paper, I shall argue that it is Schiller's conception of individual freedom as “heautonomy” that motivates his esthetic critique and modification of Kant's ethics.<sup>3</sup>

However, the systematic significance of Schiller's theory of freedom is not obvious.<sup>4</sup> Its argumentative structure must first be reconstructed, because it is concealed by an esthetic discourse. A reconstruction of Schiller's theory of freedom shows that he contrasts his concept of heautonomy as individual self-determination with the Kantian concept of an autonomy or autocracy of reason by the universal moral law. Schiller's own philosophical contribution to the debate on freedom after Kant must therefore not be understood as a mere esthetic balancing and softening of Kant's ethical rigorism, nor as a “breakthrough beyond subjectivism” in the wake of Hegel, as Henrich (1957) and Schindler (2008) have argued.<sup>5</sup> Rather, it shows serious transformations compared to Kant's approach—concerning the concept of will, nature, and personhood—, which justifies understanding it as a critical step beyond Kant's theory of the autonomy of reason. Schiller's theory of freedom is therefore not so much about esthetic balances, but rather about important systematic problems inherited from Kant, the resolution of which he only *illustrates* in the medium of esthetics. Accordingly, Schiller's theory of beauty can be understood as a phenomenology of individual freedom; it describes the reality of freedom, that is, the structure of the individual will as an instance of choice, mediation and reflection. “Beauty,” as Schiller puts it, is nothing but “*freedom in appearance, autonomy in appearance.*” (Kallias, 2003, p. 151; NA XX:285).

In order to reconstruct Schiller's conception of freedom of the will, I will first outline Kant's theory of autonomy, referring to the tight relationship between will and practical reason. I will then outline the so-called “Reinhold's dilemma” (Allison, 1986, p. 422) that concerns our freedom to act immorally if the will is identified with practical reason, as Kant in fact did identify it. After Kant, thinkers such as Carl Christian Erhard Schmid made the consequences of such an identification explicit and argued for an intelligible fatalism, according to which only morally good actions are free, whereas morally evil actions are determined by external influences of sensibility. Finally, I shall reconstruct Schiller's esthetics as a theory of individual freedom as heautonomy that attempts to avoid Reinhold's dilemma.

## 2 | KANT ON FREEDOM AS MORAL AUTONOMY

Kant's concept of freedom is closely connected with the faculty of pure practical reason and its causality.<sup>6</sup> In his *Critique of Practical Reason*, Kant formulated the “first question” in the sense of “whether pure reason of itself alone suffices to determine the will or whether it can be a determining ground of the will only as empirically conditioned.” (CPrR, 1997, 5:15) This question arises from the critical position of the human will, which “stands between its a priori principle, which is formal, and its a posteriori incentive, which is material, as at a crossroads” (GMM, 1997, 4:400). According to Kant, freedom of the will is a kind of absolute freedom that is only possible by the lawful form of pure reason. Kant insists that freedom of the will “is not [...] lawless but must instead be a causality in accordance with immutable laws but of a special kind; for otherwise a free will would be an absurdity” (GMM, 1997, 4:446; my

emphasis). This entails the “reciprocity thesis” (Allison, 1986), according to which “a free will and a will under moral laws are one and the same.” (GMM, 1997, 4:447).

Kant explains this special kind of law in terms of a special kind of *causality* that he refers to as a “causality of reason” (CPrR, 1997, 5:80) or “causality through freedom” (CPrR, 1997, 5:47). In order to be free and autonomous, the causality of reason needs to determine the will in moral terms:

[T]he moral law, since it is a formal determining ground of action through practical pure reason and since it is also a material but only objective determining ground of the objects of action under the name of good and evil, is also a subjective determining ground – that is, an *incentive* – to this action inasmuch as it has influence on the sensibility of the subject and effects a feeling conducive to the influence of the law upon the will. (CPrR, 1997, 5:75).

Kant argues that pure practical reason is able to determine the human will and even motivate to an action. The incentive of pure practical reason is the moral feeling of respect, which, according to Kant has a purely rational origin.<sup>7</sup> In feeling respect, the moral agent is humiliated insofar as she is an empirical being. From another point of view, however, the moral agent is elevated “since this constraint is exercised only by the lawgiving of his own reason” (CPrR, 1997, 5:80). Therefore, Kant's theory of freedom as autonomy entails a control model of moral motivation, which he even calls “autocracy”.<sup>8</sup> It addresses the purely rational and universal aspect of human existence, according to the demand of the universal law of the categorical imperative.

### 3 | REINHOLD'S DILEMMA

Kant's theory of autonomy and his reciprocity thesis raise a serious issue when it comes to moral imputability. This “imputability problem” (Hudson, 1991, p. 179) stems from a conflict between Kant's general imputability thesis (IT) and his autonomy thesis (AT), which shall justify IT.<sup>9</sup>

(IT): The free agent is morally responsible for her morally right and wrong actions and has free choice between the alternatives of good and evil.

(AT): The absolute cause of the autonomous action lies in the causality of pure practical reason and its moral law.

From AT follows that an evil action cannot be causally related to pure practical reason, and therefore *is not* an autonomous action. This conflicts with IT, according to which the individual person is responsible for *all* of her actions.

Karl Leonhard Reinhold pointed to this problem in the Second Volume of his *Letters on the Kantian Philosophy* from 1792. In order to avoid the imputability problem, Reinhold develops a critical action theory in the course of which he sharply distinguishes between free will and pure practical reason: “The effect of reason can never contradict reason; but the action of a person by reason can, since the latter is not founded in the definite procedure of reason, but in the capacity to determine one's action on one's own and to deliberately make use of reason” (Reinhold, 2008, p. 180). Reinhold disagrees with Kant's theory of rational moral motivation as expressed in his theory of the moral feeling of respect. For the will's determination is properly realized by “the very specific of will's action,” which is the individual “decision” as the “person's act in willing” (Reinhold, 2008, p. 177). Reinhold's critique of Kant's conception of will leads to the following central observation: “Practical reason is not the will, even if it belongs essentially to the will and expresses itself in each actual willing. Reason's action, however, happens merely involuntarily” (Reinhold, 2008, p. 198).

Although Reinhold distinguishes between reason and will, he conceives of both as deeply connected in the form of a deliberate and reflexive relationship. In doing so, Reinhold shifts from a conception of freedom as autonomy of reason to a conception of freedom as self-reflective choice. Disagreeing with Kant's reciprocity thesis, Reinhold

develops a double aspect theory of the will: “The will ceases to be free if one considers it one-sidedly” (Reinhold, 2008, p. 189). The pure and the impure will are “one and the same will, only considered from different perspectives” (Reinhold, 2008, p. 189). As Reinhold emphasizes, “the pure will as well as the impure [...] are nothing else than the two at the same time possible modes of action of the free will; both together belong to the nature of freedom that ceases to exist without one of both” (Reinhold, 2008, p. 188).

