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### **Shlomo Biderman**

*Crossing Horizons: World, Self, and Language  
in Indian and Western Thought.*

New York: Columbia University Press 2007.

Pp. 368.

US\$45.00 (cloth ISBN-13: 978-0-231-14024-9).

Works on comparative philosophy drawing on different philosophical traditions have always been the subject of criticism and appreciation alike. As Biderman states in his opening remarks, this work 'sets itself the task of examining and comparing the views, outlooks and attitudes of two distinct cultures'. In a very impressive and thought provoking introduction, Biderman qualifies this statement by admitting that in adopting the comparative method he does not intend to cast himself into an apparent or hidden 'extra-cultural wasteland'. Proceeding along hermeneutic lines Biderman maintains that the 'comparative gaze' granted by the prejudices and biases imbibed from one's own tradition can give a better vantage point from which to view and understand the sources of one's own culture in a more comprehensive way. Biderman's distinctive style of writing, with its examples from literary works and extensive use of archaic biblical terms, shows itself throughout. The introduction provides a sufficiently detailed matrix of the book and presents his own views on comparative method in philosophy.

In the first chapter, 'Far and Beyond: Transcendence in Two Cultures', Biderman attempts to examine what he calls the 'conceptual schemes' of eastern and western thought systems. He alleges that one of the distinctive features of western thought, ever since the beginning of philosophy's search for the first principle (*archai*), is the 'prominent appearance of the presupposition of transcendence'. By transcendence Biderman means, among other things, 'an all embracing and far-reaching claim for the ontological precedence of the outward over inward, exteriority over interiority, the universal over particular, the transcendent over immanent, and structure over content' (18). Incidentally, this is also the central thesis that runs through the entire book. Biderman introduces it in his opening chapter, and in subsequent chapters it is what he seeks to demonstrate. For Biderman, Indian thought systems are, by contrast, characterized by 'immanence'. The exteriority that makes attempts at transcendence possible in western thinking, is lacking in Indian philosophy, Biderman suggests. The gap between the destination and the pursuer are mere 'false imaginings' on this account.

In Chapter 2, 'One Language, Many Things', Biderman argues that on account of 'western monotheistic traditions . . . the meaning of language wholly depends on its ability to reflect or represent an independent external reality.' He further suggests that this should be viewed as exteriorization, providing space for transcendence in the realm of language. On the other hand, in Indian philosophy of language, especially for Mimamsakas and Bharatrhari, 'the link between a word and its sense is based on an internal mechanism, residing within man' (101). Through juxtaposition of these two ideas in, re-

spectively, western and Indian views of language, Biderman attempts to demonstrate the dominance of transcendence in the west and its absence in the East.

The first two chapters give an impression that the book would have more to offer on the issues regarding culture and religion than on epistemology. Later chapters belie this impression: in Chapters 3 and 4 Biderman examines the notion of self from the point of view of transcendence. He alleges that whereas both in Descartes and Upanishads the truth of the self is actualized through an internalization via negation of the external, the Cartesian notion of the self lacks complete reflexivity, whereas this possibility is emphatically envisaged in Upanishads in their notion of self-awareness. In the fourth chapter, Biderman rather intriguingly argues that the self-erasing role of the self evident in Sunyavada philosophy is also evident in Kafka's parables, whereas in Kant the self takes upon itself the task of retrieving the transcendental categories.

In the fifth and concluding chapter Biderman focuses on the notion of idealism in Vasubandhu and Berkeley. He argues here that, whereas for Berkley ideas themselves are the objects that the mind has the role of grasping, for Vasubandhu mind is a storehouse of consciousness that is in a certain sense self-complete and characterized by immanence, and where there is a complete disconnect of the subject with the external world whether that world be ideal or material. Therefore, exteriority is completely absent in Vasubandhu, whereas it is in a certain significant way present in Berkley's account.

At the end of each chapter Biderman makes the additional point that transcendence, hitherto an inalienable feature of most of western thought, has in more recent times come to be problematized. Self is no longer viewed as an isolated independent subject; it is also viewed as the 'subjected' self. Similarly, language is no longer viewed as a simple conveyor belt taking ideas and expressions from one locus to another, but is also viewed as a locus of considerable maneuvering caused by hypostatizing certain meanings in the process of understanding and interpretation, and disallowing or suppressing certain others. This is amply evidenced, according to Biderman, in Kafka's writings and in the character of Don Giovanni in Mozart's opera.

Overall, this book displays an impressive range of readings from which Biderman draws; from Maimonides to the intricate arguments of Vasubandhu, to literature, music and cinema — the range is enormous. The task of juxtaposing and drawing all this, of displaying the many commonalities and differences, is a huge undertaking which Biderman convincingly carries off. His book's most distinctive feature is its unique style and approach to the subject matter. There have been lots of general studies on culture from a philosophical perspective, but Biderman, in an attempt to reverse the generality of this approach, explores the cultural ethos that characterizes the dominant systems of Indian and western thought. By the time she finishes reading the last chapter, the reader is left pretty convinced of the success of Biderman's effort. A small additional point: throughout there are several

improperly referenced quotations, though elaborate endnotes provide some compensation for this oversight.

**Ajay Verma**

University of Delhi

**William Blattner**

*Heidegger's Being and Time: A Reader's Guide.*

New York: Continuum 2006.

Pp. 195.

US\$75.00 (cloth ISBN-13: 978-0-8264-8608-0);

US\$14.05 (paper ISBN-13: 978-0-8264-8609-7).

**Paul Gerner**

*Heidegger's Being and Time: An Introduction.*

New York: Cambridge University Press 2007.

Pp. 204.

US\$80.00 (cloth ISBN-13: 978-0-521-83322-6);

US\$23.99 (paper ISBN-13: 978-0-521-54072-8).

Though there already exist a few guides to *Being and Time* from the past few decades, we are currently in a period of reader's guides, guides for the perplexed, very short introductions, critical idioms, and other such series. So it is no surprise, really, to see a couple of new introductory books on the key early work of Martin Heidegger. Still, given that this text is surely one of the most studied and commented upon in the last century, one can reasonably question whether any more explanatory introductions are really needed. The answer is 'yes'. As someone who significantly advanced hermeneutic thought, Heidegger held that understanding is an always unfinished task, that we are only ever 'on the way', and thus that all books, just like works of art, need to be 'preserved' through an infinite process of interpretation. The hermeneutic challenge is to keep the dialogue open in order that the past may continue to speak, albeit in fresh ways to new generations of readers.

The preservation of *Being and Time* is certainly not in question, but this merely underscores why it should be subject to novel perspectives for an expanding body of students approaching this difficult book for the first time. Both Cambridge University Press and Continuum Press have this in mind in offering introductory guides that focus on the thematic and historical contexts to what they consider our most important philosophical works, including *Being and Time*. Gerner and Blattner have each provided such an

introduction to *Being and Time*, and they have done so in strikingly different ways. Gorner's approach emphasizes Heidegger's unique conceptual language by remaining close to the original text, whereas Blattner often works to translate much of Heidegger's philosophical apparatus into easier language through the use of philosophical comparisons and novel examples.

In his work Gorner claims that he clarifies the 'essence' of Heidegger's text by attending to the details of its philosophical content. While one might assume that this is the task of any introduction, this claim is not made innocently. Gorner acknowledges that all philosophical writing is interpretive by nature, but he is just as quick to state that his reading is not a particular interpretation of Heidegger. In other words, he has neither attempted to translate Heidegger into different and possibly more accessible terms nor purposely read Heidegger through a certain lens. Rather, we are presented with a strikingly Heideggerian approach to *Being and Time*, a careful and balanced exegetical attempt to clarify the text by remaining as close to it as possible.

To this end, *Being and Time* is read as a phenomenological text with an existential orientation. Coming out of the Husserlian tradition, Heidegger was concerned with disclosing the things themselves; only his focus wasn't this or that thing, or the structures of consciousness that allow one to intuit a thing. The phenomenon that Heidegger sought was 'being' itself; not things, entities, or beings (*Seienden*), but the question of the meaning of being (*Sein*). In the opening paragraph of *Being and Time*, it is remarked that this question has been all but forgotten by philosophers since Plato. While each philosopher went about his or her business inquiring into the nature of things, ideas, or God, they each overlooked the implicit question lurking beneath every assumption: what does it mean to be? This distinction between beings and being — what will become known as the 'ontological difference' — emphasizes that what it means to *be* is something altogether different than asking what an entity *is*. 'The *being* of entities is not itself an entity' (15), states Gorner. The question of the meaning of being is therefore more fundamental than questions in traditional ontology.

In order to arrive at an initial answer to this question — a question Heidegger famously never answers in *Being and Time*, telling his readers at the very end that we are only just '*on the way*' — Heidegger must first ask how we can even pose the question of being. It is here that he opens the existential dimension of his phenomenological ontology. Heidegger must uncover an entity that will serve as a model for inquiring into the meaning of being, and his choice, as Gorner points out, is 'slightly artificial' (22). It is quickly revealed that we must pass through the existence of being human (*Dasein*) if there is any hope at arriving at the meaning of being, for it is through *Dasein* that an understanding of being takes place. We, Heidegger affirms, are the entities to be analyzed. With this last movement Heidegger reveals his latent Kantianism, for along with his phenomenological methodology there is also a transcendental reflection on 'the conditions for the possibility' of understanding *Dasein*'s being. But rather than seeking the structures of the mind

or consciousness as the pre-condition for any and all metaphysics, Heidegger transforms phenomenology into a hermeneutics as he inquires into the pre-conditions of our understanding of being, namely the existential structures of Dasein.

Both Gorner (171) and Blattner (3) therefore read Heidegger as continuing the tradition of transcendental philosophy, albeit as one that reshapes Kant's influence together with Husserlian phenomenology, traditional ontology, hermeneutic historicity, and existential circumstances. The result is uniquely Heideggerian: *Being and Time* proceeds to delve into the structures of the being of Dasein to reveal the 'existentials' (e.g., being-in-the-world, attunements, care, being-towards-death, call of conscience, temporality, etc.) that disclose an understanding of being. Thus, while being is ultimately the phenomenon Heidegger is interested in, his phenomenology is not one of reflective consciousness, but a hermeneutic phenomenology that *interprets* the being of Dasein. This interpretation is, more importantly, a pre-theoretical, existential comportment toward the world in which Dasein exists, and, as such, is the condition for the possibility of interpretation in an epistemological sense.

Gorner takes the reader through these twists and turns, and he does so in an effectively 'circular' way. For instance, a motif that often recurs throughout his book is the helpful repetition of key conceptual difficulties that might otherwise confuse a novice reader. A good example of this procedure surrounds the being of Dasein, which, early in *Being and Time*, is defined as 'being-in-the-world'. Gorner twice repeats that 'the being of Dasein is being-in-the-world' (44) in the midst of his explanation of the importance of world, but he will likewise often repeat that 'the being of Dasein is *care (Sorge)*' (154) in the midst of clarifying time as the meaning of care. To the uninitiated it might look like the being of Dasein equivocates between being-in-the-world and care, but Gorner highlights this transition through the repetition of key turns of phrase. Lest the reader misunderstand, the being of Dasein *was* said to be being-in-the-world, but care, as a later conceptual development, unravels a deeper sense of being-in-the-world, namely the ecstatic temporality of Dasein. The subtle repetitions of key phrases throughout Gorner's book, and the concise interrogative pace at which he proceeds, advance the book's pedagogical aims.

In contrast to Gorner's approach, Blattner opens by situating Heidegger's work much more broadly, not solely through his frequent use of analogies, examples, and metaphors, on such wide-ranging topics as cooking, playing basketball, and conversing with one's suburban lesbian neighbors, but also by reading Heidegger in conversation with various aspects of contemporary American philosophy (e.g., Dreyfus, Rorty). In many respects, this sets the stage for the rest of his guide, as Blattner extends beyond *Being and Time* in order to make it intelligible through comparisons to a wider philosophical field. To cite but a few examples, he will draw upon 'communitarianism' to help explain Heidegger's notion of 'being-with' others (67-9), the correspondence theory of truth to compare with Heidegger's endorsement of the Greek

*aletheia* (unveiling) (118-26), and Dostoevsky to shed light on such existential moods as anxiety. Similarly, Heidegger is put in conversation with such diverse figures as Wittgenstein, Dewey, Ortega y Gasset, Thomas Kuhn, and Charles Taylor, nearly as frequently as he is compared with Husserl or Kant. It is a diverse explication that often rewards the reader with fresh perspectives on Heidegger's difficult language, but my hesitation with this approach is that it can sometimes come off as more miscellaneous than multifaceted. Perhaps cognizant of this risk, Blattner often inserts short terminological sections in order to define key concepts, and he always provides short 'Study Questions' after each subsection, giving this reader's guide a more explicit instructional tool. Thus, while Blattner introduces his reader to the same *Being and Time* as Gorner, the style and method of his procedure are vastly different.

One quick (though not unsubstantial) reservation that I have with Blattner's guide is his overt omission of time (14, 22, 127, 164). Though he feels that 'it is unusual for students to venture that deep into *Being and Time* on their first reading,' and though he feels Heidegger's sections on time are 'both highly obscure and almost certainly unsuccessful,' the omission is highly suspect and the criticism is without support. Blattner has already written a book on the subject of Heidegger and time, so perhaps he feels warranted to leave it out here. Still, for an introduction to *Being and Time*, a work in which time plays no small role, it verges on irresponsibility to cover just a little over half the text, however frequently the omission of time is acknowledged. The reader should therefore be prepared if she or he is looking for a more detailed guide to the concluding sections on time, temporality, and history.

Whether one is an instructor looking to assign a companion volume to *Being and Time* on a syllabus, or a student approaching this text for the first time, both Gorner's and Blattner's introductions will serve you well. Gorner's approach sticks closer to the text, while Blattner more often looks beyond it for helpful comparisons and examples. Gorner remains more faithfully within the notoriously difficult Heideggerian neologisms, while Blattner works to translate the language, what Adorno pejoratively calls its 'jargon', into more accessible terminology. Thus, while both provide introductions to *Being and Time*, it is remarkable that neither is really in competition with the other because they provide such different approaches. The reader will probably have time for only one or the other, and will pick one based on the approach that he or she prefers, yet both Gorner and Blattner have offered very different and surprisingly complementary readings of a landmark text in the history of western philosophy.

**Brett Buchanan**  
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**David Boonin**

*The Problem of Punishment.*

New York: Cambridge University Press 2008.

Pp. 309.

US\$85.00 (cloth ISBN-13: 978-0-521-88316-0);

US\$27.99 (paper ISBN-13: 978-0-521-70961-3).

Boonin has written a book that is both a comprehensive survey of the philosophical arguments about the moral justifiability of criminal punishment and a systematic defence of the radical claim that punishment ought to be abolished. The comprehensiveness of the book implies, as Boonin readily acknowledges, that much of what is in it is not original. Nevertheless, even those who are familiar with many of the specific arguments will find it illuminating to re-encounter them in the context of Boonin's discussion. The scope of the book is limited to the arguments that are strictly philosophical, in the sense of being largely independent of the results of empirical research on punishment; this makes it very different from Deirdre Golash's recent book (*The Case Against Punishment: Retribution, Crime Prevention, and the Law*, 2005), which reaches a similar conclusion by arguments that do rely on empirical research.

Boonin begins the book by articulating and defending his variation on what used to be known as the Flew-Benn-Hart definition of criminal punishment. This is followed by a discussion, which in total encompasses about two-thirds of the book, of the available theories that try to show that punishment is morally justified. Discussed are various versions of utilitarianism and retributivism, as well as some more recent theories that cannot be readily classified as either. The overall conclusion of this part of the book is that none of the theories is convincing, and that punishment is without moral support.

If one is persuaded by Boonin that none of the theories is defensible, or if one is prepared to accept this at least for the sake of argument, the question arises whether there is a viable alternative to punishment. Boonin's answer is that we can replace the practice of punishment with the practice of compelling criminals to provide non-punitive restitution to their victims. In this he follows, albeit with various modifications, the theory that was formulated in the late seventies by Randy Barnett. The last chapter of the book is devoted to defending the theory of restitution from various possible objections.

In his account of restitution, Boonin gives a very wide scope to the notion of a victim of a crime: merely feeling a sense of insecurity upon hearing about the crimes in one's community may be enough to render one a victim of these crimes, according to him. Moreover, his version of the theory of restitution gives considerable prominence to the possibility of legally requiring that some components of restitution be provided in non-monetary forms. Combining these two features of his theory, he argues that restitution may involve subjecting criminals to monitoring, curfews, or detention, when these measures are needed to restore the community to the level of security it enjoyed before the crimes were committed. The goal of crime prevention,

which Barnett repudiated, thus makes a back-door re-entry in Boonin's version of the theory.

There is, however, a problem with Boonin's kind of departure from Barnett. Let us assume that the rest of the theory works well, i.e., that it is possible to provide full restitution to the primary, direct victims of crime. If I am a member of the community in which the theory is implemented, and if I hear that somebody in my community was directly victimized by a crime and then received full restitution, there will be no good reason for me to start feeling any less secure. Such news would lead me to expect that, if I ever become a victim of a crime, I too will receive full restitution, and that would mean that the crime would cause no net harm to me. If the news nevertheless makes me worried, that could indicate either that restitution does not really put the primary victims in the same position in which they were before the crime, or that I am irrational. If the former is the case, that is a fundamental problem for the theory in all of its versions; and that problem, which concerns the primary victims, cannot be solved by providing restitution to other members of the community. As for the latter possibility, any approach to criminal justice that caters to irrational community reactions to crime is likely to lead to worryingly oppressive results. (Arguably much of the inhumanity of the current justice system in the United States is due to politicians' pandering to such reactions.)

Boonin does not notice this problem in his account, because he fails to separate people's reactions to the news of crimes in which the direct victim gets full restitution, from their reactions to the news of crimes in which the criminal is not caught and so provides no restitution. The former should not cause any sense of insecurity, but the latter, of course, may. The legitimate worry that is caused by learning about unsolved crimes is, however, not caused by the criminals who get apprehended. Boonin's insistence that members of the community receive restitution for their feeling of insecurity thus amounts to requiring apprehended criminals to pay for something that is caused by somebody else, that is, by the criminals who are not apprehended. In the absence of some further argument, which Boonin does not provide, that appears unjust. An argument that can eliminate this appearance of injustice has been made elsewhere (see my 'Criminals as Gamblers: A Modified Theory of Pure Restitution', *Dialogue* 26: 77-86 [1987]), but once we take it into account, it will be possible to justify restitution for primary victims of unsolved crimes, rendering unnecessary Boonin's appeals to the third parties' feelings of insecurity.

