Abstract
The conception of social justice as equality is defended in this paper by examining what may appear to be two inegalitarian conceptions of justice, as distribution according to desert and as distribution according to need. It is argued that claims of just entitlement arise within a context of reciprocal co-operation for mutual benefit. Within such a context there are special cases where it can be said that those who contribute more deserve more, and that those who need more should get more, but those claims themselves presuppose a norm of equal contribution and equal benefit.
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Norman, R. Criteria of Justice: Desert, Needs and Equality. Res Publica 7, 115–136 (2001). https://doi.org/10.1023/A:1011926403555
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1023/A:1011926403555