#### 4 | THE MOOD OF WILL: SCHILLER ON FREEDOM AS HEAUTONOMY

Karl Leonhard Reinhold's theory of individual freedom had great influence on Schiller's philosophy. In a footnote in his treatise *On Grace and Dignity (Über Anmut und Würde)*, which is easy to overlook,<sup>10</sup> Schiller refers to “the Theory of the Will in the second part of Reinhold's Letters [...] worthy of much attention” (GD, 2005, p. 156; NA XX:290). However, Schiller does not simply adopt Reinhold's conception of will, but attempts to modify and transform it into a conception of personal freedom according to which reason and nature are deeply interwoven. In addition to Reinhold's conception of will, it is Kant's theory of the power of judgment that Schiller employs for his conception of freedom. As I will show below, this allows him to avoid both the problem of intelligible fatalism and indifferentism.<sup>11</sup>

What exactly is the systematic importance of Schiller's concept of freedom in relation to Kant's doctrine of autonomy? Schiller's theory of freedom is generally motivated by the demand for a concept of freedom that includes freedom for good and evil on the basis of man's entire nature. The immense philosophical significance of a comprehensive concept of freedom becomes apparent against the background of Schiller's dramatic work (Roehr, 2003b, p. 105). In his preface to *The Robbers*, Schiller writes that the genre of drama requires “that a character must appear who insults the finer feeling of virtue and outrages the tenderness of our customs”. Schiller continues programmatically for his conception of freedom: “Every human painter is put in this necessity if he wants to have delivered a copy of the real world, and no idealistic affects, no compendious people (*Kompendienmenschen*).” It is Schiller's aim to “unfold vice with its entire inner mechanism” (Schiller, 1953; NA III:5). He therefore places the following words in the mouth of the poetic counterpart to such a “compendium man,” who is only an expression of a general, but not an individual, character—the person of Karl Moor.<sup>12</sup> Moor's maxim represents a programmatic of his freedom for evil as a *deliberate* violation of normative laws: “I shall press my body into a laced breast, and lace my will in laws. The law has spoiled to a snail's pace what would have become eagle flight. The law has not yet formed a great man, but freedom hatches colossuses and extremities.” (Schiller, 1953; NA III:21) Likewise, the character of Christian Wolf in the *Criminal of Lost Honour* admits retrospectively to his previous life: “I wanted to do evil, so much I still remember darkly. I wanted to earn my fate. The laws, I thought, were good deeds for the world, so I adopted the maxim (*Vorsatz*) to violate them; formerly I had sinned out of necessity and recklessness, now I did it *out of free choice* for my pleasure.” (Schiller, 1954; NA XVI:14–15, my emphasis).

Schiller is therefore concerned with the concrete, “dramatic” reality of man and his individual freedom, or, as he himself emphasizes in his *Letters On the Aesthetic Education of Man* in critical contrast to Kant's doctrine of freedom:

To obviate any possible misunderstanding, I would observe that, whenever there is any mention of freedom here, I do not mean that freedom which necessarily appertains to man considered as intelligent being, and which can neither be given unto him nor taken from him, but only that freedom which is founded upon his mixed nature. (AE, 1967, p. 137; NA XX:373n.)<sup>13</sup>

Thus, according to Schiller, human freedom is not due solely to the will's exclusive relationship to the general moral law of reason and an intelligible character—like the Kantian concept of a “causality of freedom”—but to a free reflection thereon and to the inclusion of the person's whole nature: “By acting rationally at all man displays freedom of the first order; by acting rationally within the limits of matter, and materially under the laws of reason, he displays freedom of the second order.” (AE, 1967, p. 137n.; NA XX:373n.) The decisive difference from Kant is therefore that

the empirical, finite nature of the person is included in the free decision, so that Schiller can “explain the latter quite simply as a natural possibility of the former”. Freedom is thus only possible on the basis of reason *and* nature, or, as Schiller puts it, “*freedom is itself an effect of Nature*” (AE, 1967, p. 139; NA XX:373).<sup>14</sup>

Schiller's theory of freedom contains a negative (destructive) and a positive (constructive) part. The critique of Kant, which is the basis of Schiller's theory of freedom, is contained in his work *On Grace and Dignity* (1793). In the *Letters on the Aesthetic Education of Man* (1795)—which can be regarded as his theoretical major work—he exposes a sophisticated theory of freedom of the will.<sup>15</sup> Schiller's *On Grace and Dignity* sets the ground, since it contains the immanent critique of the Kantian concept of freedom; the latter can be regarded as the concrete elaboration of Schiller's own theory.

In a first step, Schiller develops a formal concept of “harmonious freedom” that sets out the guidelines for his account of freedom in analogy with the realm of the esthetic—especially the role of the faculty for reflective judgment. Schiller attempts to achieve this by analyzing the various volitional self-relations of the human person, and finally by identifying the one that is appropriate to a real concept of freedom. In a second step, this initially purely formal concept of harmonic freedom is further substantiated by relating it to human drives and thus by materializing it. This internal structure of the will leads Schiller to a weakened dualism, which no longer rigorously opposes reason and nature, as Kant did, but allows both to be connected compatibilistically through freedom, and even allows reason to emerge from nature in the course of the “history of human freedom” (AE, 1967, p. 139; NA XX:374). In a third step, Schiller's concept of the mind (*Geist*) is examined, which he explicitly distinguishes from the Kantian concept of pure reason and which is decisive for his concept of positive freedom. As a result, Schiller does no longer understand freedom in the sense of an absolute cause or as a causality of reason, but as a *quality* of actions and volitional structures that manifest different stages in the formation of the will.

## 5 | “FREEDOM IN APPEARANCE” IN SCHILLER'S KALLIAS LETTERS

In his *Kallias* letters, which emerged from an exchange of letters with his friend Christian Gottfried Körner and which arose immediately before his treatise *On Grace and Dignity*, Schiller develops his theory of individual freedom in explicit confrontation with Kant's theory of autonomous reason. Schiller first concludes that according to Kant “a pure *will* and the form of practical reason are one and the same” (*Kallias*, 2003, p. 151; NA XXVI:182). Immediately following this paraphrase, however, Schiller turns to the “natural being,” whose specific freedom he contrasts with the “rational being.” Schiller thereby contrasts pure self-determination through reason with pure self-determination through nature. Here it already becomes clear that Schiller leaves the basis of Kant's philosophy behind, because Kant always uses “pure” in the sense of pure practical reason and not in relation to heteronomous sensible nature. Also, Schiller refers the concept of the natural being, which he adopts from the *Critique of the Power of Judgment*, whereas this concept does not appear prominently in Kant's practical philosophy, since Kant speaks there only of nature as such.<sup>16</sup>

Drawing on the *Critique of the Power of Judgment*, Schiller considers the case that the pure self-determination of reason stands in close analogy to the pure self-determination of the natural being. Schiller sees the reason that a natural being can be granted freedom by practical reason in the respective purity of self-determination, even if he admits that in the strict sense this can only be granted to a rational being. Schiller argues that practical reason “lends” freedom to the natural being, that is, as it were, transfers it, such that the natural being receives “*freedom in appearance*” or “*autonomy in appearance*” (*Kallias*, 2003, p. 151; NA XXVI:182). Schiller therefore defines beauty as an “analogy of an appearance with the form of pure will or freedom” (*Kallias*, 2003, p. 152; NA XXVI:183). This shows very clearly that Schiller's aim is not only to think about self-determination in general and moral terms, but to transfer it structurally to other areas of human reality.