Boonin's many specific arguments, both against justifications of punishment and in defence of restitution, certainly deserve much more detailed discussion than they can receive in a short review. The book should also find a place on many bookshelves as an impeccably clear and illuminatingly organized survey of the field.

**Mane Hajdin**

Dominican University of California

**John Brenkman**

*The Cultural Contradictions of Democracy: Political Thought Since September 11.*

Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press 2007.  
Pp. 200.

US\$29.95 (cloth ISBN-13: 978-0-691-11664-8).

Based on its title, one would expect a book on the nature of political thought in the context of a post 9/11 world to focus on something having to do with well . . . political thought. In reality, Brenkman's work is a mixture of one part history, one part psycho-analysis and one part political philosophy.

In the introductory chapter, Brenkman argues that the United States has never fully debated the nature of its responsibilities as sole superpower. According to Brenkman, the current administration has confused power with might, where the latter is the capacity for violence while the former is the ability to act in concert. It is also here that Brenkman lays out his reason for writing the book: 'My intention in the course of writing this book has been to prove the drama of political thought in the face of the war against terrorism, the overthrow of Saddam Hussein, and occupation of Iraq. In each chapter, the uncertain events of contemporary history are measured against, and are used to measure, the ideas that animate democratic traditions and political debate' (19).

In Chapter 1, Brenkman engages in a bit of psycho-analysis of Gov. George W. Bush and his history of power without responsibility with regard to the death penalty in Texas. Brenkman believes that the foreign policy developed by the administration is characterized by 'hardliner thinking' which includes the ideas of a permanent military buildup, isolationism along with unilateralism, and a Kissinger-style understanding of national interests.

In Chapter 2, Brenkman argues that the 'fear and hubris' (particularly that of the political right) that followed 9/11 has resulted in a state of American exceptionalism in which America no longer holds itself to the same standards as the rest of the world. As a consequence, this exceptionalism works to undermine a form of universalism that recognizes and values humanity in a concrete rather than abstract way. Since universalism is something that is never fully realized, Brenkman refers to the 'ordeal' of universalism. Things are further complicated when Brenkman notes the tension between a universalist view and pluralism. Of course, American exceptionalism seems to undermine both views.

Where Chapter 2 critiques the view of the political right, Chapter 3 examines the problems with the views of the political left. According to Brenkman, the left has failed to recognize that the use of force after 9/11 in Afghanistan was justified since Afghanistan could not be 'policed' and the perpetrators and planners of 9/11 could not be brought to a court of international law. He further rejects the left's idea that the proper response to 9/11 was to rectify the U.S.'s past injustices in the Middle East. The exigencies of the immediate threat to the U.S. made such a response inappropriate. According to Brenkman, the

left misunderstands terrorism when it attempts to reduce it to a response to United States foreign policy and the conflict between Israel and Palestine.

Chapter 4 relates what most people who have followed the course of the war already know: 1) Saddam Hussein's regime would eventually need to be overthrown, 2) Islamic terrorism was a far more pressing issue than the democratization of Iraq, 3) the administration failed to prepare adequately for the rebuilding, 4) no proper liberal/rights/humanitarian case was made to the public that (with multilateral support) may have been endorsed by the American public (106-7). Brenkman also notes that though he agrees with Berman that the moral guidelines of just war theory are not applicable to the war in Iraq, he does not hold that just war theory can be replaced by means-end reasoning to justify the violence or remove moral responsibility for the evil done.

In Chapter 5, Brenkman questions whether it is possible to derive foreign policy principles from the internal principles of the democratic state. Realpolitik, national interests, and the internal debates of nations with regard to the nature and extent of freedom, draw into question the fecundity of this approach. One of the major challenges to deriving foreign policy in this way is the plurality of approaches to democracy itself. As Brenkman writes: 'Beyond this sort of plurality of interests, a modern democracy is pluralistic in a more fundamental sense; it inevitably draws on three contradictory frameworks: *liberal*, *civic*, and *social* democracy' (140). These interests are further complicated when we move to the global level where democracy must compete with religious fundamentalism, particularly Islam's geo-civil war. Additionally, Brenkman argues that the incoherent, neoliberal, unilateralist-messianic approach to foreign relations has only further complicated the goal of a workable global solution to our international troubles.

Finally, Brenkman concludes by noting that the United States needs leadership that has a greater respect for tragedy and what it can teach. As Brenkman states: 'The United States is going to need the wisdom of tragedy if it is to rescue the commitment to freedom from the wreckage of democratic messianism, and it is going to need to draw far more amply on the traditions and experiences of democratic ideas if it is to rededicate itself to liberty and self-rule, at home and abroad' (200).

Brenkman's look at political thought, while peppered with interesting philosophical insights, remains in the end a diatribe against the Bush administration's handling of the terrorist attack on the World Trade Center and its pre-emptive and botched war in Iraq. While he mentions a number of political thinkers, he never delves particularly deeply into their theories or the application of their theories to the topic at hand. Remove the history of the response to September 11 (culled mainly from popular media and recent books on the subject) and the prelude and execution of the war in Iraq, and the remaining political philosophy or political thought may be better represented in a good sized journal article.

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**Joseph E. Brenner**

*Logic in Reality.*

New York: Springer Science 2008.

Pp. 384.

US\$199.00 (cloth ISBN-13: 978-1-4020-8374-7).

Brenner's book is a detailed effort to ground fundamental ontology on an alternative logic. To do this Brenner takes on two major tasks. First, he outlines the details of the alternative logic dubbed 'Logic in Reality' (LIR), as the title suggests. The second task relates LIR to fundamental ontology and applies it to a wide variety of conceptual problems in the natural sciences, thereby either helping to solve the problems or showing how various new sciences exemplify the ontological proposals implicit in LIR. Both tasks are highly ambitious and the scope of application is very wide. LIR is applied to sciences as diverse as systems theory, quantum mechanics and evolutionary biology. The level of detail is high, and combined with the wide scope the result is sometimes a challenge. However, Brenner's writing is quite clear and anyone with a familiarity with alternative logic and the philosophy of science should have no problem following the book's main arguments.

LIR finds its inspiration in the work of the late French philosopher Stéphane Lupasco, who anticipated much of the better known work (at least to North Americans) of writers such as Bachelard and Gonthier. It incorporates features that are to be found in both paraconsistent and intuitionistic logic. LIR is unusual in that it rejects both the classical axiom of non-contradiction and the excluded middle. It also rejects the physical postulate of identity (that A is at a given time identical to A at a later time). These features are central to the ontological proposals associated with LIR.

Another important feature of LIR is the so-called T-state (from *tiers inclus*, the included third term). Brenner conceptualises logical values not in terms of the bivalent true and false, but in terms of a gradient set of values from actual (A) to potential (P). In LIR a state Q can coexist along with its contradiction but in a reciprocal relationship between actual and potential. So if Q has a certain value of actuality it co-exists with its reciprocal value of the potentiality of not-A. However, for the situations where a state Q has the same value for A or P as its contradiction, LIR postulates a special T-state. The contradiction exists at a higher level of complexity where it (i.e., the contradiction) is resolved. The T-state foreshadows how LIR accommodates emergent phenomena such as living systems.

The formulation of the T-state and the relation between Actual and Potential (rather than true or false) distinguishes LIR from more familiar non-standard logics and ties LIR directly to ontological proposals. The object of LIR is not propositions but rather physical systems themselves: 'my logic involves . . . inferring or determining the state of the real-world elements involved in the phenomena' (6). Thus in LIR the basic features of the logic connect it directly to reality, and this is held to make it especially suitable to serve as the basis of a scientific ontology.

As LIR is based upon a juxtaposition of a state with its contradiction, its Hegelian origins are clear (an unusual feature for an essentially analytic project). However, in this it shares some surprising similarities with the structuralist views of Ladyman and Ross, who define entities entirely in terms of their relations with others. However, unlike Ladyman and Ross, LIR does not make all relations internal and does not therefore suffer from the sort of regress problems that plague other Hegelian accounts of logic or metaphysics, such as Ladyman's or the earlier work of Bradley.

Although Brenner applies LIR to a wide variety of examples, his treatment of quantum mechanics is of interest since many commentators on non-standard logics have addressed it. Brenner's treatment of quantum mechanics also illustrates the application of LIR's ontology. One of the major interpretative problems associated with quantum mechanics is the physical interpretation of its features like complementary variables and the mixed state. LIR deals with such features in a fairly natural way. Bohr, according to Brenner, actually embedded the notion of contradiction into his notion of complementarity, not just epistemologically but ontologically as well (248). This situation is captured by LIR, which explicitly embraces the existence of contradictions as a basic feature of ontology and logic. Moreover, since the values of different complementary variables depend on mutually exclusive measurements, this lends itself to being conceptualised according to LIR's juxtaposition of a state's actuality with the potentiality of its contradictory state. It must be noted here that the needs of space prevent my very impressionistic sketch from doing full justice to the details of Brenner's treatment, although in spite of the book's great detail the number of different scientific cases renders it impossible for Brenner to provide a full account of them all. Any work with such a wide scope always risks sacrificing depth for breadth. However, Brenner skirts the dilemma well, and I do not regard the book's breadth as a weakness but rather as indicating the direction of future research. I expect the book will inspire much comment in the literature.

While I found the book very stimulating and wide in scope, no book can address every question. One question that occurred to me was how LIR relates to conventionalist views of logic such as Carnap's. While LIR inspires a distinct ontology, might it be not *the* logic of reality, but just *a* convenient way of expressing the content of scientific theories? To put it in Carnap's terms, perhaps the choice of logic and ontology is conventional so long as it is consistent with the empirical data. This does not of course imply that the LIR proposals, if successful, do not have much to recommend them even on purely conventional grounds.

Another quite minor quibble is the book's occasional treatment of continental commentators on science such as Derrida. Dealing with these writings will be of no interest to the book's primary audience, analytic philosophers and logicians. Additionally, the book is far too technical in its approach to be useful for most of those who are interested in continental authors. Pleasing both camps is both unnecessary and not really possible for a book of this sort.

Nevertheless, this is a fine, thought-provoking book and it promises more of the same from a very able author. It makes a significant contribution to both scientific philosophy and non-standard logic.

**Daniel McArthur**

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**Thomas Brobjer**

*Nietzsche's Philosophical Context:*

*An Intellectual Biography.*

Urbana: University of Illinois Press 2008.

Pp. 283.

US\$50.00 (cloth ISBN-13: 978-0-252-03245-5).

For a work that primarily discusses which philosophy books an individual philosopher happens to have read, this book proved a surprisingly good read. It contains an introduction, six chapters and an epilogue, along with extensive notes, tables and an index. There are three tables, including a chronological list of philosophical works that Nietzsche read, a list of philosophical works in his personal library about which we are unsure when or if they were read, and an alphabetical list of the works we can confidently assume he did read. They take up seventy-four pages of the book, while the notes come to seventy-three pages, and the index ten. Thus the text feels a bit short. I did want more, despite the author's rather dusty, book-thumbing subject matter.

There are still Nietzsche scholars in the world who will tell you that we really don't know whether Nietzsche knew of his contemporary, Karl Marx. Their numbers are dwindling, however, because the fact that Nietzsche owned and heavily annotated books that extensively quoted and discussed Marx has been publicly available at least since Thomas Brobjer revealed it in the pages of *Nietzsche Studien* in 2004. We also possess a guide to Nietzsche's knowledge of British philosophy, thanks to Brobjer's *Nietzsche and the 'English'* (2007). His new book discusses Nietzsche's knowledge of philosophical writings more widely. The results are equally provocative. If, like many scholars today, Nietzsche knew some Marx but only second hand, then, we now learn, he also knew some Kierkegaard in that way, and knew in addition almost all of his Kant, Spinoza and Hegel in that way too. For serious Nietzsche readers many questions arise. What did Nietzsche think of Kierkegaard? Does Nietzsche discuss Kant, or Kuno Fischer's Kant? Is Nietzsche's Hegel ultimately based on Schopenhauer's? What are we to make of a man who claimed Spinoza as his precursor while his knowledge of Spinoza was based entirely

on competent scholarship that quoted him generously? What are we to do about, or on the basis of, the fact that Nietzsche's primary source experience with the seven great modern philosophers is rather paltry, though his knowledge of many ancient philosophers involved the primary texts in the original language, and his knowledge of the living German philosophers of his times was surprisingly extensive and based in his native language?

This last fact is important. Brobjer notes that 'Nietzsche's relation to critical positivism . . . has received no attention at all by historians . . . in spite of the fact that he had read books by the two founders . . . Richard Avenarius and Ernst Mach . . .' He believes that Nietzsche not only 'encountered' but also 'was influenced by some of the principal ideas of what was to become logical positivism: the philosophy of the Vienna Circle and analytical philosophy' (92). Brobjer's discussion of these points will prove valuable to many. It could be that, as a philosopher, Nietzsche properly belongs more to the ongoing rise of positivism in his own country than to the Kantian-Hegelian movement that preceded it, and against which it rose. If that is so, then his works do not belong between those of Hegel and Heidegger, but between Schopenhauer and Wittgenstein; and his alleged influence on postmodern thought must be for the most part chimerical.

Another important and surprising fact brought home by Brobjer is the sheer amount Nietzsche read — it is notably more than might be expected. Nietzsche often depicted himself as a man who read little and was better off for it. His illness, according to his autobiography, liberated him from 'the book'. He claims not only to have read little, but to have read primarily only from a small number of books that had 'proven themselves' to him. Nothing in Brobjer supports Nietzsche's claims here. He read widely and he read appreciably much, especially in philosophy. The amount he was reading is surprising not only because Nietzsche often warned against reading a lot, but also because reading could be a painful activity for him, given his extreme myopia and frequent migraines. At any rate, the image of Nietzsche as primarily a writer rather than a scholar might still be appropriate, but images of him as a writer who was also an infrequent reader or a narrow reader can no longer be countenanced.

While many of Brobjer's observations will strike readers as informative about the kind of thing that should have been common knowledge long ago, his research here, as in his prior works, is groundbreaking. Nietzsche was treated as a non-person by the government of East Germany. His papers and personal library were off limits, and scholars have had access to them only since the fall of the Berlin Wall. Thus Brobjer's works, appearing in English after less than two decades of availability, are about as timely as they can be, and very well might be appearing sooner than one would have expected. Another sad note to ponder is the fact that many of the books Nietzsche owned have been re-bound by curators who frequently cut the margins of pages in order to fit larger pages into smaller bindings. In so doing, they robbed history of a significant quantity of Nietzsche's marginal comments about the works he read.

Brobjer is deft in his use of Nietzsche's texts, and exhibits a strong familiarity with the background material and how it can inform our readings of Nietzsche. The material is Nietzsche's personal library and the letters, notebooks and papers he left behind, in which he quoted from or commented upon the works he was reading. Brobjer's task is to understand Nietzsche and his published works more effectively by using this material. The topics Brobjer can realistically trace back to Nietzsche's readings are many, and the list includes decadence, nihilism, eternal return and a host of other central Nietzschean tropes. Readers will be left with little question as to whether his project can be productive.

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**C. A. J. Coady**

*Morality and Political Violence.*

New York: Cambridge University Press 2008.

Pp. 328.

US\$80.00 (cloth ISBN-13: 978-0-521-56000-9);

US\$27.99 (paper ISBN-13: 978-0-521-70548-6).

This is a comprehensive discussion of political violence and the morality of war. Each of its fourteen chapters treats a major topic with insight and analytical rigor. Coady has much to say about just war theory, but he also takes up topics not typically covered in recent writings on just war, including mercenaries, weapons of mass destruction, general and selective conscientious objection, the meaning of violence, the nature of peace, and the treatment of so-called 'illegal combatants'.

Coady puts forth no overall thesis; his book reads as a set of discussions of relevant issues, taken one by one. There are, however, five major themes that appear throughout and give the book its originality. These are 1) the aims of just war theory, 2) the importance of proportionality to moral judgment about war, 3) a rejection of the idea that soldiers in an unjust war have a right to fight, 4) the just treatment of combatants, and 5) non-combatant immunity as an absolute principle. I will discuss each of these briefly.

Just War Theory is a two-part framework for thinking about war. The *ius ad bellum* addresses the question of when a nation or group may engage in military conflict; the *ius in bello* is about how war is to be fought, with its central feature being a prohibition on intentionally harming non-combatants. Most would agree that the intent of those who developed Just War Theory

has been to limit war and the destruction it produces. Coady, however, sees it differently, as part of a process leading to a ban on war. He is at pains to emphasize the destruction of life, community, and property that war inevitably brings — a disaster to all concerned. The best outcome is to have war cease being a part of human life.

Many who find war horrific lean towards pacifism and reject Just War Theory. They see it as a set of rules for legitimizing war. Coady, on the other hand, takes Just War Theory as an essential tool for ending war. He takes seriously the modern restriction of war to self-defense. If all were to eschew non-defensive military conflict, there would be no need for war. Coady is especially skeptical of Humanitarian Intervention — wars to end genocide or massacre. He argues that such interventions usually end badly and inevitably involve atrocities by both sides. He does not rule it out absolutely, but aims ‘to dampen the enthusiasm for altruistic war that has gathered pace in recent years amongst many whose humane instincts’ he shares (75). At the very least, a sound theory of humanitarian intervention requires better thinking about the aftermath of war. A *jus post bellum* is badly needed, especially in light of the recent military conflicts in Iraq and Afghanistan.

The second important item is proportionality. According to Just War Theory, proportionality applies to the decision to go to war, and, separately, to each military action following from that decision. In each case, the expected benefits (or avoidance of harms) must outweigh the evil done. There is a tendency to consider proportionality as a secondary consideration for war, after it has been determined that there is just cause. Coady rejects this. A war that violates *ad bellum* or *in bello* proportionality, even for a just cause, cannot be a just war. Once again, the idea is not to lose sight of the horror war unleashes. We are less likely to do this if we see proportionality and just cause as equally important and connected.

Coady’s third point is the most controversial. The standard view is that soldiers on both sides of a conflict are justified in fighting, including those fighting for an unjust cause. Michael Walzer, in his modern classic *Just and Unjust Wars* (4<sup>th</sup> edition, Basic Books 2006), refers to this as ‘the moral equality of soldiers’ and asserts the logical independence of the *jus ad bellum* from the *jus in bello*. Coady rejects this. Killing for morally bad reasons cannot be right. The soldiers in an unjust war have no right to kill.

Coady tempers this conclusion by noting that soldiers may be compelled to fight, are themselves being shot at and resist in self-defense, and often lack the resources to determine whether their cause is just or unjust. Further, the question of whether a particular resort to political violence is just is often a matter of controversy. Soldiers in an unjust cause have no *justification* to kill but they have *excuses* to do so based on pragmatic and epistemic reasons. Nevertheless the ‘equal right to kill is not a deep moral fact about the equal status of combatants . . . [but] an uneasy compromise between the profound moral fact that unjust combatants have no right to kill and the empirical, institutional, and subjective facts created by the realities or war itself’ (127). In such a case ‘law and morality come apart’ (128).

It is truly paradoxical to hold that soldiers in an unjust cause have a right to kill, as the modern just war tradition asserts. Coady's arguments do not end the controversy but they push it forward, as well as providing powerful reasons for being very skeptical about Walzer's commitment to 'the moral equality of soldiers'.

I will briefly comment on the two final features. The *jus in bello* is centered around the idea that non-combatants are immune from intentional attack. Coady defends this vigorously, while noting the difficulty of determining and recognizing who exactly is a non-combatant. He attempts to strengthen the idea of non-combatant immunity, especially against the claim that much civilian death is acceptable as an unintended side effect ('collateral damage'). His commitment to non-combatant immunity also moves him to see no excuse or justification for terrorism.

Coady thinks, however, that in our concern for non-combatants, we have overlooked combatants. Killing combatants beyond what is necessary is also a grave wrong. Military tactics (especially aerial bombing) often go far beyond military need. Here is another area where proportionality should be given greater attention. War tends to waste the lives of soldiers and we must make greater attempts to avoid this.

Finally, Coady rejects Michael Walzer's famous excuse for attacking non-combatants in cases of 'Supreme Emergency' (*Just and Unjust Wars*, Ch. 16). Walzer argued that the allies early in World War II were justified in their terror bombing of German cities as a necessary means to counter an enemy whose victory would destroy the humane ideals of western civilization. Coady argues, however, that the supreme emergency exception lets in too much. There can be no clear definition of supreme emergency, and unscrupulous leaders will be happy to use this loop-hole. Coady argues this in his final chapter, entitled 'The Issue of Stringency'. Modern moral philosophers realize that it is problematic to lay down absolute moral prohibitions. 'We are wary of absolutes in all areas of thought' (298), as 'messy realities' may challenge us to override our deepest moral commitments in rare circumstances. Coady recognizes this, but argues that it is a mistake to lay down criteria for violating our most fundamental rules. Doing so provides reasons for violations that can and will be used inappropriately. For Coady, as I read him, we must accept an absolute ban against targeting non-combatants, and deal with the difficult cases as they come up, one by one.

For elegance and vividness of style, Coady's book will not compete with Michael Walzer's *Just and Unjust Wars*. It is sober, analytical, restrained. Arguments are given, counter-arguments produced and answered. It can be a bit of a chore to read from beginning to end. But it pays to read the chapters most relevant to one's interests. Agree or not, one will be made to think.

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**François Delaporte**

*Anatomy of the Passions.*

Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press 2008.

Pp. 209.

US\$65.00 (cloth ISBN-13: 978-0-8047-5850-5);

US\$24.95 (paper ISBN-13: 978-0-8047-5851-2).

This magnificent study of Guillaume Duchenne de Boulogne offers an important contribution to epistemology and history of science, and corrects many accounts of a figure perhaps best known for the muscular dystrophy named after him and for having paved the way for Darwin's theory of the emotions. Out of a seemingly straightforward physiological gesture, this book retrieves a series of complex historical, philosophical, and epistemological breaches of broad scope and forceful effect. Delaporte's historical argument connects the event of Duchenne's 1850s galvanization of the facial muscles with a history of physiological problems, dating back to the seventeenth century, whose influence on the study of emotions Duchenne rejected or overcame, leading him to establish in turn not just ciphers of a new and comprehensive theory of the emotions, but essential (and lasting) foundations. The philosophical object of Delaporte's study of surfaces, traces, and expression is Duchenne's construction of a semantics of facial muscular movement in terms of 'the passions'. A further aim of Delaporte's book is epistemological: using Duchenne, he emphasizes the co-dependency of philosophical, physiological, and technological concerns in the object of his study, and he turns this study itself into an exemplary demonstration of the proper construction and examination of objects by intellectual history and the philosophy of science. Above all, Delaporte demonstrates convincingly how an innovation such as Duchenne's engages with and reframes the complex interplay between very different bodies of knowledge.

At stake in this book is the 1850-1862 event of Duchenne's electrical stimulation of the facial muscles, the photographs he took of his experimental subjects, and his substitution of 'a mosaic of muscles for the muscular mask' that was then the dominant scientific paradigm (16). In four similarly constructed chapters, Delaporte addresses Duchenne's innovations from the perspective of different disciplines: the anatomy of facial muscles, or myology; photography and the tradition of physiognomy; systems of expression; and the aesthetic treatment of the passions. Throughout, he shows how Duchenne's 'electrical scalpel' offered a technical answer to the Gordian knot of problems posed by the attachment of muscular filaments to the inside of facial skin: as the use of a scalpel would ruin these filaments (10), it remained impossible at the time for anatomists to discern the exact contours of muscles and their relations. The result was a broadly shared conviction, grounded in fibrillary theory, that muscles were co-dependent and essentially created a mask, which was in turn responsible *as a whole* or *in parts* for the various expressions of the face. By demonstrating through electrical stimulation that the face was a 'mosaic' of muscles, that these can be excited individually (26),

that some are completely expressive while others incompletely so and yet others complement expressions (57, 70), Duchenne broke with the fibrillary paradigm. In this break, a second tool complemented the scalpel — namely the photograph. Its use made possible ‘the examination of the face, the examination of indices, and the emergence of the subtlest nuances’ (64), which in turn served the physiologist as ‘symptoms’ of the normal (81). Duchenne thus managed, from muscular movements, to retrieve indices of facial expressions and to recognize these as signs, indeed as *natural* signs (91) — as expressions of emotion. His photographic portraits of emotions set the stage not only for his recognition of a ‘universal’ grammar of the human expression of passions (and for the correction of false synergies, or the importance of false signs, e.g., grimaces), but also for border crossings between physiology and psychology (68-9), and the possibility of moving the ‘correct’ artistic rendering of the passions decidedly beyond the use of models or Charles Le Brun’s physiognomies.

The results from Duchenne’s technological innovations and physiological paradigm shift set the ground for a clearer understanding of his philosophical significance and his anthropological influence. In some of the best parts of his book, Delaporte demonstrates that Duchenne’s ‘orthography’ of facial expression responded (with considerable force) to a long tradition concerning the relations of body and soul. At stake in this tradition were several series of questions, notably the concern — since Descartes — whether expression is an effect of the will. This in turn affected dissimulation, performance, belief, the state of the soul. Duchenne did not thus merely discard physiognomy and classical pathognomy (47), the ‘metaphysics’ to which passions had been relegated. Instead, against the belief of Descartes and his successors (e.g., Bell and Moreau) that the passions were voluntary (21, 34-5, 45, 92), Duchenne showed them to not depend on the will (94) and facial expressions not to be merely the soul’s way of expressing or dissimulating. And (one step further), against Condillac’s claim that the language of passions was a learned language of action, Duchenne declared it a natural language that was biological and universal (91-2, 95-6).

Duchenne had many detractors, and — keeping in mind the various theological and physiognomic remnants Duchenne maintained in his understanding of the ‘passions’ — Delaporte champions him throughout, largely because of the radicalism and scientific, philosophical, cultural and aesthetic consistency of his argument. Throughout, Delaporte shows that the historical, scientific and philosophical identification of the correct parameters of an epistemological problem constitutes the most difficult and significant methodological issue facing historians of science and concepts. Furthering Bachelard’s work on continuity and rupture, and Canguilhem’s studies of notions that have simultaneously experimental, conceptual and pre-scientific application, Delaporte uses Duchenne’s conceptual breaks with his predecessors, elders, and contemporaries, in order to showcase his own historical method and the continuing pertinence of historical epistemology. (Also particularly instructive is Delaporte’s frequent critique of alternative methodologies for

their failure to recognize objects that require a conceptual rupture or break in order to be understood.) Thus, essentially inverting the priority of Darwin over Duchenne in the modern discussion of expression, Delaporte attributes to his subject's innovation a cardinal role in the emergence of the modern notions of expression that have prevailed in the twentieth century: from Ekman's and related studies on the universal recognition of emotion, to conceptions of the face in Wittgenstein and of the surface in Deleuze, and from approaches to the correct method of painting expression to acting theory.

### **Stefanos Geroulanos**

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### **Joshua Foa Dienstag**

*Pessimism: Philosophy, Ethic, Spirit.*

Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press 2006.

Pp. 306.

US\$37.50 (cloth ISBN 13: 978-0-691-12552-7).

We tend to think of both pessimism and optimism as matters of temperament or mood. Pessimists, the caricature goes, are those gloomy souls who, wallowing in negativity, insist on seeing things in the worst possible light; optimists are those cheery, stalwart types who choose instead to look on the bright side of life. In a philosophical sense, however, pessimism and optimism are not psychological states like moods or dispositions, but competing paradigms for understanding the human condition, distinct traditions of thought with practical implications for understanding the problems and aims of political theory.

This book is an intellectual history of pessimism in the philosophical sense. Arguing that pessimism has 'gone missing from our standard histories of political theory' to our own detriment, Dienstag aims to 'reframe the history of political thought so that pessimism becomes one of its major strands' (3). Far from being a necessarily dispiriting or defeatist doctrine, pessimism can be an 'energizing and even liberating philosophy' (ix) that provides a much needed counterweight to the varieties of philosophical optimism — liberalism, socialism, pragmatism — that dominate contemporary Western political thought. Or so Dienstag hopes to show.

Chapter 1 gives an 'anatomy' of pessimism, identifying several central themes shared by its proponents. Both pessimism and optimism, according to Dienstag, trace their origins to a transformation in time-consciousness — a shift to a distinctively linear conception of time — that occurred in the early modern period. But while optimists assimilate the idea of linear time

to the idea of progress, taking for granted the possibility of improvement in the human condition over time, pessimists reject, or at least find no evidence for, such a belief. On the surface it looks like we're making progress — for example, technology improves, science makes breakthroughs — but the 'irony of history', as Dienstag calls it, is that the human condition on the whole is getting either worse or no better. And while optimistic philosophies assume that 'justice is the achievable object' of their theorizing, and that 'the patient application of reason to human society will result in political structures that increasingly approach such a condition' (35), the pessimistic tradition reminds us that 'temporality creates barriers to freedom and happiness' (267) that institutions devoted to managing social and material conditions cannot address. Indeed, according to Dienstag, for the pessimist time itself is the fundamental problem of human existence. Time burdens us with frailty, old age, death; the fleetingness of existence condemns us to lives of vanishing significance. From the pessimist's perspective, ours is a 'bare condition of temporality, with nothing to distract us from its endlessness and meaninglessness' (31).

Chapters 2 through 5 trace the themes identified in Chapter 1 — the burden of time, the absurdity of existence, the incompatibility of happiness and freedom, the irony of history — through the work of several prominent pessimists, organized according to a rough typology of different strands of the tradition: cultural pessimism, represented by Rousseau and Leopardi, metaphysical pessimism, represented by Schopenhauer and Freud, and existential pessimism, represented by Camus, Cioran, and Unamuno. Nietzsche, though Dienstag considers him an existential pessimist, gets a separate chapter of his own because his particular brand of 'Dionysian pessimism' is 'maximally valuable and persuasive' (162) in emphasizing that pessimism need not lead to resignation, but instead can inspire 'spirited activity' (166) and a defiant embrace of life — a position that Cervantes' *Don Quixote* models for us, as Dienstag argues in Chapter 6. The book also includes a chapter exploring the connection between aphorism and pessimism, and a final chapter, itself written in aphoristic style, on pessimism and freedom.

Though the book is structured primarily as a historical survey of pessimist thought, Dienstag also hopes to persuade readers of the tradition's contemporary appeal. Optimistic political theory, largely oblivious to the burdens imposed on us by our time-bound condition, offers scant resources for addressing the crucial problems of human life, Dienstag argues, and 'citizens of modern states face inevitable disappointment when their lives do not measure up to what contemporary rhetoric tells them is possible' (267). Pessimism, by contrast, protects us from the let-downs bound to follow from false hopes and inflated expectations, preparing us to grapple with the limitations of a disordered world. Indeed, 'there is a freedom to be gained when one's existence is detached from the narrative of progress' (198), Dienstag argues. Optimism makes us 'perpetual enemies of those future moments that do not meet our expectations,' whereas 'when we expect nothing from the future . . . we are free to experience it as it will be, rather than as a disappointment'

(247). Thus, according to Dienstag, while optimism ‘subordinates the present to what is to come and thereby devalues it’ (245), pessimism instead ‘envision[s] a democracy of moments’ (41).

Discussion of the concrete implications of pessimism for political theory is not always forthcoming. On the political level, what does a ‘democracy of moments’ look like? How are we to imagine a politics that eschews expectations for the future? Dienstag gives us some hints as to what he has in mind — for example, he remarks that pessimists would resist global ambitions to ‘remake the world in [their] image’, realizing that ‘the world will hold no image at all for very long’ (198) — but some more substantial treatment of such issues would be helpful, especially since Dienstag also notes that nothing should deter the pessimist from entering ‘local projects’ or organizing ‘small portions of the world’ (198). Presumably both large and small portions of the world are equally resistant to being remade to match our expectations, so the difference between global and local ambitions becomes obscure.

Pessimism, as Dienstag describes it, is primarily ‘a philosophy of personal conduct, rather than public order’ (7), and he recognizes that some, expecting political theory to set out schemes of ideal government or principles of justice, will be resistant to it for that very reason. Since the book is largely a survey of perspectives from within the tradition, there isn’t much independent argumentation to convince such readers. Insofar as Dienstag’s goal is to recommend pessimism as an attractive political theory, this detracts from his success. Insofar as his goal is simply to illuminate a neglected philosophical tradition, however, the book more than meets its target.

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### **Kaibara Ekken**

*The Philosophy of Qi:*

*The Records of Great Doubts.*

Trans. Mary Evelyn Tucker. New York:

Columbia University Press 2007.

Pp. 208.

US\$34.50 (cloth ISBN-13: 978-0-231-13922-5).

For those unfamiliar with the Japanese studies field, Ekken (also Ekiken) was a seventeenth century intellectual whose work influenced the course of philosophy, science and even gender studies from the seventeenth century to the present. His writings included travel accounts, botanical studies, moral philosophy, education and even health; one foreign resident of Japan in the

nineteenth century called him the 'Aristotle of Japan'. The translation under review is of what is probably the most philosophical of Ekken's writings. The title's 'Great Doubts' refers to Ekken's move away from the most influential thinkers of the Neo-Confucian era.

This translation is certainly a welcome addition to the understanding of Ekken for specialists in the Japanese studies field. Tucker's hope is that her translation 'will provoke further discussion regarding the formulation of cosmology and ethics in the Tokugawa Period' (9). The translation is the most reliable one available, but her lengthy introduction (nearly half of the book) is especially important for those unfamiliar with the field of East Asian philosophy. In it Tucker explains the debates regarding the relationship between 'material force' (*qi*) and 'principle' (*li*) in Chinese Neo-Confucianism, then moves to a brief discussion of how these concepts developed in China, Korea and Japan.

Briefly, *qi* can be thought of as a dynamic vital energy that binds all things in the universe together. Humans can cultivate their *qi*, which is done not only for health reasons but also, in a moral sense, to live in harmony with all things. Therefore, philosophers as early as Mencius believed that humans possess an inherently good nature (*li*), while impure *qi* causes people to do bad things. Principle (*li*) refers to the pattern or nature of objects, humanity, nature, et cetera. *Li* was often emphasized over *qi* in many Neo-Confucian writings, in part because its ambiguity is difficult to grasp yet is vital to one's own cultivation. These ideas became even more complex when they mixed with Buddhism and Daoism, a trend represented in the works of Zhu Xi and the Cheng brothers, the patriarchs of Neo-Confucianism. Zhu Xi in particular subordinated *qi* to *li*, and thus emphasized the study of the abstract over the concrete. Throughout East Asian philosophical history, scholars have split over the relationship between *qi* and *li*. Ekken, like other scholars before him in China and Korea, believed that this metaphysical emphasis of *li* over *qi* might lead people to engage in quietism as found in Buddhism and Daoism.

Instead, Ekken follows what Tucker calls the 'monism' of *qi*, whereby materialism and principle are joined, with *qi* taking priority over *li*, thus forming a vital dynamism that becomes the 'unifying basis of self, society and nature' (4). *Qi* is physical, present in our surroundings, and thus one needs to observe nature, often referred to as the 'investigation of things', in order to cultivate self and society — studying texts is not enough. Moreover, Ekken's claim that people should actively participate in the world explains why he branches into so many different types of practical learning. For Ekken, this active study not only informs self-cultivation, but also benefits society. Ekken pursues astronomy not simply to understand the movement of the stars as a form of self-cultivation through understanding nature or the universe, but to assist society by furthering calendar reforms (51).

Tucker is also speaking to those who work outside of the field of Asian studies. She shares with past scholars of Tokugawa intellectual history a concern for how Asian philosophy fits into Western conceptions of modernity, but she is careful not to be limited by those categories. For example, she

points out that Ekken's work is one of questioning and critiquing past intellectual traditions and creating them anew. Ekken does not blindly accept Zhu Hsi's interpretations of *li* and *qi*, nor does he completely abandon Zhu Hsi altogether. Tucker uses Ekken to demonstrate that in Asia, as in the Western tradition, 'doubt has been an ongoing preoccupation' (33). She hopes to dispel Orientalist understandings of Confucianism, by showing that 'Ekken's intellectual struggles cause us to reevaluate the conventional notion that Confucianism was a tradition transmitted routinely without disagreement or individual reflection' (35). This is a valid argument that has long informed the work of other scholars of Neo-Confucianism such as Theodore de Bary, and is a message worth repeating.