Schiller then turns to the question of the reason for this analogy between the freedom of reason and the freedom of nature. According to Schiller, the principle of beauty can be determined a priori by reflecting on the “self-

determination of a thing" (Kallias, 2003, p. 154; NA XXVI:192). Schiller, in contrast to Kant, attempts to explain "that beauty is an objective quality" (Kallias, 2003, p. 153; NA XXVI:190), while Kant explained beauty only as a "subjective universality" (CPJ, 2000, 5:212). This is possible to the extent that, according to Schiller, freedom of natural beings is not merely a derived or analogous mode of being determined by pure practical reason. On the contrary, Schiller argues for the objective reality of natural freedom in that he defines freedom in appearance and freedom of reason as two forms of a superordinate principle that he defines as "existence out of pure form" (Kallias, 2003, p. 153; NA XXVI:191). Therefore, Schiller's conception of freedom is not primarily about moral freedom, as in Kant's case, but about the *form* of individual self-determination *as such*. Schiller notes that beauty can be called free in so far as it "imitates" the autonomy of reason, which concerns its form but not its matter (Kallias, 2003, p. 156; NA XXVI:195). Moral and natural self-determination therefore differ in their matter, but not in their form.

How can we better understand freedom in appearance in terms of beauty? Schiller argues that although the "beautiful object" is essentially "rule-governed," it "must appear as free of rules" (Kallias, 2003, p. 155; NA XXVI:193). This can be understood in this sense that Schiller conceives of individual freedom not as something indifferent but rather in terms of a compatibilism according to which the free will needs determination by reasons and motives, or, as Schiller puts it: "It is the same thing to be free and to be determined through oneself and from within oneself." (Kallias, 2003, p. 161; NA XXVI:200).

Schiller's compatibilism about freedom becomes obvious if we consider his special notion of nature, which needs to be distinguished from the Kantian conception. While Kant had opposed nature as "the sum total of all appearances" (CPR, 1998, B 163) and realm of heteronomy to the autonomy of reason, Schiller defines "nature" more generally as "the person of the thing through which it is distinguished from other things which are not of its kind" (Kallias, 2003, p. 163; NA XXVI:203). As such, "nature" now designates "[t]he inner principle of the existence of a thing, which can be at the same time seen as the ground of its form; *the inner necessity of form*." This further illustrates Schiller's individual concept of freedom: "The form must, in the true sense of the word, be self-determining and self-determined; it needs not merely autonomy, but also heautonomy." (Kallias, 2003, p. 166; NAXXVI:207).

Schiller here draws on Kant's concept of heautonomy as individual self-determination versus universal self-determination, as developed in his *Critique of the Power Judgment*: "The power of judgment thus also has in itself a principle for the possibility of nature, though only in a subjective respect, by means of which it prescribes a law, not to nature (as autonomy), but to itself (as heautonomy) for reflection on nature" (CPJ, 2000, 5:185). Unlike Kant, who had conceived of heautonomy as a concept of reflection, Schiller, in the course of his deduction from pure form, attributes an "objective characteristic[]" to heautonomy in nature, which is still given "even if they have been abstracted from by the thinking subject" (Kallias, 2003, p. 167; NA XXVI:208). In order to argue for the individuality of nature, Schiller therefore opposes autonomy with heautonomy: "The perfect can have autonomy insofar as its form is purely determined by its concept; but heautonomy is possible only in beauty, since only its form is determined by its inner essence." (Kallias, 2003, p. 169; NA XXVI:210).

## 6 | ESTHETIC FREEDOM IN SCHILLER'S ON GRACE AND DIGNITY

In his work *On Grace and Dignity*, Schiller lays the foundations for his theory of the "mixed nature" (AE, 1967, p. 137n; NA XX:373n) of man.<sup>17</sup> He starts from the position of the will as a capacity to choose between the law of nature and law of reason but attempts, unlike Kant, not to grasp choice in terms of a domination of pure reason over the empirical will. Rather, for him, volitional control consists in creating a harmonious structure of first-order desires and second-order volitions, which can be described in terms of reflective judgment and "accord" (CPJ, 2000, 5:190) between the power of imagination and the understanding in their teleological perspective.<sup>18</sup>

Schiller generally defines the human will as "a suprasensual faculty" that is "is not so subject either to the law of nature or to that of reason that it does not have complete freedom to choose whether to follow the one or the other" (GD, 2005, p. 155; NA XX:290). Schiller argues for a general conception of will that can be used in a moral

and immoral way: “The will of man” is according to Schiller “a noble concept, even when one does not consider its moral application”. The will, as Schiller puts it, “stands between these two jurisdictions, and it alone decides which law to accept” (GD, 2005, p. 155; NA XX:291). It is therefore the “capacity of choice” (AE, 1967, p. 17; NA XX:316). This freedom of individual will which “stands completely free between duty and inclination” Schiller calls the “sovereign right (*Majestätsrecht*) of his personality” (AE, 1967, p. 17; NA XX:316).

In a first step, Schiller aims to further analyze this “sovereign right” of the will and its powers. Schiller does so indirectly through a phenomenology of freedom by means of the concept of beauty. “Beauty,” as Schiller puts it, is the “consummation” of the free human being (AE, 1967, p. 95; NA XX:356). It is in the case of beauty that man becomes perfectly free and that this freedom confirms with his mixed nature and demonstrates his unity. Whereas Kant developed his conception of freedom as autonomy from the “fact of reason” (CPrR, 1997, 5:31), Schiller’s theory, as it were, draws on the “fact of beauty”. This conception of beauty serves as the *formal* condition for specifically personal freedom of the will. Schiller argues that only in a certain harmonious relationship between nature and man’s reason can a reflexive volitional activity arise, since an imbalance would not permit the self-distancing of the will with regard to its first-order desires: “Exclusive domination by either of his two basic drives is for him a state of constraint and violence, and freedom lies only in the co-operation of both his natures.” (AE, 1967, p. 119; NA XX:365). In order to be free, human persons demand “an intimate agreement between their two natures, of always being a harmonious whole” (GD, 2005, p. 154; NA XX:289). This “intimate agreement” can be understood in terms of harmonious structure of first-order desires and second-order volitions in which the individual “resonance frequency” of the person is realized.<sup>19</sup>

Schiller characterizes Kant’s conception of autonomy not as freedom in the full sense but as a special perspective on freedom—as purely rational or “moral freedom,” which is “in struggle [...] against matter” (GD, 2005, p. 147; NA XX:280). Kant’s conception of moral motivation through the feeling of respect proves to be a paradigmatic point of reference for Schiller’s critique of Kant’s autocracy model of human freedom. Schiller contrasts Kant’s concept of respect, which “is forced,” with the state of love, which he characterizes as a “free emotion” (GD, 2005, p. 166; NA XX:303). According to Schiller, freedom is not realized under the control or even oppression of individuality, but is rather an *expression* of it. More precisely, love is an expression of a will that is essentially harmonious, individual, unified, and decisive. Schiller therefore favors a harmony model instead a control model of freedom. He deprives the capacity of pure practical reason of its *principium executionis*, which he transfers to the capacity to choose: “Reason has accomplished all that she can accomplish by discovering the [moral] law and establishing it. Its execution demands a resolute will and ardour of feeling.” (AE, 1967, p. 49; NA XX:330).