However, Tucker is careful not to let her study of Ekken be limited to a Eurocentric definition of modernity. For example, she does not see Ekken's teaching as belonging to the easily reducible category of 'practical learning' posited by previous scholars of Tokugawa intellectual history. They believed that Ekken and his contemporary Ogyu Sorai moved away from religion towards secular modernity, a feature of Western modernity. Instead, as Tucker has argued in her past works, Ekken follows the sacred and secular elements of Neo-Confucianism.

I have only a few minor criticisms of this otherwise well-written and important book. Tucker argues that Ekken's treatise is important in the context of the Neo-Confucian tradition in East Asia for religious reasons (among others). She does not clearly define her use of the term 'religious' except to state that 'religiously' his ideas reaffirm the cosmological idea that man should live in harmony with *qi* in order to change self and society (26). Second, given the book's short length, nearly twelve pages of illustrations are included with no captions or explanation of how these tie into the larger work. Most are of plant and animal life, and I assume they can be attributed to Ekken's scientific works. Finally, although I admire Tucker's desire to have us see Neo-Confucianism contribute solutions to the world's present ecological problems, it is a bit simplistic to sum up the contemporary legacy of the French enlightenment as one that separates matter and spirit, resulting in a lost reverence for nature and facilitating its exploitation (64). If we scholars of Asia do not want Europeanists to reduce and simplify our subjects of study, we should not do the same to theirs.

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**Lorenzo Fabbri**

*The Domestication of Derrida:*

*Rorty, Pragmatism and Deconstruction.*

Trans. Daniele Manni. New York:

Continuum 2008.

Pp. 192.

US\$130.00 (cloth ISBN-13:978-0-8264-9778-9).

In the blurb on the back cover of this book we read that what is ultimately questioned here 'is the legitimacy of labelling deconstruction as a post-modern withdrawal from politics and theory. By discussing Derrida's resistance against the very possibility of theoretical and political asceticism, Fabbri shows that there is much more politics and philosophy in deconstruction than Rorty is willing to admit.' I confess, I am immediately tempted to raise some doubts about the legitimacy of a strategy of *domestication*, from the Latin *domus*, if the domestication of Derrida means that deconstruction resembles a private way of philosophizing, totally deprived of any political pretension.

It is difficult, indeed, to reject Fabbri's thesis by looking either at Derrida's entire corpus, or at Derrida's direct and personal testimonies. Against the charge that he was overprivatizing his philosophical thinking (Habermas), Derrida repeatedly countered that he never abandoned political engagement. Speaking of his temptation towards the political and of political engagement, he once spoke of the 'Syracuse paradigm', i.e., the experience of the philosopher who believes himself qualified to enlighten the statesman. He recalled Plato's trip to Syracuse to instruct the tyrant Dionysius on becoming a good ruler of the city. On the other side of the fence, many critics think that deconstruction, even though characterized as a textual and academic project of denaturalization, is for Derrida inherently political.

But let us return to the book. In the opening Fabbri begins with the question: what is the essence of philosophy? Moreover, he warns us that for Rorty 'Kant was the first consciously to identify the essence of philosophy as "theory of knowledge", thus allowing for the survival of philosophy and securing it as an autonomous discipline' (7). In fact, in 'The Paralogism of Pure Reason', 'The Antinomy of Pure Reason', and the 'Ideal of Pure Reason', Kant cast many doubts on the epistemological value of pure reason. He lucidly exposed the fallaciousness of traditional metaphysics and the undecidability of the synthetic a priori, even speaking of the end of metaphysics.

In our non-philosophical epoch Rorty argued that the quasi-philosophers or substitutes for philosophers are the ironists, who embody the well known skeptical human attitude. 'The first great ironist in Rorty's mainly Western philosophy is Hegel. Instead of looking at things, Hegel looked in fact at philosophical texts; instead of philosophizing, he was engaged in writing a history of philosophy' (13). This is a kind of writing that, as Rorty affirms, can be equivalent to literary criticism, or to private literature. The new phi-

losopher (or non-philosopher) — the ironist — is a kind of intellectual whose task is continually to move through the pages of large encyclopaedias, and who responds to a re-description by means of a re-description.

With respect to the Rortyan domestication of Derrida, Fabbri critically affirms: ‘Rorty at once expects too much anti-philosophy and too little politics from Derrida. He generously awards Derrida the success of having circumvented the metaphysical tradition by transforming theory into autobiography, but intolerantly claims that Derrida should be considered a thinker lacking any public dimension’ (51). In support of his interpretation Rorty cites *Circumfession*, a diary in which Derrida plays at writing a sort of Proustian memoir, but Fabbri urges: ‘Autobiographies function on the basis of a true reference to life, and even if they contain phantasm, dreams and deviations, their meaning would still remain rooted in the identity of a subject who lived the narrated experiences’ (54).

In Chapter 3, the most important of the book, starting from the Rortyan essay ‘Trotsky and the Wild Orchids’, Fabbri poses the pregnant question of the relation of the personal to the political: ‘Is it possible to reconcile what is important for oneself with what is important for society? Is the time dedicated to literature and philosophy time taken away from politics? Thirty years after his departure from Chicago, Rorty was still searching for a language which might make compatible the sublimity of the orchids with the beauty of the socialist revolution’ (88-9). In the long run, Rorty’s reply was that private and public must be separate, that they are on different planes. And in order to strengthen the private-public separation he added, almost in defence of Derrida, that ‘“Whereas Habermas sees the line of ironist thinking which runs from Hegel to Foucault and Derrida as destructive of social hope, I see this line of thought as largely irrelevant of public life and to political questions” ’(91). But — and for Fabbri this is the kernel of the book — at the middle of the same page we read that ‘instead of opposing Habermas’ thesis of highlighting how and why deconstruction is (or might be) politically relevant, Rorty reduces philosophy as a whole to an equivalent of his own private search for wild orchids’ (91). And in comparing the Rortyan line of thought to Derrida’s, Fabbri emphasizes ‘[r]adicalism and philosophy in the privacy of self-achievement; reformism and common sense in public engagement. This is Rorty’s solution to the intricate relationship between theory and practice, thought and politics. Derrida handles the same topic in a totally different way connecting the radical questioning of a certain philosophical practice with the engagement toward a democracy to come’(98). Derrida thinks the humanities can take some steps toward an originary anarchy, and thinks deconstruction is nothing but a general opposition which reclaims the right to contest the limits of a secure responsibility.

In the last years of his life Rorty was taken up by the wild orchids and his love of the outdoors, but in doing so he made an eloquent political gesture, both private and public. Given the abundance of sources and its close confrontation with primary texts, I cannot but think that this book probably

needed to be at least twice as long, in order properly to cover its intended ground. It might thereby also have been more fluid in its exposition.

**Francesco Tampoia**

**George P. Fletcher**

*The Grammar of Criminal Law Vol. 1:  
Foundations.*

New York: Oxford University Press 2007.

Pp. 425.

US\$55.00 (cloth ISBN-13: 978-0-19-510310-6).

It would be difficult to overstate Fletcher's contributions to the field of legal philosophy. He has been publishing for well over forty years, and is (according to the blurb for this book) the most frequently cited author in criminal law. Fletcher's special talent has been to serve as a mediator between the fields of law and philosophy, bringing the insights of moral and political philosophy to legal scholars, and bringing concrete legal questions to the attention of moral philosophers (his classic article 'Proportionality and the Psychotic Aggressor' created an entire field of debate in the discussions of the morality of self-defense). He is well suited to this role of mediator, and is willing to chastise legal scholars for ignoring fundamental issues in moral philosophy, but also to chastise philosophers for excessive abstraction and failure to attend to the concrete realities that judges and lawyers face in the field of criminal law. This book, the first of a three-volume set, he describes as the 'culmination' of his work in the field of criminal justice in both senses: both a fulfillment and (sadly) the end of his extraordinary scholarly career.

Here Fletcher aims to supplement his classic *Rethinking Criminal Law* with a focus on comparative and international law, in a time when international law is assuming vastly greater importance. This is a welcome and much-needed project. Just as the American legal system has long had a blind spot with respect to moral philosophy, so too does it have a blind spot with respect to the importance of comparative law. American isolationism and exceptionalism is alive and well in the field of law, with parochialism having respectable advocates including Antonin Scalia. But surely such a position is short-sighted given the increasing globalization of the legal system, as symbolized in the landmark creation of the International Criminal Court in 2002 (in which, alas, America has refused to participate). This book alone is sufficient to demonstrate the enormous value of a comparative approach in criminal law, illustrating the merits and demerits of different approaches to

problems in criminal law. Fletcher, with his command of many languages, is again uniquely well-suited for this project. He is even well-versed in Biblical Hebrew, and draws on the Bible as explanation for the origin of some of our traditions. (Occasionally he overstates his case however; it seems unlikely that, e.g., the victims' rights movement can be traced to Leviticus [119]!)

Fletcher's aim in this volume is to uncover the deep structure (or 'grammar') of the criminal law, the fundamental principles to be found by exploring criminal law in its many manifestations around the world. This approach is vastly different from the typical criminal law treatises in the Anglo-American tradition, which have tended to summarize case law but not attempt to seek general principles or systematic doctrines. It must be said, however, that Fletcher's strength can also be his weakness. Consider, for, example his central thesis that the criminal law can be analyzed into three central elements, punishment, human action, and guilt, though these are 'tied together' by a 'fourth concept', that of wrongdoing (341). It is difficult to know what to make of this claim. What sort of things are these 'elements': principles, ideas, concepts? What exactly is Fletcher claiming? That the entirety of the criminal law can be deductively derived from these elements? And what does it mean that they are 'tied together' by wrongdoing? Is wrongdoing the fundamental concept? Such a conclusion pursues generality at the risk of arriving at vacuity.

Fletcher must be commended for his influence in insisting that the criminal law cannot be studied in isolation from philosophy; the famous first sentence of *Rethinking Criminal Law* reads: 'Criminal law is a species of moral and political philosophy.' However, some of the methods of philosophy that Fletcher relies on are controversial and even somewhat dated. He is a proponent of 'conceptual analysis', according to which one can resolve moral and political disputes by analyzing the meaning of words. For instance, Fletcher accepts the argument, widely believed several decades ago, that it is a conceptual requirement that punishment be for an offense, hence it is not permissible to 'punish' the innocent (223). However, few if any philosophers take this position seriously anymore. Whether the innocent may be 'punished' is not a question of logic or meaning, but a moral question. Fletcher also seems to be one of the few remaining defenders of H. L. A. Hart's famous 'mixed' theory of punishment, distinguishing a utilitarian 'general aim' from a deontological principle of 'distribution'.

Occasionally Fletcher also purports to resolve a deep moral problem with a cursory solution. For example, he claims that it is permissible to kill soldiers in war because of the principle of 'reciprocity', such that soldiers acquire immunity for killing in that they take a risk of being killed themselves (203). However, this is a deeply problematic explanation. For one thing, what about involuntary draftees, who do not voluntarily accept the risk of being killed: on what basis are they liable to being killed? Further, the reciprocity principle would prove too much, as it would allow executing prisoners as well. In any case, it will not do to 'resolve' this deep problem in a single sentence. His claim that punishment must be 'impersonal' is also troublesome; it is un-

clear just what he is concerned about in insisting that punishment cannot be 'personal': does he mean it would elevate feelings over reason? That it would allow acting on a lust for vengeance? That personal punishment cannot be fair? This thesis would need substantially more development.

None of these criticisms should, however, detract from the enormous praise Fletcher is due for embarking on this project and for being at the vanguard of what is almost certain to be a major turning point in the history of criminal law, as it shifts from being a local matter to being an international one. We can only look forward to what the next two volumes of this project will bring.

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**Christopher Gill**

*The Structured Self in Hellenistic and Roman Thought.*

New York: Oxford University Press 2006.

Pp. 544.

US\$150.00 (cloth ISBN-13: 978-0-19-815268-2);

US\$49.95 (paper ISBN-13: 978-0-19-956437-8).

In this carefully researched study, Gill gives us a detailed account of Stoic and Epicurean thinking on the human personality, the human self. The work divides into three main parts. In Part 1, 'The Structured Self in Stoicism and Epicureanism', Gill surprises us by revealing that both Epicureanism and Stoicism, in many ways incompatible schools of thought, are committed to forms of holism, psychophysical and psychological, and to naturalism. He contrasts this 'Stoic-Epicurean' understanding of the structured self with the classic earlier conceptions in Greek thought, described as 'core-centered' and 'part-based', conceptions that continued to be represented by Middle Platonism. In Part 2, 'The Unstructured Self: Stoic Passions and the Reception of Plato', Gill provides us with a case study of the Stoic analysis of emotions, an illustration of stoic naturalism and holistic psychology put to use. In Part 3, 'Theoretical Issues and Literary Reception', Gill argues that, contrary to the generalization that there was a sweeping subjective turn in Roman thought, the Stoic-Epicurean school is as objective in its psychology as we find in earlier philosophy, and we can see the influence of this fairly 'objective' naturalistic/holistic psychology in Senecan tragedy and in Virgil's *Aeneid*.

In Part 1 Gill begins his delineation of just what is meant by the Stoic-Epicurean structured self by tracing out the background history of the concept of the self found principally in Plato and Aristotle. There we find a kind of tension between 'core-centered' and 'part-based' concepts of the self, with perhaps a tilting toward the core-centered account. For instance, we find Plato's 'core-centered' account of what 'we ourselves are' in the *Alcibiades*, the end of the *Republic*, and the *Phaedo*, where it is maintained that we are 'essentially' our soul or personality, our capacity to reason, and not our body. Yet to account for how we are in the world and how we behave, we turn to Plato's tripartite soul, a part-based account. Likewise, we see the 'core-centered' view illustrated in Aristotle's account of self-love in his discussion of friendship in the *Nicomachean Ethics*, where what we really are is seen in the soul engaging in practical reasoning and contemplation; whereas to account for *akrasia*, or moral weakness, we find Aristotle using a part-based model, contrasting the non-rational appetites with the rational soul. In contrast to these is the Stoic-Epicurean view of human and animal selves as psychological 'systems or structures', or better, the view that the self is the result of the development of psychophysical ordered structures, systems, and capacities. Although Gill doesn't put it exactly like this, animal perception would be a psychophysical system and capacity, animal and human self-perception a further structural development, and human conceptual self-understanding a higher order development again. It shouldn't surprise us that Gill finds parallels between the Stoic-Epicurean structure-centered account and the thinking of such contemporary philosophers as Daniel Dennett. Although, as Gill carefully points out, there are antecedents to Stoic-Epicurean psychological holism in Aristotle's hylomorphism and in aspects of Plato's thinking in the *Timaeus*, Plato and Aristotle remain dualistic, inconsistently torn between core-centered and part-based accounts of the self, an unhappy dynamic not found in the Stoic-Epicurean view.

Following von Staden, Gill contends that the holistic view found in the Epicureans, many Stoics, and some of the early Hellenistic physicians holds the following tenets: all soul (*psyche*) is body (*soma*), though not all body is soul; only what is three dimensionally spatially extended and capable of acting and being acted upon exists, and the soul or *psyche* meets these criteria; the corporeal psyche is, like the rest of the body, mortal and transient; and the soul comes into existence as an inseparable dimension (or aspect) of the body and cannot exist apart from it, either before, during, or after the life of the physical person. This paradigm shift in the view of the soul that begins to emerge at the end of the fourth century and beginning of the third is in stunning contrast to fifth and fourth century conceptions, especially those of Plato. It is not so surprising then to find the Stoics having more in common in important ways with Epicureans than they do with Middle Platonists.

In Part 1, Gill provides us with detailed accounts of psychological holism, the 'structured self', first in Stoicism and then with Epicureanism, and as he does so he brings in contemporary categories and concepts from philosophy of mind. For instance, he describes both Stoicism and Epicureanism as exhib-

iting a ‘combination of non-reductive physicalism and non-dualistic interactionism.’ They are physicalists in holding that psyche is a form of body, but they are non-reductionist in that psychological processes cannot be reduced to merely physical terms. They are interactionists in that they see all psychological activities as interactions of psyche and body. In discussing the Stoic treatment of psychophysical holism in humans as being in continuity with other animals, Gill draws an analogy between Hierocles’ claim that animals have self-perception without having conscious mental states and Dennett’s similar ascription of beliefs to animals. Both are non-Cartesian treatments of animal and human psychology that do not involve a ‘Cartesian’ perspicacious awareness of one’s own mental states and beliefs. When Gill turns to discussing physicalism and holism in the Epicureans, he again does so using contemporary categories to help clarify these ancient positions. Thus where we might expect the Epicureans (following Democritus) to give us something along the lines of eliminative materialism, *pace* the Churchlands, he makes a case for their non-reductionist strain of thought as best described, not as ‘emergent dualism’ (Sedley), but as ‘token identity physicalism’ (Annas). Gill concludes Part 1 by segueing from descriptions of psychophysical and psychological holism and naturalism, and the implications of these views for agency and responsibility, to an account of how the Stoics and Epicureans combined this naturalism with Socratic ethical ideals of time-independent perfection and invulnerability. One may be a thoroughly mortal and transient being, but the attainment of *autarkeia*, a state of ‘independence and self-sufficiency’, raises one’s life to the level of Socratic perfection and invulnerability, at least for the here and now.

In Part 2 Gill provides an in-depth look at Stoic naturalistic psychophysical holism put to use in the analysis of the passions, an analysis very much at variance with the Platonic part-based analysis. (The paradoxical term ‘unstructured self’ in this part’s title, ‘The Unstructured Self: Stoic Passions and the Reception of Plato’, is relative and refers to those who fail to *fully* develop toward the ideal condition of cohesive structure found in the perfectly wise and virtuous man.) According to the Stoic analysis, the emotional and ‘irrational’ aspect of the psyche is not distinguished from the rational by nature, and passions are simply bad and mistaken judgments which have acquired force. The torn or conflicted self is not the result of two parts, reason and appetite straining at odds against each other, but rather the conflicted self is reason alone (the control center or *hegemonikon*) turning at great speed from one impulse to the other, from one judgment to the other, at a rate so rapid we are not altogether aware of it. Gill provides us this account within the historical context of the heated debate between Platonists and Stoics over the nature of the passions. Indeed, Plutarch’s *On Ethical Virtue*, one of Gill’s sources for his description of the Stoic analysis of the passions, is ironically a defense of the Platonic part-based model against the Stoic. Gill ends this part with an account of the contrasting positions of Galen and Chrysippus on Plato’s *Timaeus*. He does this to show how Plato fits into the Hellenistic debate between holistic and part-based psychology, and to show how the *Ti-*

*maeus* may have provided some of the basis and impetus for the development of holistic thinking in the Stoics.

In Part 3 Gill concludes his study by taking issue with the widely held view that there was a subjectivist-individualist turn in Roman culture, a turn due in part to the influence of Stoic-Epicurean thinking (Long and Kahn). Building on the extensive analysis of the first two parts of his book, Gill argues that Stoicism is better understood from the perspective of the 'objective-participant' conception, and he doubts the relevance of modern subjectivity in the ancient context. He concludes by contrasting Plutarch's *Lives* as illustrating a Platonic part-based psychology with the holistic Stoic view of the self illustrated in Senecan tragedy, his *Phaedra* and *Medea*, and in Virgil's *Aeneid*.

Gill's work is a monumental study rich in historical detail and in-depth analysis of the Stoic-Epicurean structured self, a self understood as a development of psychophysical systems, processes and structures. It is a goldmine for both historians of thought and for those interested in ancient holistic and naturalistic views of the self that bear striking similarities to much contemporary thinking in philosophy of mind.

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**Mitchell S. Green**

*Self-Expression.*

New York: Oxford University Press 2007.

Pp. 240.

US\$85.00 (cloth ISBN-13: 978-0-19-928378-1).

Mitchell Green has given us something too rare: a book-length treatment on expression unparalleled since Alan Tormey's 1971 landmark *The Concept of Expression*. It is strange that so few books about the topic exist, since, as Green notes in Chapter 1, the phenomenon itself is so pervasive in the world. From television ads to art, from a doctor's description of a child's behavior to the analyses of sports commentators, almost all of our everyday interactions are replete with self-expressions, with someone making public her point of view of the world.

This is a relatively short work for such a broad topic, but Green nevertheless manages to canvas many past theories of expression in the course of arguing for his own. In Chapters 1 and 2 Green lays the groundwork for his view that the purpose of self-expression is communication. In signal-

ing, communication takes place when an entity is successful in conveying information to a receiver. Expression, it turns out, is a signal, but it is not a mere signal; expressions are signals in an extended sense, in that they both show a state of affairs *and* make the receiver aware of the sender's attitude toward that state of affairs. For instance, I could give you a note with the words 'You were not at the meeting last Tuesday', but by saying that while raising my voice and emphasizing certain words, I also *express* my attitude of disappointment.

In Chapters 3 and 4, Green locates aspects of his view with respect to issues of speaker meaning in the philosophy of language, particularly in the work of H. P. Grice. There are three ways of showing: *showing-that*, where propositional knowledge is transmitted, say, by giving evidence of my courage by doing certain (i.e., courageous) things; *showing-a*, which is making something perceptible by showing some component of that thing, for instance, by showing you part of an apple to make you aware of the apple; and *showing-how* something looks, feels, sounds, etc., which can give qualitative knowledge of a thing, for example, by painting you a picture or writing a song about it. By the end of Chapter 4 Green expands on Grice's conception of speaker meaning to include both the content and the particular sense of that meaning.

Chapter 5 compares two views of the facial expression of emotion: the Neurocultural View and the Behavioral Ecology View. In the former view, facial expressions are reliable indications of a person's emotional state, and are — at least for the 'basic' emotions — not subject to the relativism of any given culture's expressive practices. In the latter view, facial expressions co-evolved as mutually beneficial communication aids for both sender and receiver. Agreeing with some aspects of both views, Green offers a third, which he calls the Strategic Readout View, according to which, facial expressions both are reliable indicators of the subject's inner state, and arise through natural selection from the benefits they bestow on both sender and receiver. In other words, not only is my expression of anger a reliable indicator that I am in fact angry, but my expression of anger is beneficial both for me (in the way my anger is accompanied by characteristic elements, like stimulating my fight-or-flight response), and for those with whom I interact (in that my expression lets them know I may be preparing to fight or run away). In Chapter 6, Green argues that not all expressions are hardwired, and that many of our expressions are conventional, i.e., learned from our cultural context, but that this fact poses no challenge to the view that self-expressions are reliable 'showings' of the subject's point of view. It must be said that this chapter contains some very technical sections, but most of the chapter has explanatory material which, though difficult, is clear enough.

Chapter 7, the longest chapter at forty pages, pulls everything together that has thus far been said, though some strands argued for earlier don't reappear, and thus don't seem crucially important for Green's view as a whole. One could argue, perhaps, that the earlier chapters were necessary

in order to position his views on expression in relation to other similar views in the philosophies of language and mind. In any case, Chapter 7 could in principle be read by itself, especially if one's main interest is in how Green applies his view to empathy and aesthetics.

The crux of Green's view is this: psychological research has shown, according to the sources that Green cites, that sensations in one modality appear to resemble some sensations in a second modality more than other sensations in that second modality. So, for instance, yellow is more like the sound of a piccolo than like the sound of an oboe; the taste of a lemon is more like a minor chord than it is like a major chord. In fact, if the sensations of one modality can be located with respect to three dimensions (intense/mild, pleasant/unpleasant, dynamic/static), then sensations in another modality that are similar along the same dimensions will be judged as similar. In this way, we are able to make inter-modal comparisons, which can then be expressed in music, painting, sculpture, etc. My emotions and other feelings, then, can be expressed by my fashioning artworks designed to stimulate sensations in you that you will then (if I am successful) associate inter-modally with the feelings I am undergoing, or even just the feelings I am wanting to communicate to you.

Some might object that Green misses the point that expression stands at the interface between the social and the individual. What the sender expresses doesn't just affect the receiver; it affects the sender as well. In addition, one gets no indication from Green that artistic and musical expressions have often *changed people's lives*. Be that as it may, Green does a commendable job at laying new foundations for philosophical and psychological research in expression. Though the book is too technical for undergraduates, I would highly recommend it for graduate students in the philosophies of language and mind, as well as for aestheticians and members of the general public conversant in those areas. This book doesn't do everything it could have done, but what it does do, it does very well.

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**Charlie Huenemann, ed.**

*Interpreting Spinoza: Critical Essays.*

New York: Cambridge University Press 2008.

Pp. 206.

US\$90.00 (cloth ISBN-13: 978-0-521-87183-9).

This is a collection of new articles written to honor the career of Edwin Curley and his contribution to Spinoza scholarship. Through his translations, books, and many articles, Curley is responsible for bringing attention and an influential interpretation to Spinoza's metaphysics, psychology, and political philosophy. Editor and contributor Huenemann has done an excellent job bringing together new articles on these three areas of Spinoza's system, all of which in some way engage Curley's legacy, some more directly than others. The following offers a brief overview of each article.

In 'Representation and Consciousness in Spinoza's Naturalistic Theory of the Imagination' (4-25), Don Garrett solves several puzzles in Spinoza's philosophy of mind previously raised by Margaret Wilson. Wilson argued that Spinoza's identification of a mind with an idea in God results in a theory unable to account for 1) the ignorance of events going on within the body (such as the actions of various organs), 2) the representation of the external world, 3) the consciousness of the imagination, and 4) why many mental states seemingly are never expressed in behavior. Garrett argues that these problems are resolved by Spinoza's 'incremental naturalism' (the view that humans are part of nature and that things are a matter of degree). His interpretation involves an analysis of Spinoza's concept of 'being in' and of the claim that Spinoza equates consciousness with power of thinking. This work provides an overview of Garrett's view of inherence, a point on which he and Curley famously disagree.

In 'Rationalism Run Amok: Representations and the Reality of Emotions in Spinoza' (26-52), Michael Della Rocca considers Spinoza's views that emotions are inherently rational and yet that they are somehow inferior to reason. Della Rocca makes sense of these two claims by examining the relation between causality and inherence in Spinoza's system. He understands, as per the principle of sufficient reason, effects to inhere in their causes rather than in finite minds. An inadequate idea, then, results from the fact that the particular effect only exists partially in a given finite mind. In the end, Della Rocca accepts Garrett's, not Curley's, interpretation of inherence, but provides a new defense of Curley's enormously influential and controversial understanding of the relation of substance and mode. Della Rocca agrees with Curley that ideas and their affects are propositional. However, he stresses that all affects are inadequate ideas in finite minds and all ideas are representational.

In ' "Whatever Is, Is in God": Substance and Things in Spinoza's Metaphysics' (53-70), Steven Nadler explains that Curley's causal model was a response to and criticism of Bayle's inherence model, which treats the substance-mode relationship as that of a thing and its property. Curley, on the

other hand, treats attributes of substance as the most general laws, and he treats singular things as facts, seeing God as the proximate cause of infinite modes and the remote cause of finite modes. Nadler criticizes Curley's identification of 'in God' with 'caused by God' as too weak to support immanent causality. The article ends by arguing that, by strictly identifying God with nature, Spinoza is an atheist, not a pantheist as is often claimed.

In 'Necessitarianism in Spinoza and Leibniz' (71-93), Michael V. Griffen says that Spinoza and Leibniz both see God as intrinsically necessary and everything else as extrinsically necessary, but differ in their concept of God. Griffen critiques Curley's 'anti-necessitarian' interpretation of Spinoza, that is, the view that absolute necessity is the same as intrinsic necessity. He argues that Spinoza, like Leibniz, can allow for a plurality of possible worlds because they both consider the world not necessary through itself, but rather through its cause (God). Leibniz needs this plurality of possible worlds to allow God a choice in making this world, whereas Spinoza has no philosophical need for this plurality.

In 'Epistemic Autonomy in Spinoza' (94-110), editor Huenemann takes on the apparent contradiction between Spinoza's deterministic metaphysics and the normativity of the *Ethics*, which strives for personal autonomy and freedom. He paints Spinoza as a mystic who, in the end, gives us a third kind of knowledge in which the meaning of the autonomy of the self 'becomes empty'. He claims that Spinoza did hold that the mind can detach from the body through this process, but was in no way entitled to this opinion given his metaphysics. Further, Huenemann wonders why, given that enlightenment involves a detachment from particulars, philosophers would concern themselves with morality or politics, which by their nature are about particulars.

In 'Spinoza and the Philosophy of History' (111-127), Michael Rosenthal argues that despite what Hegel thought, Spinoza does have a philosophy of history. In fact, historical narratives of individuals, as well as collective human striving, are a key part of Spinoza's ethical project. In this way, Rosenthal makes a case for the central role of the imagination in Spinoza's ethical account, not only in constructing one's narrative, but also in constructing the exemplar after which one strives. Reason may assist us in moving towards those exemplars, but ultimately, they themselves are the product of imagination.

Susan James' article, 'Democracy and the Good Life in Spinoza's Philosophy' (128-64), argues that the wellbeing of Spinoza's state depends on the imagination of its people. This is true to such an extent that it is possible, given a better collective imagination, that a non-democratic state could flourish more than a democratic one. In 'Spinoza's Unstable Politics of Freedom' (147-65), Tom Sorrel argues that Hobbes' political philosophy is more consistent with a perfectionist notion of freedom, understood in terms of rationality, than is Spinoza's. He contrasts different notions of freedom that Spinoza uses in the *Ethics* and the *Theologico-Political Treatise* and questions whether they are consistent. In 'Should Spinoza have Published his Philosophy?'

(166-87), Daniel Garber asks whether Spinoza's philosophy, particularly his understanding of universal faith and its role in preserving public order, can support the choice to publish his philosophy, given that it undermines religion.

These articles comprise an excellent collection for readers to become familiar with what has for many become the standard reading of Spinoza (Curley's), as well as its main strengths, puzzles, and opposition. In doing so, it helps the reader gain an overall grasp of the English literature. At the same time, these articles raise fresh questions and provide original analysis that will be of interest to more seasoned Spinoza scholars.

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**Fiona Hughes**

*Kant's Aesthetic Epistemology: Form and World.*

New York: Edinburgh University Press 2007.

Pp. 336.

US\$100.00 (cloth ISBN-13: 978-0-7486-2122-4).

**Rachel Zuckert**

*Kant on Beauty and Biology:*

*An Interpretation of the Critique of Judgment.*

New York: Cambridge University Press 2007.

Pp. 421.

US\$99.00 (cloth ISBN-13: 978-0-521-86589-0).

Two new books have recently appeared which offer original readings of Kant's *Critique of Judgment* (*CoJ*). Rachel Zuckert offers a reading oriented to the unity of the work, covering the two introductions, the *Critique of Aesthetic Judgment*, and the *Critique of Teleological Judgment*. Fiona Hughes focuses more closely on the *Critique of Aesthetic Judgment*.

I will first consider Zuckert's work. Her book promisingly centers on the principle of purposiveness (*Zweckmässigkeit*). This principle is offered near the beginning of the *CoJ*, and it involves the claim that nature is to be taken as-if purposive for our mental faculties. We must view nature as-if it is composed of laws among which, due to divine providence or the apparent benevolence of a demiurge, we are capable of finding order and hierarchy. The principle of purposiveness is furthermore suggested by Kant, rather unconvincingly for commentators such as Paul Guyer and Henry Allison, to have a

grounding role for both judgments of taste and teleological judgments. It is also presented as grounding other species of so-called 'reflective judgment'.

One imagines then that by tracing beauty, teleology, and concept-forming judgments of a reflective sort back to the principle of purposiveness, exciting insight could be gained into the relations between beauty, art, biology, natural purpose, and concept formation. This is precisely the tack that Zuckert takes. However, she finds it necessary to extensively reformulate Kant's proposals, by for example denying that judgments of taste truly are properly termed 'reflective', on the grounds that this implies that they seek concepts. Instead of connecting judgments of taste to the goal of concept-seeking, as she takes to be required by labeling them as 'reflective', Zuckert sees judgments of taste as centrally characterized by their future-directed, anticipatory qualities. In other words, Zuckert de-emphasizes an indirect role for judgments of taste in producing concepts of really existing objects, in order to make way for a view of them as leading to valuable stances on, or orientations toward, non-actual, 'future' states of affairs.

The principle of purposiveness itself is cast as having a close connection to cognition of actually existing things. However, in describing this role, Zuckert again points to an alleged need to reformulate Kant's arguments. We must, Zuckert argues, see cognition as bound by a drive toward 'purposiveness without purpose', which is of course Kant's famous dictum concerning the character of beauty. Beauty involves this purposiveness without purpose on Kant's account, almost all would agree. But is purposiveness without purpose a more general type of quality attaching to natural organisms and, most significantly, the structure of our judging activity? Zuckert provides detailed arguments for a 'yes' answer, full of many very helpful references to scholarship on Kant.

As one might imagine, Zuckert's arguments center around tying together the above-mentioned theme of reflective judgment (such as aesthetic reflective judgment) as future-oriented, and of reflective judging as striving forward in purposive fashion even when without a purpose.

I went into my reading of her work with some very different ideas concerning the relation of reflective judgment to cognition, and did not find that I had abandoned my earlier views upon putting down Zuckert's book. But I did find that I had been brought to consider a wealth of possible truths as possibly contained-in or expressed by Kant's *CoJ*. Zuckert's book struck me as being truer to the spirit of Kant, and encompassing more of the truth of the *CoJ* than is found in drier, more-analytic approaches that seem deathly afraid of connecting the dots in the text, even when the *CoJ* simply cries out for a more holistic and synthesizing hermeneutic. Her work, tied to a close reading of Kant's text, did a very good job of finding novel connections between Kant's writing on beauty and his writing on biology.

Still, I think that Zuckert may have gotten certain points wrong, points she casts as central to her enterprise. I am not convinced, for example, that 'in *reflective* empirical judging, we judge purposively *without* a purpose', or that this purposeless mode of judging is key to the reflective-judgmental en-

terprise in general. Certainly, these are very controversial claims, appearing, so far as I know, nowhere else in Kant scholarship. What motivates them seems to be a notion of futurity: I judge with a 'purposiveness' toward unification of diverse elements in thought, yet without a clear idea of precisely what unity I will develop, and so (Zuckert suggests) without a purpose. Also, Zuckert introduces the point that, in aesthetic reflective judging of a pure sort, I do not begin with a concept of an object, and so I am in this way more fully ruled by final causation, in place of efficient causation arising from an object that acts upon my sensibility in order to help produce a concept of the object.

But is this theme of futurity properly integral to Kant's work? What precisely do we learn about Kant, cognition, or beautiful art by emphasizing this theme of futurity? These are issues that will have to be explored in the wider Kantian literature. I certainly think there is much for us to learn, but this short review piece cannot possibly hope to take up these issues, given the many difficult philosophical and exegetical questions involved. One certainly can say that Zuckert has provided us with an abundance of purposive writing, likely to lead to many states of enlivened cognition. And although one may question her use of the term 'purposiveness without a purpose', her points, one explicit, the other implicit, that two items of great interest in the Kantian account of judging are judgment's anticipatory character concerning a final system of thought and judgment's as-if tie to divine foreknowledge, seem beyond question. Moreover, the explicit point at least was generally well-illustrated and provided much interesting discussion of the task of concept-formation.

From across the pond, Fiona Hughes brings us a rather different sort of Kant book from the kind offered by Zuckert, one much more focused on the *Aesthetic* of the first *Critique*. At the same time, there are many similarities between the two works. For one, Hughes, like Zuckert, while exploring the connection between aesthetics and cognition, does not wish to emphasize the potential contributions of judgments of taste for cognition and knowledge of the actual world. Also, both Hughes and Zuckert share with Kant the view that the judgment of taste, or least its theorizing, indirectly reveals profound features of cognition. Zuckert takes these to connect to the problem of beginning in thought apart from a false structuring of the matter at hand. Hughes focuses on what may be revealed by the judgment of taste concerning a fit between mind and world allegedly needed to avoid 'subjectivism' and the mangling of the material that is the basis for experience.