We can better understand Schiller’s notion of love as a “free emotion” if we refer to Harry Frankfurt’s conception. Like Schiller, Frankfurt criticizes Kant’s control model of autonomy and opposes it with the state of love: “I do not share Kant’s view [...] that autonomy consists essentially and exclusively in submission to the requirements of duty. In my opinion actions may be autonomous, whether or not they are in accordance with duty, when they are performed out of love.” (Frankfurt, 1994, p. 435) Frankfurt further analyzes love in terms of a person’s individual will:

The heart of love [...] is neither affective nor cognitive. It is volitional. That a person cares about or that he loves something has less to do with how things make him feel, or with his opinions about them, than with the more or less stable motivational structures that shape his preferences and that guide and limit his conduct. What a person loves helps to determine the choices that he makes and the actions that he is eager or unwilling to perform. (Frankfurt, 1994, p. 433–434).

The “necessities of love” are, as Frankfurt puts it, “substantive, rather than merely formal”. They are “contingent volitional necessities” (Frankfurt, 1994, p. 443) that are fully compatible with freedom, or more precisely: they are both the *reasons* and *grounds* of personal freedom. Love is, as Frankfurt puts it, “in a way reflexive” and therefore characterizes second-order volitions. It is in the state of love that a person maintains her “volitional unity” (Frankfurt, 1994, p. 444).

Besides the feeling of love, the concept of beauty serves as the paradigm for Schiller's harmony model of free will. According to Schiller, "beauty" is to be regarded as "the citizen of two worlds, one *by birth*, the other *through adoption*. It receives its existence in the sensuous world and *achieves* citizenship in the world of reason", whereby it "transforms the sensuous world, in a certain way, into a realm of freedom" (GD, 2005, p. 131; NA XX:260). Schiller's transformative account of freedom does not conceive of nature as something that needs to be controlled or even oppressed. Rather, nature must be cultivated and united with reason.

The intermediate position of beauty makes it possible to bring it into a structural analogy with Kant's notion of will and the power of judgment. In his *Critique of Practical Reason*, Kant defined the will as standing "between its a priori principle, which is formal, and its a posteriori incentive, which is material, as at a crossroads" (GMM, 1997, 4:400). Kant conceives of beauty as the effect of a harmoniously structured, free relationship of human nature:

The spontaneity in the play of the faculties of cognition, the agreement of which contains the ground of this pleasure, makes that concept suitable for mediating the connection of the domain of the concept of nature with the concept of freedom in its consequences (CPJ, 2000, 5:197).

Just as the power of judgment, which, according to Kant, has "a proper principle of its own for seeking laws, although a merely subjective one", and stands between the law of nature and the law of reason, so also the will as the capacity to choose, according to Schiller, takes its specific place in the structure of the human powers. Its state of freedom is *subjective* to the extent that it cannot be reduced either to the legality of pure practical reason nor to the legality of nature. It is *general* in the sense that it is not indifferent but has an objective structure that manifests itself in the holistic and purposeful harmony of volitions. This realm of the "subjective universality" (CPJ, 2000, 5:212) that characterizes the capacity of judgment is thus structurally analogous to the will as the capacity of choice according to Schiller.

Schiller's harmonistic concept of freedom also follows Kant's esthetic concept of freedom in so far as according to it "the judgment of taste must rest on a mere sensation of the reciprocally animating imagination in its *freedom* and the understanding with its *lawfulness*", which corresponds to the "free play" of the human epistemic capacities (CPJ, 2000, 5:287). Schiller describes the harmonic state of the will as that of a "*beautiful soul*" in which "nature possess[es] freedom and at the same time preserve its form, since freedom vanishes under the control of a strict disposition and form under the anarchy of sensuousness" (GD, 2005, p. 153; NA XX:288).

## 7 | THE NATURE OF FREEDOM IN SCHILLER'S *LETTERS ON THE ESTHETIC EDUCATION OF MAN*

After Schiller has *formally* determined the basic volitional relationship of the free person in terms of beauty, he deals with the *material* constitution of this harmonic state and its constitutive moments. The human will is divided into two drives that "exhaust our concept of humanity" (AE, 1967, p. 185; NA XX:347).<sup>20</sup> Schiller's distinction of these volitional structures does not follow the Kantian opposition between autonomy and heteronomy. Rather, he conceives of both drives as the basis of the realization of individual freedom.

I have no qualms about using this expression [scil. "drive"] collectively, both for that which seeks to follow a law and for that which seeks to satisfy a need, although it is otherwise restricted to the latter only. Just as rational ideas become imperatives or duties as soon as they are placed within the limits of time, so these duties become impulses as soon as they are related to something specific and real. [...] This drive [scil. The form-drive] necessarily arises, *and is also not absent from the one who acts against it. Without it there would be no morally evil, and consequently no morally good will* [my emphasis]. (AE, 1963; NA XXI:243–244.).



By integrating the form-drive in both morally good and evil actions, Schiller is able to avoid Reinhold's dilemma. Morally evil actions arise through the reflected use of both drives, and not solely through the action of the material drive or by heteronomy. However, both drives do not exist independently of each other. In this way, the human person would be divided, which Schiller aims to avoid. Rather, both drives must stand mutually in a relationship of subordination: "Both principles are, therefore, at once subordinated to each other and co-ordinated with each other, that is to say, they stand in reciprocal relation to one another: without form no matter, and without matter no form." (AE, 1967, p. 85.; NA XX:347n.).

By no longer understanding freedom as a causality of reason, as Kant did, Schiller is able to conceive of free self-determination as a *gradually* occurring *quality* of human action that depends on the harmony of all human powers. Freedom, according to Schiller, does not have a purely rational origin in the sense of an intelligible character, but is naturally situated; it is "not the work of Man", but "an effect of *Nature*" and can therefore "be furthered or thwarted by natural means" (AE, 1967, p. 139; NA XX:373).<sup>21</sup>

How can we understand both drives of human nature? Schiller describes the complex personal drive structure as follows: The "sensuous drive" (AE, 1967, p. 139; NA XX:374), or the "material drive"—as Schiller reformulates the finite and empirical nature by analyzing the *real* side of his concept of freedom—"proceeds from the physical existence of man, or his sensuous nature" and "set[s] him within the limits of time" (AE, 1967, p. 79; NA XX:344). Here the material drive, as it were, "presses for reality of existence" (AE, 1967, p. 81; NA XX:345). Each drive is characterized by its specific intentionality and its object. Schiller calls the object of the material drive "life, in the widest sense of this term" (AE, 1967, p. 101; NA XX:355). As a "life impulse" (*Lebenstrieb*) (AE, 1967, p. 139; NA XX, 374), this drive represents the volitional structure directed towards the preservation of the individual.<sup>22</sup> While the material drive constitutes the empirical and finite dimension of the person, the formal drive has "*form*" as its object, inasmuch as it "includes all the formal qualities of things and all the relations of these to our thinking faculties" (AE, 1967, p. 101; NA XX, 355).

However, both drives are not only in a synchronous relationship of coordination, but also in a genetic one of *evolution*. Schiller conceives a developmental theory of human freedom on the basis of nature: "The sensuous drive awakens with our experience of life (with the beginning of our individuality); the rational drive, with our experience of law (with the beginning of our personality); and only at this point, when both have come into existence, is the basis of man's humanity established" (AE, 1967, p. 137; NA XX:373). Schiller speaks of a "*priority* of the sensuous drive" and argues that it "provides the clue to the whole history of human freedom" (AE, 1967, p. 141; NA XX:374). Freedom, as Schiller puts it, "arises only when man is a *complete* being, when *both* his fundamental drives are fully developed" (AE, 1967, p. 139; NA XX:374). Nature thus represents the *real* basis of freedom, out of which, as the last stage of volitional evolution, human freedom emerges. Schiller therefore neither harshly opposes nature to the individual person (here the problem of intelligible fatalism looms), nor does he allow it to merge completely into nature (here the problem of natural determinism and indifference occurs). Rather, he locates freedom genetically and reflexively in relation to nature:

Since nature gives purpose to human beings but places the fulfillment of that purpose in their will, the present relationship of their condition to their purpose cannot be a work of nature, but must be their own work. The expression of this relationship in their constitution thus does not belong to nature but to themselves, that is, it is a personal expression. (AE, 1967, p. 141; NA XX:273).

Since the form-drive and the material drive are directed towards "opposite ends," they "cancel each other out, and the will maintains perfect freedom between them" (AE, 1967, p. 135; NA XX:371). This freedom, however, is just the freedom of indifference. Schiller understands the mutual relation of both drives in an individual decision of the person not as a mere opposition or equilibrium, but as a harmonious coordination, which he calls "play-drive." In the dynamic state of play-drive, the form-drive and the material drive "act in concert": "it will, therefore, since it annuls all contingency, annul all constraint too, and set man free both physically and morally." (AE, 1967, p. 97; NA XX:354) The state of such a harmoniously integrated will, in which first-order desires harmonize with second-order volitions, is "to be looked upon as a State of *Supreme Reality* (*höchste Realität*), once we have due regard to the absence of all

limitation and to the sum total of the powers which are conjointly active within it" (AE, 1967, p. 151; NA XX:379), so that "through the use of his freedom"—through specific spontaneity—"it is now up to the mind (*Geist*)<sup>23</sup> to make use of its tools" (GD, 2005, p. 133; NA XX:263).

The play or the game—both is expressed by the German word "Spiel"—is not so much a "limitation" as an "expansion" of man (AE, 1967, p. 195; NA XX:358), or as Schiller puts it in his famous dictum: "man only plays when he is in the fullest sense of the word a human being, and *he is only fully a human being when he plays.*" (AE, 1967, p. 107; NA XX:359) Playing does not mean a meaningless or indifferent activity. Rather, in playing the rules serve as reasons for actions; they do not restrict but rather enable freedom. In playing, "the material constraint of natural laws and the spiritual constraint of moral laws" are abolished in an esthetic state of "higher concept of Necessity, which embraced both worlds at once; and it was only out of the perfect union of those two necessities that for them true Freedom could proceed from which" (AE, 1967, p. 109; NA XX:359).

Schiller understands inner necessity not as a kind of fatalism that makes freedom impossible. Rather this kind of necessity is a state of "real and active determinability" (AE, 1967, p. 141; NA XX:375), that is, as a unity of determination and contingency, which—in contrast to metaphysical or logical necessity—is an expression of individual freedom. In playing, the form-drive and the material drive are preserved, so that this state is not just lawlessness but rather harmony of laws, not arbitrariness but supreme inner necessity" (AE, 1967, p. 125; NA XX:367). Schiller distinguishes this free state of inner necessity from that of the necessitation of reason in Kant's conception of autonomy and respect by referring to Kant's notion of heautonomy.<sup>24</sup> Schiller thus argues, as it were, with Kant against Kant, for the concept of heautonomy refers to the capacity of esthetic *judgment*: "The perfect can have autonomy insofar as its form is purely determined by its concept; but heautonomy is possible only in beauty, since only its form is determined by its inner essence." (*Kallias*, 2003, p. 169; NA XXVI:210).

## 8 | THE FREEDOM OF MIND

How can we better understand Schiller's concept of the play-drive in terms of freedom? In the equilibristic state of "real and active determinability" (AE, 1967, p. 141; NA XX:375), the human will is not necessitated, but rather integrated and coordinated. The play-drive is a "middle disposition," "in which sense and reason are both active," and "in which the psyche is subject neither to physical nor to moral constraint, and yet is active in both these ways" (AE, 1967, p. 141; NA XX:375). Therefore, according to Schiller, "contemplation (reflection)" is also "[t]he first liberal relation which man establishes with the universe around him"—or, as Schiller formulates the difference between first-order desires and second-order volitions: "If desire seizes directly upon its object, contemplation removes its object to a distance, and makes it into a true and inalienable possession" (AE, 1967, p. 183; NA XX:394).

Schiller argues for a compatibilist account of freedom of the will: "it is a question of combining such sheer absence of determination, and an equally unlimited determinability, with the greatest possible content" (AE, 1967, p. 141; NA XX:375). How must the determination of will be thought? According to Schiller, freedom of the will takes place on the basis of first-order desires: "The determination he has received through Sensation must therefore be preserved, because there must be no loss of reality" (AE, 1967, p. 141; NA XX:375); otherwise the threat of a groundless indifferentism arises. However, the determination of first-order desires must not apply exclusively: "The problem is, therefore, at one and the same time to destroy and to maintain the determination of the condition" (AE, 1967, p. 141; NA XX:375). The mind—or better—the will, is not ontologically distinct from these first-order desires, but it integrates and reflects them: "it has no limits, because it embraces all reality" (AE, 1967, p. 145; NA XX:376), it is not an "empty infinity", but an "infinity filled with content" (AE, 1967, p. 145; NA XX:377).