Hughes' book is a fascinating read, full of extensive, often 'head-on' engagements with the heavyweights of Kant scholarship, such as Dieter Henrich, Paul Guyer, Henry Allison, Beatrice Longuenesse, Robert Pippin, and Rudolf Makkreel. Much of Hughes' exploration of the secondary literature deals with the question of the relation of form and matter in Kant. To what extent is there a formal imposition or structuring of the matter of thought, which is typically identified with sensibility? And to what extent is thought determined by the faculty of sensibility, or otherwise determined by external

objects? Hughes advocates giving a larger role to the material and the external, and so curtailing the role of impositional mental activities. To some extent, this is meant as a straightforward correction of other readings of Kant, but it is also meant to act as a description of what Kant could be taken to mean, combined with an account of what would be a philosophically better account of the relation obtaining between formal structuring and matter or world. It was not entirely clear to me whether her arguments succeeded. They seemed to involve what I take to be the suspect claim that empirical objects, for Kant, do not conform to us, but that there is instead a 'dynamic' between self and world that constitutes such objects. Hughes' related claim that the transcendental unity of apperception is only anticipatory of a unity, rather than providing of a unity of apperception *a priori*, appeared more plausible (although still very controversial), and provided an interesting contrast to Henrich. Further research concerning this line of thought, which is somewhat similar to some of what Zuckert writes about concerning the future-directed, purposiveness of judgment, might be useful.

Having slogged through many sections of the first *Critique*, Hughes goes on to argue that judgments of taste illuminate the subjective structure of synthesis. She takes issue with Allison's reading of Section 9 of the *CoJ*, and holds that the feeling resulting from aesthetic free play of the faculties is the very same feeling that is the basis for all forms of judgment. She points to the non-persuasive character of Allison's arguments to the contrary. She is certainly right that Kant has important points to make by holding that the judgment of taste is grounded in the principle of purposiveness (PoP).

Hughes' discussion of the *CoJ* was much more interesting and original than the exploration of the *Critique of Pure Reason*, and might have been greatly expanded. I would have liked to have seen it have a book of its own, separate from the earlier, extensive discussion of the first *Critique*. Still, Hughes does attempt to provide some unity to her work. For one thing, she claims that judgments of taste exhibit the anticipatory character of the activity of judging. She makes the further point that such judgments exemplify the soundness of the 'fit' between mind and object that we anticipate, a 'fit' discussed by her as part of exploration of the first *Critique*.

Hughes ends up concluding that the principle of judgment is the principle of purposiveness, which is simply what Kant states. But this is a point with which Allison has taken issue, meaning that Allison thinks that Kant has misunderstood his own arguments, in the dense thicket of the *CoJ*. So we can understand why Hughes would want to reiterate Kant's own claims. Hughes next concludes that the PoP is a 'condition of the possibility of empirical synthesis'. This, however, seems a very doubtful claim. Kant has clearly stated that PoP concerns our ability to make 'progress' with cognition by unifying empirical laws; at no point does Kant suggest that, absent the PoP, we cannot provide the empirical synthesis necessary for objective cognition of individual empirical laws. At the same time, it is not clear how committed Hughes is to a role for the PoP as a condition for synthesis in individual determinant judgments. She seems more interested in suggesting some possible ways of think-

ing about Kant and the aesthetic, than about providing a definite reading of the connection of the PoP to the issue of impositionalism. In any case, with the idea of such a connection we do find a second potential point of grounding for the unity of her work.

As her book winds down, Hughes describes the exemplary role of judgments of taste for cognition, which she casts as involving 'contrapuntal exemplarity'. 'Aesthetic appreciation is exemplary by contrast with cognition' (279). What does this mean for us? 'Aesthetic judgment facilitates a reflection on the possibility of cognition, but this is only possible because the latter does not complete the cognitive synthesis' (296).

Hughes thus begins and ends her book with a turn to the non-cognitive, offering consideration of an artwork by Ian Finlay in the 'Little Sparta' neighborhood of Edinburgh, an artwork which consists of planks bridging a ditch, inscribed with a quotation from Heraclitus. One thinks of the famous words of Kuno Fischer concerning Kant's bridging project in the *Opus postumum*: Fischer complained that he saw 'neither the ditch nor the bridge'.

## Marcus Verhaegh

### Jeff Jordan

*Pascal's Wager:*

*Pragmatic Arguments and Belief in God.*

New York: Oxford University Press 2006.

Pp. 240.

US\$75.00 (cloth ISBN-13: 978-0-19-929132-8).

Pragmatic arguments are designed to support beliefs even when evidential support is lacking. Jordan's book follows up his many papers discussing these arguments and makes clear that the papers constitute a coherent, systematic exploration of a position in epistemology — especially the epistemology of religious beliefs — that has not been properly appreciated. Jordan examines a range of pragmatic arguments for theism at different levels of technical difficulty and from various perspectives. His first chapter explains Pascal's Wager, which is arguably the most elaborate and interesting of the pragmatic arguments. Jordan distinguishes convincingly between Canonical Wager and Jamesian Wager (from William James' paper 'The Will to Believe'). The former 'contends that, since there is everything to gain and very little to lose, the expected utility of forming theistic beliefs exceeds that of not forming theistic beliefs, as long as it is logically possible that God exists' (2-3). The second says that 'anyone who has as much evidence for atheism as she has

for theism has . . . a rational way of moving beyond that evidential impasse toward the cultivation of theistic belief" (3). Jordan shows also convincingly that the Jamesian Wager is resistant to the many objections addressed to Pascal's Wager, even those that appear very convincing *prima facie*. But Jordan's main point is that Pascal's Wager, the Jamesian Wager, and pragmatic arguments in general, all presuppose a distinction between having reasons to think a certain proposition is true, and having reasons to induce belief in that proposition.

Jordan defends pragmatic arguments, especially the Jamesian Wager, in two technical chapters, Chapters 3 and 4, which contain insights into the domain of probability and decision theory. Even if technical, they are not very difficult to read for the non-specialist (and serve as an excellent introduction to this area). In Chapter 5, Jordan isolates nine objections to Pascal's Wager. Discussing them permits him to offer an impressive exposition on the ethics of belief: the question of our moral duties with respect to our own beliefs. The grounds for this have been already been laid in Chapter 2, where Jordan argues 'that there are occasions in which it is permissible, morally and intellectually, so to act as to form and maintain beliefs on the basis of pragmatic reasons and not on the basis of evidence' (37). Chapter 2 also contains a discussion of six objections, for Jordan never chooses the easy way to defend pragmatic arguments but always confronts what he takes to be the strongest arguments against them. A number of objections amount to different formulations of evidentialism, the view that proper belief formation is limited to sufficient evidence only — an hegemonic view shared by Locke, Hume, Clifford (whose well-known essay, "The Ethics of Belief", is attentively examined) and Russell. Jordan does not reject evidentialism, and he even shows that Pascal's Wager, in certain formulations, is compatible with a moderate evidentialism. He distinguishes no less than six varieties of evidentialism and proposes a useful distinction between *propositional* evidentialism and *experiential* evidentialism; generally, philosophers have focused on the former — though I wonder whether any difference can be made between experiential evidentialism and reliabilism. By the way, Jordan also offers new insights into, and against, doxastic voluntarism, the view that we can *decide* to believe something (or not to believe it). This view generally accompanies the stronger form of evidentialism.

Importantly, Jordan also distinguishes between those pragmatic arguments that recommend taking steps to believe a proposition 'because if it should turn out to be true, the benefits gained from believing that proposition will be impressive' (40), and other pragmatic arguments which are truth-independent, recommending that steps be taken 'to believe a certain proposition simply because of the benefits assured by believing it, whether or not the believed proposition is true' (41) The Jamesian Wager illustrates the second kind of pragmatic argument. It proposes an argument in favor of a better life — not worse.

Even if this not a book in history of philosophy, it is clear that Jordan well understands the historical context of Pascal's Wager. He also offers an inter-

esting historical gallery of philosophers who have used pragmatic arguments. Although William James might have been expected, the names of James Beattie (the one considered to be a 'silly bigoted fellow' by David Hume), John Stuart Mill (his paper 'Theism' in *Three Essays on Religion*) and the French idealist philosopher Jules Lachelier are perhaps more surprising entries on the list. Subsequent to an argument presented in Plato's *Meno* (86 b-c), a tradition of pragmatic arguments developed in philosophy, especially in connection with religious beliefs. With this book, pragmatic arguments receive a clear and rigorous formulation and typology. Jordan also suggests a relation between pragmatic arguments and the Augustinian and Anselmian tradition of believing in order to gain understanding. If Jordan is right, pragmatic arguments could be the true 'preambles of faith', a role the Thomistic tradition attributed to metaphysical arguments. (This last is my remark, not Jordan's.)

Religious believers are rarely interested in arguments based upon natural theology. Jordan is right to say at the very beginning that pragmatic arguments are closer than the arguments of natural theology to the arguments used by Christians and other believers in support of their religious commitments. This would be especially true of the truth-independent arguments. People are inclined to say: 'Well, perhaps it is not true, but it makes me feel and live better.' I am not sure that such an argument is epistemologically acceptable in the end; and one can wonder whether it is not a problem to separate truth from argumentation, even if this is the very nature of pragmatism. But when one has read Jordan, one may no longer be inclined to say that acceptance of God's existence on the basis of existential benefits cannot be done by means of serious argument, or that it is irrational to think in that way.

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**John Panteleimon Manoussakis**

*God After Metaphysics: A Theological Aesthetic.*

Bloomington: Indiana University Press 2007.

Pp. 232.

US\$39.95 (cloth ISBN-13: 978-0-253-34880-7).

This excellent volume contributes significantly to the exchange between Christian theology, philosophy of religion, and phenomenology. It will be of benefit to readers in any of these three areas. Manoussakis argues in this book how God can be experienced, taking sensation rather than beauty as the subject of aesthetics. He calls for reconsideration of the exclusion of God

as an object of experience, whether in its critical or phenomenological forms. Manoussakis makes use of Christian practices central to Eastern Orthodox life and thought, in order to substantiate his phenomenological method and thereby accommodate a theological aesthetics. After devoting the first part of the book to a sustained reflection on the method of phenomenology, Manoussakis invokes many kinds of sensation and religious practices to demonstrate how God appears in sight, hearing, and touch. In the course of the final parts of the book, he examines time, language, and human embodiment in relation to his phenomenological account of theological experience.

Manoussakis frames this volume with discussions of a series of paintings on these themes by Jan Brueghel. He deftly integrates his consideration of Brueghel's art with his phenomenological reflections, continuing the fine tradition of phenomenologists attaching themselves to particular painters. The chapters following this one (on sight) examine the questions that confront any phenomenologist who suspends the strictures against experiencing the divine. In other words, they question how God might appear in sensation.

It should be noted that in any study like this, interweaving the phenomenological and the theological draws sharp boundaries between different camps in contemporary phenomenology. The first (phenomenological) camp adheres to a traditional reading of Husserl's bracketing of transcendence and excludes the religious and theological. The second relaxes the strictures of the first but remains coy about whether God can be experienced, affirming that phenomenology must mark God's absence through traces and fragments. Manoussakis puts his stake down in the third camp, alongside Marion, Emmanuel Levinas, Michel Henry, Richard Kearney, and others who admit God back into phenomenology. Manoussakis takes up the necessary questions confronting this third collection of phenomenologists. He refuses to develop a phenomenon that blinds or overpowers one's subjectivity, but he also rejects the idea that taking any phenomenon as a theophany is idolatry. This leaves him in a middling position, requiring him to consider how such phenomena, since they are neither a blinding divine vision nor a forbidden idol, give one the ability to experience God.

Manoussakis' solution emerges from his novel construction of a 'prosopic reduction'. This reduction, which builds upon the other reductions developed in the history of phenomenology, claims to reduce a phenomenon to its relation with others, to their individuality and singularity. This reduction further allows Manoussakis to consider phenomena in relation to their future, to the unseen. Taking this step enables the visible to give appearance to the unapparent.

The remainder of the book demonstrates the virtues of this reduction through an analysis of the senses of sight, hearing, and touch. In each instance Manoussakis considers how phenomena of Christian liturgical experience bring God into view. Of particular interest is the discussion of language. In the course of examining both Wittgenstein's treatment of the unsayable and Derrida's use of *khora* and difference — two important philosophical loci that bear resemblance to a form of Christian theology called negative or apophatic

theology — Mannoussakis gives a remarkably insightful reading of Pseudo-Dionysius, Augustine, and Gregory of Nyssa. His use of these figures and the prosopic reduction allow him to consider liturgical speech such as hymns to be understood as the proper way of speaking about God. This, he claims, can avoid the dazzling saturated phenomena of Marion or the dark night of the soul of Derrida.

Though Manoussakis has argued for it more strongly in places other than this book, not every reader will accept the grounds for this prosopic reduction. From its earliest roots to the present day, phenomenology has remained haunted by what it has excluded. The transcendent and transcendental remain the chief trials that phenomenology continues to endure. Manoussakis' volume contributes significantly and brilliantly to this tradition by its attention to the experience of God.

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**Neil C. Manson and Onora O'Neill**  
*Rethinking Informed Consent in Bioethics.*  
New York: Cambridge University Press 2007.  
Pp. 226.  
US\$95.00 (cloth ISBN-13: 978-0521874588);  
US\$34.99 (paper ISBN-13: 978-0-521-69747-7).

The concept of informed consent plays a central role in many areas of modern ethical and political thought, from social contract theory to sexual ethics. Its prominence in the literature of bioethics has grown steadily through recent decades, having been the subject of over 1,800 articles in the year 2002-2003 alone (1, n.1). In this book Manson and O'Neill (M&O) set out to defend the bold claim that current thinking about the role of informed consent in bioethics suffers from fundamental conceptual distortions whose pernicious influence begins in inadequate philosophical analysis and ends in wrongheaded bioethical policies.

The book opens with an historical account of how informed consent became an important issue for bioethics. Its bioethical importance was first officially recognized in the Nuremberg Code, adopted after World War II in reaction to the revelation of atrocities committed by Nazi doctors in the name of medical research. Policies of informed consent developed for the regulation of research were soon applied to clinical settings, and official criteria for the determination of consent became increasingly stringent and unwieldy.

Things have come to such a head that one might wonder how a patient could grant sufficiently informed consent to a medical procedure without first completing a medical degree and an internship in the relevant specialty! Ethical guidelines for researchers are now also in danger of becoming unreasonably restrictive due to new concerns over the alleged obligation to gain the consent of the original research subjects each time data and tissue samples from one study are reused in subsequent projects. M&O feel that bioethics has reached an impasse: physicians and researchers are left to choose between 'systematic hypocrisy' (25) — universal non-compliance with official standards for informed consent — and the paralyzing alternative of genuinely trying to apply impossibly demanding standards. M&O insist that only a revolution in our understanding of informed consent can deliver us from this dilemma.

M&O judge that the current impasse stems from inadequate conceptual analyses of what it means to inform someone and of why it can be important to gain their consent. According to the standard view, physicians and researchers are required to convey all relevant information to patients and experimental subjects. The latter exercise their moral autonomy by using that information in rationally choosing their preferred course of action. The standard view is based upon what M&O refer to as the 'conduit' and 'container' metaphors of information and communication. The physician knows certain things or 'contains' information, and this information must be conveyed, as if through some kind of 'conduit', to a new 'container', i.e., the patient. M&O argue that this kind of account leaves out many crucial aspects of communication, such as the fact that it is governed by norms, that it must be sensitive to the character of its audience, and that it involves an interaction undertaken taken by two active parties. Far from remaining an inert receptacle, a patient may respond to the physician's explanations and advice with skepticism or misunderstanding; the patient may also infer countless new conclusions from the information offered.

M&O are also worried that the standard view places mistaken emphasis on the roles played by the patient's autonomy and rational decision making. Moral autonomy is an important concern, but there is no reason to think that it always trumps all other factors, such as the physician's duty not to harm her patients. Patients are often simply in no position to work out rational cost-benefit solutions to questions regarding their treatment. At the end of the day, doctor-patient interactions must be founded upon intelligently placed trust, which itself depends on a workable system of accountability.

When discussing autonomy, M&O ask why it is that physicians and researchers seek to obtain informed consent to begin with. They claim that consent is required not merely because of some abstract respect for autonomy, but rather because the physician or researcher is proposing that the patient waive some obligation (such as the obligation upon people not to cut each other) in order for some medical procedure to be performed (such as surgery). Different procedures involve the waiving of different obligations. Standards of consent should reflect the nature and gravity of the obligations being waived; the performance of open heart surgery, for instance, requires

a different standard of consent than does checking a pulse. M&O learn from all this that current attempts to set up ever more stringent and uniform standards for informed consent should be replaced with a more flexible policy 'that focuses on the obligations and expectations to be waived, and the reasons for waiving them in specific cases' (190).

M&O are not only concerned with informed consent relating to the performance of medical procedures and the like; they also discuss informational privacy, data protection, and the need to gain consent for the sharing of medical information. They do not think it is particularly worthwhile to develop different standards relating to different categories of information (such as 'private' and 'public'); the usefulness of such categories for ethics breaks down under scrutiny. M&O devote an entire chapter to explaining why the category of 'genetic information' does not deserve the special attention it has received from bioethicists and lawmakers. Instead of worrying about the *kind* of information involved, M&O want us to think about what people are *doing* with the information in question and 'give due attention to the variety of reasons why certain types of action by which we acquire, hold, use, disclose or communicate information may be impermissible and others entirely permissible' (110).

This book certainly makes an important contribution to bioethics, and its conceptual subtlety can hardly be reflected in a short review. It does, however, suffer from one rather unfortunate shortcoming. Although the book includes extensive discussion of some bioethical legislation (in particular, the UK's *Data Protection Act* 1998 and the USA's proposed *Draft Genetic Privacy Act*), it contains almost no discussion or mention of relevant case studies. Such examples would make M&O's arguments more easily understandable and also give a clearer idea of how they would apply their ideas to the real world. That, as well as the book's highly abstract tone, will make it a rather difficult read for the policy makers, physicians, and researchers whom it calls upon to begin rethinking informed consent in bioethics.