Of course, the question now arises as to how Schiller's concept of an inner necessity out of which the individual decision follows is to be understood more precisely. According to Schiller, human actions are not unfounded products of indifference, but essentially determined. Whereas "in animals, action results from desire and loathing just as necessarily as desire results from sensation and sensation resulted from the outward impression" (GD, 2005, p. 155;

NA XX:290), man can reflect on his first-order desires. We can better understand Schiller's notion of "inner" and "higher" necessity if we relate it to Harry Frankfurt's notion of "volitional necessity", which he distinguishes from metaphysical and logical necessity that would make freedom of the will impossible. Volitional necessity concerns "the purposes, the preferences, and the other personal characteristics that the individual cannot help having and that effectively determine the activities of his will" (Frankfurt, 1994, p. 443):

A person who is subject to volitional necessity finds that he must act as he does. For this reason it may seem appropriate to regard situations which involve volitional necessity as providing instances of passivity. But the person in a situation of this kind generally does not construe the fact that he is subject to volitional necessity as entailing that he is passive at all. People are generally quite far from considering that volitional necessity renders them helpless bystanders to their own behavior. Indeed they may even tend to regard it as actually enhancing both their autonomy and their strength of will. (Frankfurt, 1982, p. 264).

Freedom of the mind, in contrast to the Kantian notion of freedom of reason, consists in the fact that in it the will can behave reflexively to its nature, that is, to the two first-order desires of the material drive and the form-drive and coordinate them. The mind is according to Schiller a both volitional and self-reflective structure. Schiller writes with regard to the autonomy problem and the threat of intelligible fatalism:

Both drives exist and operate within it; but the mind itself is neither matter nor form, neither sense nor reason—which fact does not always seem to have been taken into account by those who will only allow the human mind to be active when its operations are in accordance with reason, and declare it to be merely passive when they are at odds with reason. (AE, 1967, p. 133–134; NA XX:371).

The mind, understood as the self-reflective will, and expressed by beauty, is the basis of Schiller's compatibilist notion of freedom. Schiller's compatibilist concept of the mind thereby adopts an analogous position to Kant's concept of the power of judgment, "which in the order of our faculties of cognition constitutes an intermediary between understanding and reason", "as the intermediary between the faculty of cognition and the faculty of desire" (CPJ, 2000, 5:168), without being able to be reduced to natural causality or causality of reason.

How is the mode of action of the mind to be conceived in contrast to reason? Unlike Kant, Schiller does not conceive of free decision in the sense of an absolute causality of reason, but as a formal operation of the mind, as the creation of an individually harmonious order on the basis of second-order volitions, which results from the reflected relationship of the form-drive and the material drive as first-order desires. Freedom, as Schiller understands it in terms of beauty, acquires its determination "in the *exclusion of certain realities*, but in the *absolute inclusion of all realities*, that it is, therefore, not limitation but infinity" (AE, 1967, p. 125; NA XX:367). The greater the diversity of first-order desires can be harmoniously integrated into the unity of a will, the greater individual freedom is. This integration is to be understood in the sense of an intersubjective integration, as Schiller puts it: A "noble" mind "is not content to be itself free; it must also set free everything around it, even the lifeless." (AE, 1967, p. 167n.; NA XX:386n.) A free person thus transfers her inner-harmonious volitional structure to an interpersonal community, which she places in a common "resonance frequency": "He is to set up a world over against himself because he is Person, and he is to be Person because a world stands over against him." (AE, 1967, p. 353; NA XX:353).<sup>25</sup>

## 9 | CONCLUSION

Schiller develops a compatibilist conception of freedom of the will that does not exclude the nature of man through the autocracy of reason, but integrates it as a living basis from which freedom emerges. By distinguishing the spirit

(*Geist*) from the form-drive and the material drive, and by relating them at the same time, Schiller is able to develop a concept of self-reflective will that avoids Reinhold's dilemma. This will can further be characterized by the concepts of beauty and love, which Schiller not only uses as esthetic concepts, but also as expressions of individual freedom.

However, Schiller's concept of freedom is in some respects problematic. By referring to esthetic concepts, Schiller is able to further illuminate the complex internal structure of the will as a harmonious structure of first-order desires and second-order volitions. This concentration on the internal coherence of the will, however, which allows him to think in terms of a compatibility of freedom and nature, ultimately leads to a separation of freedom from normative questions.<sup>26</sup> The form-drive and the material drive can no longer be qualified morally, but appear as primarily individual esthetic categories that are indifferent to the objective and intersubjective dimension of freedom. Due to his structural connection to the concept of beauty, Schiller's concept of freedom has the status of a "disinterested satisfaction" (CPJ, 2000, 5:205). If beauty is "a symbol of morality" (CPJ, 2000, 5:351), as Kant wrote in his *Critique of the Power of Judgment*, then freedom according to Schiller threatens to be reduced to a passive state of complacent self-sufficiency and harmony devoid of actual moral relevance.

## ACKNOWLEDGMENT

Open access funding enabled and organized by Projekt DEAL.

## ORCID

Jörg Noller  <https://orcid.org/0000-0002-1070-156X>

## ENDNOTES

- <sup>1</sup> See also Gauthier (1997), Baxley (2010), and Deligiorgi (2006).
- <sup>2</sup> Important contributions to Schiller's conception of freedom of the will are Barnouw (1982), Beiser (2005), 213–237, Peetz (1995), 163–165, Roehr (2003a, 2003b), Schindler (2008), Schindler (2012, p. 49–110), Moland (2017), and Bondeli (2020).
- <sup>3</sup> Beiser (2005, p. 140) has pointed out the importance of individuality in Schiller's philosophy: "It is in this insistence upon the intrinsic value of individuality that Schiller begins to take one of his more important steps beyond Kant."
- <sup>4</sup> See Beiser (2005, p. 213): "For all its importance, Schiller's ideal of freedom remains relatively understudied in the vast corpus of secondary literature."
- <sup>5</sup> See Hegel's *Lectures on Aesthetics*: "It is Schiller [...] who must be given great credit for breaking through the Kantian subjectivity and abstraction of thinking and for venturing on an attempt to get beyond this by intellectually grasping the unity and reconciliation as the truth and by actualizing them in artistic production." (Hegel, 1975, p. 61).
- <sup>6</sup> For a discussion of Kant's notion of freedom as autonomy see Noller (2016, p. 105–188), Noller (2019a, p. 853) and Noller (2019b, p. 8–9).
- <sup>7</sup> For a systematic reconstruction of Kant's conception of the moral feeling of respect, see Noller (2019b).
- <sup>8</sup> See Kant, AA 29:626: "If reason determines the will through the moral law, it has the power of an incentive, it has not only autonomy but also autocracy."
- <sup>9</sup> For a discussion of Reinhold's dilemma, see Noller (2019a).
- <sup>10</sup> See Roehr (2003b, p. 115): "How has this adoption of Reinhold's concept of will by Schiller been taken up in secondary literature? Surprisingly—or perhaps not surprisingly—it has been almost ignored." (my translation) For a recent discussion of the relationship between Reinhold's and Schiller's conception of freedom, see Bondeli (2020).
- <sup>11</sup> See Schiller's letter to Körner (3.3.1791), Schiller, 1992; NA XXVI:77: "You probably will not guess what I am reading and studying now? Nothing worse [!] than—Kant. His Critique of the power of judgment that I have acquired for myself sweeps me through its new light-filled, spiritually rich content and has brought me the greatest desire to gradually work my way into his philosophy." On April, 25th of 1792, he again wrote to Körner, now even more concretely, that he "reads in this intention Kant's Critique of the power of judgment again" (Schiller, 1992; NA XXVI:141).
- <sup>12</sup> See Roehr (2003b, p. 105); 114, and Roehr (2003a, p. 126): "By putting characters onto the stage like Karl Moor (in *The Robbers*), who defies not only the political laws of his country, but also those of common morality, Schiller must be able to account for the possibility of a human will that is independent of any (external or internal) laws." However, as I shall argue, this does not mean that Schiller conceives of freedom as *indifferentism*.

- <sup>13</sup> For a discussion of the relationship between these two kinds of freedom see Roehr (2003a, p. 134) and Bondeli (2020).
- <sup>14</sup> This relationship between nature and freedom is exposed in Peetz (1995, p. 164–165). However, Peetz discusses this relationship mostly from an epistemic perspective, and is not so much concerned with the problem of freedom.
- <sup>15</sup> Further theoretical elements can be found in the *Kallias* letters, which must also be consulted for a reconstruction of Schiller's concept of freedom of the will. The importance of these letters is emphasized by Schindler (2008).
- <sup>16</sup> The word "natural being" (*Naturwesen*) occurs only once in the *Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals* (GMS 4:438), which Schiller had read, however 12 times in the *Critique of the Power of Judgment*. I would like to thank Andreas Schmidt (Jena) for directing my attention to Schiller's *Kallias* Letters.
- <sup>17</sup> This interest in the mixed nature of man can be traced back to Schiller's earliest works. For example he writes in his 1780 *Essay on the Connection between Man's Animal Nature and his Spiritual Nature* (Schiller, 1962; NA XX:37–75): "In the exercise of his powers man's perfection lies in the contemplation of the world plan; and since between the measure of power and the purpose on which it acts there must be the most exact harmony, perfection will exist in the highest possible activity of his powers and their mutual subordination [emphasis mine]". (50).
- <sup>18</sup> For this volitional distinction, see Frankfurt (1971): "It is my view that one essential difference between persons and other creatures is to be found in the structure of a person's will [...]. It seems to be peculiarly characteristic of humans [...] that they are able to form what I shall call 'second-order desires' or 'desires of the second order'" (6); "[I]t is having second order volitions, and not having second order desires generally, that I regard as essential to being a person" (10).
- <sup>19</sup> For the notion of a "resonance effect" see Frankfurt (1971, p. 16): "When a person identifies himself *decisively* with one of his first-order desires, this commitment 'resounds' throughout the potentially endless array of higher orders."
- <sup>20</sup> Schiller's interest in this topic can already be found in his dissertation, written in 1780, *On the Connection between the Animal Nature of Man and his Spiritual Nature* (Schiller, 1962; NA XX:37–75), which, according to today's terminology, deals with a topic of the philosophy of the mind, namely the mind–body problem. In it he devotes himself to the "history of the individual" and examines "how all his mental abilities develop from sensual drives." (50). Schiller establishes the "fundamental law of mixed natures," which reads: "The activities of the body correspond to the activities of the mind" (57).
- <sup>21</sup> On the graduality between nature and mind see Beiser (2005, p. 218). On the location of freedom see Beiser (2005, p. 3): "[Schiller] sees moral agency within nature, as the product of history and the education of sensibility."
- <sup>22</sup> This is quite analogous with Reinhold's notion of the "selfish drive." See Reinhold (2008, p. 149).
- <sup>23</sup> There are different ways to translate Schiller's notion of "Geist." Wilkinson and Willoughby translate it with "spirit," whereas Curran translates it with "mind." Since the German word "Geist" can be understood in terms of "spirit" and "mind," I will use both English words to refer to Schiller's notion of Geist.
- <sup>24</sup> Cf. Kant's concept of heautonomy as individual self-determination versus universal self-determination: "The power of judgment thus also has in itself an a priori principle for the possibility of nature, though only in a subjective respect, by means of which it prescribes a law, not to nature (as autonomy), but to itself (as heautonomy) for reflection on nature" (CPJ, 5:185–6). For the notion of heautonomy in Schiller see Schindler (2012, p. 67). For the notion of a "higher necessity" in Schelling see Noller (2020).
- <sup>25</sup> For a discussion of the relationship between individuality and multiplicity see Beiser (2005, p. 140–141).
- <sup>26</sup> See Noller (2016, p. 260).

## REFERENCES

### Works Cited by Abbreviations

Schiller's writings are quoted according to the English translation and the *Nationalausgabe* [NA], edited by Julius Petersen, Lieselotte Blumenthal, Benno von Wiese, and Siegfried Seidel, Weimar 1940 ff., with indication of volume and page number. All other translations from the *Nationalausgabe* are my own.

AE: *On the Aesthetic Education of Man in a Series of Letters*. Edited and Translated with an Introduction Commentary and Glossary of Terms by Elizabeth M. Wilkinson and L.A. Willoughby. Oxford 1967/NA XX, 309–412; NA XXI, 232–277; ed. Benno von Wiese, Weimar 1962; 1963, orig. 1795.

GD: *On Grace and Dignity* (Transl. Jane V. Curran). In: Jane V. Curran/Christophe Fricker: *Schiller's "On Grace and Dignity" in Its Cultural Context. Essays and a New Translation*. Rochester 2005, NY, 123–170 /NA XX, 252–308, ed. Benno von Wiese, Weimar 1962, orig. 1793.

*Kallias: Kallias or Concerning Beauty: Letters to Gottfried Körner*. In: J. M. Bernstein (Ed.): *Classic and Romantic German Aesthetics*. Cambridge 2003, 145–183 / NA XXVI, ed. Edith Nahler/Horst Nahler, Weimar 1992, 174–229 [together with other letters], orig. 1793.

Citations of Kant's works refer to the volume and page number in the Academy Edition of Immanuel Kant, *Gesammelte Schriften* (Berlin: Walter de Gruyter and predecessors, 1900–).

CPJ: *Critique of the Power of Judgment*. Edited and translated by Paul Guyer. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 2000, orig. 1790.

CPR: *Critique of Pure Reason*. Edited and translated by Paul Guyer and Allen W. Wood. Cambridge, 1998, orig. 1781; 21787.

CPrR: *Critique of Practical Reason*. Edited and translated by M. Gregor. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 1997, orig. 1781.

GMM: *Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals*. Edited and translated by M. Gregor. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 1997, orig. 1785.