**Berel Dov Lerner**

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**Marina McCoy**

*Plato on the Rhetoric of Philosophers and Sophists.*

New York: Cambridge University Press 2008.

Pp. 220.

US\$80.00 (cloth ISBN-13: 978-0-521-87863-0).

There is one interpretive tradition in ancient philosophy scholarship that may defy full bibliographic recording, the tradition that has it that Plato's Socrates (especially that of the early dialogues) makes use of a philosophical method of moral persuasion that is somehow non-rhetorical. In fact, it's 'anti-rhetorical' insofar as Socrates' main foil is the very sophists who, from his point of view, professionally deploy an objectionable mode of discourse. Surely, this tradition argues, Socrates does not exploit the very method against which he inveighs. Philosophy is a nobler calling and practices a nobler method. McCoy's book challenges this long-standing tradition by providing an account of Socrates — both the early and late — according to which his persuasive methods quite plainly cannot distinguish him from those of his counterparts. Socrates, in other words, is a rhetorician.

Calling the one interpretive strain the 'tradition' is by no means to say that it is completely uncontroversial. Nor is it unheard of for the occasional traditionalist scholar to vent a nagging suspicion that Socrates is really only a sophist, after all. Nevertheless, Socrates and the sophists are typically distinguished according to their methods of persuasion. At the same time, the standing tradition has had an extraordinarily difficult time consistently and confidently articulating how Socrates' method differs from that of the sophists. Attempts to sustain incontrovertible evidence of a single, genuinely Socratic method (such as the so-called *elenchus*) throughout the dialogues have proven problematic, at best; and Socrates' well-known denials that he himself knows the answers to the questions he asks, as well as the frequent aporetic conclusions of several dialogues, have done much to provoke the idea that Plato's own stance towards rhetoric, sophistry and philosophy isn't nearly as cut-and-dried as is normally supposed.

McCoy's study openly embraces the conclusion that Socrates employs rhetorical means of persuasion in the dialogues, and she suggests that we therefore instead locate his distinguishing feature elsewhere. McCoy thinks the textual evidence very strongly indicates that the difference is simply a motivational one: Socrates (and Plato) are interested in learning about virtue and the forms and in persuading others to do the same (if even sometimes by rhetorical means), whereas the sophists are interested mostly in 'worldly' goals (and achieving them via rhetoric). Both the philosopher and the sophist use rhetorical means to achieve their goals. This does not mean that Plato does not have Socrates using 'philosophical,' 'non-rhetorical' arguments with his interlocutors. But it is quite simply not true that the latter sort of strategies are absent from Socrates' speeches. As McCoy contends, in fact, Plato's dialogues (or, at least, those she examines) are best read as Plato 'testing'

philosophy's ability to persuade and advance productive discussion, or as his exploring its strengths and weakness in argumentative discourse. Philosophy, though, is by no means Plato's settled method.

Here are the conclusions of several of McCoy's arguments and textual analyses. 'Philosophical rhetoric is distinguished from sophistic rhetoric not by a precise method but rather by how Socrates' speech is informed by the presence of . . . key virtues' (87). 'There is no final or complete distinction between philosophy and rhetoric in the *Gorgias* because a key part of Platonic philosophical activity is to continue to test philosophy itself' (109). 'Plato here is less interested in finding a definition of philosophy vis-à-vis rhetoric than in critically exploring it as a practice' (110). 'The *Gorgias* does not reject rhetoric as such but instead connects good rhetoric to the possession of . . . philosophical virtues' (110). '[T]he philosopher's differentiation of the sophist from himself begins with love and the soul's longing for the forms. Love, more than knowledge, defines the soul of the philosopher in the *Republic*' (137).

In making her case, McCoy focuses in sequential chapters upon the *Apology*, *Protagoras*, *Gorgias*, *Republic*, *Sophist* and the *Phaedrus* — a group which, by nearly any standard of chronology, is a respectable cross-section of Plato's Socratic, transitional and Platonic periods. If it is supposed that, in ancient philosophy scholarship, there is a continuum between studies which are extremely close to the text (where particular passages are poured over in lengthy detail, e.g., Oxford-style commentaries) and studies which are extremely 'impressionistic' and 'discussive,' (e.g., introductory-level books), McCoy's study seems to fall very comfortably in the middle, at once well aware of both where her strongest textual evidence lies and which passages will pose some of the strongest challenges to her thesis, as well as the importance of being able to make her case about an extensive corpus in a relatively small space. (There is no *index locorum*, nor is there a great need for one.) One cost of such an approach, it seems, is that very little space is devoted to second-guessing her interpretations of the passages, and then addressing the resulting objections. (The simple fact that particular speeches of Socrates' as well as certain bits of narrative elements may well be construed as instances of rhetorical techniques — or, in fact, are essentially called rhetorical by one of the characters in a dialogue — does not show that in fact they *are* instances of such techniques.) Nor, it should be added, does McCoy invest a great deal of time carefully defining and critically discussing precisely what makes a speech rhetorical and what makes a speech philosophical (a preliminary task normally associated with the extreme end of this supposed continuum).

On the other hand, a big plus is this: What emerges quite plainly is that the traditionalists may well be wrong, for a coherent, textually-based, reading of Plato and Socrates along the lines of McCoy's thesis can indeed be sustained over the course of many key passages of an important dialogue. Add to McCoy's account of philosophy and rhetoric the history of difficulties with the traditionalist picture outlined above, and there seems little question that supporters of the latter working on defending that view will need to

answer her challenge. One clear reading audience in this connection — one not necessarily extensional with the ‘traditionalist’ audience — is that set of scholars who argue for an ‘intellectualist’ Socrates, at least the Socrates of the early dialogues. For them, rhetorical devices are either in violation of Socrates’ philosophical commitments, or, as some intellectualists hold, there are quite simply no such things as such devices, but only instances of good and bad reasoning. In either case, McCoy’s contention will need to be carefully addressed.

The book includes bibliographies for both primary and secondary sources, and a general index.

**Patrick Mooney**

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**Brian McGuinness, ed.**

*Wittgenstein in Cambridge:*

*Letters and Documents 1911-1951.*

Boston: Blackwell 2008.

Pp. 519.

US\$134.95 (cloth ISBN-13: -978-1-4051-4701-9).

This is a splendid volume, a significant publishing achievement. The collections on which it builds, *Letters to Russell, Keynes and Moore (LRKM)*, 1974) and *Cambridge Letters (CL)*, 1995), were important additions to the literature. But neither measures up to the present work (*WIC*). Now solely the responsibility of Brian McGuinness — *LRKM* was edited by Georg von Wright with McGuinness’ aid, *CL* jointly by the two of them — it is a model of serious scholarship and high-quality bookmaking.

*WIC* has 439 letters and documents to *CL*’s 205 letters and *LRKM*’s 122. Everything important in *LRKM* is in *CL*, and everything important in *CL* is in *WIC*. The main difference is the coverage. As well as supplementing the letters from Wittgenstein to Russell, Keynes and Moore with ones from them to him, *CL* includes correspondence with Frank Ramsey and Piero Sraffa. And going one better *WIC* includes correspondence with other colleagues, friends, students and officials, along with a fair number of documents from Wittgenstein’s time in Cambridge, not least the minutes of various meetings in which he is mentioned. Also the editorial comments have been expanded and more useful indexes supplied.

Apparently since the publication of *CL* little of value has been uncovered for the period between Wittgenstein’s arrival in Cambridge in 1911 and his

return to the city (and to philosophy) in 1929. The sole new item in *WIC* from these years is an extract from the minutes of a meeting of the Moral Sciences Club in 1912 reporting that Wittgenstein talked on 'What is Philosophy?' for four minutes, well within the seven-minute limit he had earlier got the Club to adopt. Rereading the letters themselves, I was again struck by his hypersensitivity, impatience and irksome carping. We are only getting slivers of a life but there can be no missing how hard a time he had coping — and how much slack Russell, Keynes, Moore and Ramsey were willing to cut him.

In the material from 1929 to 1951, the single letter from Sraffa to Wittgenstein in *CL* has been augmented by four memoranda linked to their conversations and some 40 more letters between them. Though worth having, these letters do not make for particularly pleasant reading. When practical matters are at stake (about travel to Vienna after the Nazis' arrival, for instance), Wittgenstein is all business. But mostly he agonizes about himself and his relationship with his friend. Who else would have had the nerve to write to Sraffa: 'I wish to say one more thing: I think that your fault in a discussion is this: YOU ARE NOT HELPFUL!' (224)? Nor is Wittgenstein's grouching redeemed by the letters and notes touching on philosophy. I am, I have to confess, less sure than McGuinness that this material gives us 'rather more than a speculative idea of the conversations to which Wittgenstein ascribed much of the inspiration of his *Philosophical Investigations*' (1).

Yet another side of Wittgenstein comes to the fore in his correspondence with students and non-philosophers from 1929 on. Here he is much less prickly, indeed sometimes positively friendly and light-hearted. In letters to the ethical analyst, C. L. Stevenson, who was just starting out, he is encouraging and generous. In letters to Alice Ambrose he handles, rather admirably, a strong-willed student who, feeling she was being railroaded, had the guts to push back. And in letters to the physicist W. H. Watson he could hardly have been brighter or breezier (he seems to have been tickled by the examples Watson sent him of scientists spouting nonsense in off-hours).

A majority of the correspondence in the volume post-1940 is from Wittgenstein to Norman Malcolm, Rush Rhees and von Wright. This material has been previously published but benefits from being brought together and arranged chronologically. I had not realised how often Wittgenstein wrote letters in batches and recycled the same sentences. Nor, knowing how much he accomplished during the period, was I prepared for his virtually non-stop grumbling about his inability to work and the poor quality of his thoughts. What mostly impressed me, however, were the letters Wittgenstein wrote in the last year or so of his life when he knew he was dying. This time around I was, if anything, even more moved by his fortitude and determination to keep on working. These letters, I dare say, show him at his best.

The other material in the volume confirms and fills out the picture of Wittgenstein as a maddening customer. He never seems to have missed a chance to make a mountain out of a molehill, take umbrage and create problems for himself (though, notably, not in his letters, new in *WIC*, to a Cambridge University administrator). And on more than a few occasions he complains about

his health, his mental/spiritual state, the strain of teaching and other real or apparent troubles. Still, he does not always come off badly. One sees why friends would speak not only of his honesty and seriousness but also of his loyalty and decency, and why, for all his faults, he was supported to the hilt by the powers-that-be at Cambridge. (The mathematician J. E. Littlewood's appraisal of him for the Council of Trinity College in 1930 especially caught my eye.) McGuinness warns against treating *WIC* as 'a first introduction to Wittgenstein and his circle' (2), but it is not a bad one either. Read in conjunction with the accompanying notes, the letters provide a more rounded portrait of the man than most biographical works.

Pressed to criticise the collection, I would only say that I missed the facsimiles of Wittgenstein's handwriting in *LRKM* (these were omitted in *CL*) and more information on the sources of the items would have been welcome. No doubt, another hundred letters would not have gone amiss; a Selected Letters including correspondence with Wittgenstein's non-Cambridge English acquaintances and his Viennese friends surely cannot be far off. But for the time being *WIC* will do very nicely. Books as readable, useful and illuminating are, to put it mildly, thin on the ground.

**Andrew Lugg**

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**Michael Morris**

*An Introduction to the Philosophy of Language.*

New York: Cambridge University Press 2007.

Pp. 330.

US\$79.99 (cloth ISBN-13: 978-0-521-84215-0);

US\$29.99 (paper ISBN-13: 978-0-521-60311-9).

This is a knowledgeable and very useful addition to contemporary introductions to the philosophy of language, somewhere in difficulty between Lycan's (2008) and Taylor's (1998) worthy texts. It is the right size for a 15-week semester course, at one chapter a week (students like to use what they buy). Starting with Locke's view of language, the book is structured, in part, as a series of responses to it, and responses to those responses: 2. Frege on sense and reference, 3. Russell's theory of descriptions, 4. Kripke on proper names, 5. natural kind terms, 6. Quine on modality, 7. reference and propositional attitudes, 8. semantics of propositional attitudes, 9. Davidson on truth and meaning, 10. translation and interpretation, 11. indeterminacy of translation, 12. Austin on speech acts, 13. Grice on meaning, 14. Kripke on rule

following, and finally, 15. Wittgenstein on the Augustinian picture. There is not space to comment on all these chapters, so I will comment briefly on a select few, first a pair from the 'semantic' end of the subject, then a pair from the 'pragmatic' end.

Chapter 2 introduces Frege's doctrines of sense, reference, coloring, concepts vs objects, assertion vs. presupposition, some logic and a hint of the three realms (mental, physical and abstract). As with Locke, basic Fregean doctrines are set out and argued for (and against). This exposition is generally sound, and concentrates on the utility of, and problems with, the notion of sense, explicating it in terms of conditions on reference. The author is needlessly bothered by two aspects of Frege's theory: the tension between the context principle and compositionality, and the sense of referenceless terms. The context principle plays a role in Frege's thinking during his single-factor period (roughly 1879-1890), but disappears once the sense-reference distinction is made and over which compositionality reigns. And although Frege introduced the technical notion of sense by associating it with reference, that was only an illustration, not in any way definitional or criterial. Once we get the idea of sense as a condition on reference, that ladder can be kicked away in the face of empty terms. There is no discussion of Frege's notion of (illocutionary) force and its role in the analysis of sentences, and hardly anything on coloring, except the suggestion that it has to do only with poetry. But Frege gives a number of examples that are more like Gricean implicatures than poetry. Chapter 3 introduces Russell's influential theory of (definite) descriptions, including attendant notions of propositional functions, scope and logically proper names, again by clearly setting out central theses and discussing them. The three basic puzzles of informativeness, opacity and empty names, as well as two more, are subjected to the theory, and Russell's solution (not using the notion of sense) is compared with Frege's. Strawson's criticism that Russell conflated linguistic types with their token or uses is discussed, as is Donnellan's contention that neither Strawson nor Russell distinguished attributive from referential uses of descriptions. Finally, a Russellian rejoinder to these challenges is tried out, mostly in terms of taking the sting out of the intuitive conversational oddness of the existence and uniqueness clauses in Russell's theory.

Chapter 12 takes up speech act theory mostly from an Austinian perspective. We are introduced to the performative-constative distinction, its downfall, and the final assimilation of constatives into performatives, and then into the general theory: locutionary, illocutionary and perlocutionary acts. Two topics are taken up further. The first is the issue of the truth value of performatives. Austin intuited that performatives are not true or false, but some sentences systematically have both performative and non-performative uses — do the meanings of the words change? One solution is to give up Austin's intuition (which was all he had) and make performatives be both sayings (or constatings) and doings; in uttering 'I promise I will be there' one is both (directly) constating that one will be there and (indirectly) promising that one will be there. This gives 'promise' the same role in performative

sentences as in non-performatives. For some reason this idea is cast as 'self-verifying', and criticism of it in that regard is mounted. But that is all a red herring. There is nothing more 'self-verifying' about promising by constating than there is requesting by asking 'could you pass the salt?'. The second issue developed is the relation between illocutionary acts and linguistic meaning, and Alston's idea of analyzing word meaning in terms of contributions to sentence meaning and sentence meaning in terms of illocutionary act potential are briefly discussed. One could question the inclusion of this in such a short chapter, especially to exclusion of topics such as indirect speech acts and metaphor.

Chapter 13 develops Grice's analysis of meaning the way Grice did: first by giving an analysis of speaker meaning in non-semantic terms, then by analyzing expression meaning partly in terms of speaker meaning. Most of the elaboration of Grice's basic ideas is by means of considering sympathetic (Strawson and Schiffer) and unsympathetic (Platts) objections to the speaker meaning project, and to the expression meaning project (Searle). The exposition helpfully avoids the details of the mind-bending counterexamples the literature developed by concentrating on the principles behind those examples. I think that it is a disappointment, however, that the chapter does not take up that aspect of speaker meaning that goes under the label of '(conversational) implicature', which is one of the few examples of philosophical work on language that has been hugely influential in language study outside philosophy (the other being Searle's theory of speech acts, which is also ignored).

Of course everyone who is too lazy to write a text has a wish-list, and I have mine. In place of the last chapter, for instance, I wish that more recent topics had more than passing mention, e.g., the Kaplan-Perry attempt to combine Frege and Russell, or the current debate on 'unarticulated constituents' and 'implicature'. I also wish that current linguistic theory had been better integrated into the discussion of the structure of sentences and semantics, and as a corollary, that Chomsky's provocative theses regarding 'I(nternal)-language' vs 'E(xternal)-language' had been introduced when appropriate (e.g., p. 260 on Davidson on language). All that said, paired with some original readings, this book will give any motivated student a good survey of the subject.

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**Robert Nola and Howard Sankey**

*Theories of Scientific Method:*

*An Introduction.*

Montreal and Kingston: McGill-Queen's  
University Press 2007.

Pp. 381.

Cdn\$/US\$90.00

(cloth ISBN-13: 978-0-7735-3344-8);

Cdn\$29.95/US\$27.95

(paper ISBN-13: 978-0-7735-3345-5).

What is so special about science? What about it, and the way it works, accounts for its especially reliable and useful results? One popular answer is that scientists employ a special method — *the scientific method*. Unfortunately, there is no agreement among scientists or philosophers of science about *what* method (if any) explains the success of science and why it does so. Indeed, some recent historians and sociologists of science have denied that there *is* any distinctively scientific method.

Nola and Sankey's (N&S) recent book is a review of different theories of scientific method coupled with a general defense of method. Part 1 provides a framework for evaluation. N&S begin, in Chapter 1, by setting out a number of different things that 'methodology' might mean, only to reject them. In Chapter 2 they consider and endorse the view that methodology is the aims (33-5), values (35-7), and virtues (37-45) that good theories should exemplify. Methodology is thus explicitly normative. Next, in Chapter 3, they consider and endorse the view that theories of scientific method are to be understood as sets of principles to which theories ought to conform, and they argue that these encompass the idea of methodology as a set of values (59-62). Given such sets of principles and values, questions naturally arise: What justification do they have? Which set is to be preferred? Consideration of these questions is the province of 'metamethodology' (MM), or the effort to determine what method is best and why. It may look as if this will depend on one's view of the aims and values of science, but N&S argue that MM can offer ways for adjudicating between different theories of method by giving reasons for adopting or rejecting them (83-103, esp. 91-8). I return to this point shortly.