RBMR: *Religion within the boundaries of mere reason*. In *Religion and Rational Theology* (pp. 39–215). Edited by A. W. Wood and G. Di Giovanni and translated by G. Di Giovanni. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 1996, orig. 1793.

## Other Works

Allison, H. (1986). Morality and freedom. Kant's reciprocity thesis. *The Philosophical Review*, 95(3), 393–425. <https://doi.org/10.2307/2185466>

Barnouw, J. (1982). "Freiheit zu geben durch Freiheit". Ästhetischer Zustand– Ästhetischer Staat. In W. Wittkowski (Ed.), *Friedrich Schiller: Kunst, Humanität und Politik in der späten Aufklärung. Ein Symposium* (pp. 138–163). Tübingen, Germany: Max Niemeyer.

Baxley, A. M. (2003). The beautiful soul and the autocratic agent: Schiller's and Kant's "children of the house". *Journal of the History of Philosophy*, 41(4), 493–514. <https://doi.org/10.1353/hph.2003.0048>

Baxley, A. M. (2008). Pleasure, freedom and grace: Schiller's "completion" of Kant's ethics. *Inquiry*, 51(1), 1–15. <https://doi.org/10.1080/00201740701858886>

Baxley, A. M. (2010). The aesthetics of morality: Schiller's critique of Kantian rationalism. *Philosophy Compass*, 5(12), 1084–1095. <https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1747-9991.2010.00350.x>

Beiser, F. (2005). *Schiller as philosopher. A re-examination*. Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press. <https://doi.org/10.1093/019928282X.001.0001>

Bondeli, M. (2020). Schillers zwei Arten der Freiheit. Eine ästhetische Transformation von Reinholds Theorie der Willensfreiheit. *Kant-Studien*, 111(2), 227–247. <https://doi-org.emedien.uni-muenchen.de/10.1515/kant-2020-0015>

Deligiorgi, K. (2006). Grace as guide to morals? Schiller's aesthetic turn in ethics. *History of Philosophy Quarterly*, 23(1), 1–20.

Frankfurt, H. G. (1971). Freedom of the will and the concept of a person. *The Journal of Philosophy*, 68(1), 5–20. <https://doi.org/10.2307/2024717>

Frankfurt, H. G. (1982). The importance of what we care about. *Synthese*, 53(2), 257–272. <https://doi.org/10.1007/BF00484902>

Frankfurt, H. G. (1994). Autonomy, necessity and love. In F. Fulda & R.-P. Horstmann (Eds.), *Vernunftbegriffe in der Moderne: Stuttgarter Hegel-Kongress 1993* (pp. 433–447). Stuttgart, Germany: Klett-Cotta.

Gauthier, J. A. (1997). Schiller's critique of Kant's moral psychology: Reconciling practical reason and an ethics of virtue. *Canadian Journal of Philosophy*, 27(4), 513–543. <https://doi.org/10.2307/40231999>

Hegel, GWF (1975). *Aesthetics. Lectures on fine art*. T. M. Knox. 1. Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press.

Henrich, D. (1957). Der Begriff der Schönheit in Schillers Ästhetik. *Zeitschrift für Philosophische Forschung*, 11(4), 527–547.

Hudson, H. (1991). Wille, Willkür, and the imputability of immoral actions. *Kant-Studien*, 82(2), 179–196.

Moland, L. L. (2017). Friedrich Schiller. In E. N. Zalta (Ed.), *The Stanford encyclopedia of philosophy (Summer 2017 Edition)*, Stanford: The Metaphysics Research Lab, Stanford University. <https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/sum2017/entries/schiller/>

Noller, J. (2016). *Die Bestimmung des Willens. Zum Problem individueller Freiheit im Ausgang von Kant* (2nd ed.). Freiburg, Germany: Alber.

Noller, J. (2019a). "Practical reason is not the will": Kant and Reinhold's dilemma. *European Journal of Philosophy*, 27(4), 852–864. <https://doi.org/10.1111/ejop.12448>

Noller, J. (2019b). Reason's feeling. A systematic reconstruction of Kant's theory of moral respect. *SATS. Northern European Journal of Philosophy*, 20(1), 1–18. <https://doi.org/10.12857/10.1515/sats-2019-0012>

- Noller, J. (2020). Higher necessity: Schelling's volitional compatibilism. *Idealistic Studies*, 50(1), 33–49 <https://doi.org/idstudies202061112>.
- Peetz, S. (1995). *Die Freiheit im Wissen. Eine Untersuchung zu Schellings Konzept der Rationalität*. Klostermann: Frankfurt, Germany.
- Reinhold, K. L. (2008, orig. 1792). In M. Bondeli (Ed.), *Briefe über die Kantische Philosophie. Zweyter Band*. Basel, Switzerland: Schwabe.
- Roehr, S. (2003a). Freedom and autonomy in Schiller. *Journal of the History of Ideas*, 64(1), 119–134. <https://doi.org/10.2307/3654299>
- Roehr, S. (2003b). Zum Einfluß K. L. Reinholds auf Schillers Kant-Rezeption. In M. Bondeli & W. H. Schrader (Eds.), *Die Philosophie Karl Leonhard Reinholds* (pp. 105–121). Amsterdam, The Netherlands: Rodopi.
- Schiller, F. (1953; orig. 1781). The robbers (Die Räuber). In NA III. H. Stubenrauch (Ed.) (pp. 1–136). Weimar, Germany: Böhlau.
- Schiller, F. (1954; orig. 1786). The criminal of lost honour (Der Verbrecher aus verlorener Ehre). In NA XVI. H. H. Borchardt (Ed.) (pp. 7–29). Weimar, Germany: Böhlau (my translation).
- Schiller, Fr. (1962; orig. 1780). Essay on the connection between the animal and spiritual nature of man (Versuch über den Zusammenhang der tierischen Natur des Menschen mit seiner geistigen). In NA, XX. B. von Wiese (Ed.) (pp. 37–75). Weimar, Germany: Böhlau (my translation).
- Schiller, Fr. (1963; orig. 1793). On the sublime (Über das Erhabene). In NA XXI. B. von Wiese (Ed.) (pp. 38–54). Weimar, Germany: Böhlau (my translation).
- Schiller, F. (1992). Correspondence, Schiller's letters, 1.3.1790–17.5.1794. In NA XXVI. E. Nahler, & H. Nahler (Eds.). Weimar, Germany: Böhlau (my translation).
- Schindler, D. (2008). An aesthetics of freedom: Schiller's breakthrough beyond subjectivism. In: F. Long (Ed.), *Yearbook of the Irish Philosophical Society* (pp. 84–109). Maynooth: Irish Philosophical Society.
- Schindler, D. (2012). *The perfection of freedom. Schiller, Schelling, and Hegel between the ancients and the moderns*. Eugene, OR: Cascade Books.

**How to cite this article:** Noller J. Heautonomy: Schiller on freedom of the will. *Eur J Philos.* 2021;29: 339–353. <https://doi.org/10.1111/ejop.12576>