Part 2 begins the review of theories. Chapters 5 and 6 describe various principles of inductive method and the problems of justifying them. Chapter 7 does the same with so-called hypothetico-deductive (H-D) method. Part 3 is an introduction to probabilistic modes of reasoning, especially Bayesianism in its different guises. Part 4 then considers a number of philosophers, such as Popper and Lakatos in Chapter 10, and Kuhn and Feyerabend in Chapter 11, who have proposed distinctive theories of method. Part 5 extends the survey to philosophers, such as Quine, Laudan, and Rescher, who have proposed 'naturalized' theories of method. The book ends with an account of the role that principles of method have in arguing for scientific realism as opposed to various forms of non-realism.

What account of method is to be preferred? N&S think it useful to address that issue in a Lakatosian manner, in terms of the progressiveness of research programs in the methodology of science (352). In the same way that a progressive scientific research program gathers the support of scientists by making headway with its problem agenda, so, too, in the methodology of science, a progressive research program will gather the support of methodologists, which may in time lead to a convergence of opinion. Although N&S do not explicitly endorse any particular theory of method, they do think that the Bayesian program has made impressive progress in resolving various problems of method. As such, it is very promising as a unifying framework for the methodology of science. N&S cite the following virtues: 1) The Bayesian theory of method is based on a central idea that is both simple and coherent: a uniform procedure for rationally updating beliefs. 2) It draws a large variety of methodological ideas together in a systematic way. 3) It can accommodate inductive methodologies (242-5). 4) It deals effectively with the issue of predictive novelty, and 5) it explains increase in confirmation by new evidence (231-6). 6) It reveals the strengths and weaknesses of the H-D model (203-4). 7) It easily accommodates inference to the best explanation (240-2). 8) It can be used to account for Kuhn's scientific values (236-40). 9) It resolves the Quine-Duhem problem, i.e., holism with regard to testing (245-9). 10) It makes important links to theories of statistics that many other theories of method do not. Bayesianism appears to them to be 'the most comprehensive current theory of method. It's hard to see what more one could ask of a theory of method' (353).

There is much that is appealing about N&S' book. First is their general defense of method, of the idea that method is and should be central to doing good science. They see themselves in the Enlightenment tradition of critical rationalism. They are not post-modernists who think that all notions of rationality should be exploded, i.e., shown to be illusory through 'deconstruction', or social constructivists who think that what counts as 'knowledge' depends on who is in a position of power and so able to determine what gets accepted. This is because they are scientific realists: they think that science aims at truth about the world and that proper method is truth conducive. Further, they are naturalists in the sense that normative methodology should be informed by the best current scientific account of human beings and their place in the world, but without trying to reduce normative questions to scientific ones in the manner of Quine (317-18). Science is a resource for answering philosophical questions, not a replacement for philosophy. N&S provide valuable discussions of Kuhn and Feyerabend, which go some way in rescuing Kuhn from the charge of relativism (45-9, 285-98) and Feyerabend from the charge of anarchism (298-309). Despite the common view that both are debunkers of rational methodology, their considered positions involve sophisticated appeals to method. Other virtues of the book include many good examples of methodology in practice from the history of science and contemporary science, and interesting historical interludes involving methodological differences (Descartes vs. Newton, e.g.). I also liked the attention to Pierre

Duhem (52-5, 74-9), who often gets ignored except when he is (wrongly) lumped with Quine, even if they wrongly think him a positivist.

Does the book have other shortcomings? Some. The major one, I think, is its enthusiasm for Bayesian methodology. N&S concede that something better might come along, but right now it's the most progressive methodological game in town. Indeed, they write, 'Over the past fifty years subjective Bayesianism has been regarded (by many but not all) as the leading theory of scientific method' (186). Really! Before Popper became widely known (*Logik der Forschung*, although written in 1934, wasn't translated until 1959)? And before Kuhn, Lakatos, and Lauden even came on the scene? My impression is that Bayesianism has a modest following among formally inclined philosophers of science who write *highly* technical papers for similarly inclined readers. (For readers of this review who have not dipped into a Bayesian paper: Beware! Most of the English is likely in the abstract rather than in the paper itself.) In any case, I am not persuaded that Bayesian methodology *now* has all the virtues N&S think it has; but it would require more space than I have available to explain why. Permit me only to mention a large problem with the alleged first virtue, that Bayesian method gives a simple procedure for rationally revising belief. Well, it does — once one has numerical values for the terms in Bayes' theorem. One need only turn the computational crank. But determining these all require subjective probability assessments, and a standing problem for Bayesian methodology is how to do that in a non-arbitrary manner. N&S address the problem (204-10, 221-6), but not in a way that is likely to persuade readers not already committed to making the Bayesian program work. It didn't me.

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**Christopher Norris**

*Fiction, Philosophy and Literary Theory:  
Will the Real Saul Kripke Please Stand Up?*  
New York: Continuum 2007.

Pp. 272.

US\$120.00 (cloth ISBN-13: 978-0-8264-9755-0);

US\$24.95 (paper ISBN-13: 978-0-8264-9756-7).

This book presents itself as an exercise in bridge-building. It tries to bridge 'analytic' and 'continental' philosophy, claiming that the two camps share more than we might think. It also seeks to bridge philosophy and literary theory, and to show that these fields have much to learn from one another.

Each of the book's seven chapters can be read as a stand-alone essay. The first two chapters deal with Derrida, and defend him from criticisms often made by Anglo-American philosophers. One is that Derrida's discussions of undecidability commit him to a paraconsistent logic in which some statements are neither true nor false. According to Norris, Derrida actually insists on 'the indispensability of classical (bivalent) logic' — though he does so 'as a means of locating . . . stress points or moments of strictly inescapable aporia' (16). In this respect Derrida is a much more traditional philosopher than, say, Quine, who claims that *no* elements of one's web of belief — not even the axioms of logic — are in principle immune from revision. Norris also defends Derrida's work on ethics. Derrida sometimes speaks as if 'authentic ethical choice' involves 'the suspension of all operative rules and guidelines' (36). This suggests that he sees ethical choice as groundless, arbitrary, and non-rational. Norris shows that Derrida's position is much more subtle, and that it recognizes that our ability to choose is always situated and constrained.

The next two chapters deal with the relation between science and philosophy. Chapter 3 examines Saussure's attempt to make linguistics scientific, and asks whether Saussure's more radical followers have interpreted him correctly on this point. According to Norris, post-structuralists such as Foucault wish to generalize Saussure's claims about language. They think *any* field of inquiry, not just language, may be understood as 'a system of contrastive features, relationships, and differences "without positive terms"' (77). Norris sees this as misguided, and argues that Saussure's approach is a response to features that are unique to language. Chapter 4 discusses the often rocky relationship between the sciences and the humanities. Norris is especially concerned with the tendency of literary theorists to dismiss science, and to see it as just another type of writing. He urges them to reject 'the strong-sociological argument that scientific "truths" are constructed, rather than discovered' (115). He also suggests that literary theorists might fruitfully draw on philosophical discussions of possible worlds. This is an intriguing suggestion, but precisely how it might be followed remains somewhat unclear. Chapter 5 also deals with possible worlds, and discusses Saul Kripke's work on the topic. Norris does a good job of explaining why literary theorists should care about Kripke, but most philosophers will find this familiar territory.

The final two chapters deal with 'extraordinary language' (159): language that draws attention to itself by virtue of its extreme inventiveness. Chapter 6 takes a fresh look at why Wittgenstein did not like Shakespeare. The standard answer is that Shakespeare's extraordinary language clashes with the later Wittgenstein's quietism. Wittgenstein insists that 'everything is perfectly in order with our everyday, communal language games', and he is therefore suspicious of writers who lead us astray with their 'profligate way with words' (162). Norris thinks this answer captures only part of the truth. He suggests that Wittgenstein sees *himself* in Shakespeare. Just as Shakespeare's literary genius lies in his extreme inventiveness, Wittgenstein's philosophical genius lies in his skill at articulating puzzles, paradoxes, and

thought experiments. Norris sees Wittgenstein as a deeply conflicted figure, one who wants to bring peace to philosophy but who cannot silence his obsessive skeptical worries. The book's seventh chapter, on the topic of free will, is its least satisfying. It suggests that philosophical discussions of free will could benefit from a more careful study of language use. Speech offers a 'test-case' (227) for our intuitions about freedom. When I speak, I am both creative and constrained: I try to say something new within a structure I do not create. Speech is neither simply free nor simply determined, but involves a 'complex interplay of freedom and necessity' (249). Norris hopes that this interplay can illuminate the debate over free will. This is an interesting suggestion, but it is unclear what follows from it. Perhaps it is less a contribution to the debate than a suggestion about what sorts of considerations are relevant to it.

This is a big book. Each chapter is long, repetitive, and full of digressions. It tackles large questions — free will is just one example — and draws on a dizzying range of texts. Norris' idiosyncratic set of interests is sometimes fruitful. It leads him to bring together seemingly unrelated fields, such as literary criticism and possible worlds ontology. But it also seems to skew his treatment of the larger issues. Norris' two greatest interests are recent literary theory and analytic philosophy of language. He portrays them as poles of an either-or facing intellectual life today: we tend *either* to be literary theorists who think that there is nothing outside the text and that science is just another kind of writing, *or* to embrace an arid and reductive analytic philosophy that refuses to learn from other approaches. Having set up this dichotomy, Norris urges us to reject it, to embrace *both* literary theory *and* analytic philosophy. But this dichotomy is false, and Norris is not the first person to say so. For decades, plenty of philosophers have done serious work on both sides of the divide. Paul Ricoeur is one example; Ernst Tugendhat is another. Both raise questions of a 'continental', even 'literary' bent, but draw heavily on analytic philosophy of language to answer them. Norris fights against a parochialism that is not as widespread as he thinks.

None of this means that this book should not be read. Norris has much to teach us. But his bridge-building might be more successful if it did not exaggerate the size of the gap.

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**Fiona Randall and R. S. Downie**

*The Philosophy of Palliative Care:  
Critique and Reconstruction.*

New York: Oxford University Press 2006. Pp. 251.  
US\$57.50 (paper ISBN-13: 978-0-19-856736-3).

Despite the terrific successes of modern medicine, time currently spent in a hospital can be an alienating experience filled with the excessive technology of tubes and monitors and overly busy physicians and nurses who often haven't the time for the sorts of personal interactions many patients would like to have with their health care workers. This can be especially true toward the end of life when it becomes clear that there is nothing that can be done to save a patient. All too often, modern medicine has refused to accept that death is unavoidable and that keeping someone alive does not always serve the patient's best interest; nor does it necessarily represent their wishes. The development of modern palliative care came as a tonic to this excessive use of medical technology. Rooted historically in medieval religious orders and hospices which took responsibility for the care of the dying, and based philosophically in Asklepius, the Greek demigod of healing and medicine, this tradition 'stresses healing, but in the context of our mortality' (7), and looks upon the patient not as a mere token of some disease type, but as 'a unique and important person in the context of our knowledge of our humanity' (8).

According to Randall and Downie, the palliative care movement has veered away from the exemplary work of Dame Cicely Saunders and the Hospice movement that began in the 1960s. In the first two parts of their book, they describe the ways in which contemporary palliative care, particularly as it is practiced in the U.K., has gone seriously off track. Part 1 explores its framework and the concepts it employs while Part 2 focuses on palliative interventions and assesses their effectiveness and cost. Part 3 presents an alternative view of palliative care and suggests some changes Randall and Downie think are necessary if this aspect of health care is to fulfill its original intentions.

Symbolic of the misdirection of current palliative care is the characterization of it by the World Health Organization (WHO), which claims that palliative care can improve quality of life, for both patients and their families, not only in terms of symptom and pain relief but also in terms of psychosocial and spiritual needs. Randall and Downie maintain that these promises are far more than palliative care can deliver. Indeed, even the idea that we can measure 'quality of life, or spirituality, as a single scored item is . . . ludicrous' (34). These goals, then, ought to 'be abandoned as an aim of palliative care.' Instead, we should focus on 'the relief of pain and other symptoms; the improvement of physical function; and the provision to patients of the information they seek about their illness in order to enable them to take part in decisions and lessen emotional distress' (50).

Contemporary palliative care also suffers from a misguided conception of patient autonomy. Kant originally conceived of autonomy as the capacity we have as rational beings to construct universalizable laws, laws under which

we all could live. Dignity was then conceived in terms of respecting that capacity. At present, however, autonomy has come simply to mean the right of a patient to receive (or reject) any treatment they desire, with dignity being everyone else's duty to respect those choices, no matter how foolish they turn out to be. Randall and Downie argue that we must reject this view of dignity, and recognize that 'in order to be justifiable, treatments must always carry a likelihood of conferring net benefit' (73).

In Chapter 4, Randall and Downie consider, and reject, the WHO's claim that the goal of palliative care is 'the best possible quality of life for the patient and the family' (75). Here, the authors present a number of sharp and incisive arguments that health care workers have a therapeutic relationship only with the patient and not their relatives: hence, improving the quality of life of patient's relatives is not an intrinsic goal of palliative care. In fact, attempting to do this would often lead to irresolvable conflicts between pursuit of the best interests of the patient and pursuit of the best interests of their family. With regard to the patient's family, then, the obligations of palliative care workers are 'of a general nature: to provide information (subject to the constraints of confidentiality), to offer advice on the care of the patient, to behave sensitively in the face of the inevitable family distress' (92).

Individual chapters within Part 2 investigate controlling symptoms and prolonging life (Chapter 5), resuscitation and advance statements (Chapter 6), assessment and treatment of psychosocial and spiritual problems (Chapter 7), and resource allocation (Chapter 8). The arguments presented in these chapters are nuanced and display an intricate knowledge of the field of end of life care. My only criticism of this part of the book concerns the discussion of the relationship between palliative care and active euthanasia. To my mind, Randall and Downie are much too quick to accept David Roy's claims that the legalization of active forms of euthanasia (such as exist in Holland) would require that palliative care be 'altered in very significant ways' (115). Perhaps this is true, but it is too important to deal with parenthetically. I would suggest that while it is of course true that an active euthanasia program needs to fund palliative care properly, it may also be the case that a system of palliative care cannot be complete without both passive and active forms of euthanasia.

Part 3, comprising only a single chapter, offers a preliminary outline of a revised version of palliative care which attempts to route it away from its current path, back to its Asklepiian roots. Doing so will require, among other things, that we accept that palliative care, like all other forms of health care, has limitations. By recognizing this, it will begin to focus more completely on those things it can actually accomplish, with the hope that this will produce a maximal number of 'good deaths.'

This is an important book that presents a thorough and comprehensive critique of contemporary palliative care. As such, it deserves to be read widely and carefully by those working in the field.

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### **D. D. Raphael**

*The Impartial Spectator:*

*Adam Smith's Moral Philosophy.*

New York: Oxford University Press 2007.

Pp.160.

US\$45.00 (cloth ISBN-13: 978-0-19-921333-7);

US\$35.00 (paper ISBN-13: 978-0-19-956826-0).

In this book Raphael's focus is the significant shift in Smith's moral theory between the first 1759 edition and sixth 1790 edition of *The Theory of Moral Sentiments*. As editor of the Glasgow critical edition of the *Moral Sentiments*, Raphael is uniquely positioned to offer this analysis. Unfortunately, his specific argument is difficult to distill from the perambulations of his discussion. The gist of it seems to be that in the early edition of the *Moral Sentiments* Smith emphasized the role of sympathy in moral judgment, whereas by the later edition he emphasized the role of imagination in moral judgment. With the new emphasis on imagination, Smith arrived at a conception of sympathy that was a departure from David Hume's, and in turn, this new conception of sympathy is the key to understanding Smith's account of the impartial spectator.

Before Smith, Francis Hutcheson as well as Hume had offered empirical, psychological moral theories that invoked a spectator or observer to explain how there could be disinterested approval or disapproval of an agent's actions. Hutcheson argued that we have a sixth, moral sense that naturally evokes a feeling of approval in response to the observation of an agent's action that is motivated by benevolence, as well as a feeling of disapproval in response to an agent's action that is not motivated by benevolence. Hume expanded Hutcheson's list of virtues beyond simple benevolence, but more importantly, explained the capacity for approval and disapproval in terms of sympathy. Departing from Hutcheson, Hume claimed that the actions of an agent produce approval or disapproval in a spectator because the spectator sympathizes with the person affected by the agent's action. Of course, the passions of others are opaque to us, but we can observe the predicament and reactions of others, and this naturally produces passions within us. For Hume, there is sympathy when the same circumstances produce the same passions with roughly the same vivacity in both the person affected and the spectator.

Smith's first modification of Hume's spectator theory was to claim that the spectator sympathizes with the sentiments that motivated the actions of the *agent*, not, as Hume had claimed, with the sentiments of the person affected by the action. Raphael claims that a consequence of this modification was that Smith's moral spectator has sympathy 'with motive alone, instead of including also sympathy with intended or probable consequences' of an agent's action (25). Raphael is deeply unhappy with this change since he thinks it emphasizes motives of the agent and does little to consider the actual effects of the agent on others. Raphael is much happier with Smith's second modification to Hume's theory, which was to give the imagination a much larger role in moral judgment. Smith departs from Hume by claiming

that sympathetic passions are produced in spectators entirely by the imagination of the spectator. Whereas Humean sympathy is a naturally arising concordance between person affected and the spectator, Smithian sympathy is the passion that arises from the concordance, not the fact of concordance itself. This passion is entirely the product of the imagination. Smith further departs from Hume by claiming that the spectator might be an invention of imagination rather than an actual person. In the second and sixth editions of the *Moral Sentiments*, Smith argues that imagination is the root of conscience since the operation of conscience involves the invention of a spectator to our own actions. Smith tells us that, when I reflect on my own conduct, 'I divide myself as it were into two persons: and that I, the examiner and judge, represent a different character from that other I, the person whose conduct is examined into and judged of' (TMS III.1.6).

The broad strokes of Raphael's argument are interesting, and they will be of interest to Smith scholars. But, on closer inspection, the book has problems that make its specific arguments difficult to review charitably. I will be illustrative rather than exhaustive. First, there is a difficulty with the way Raphael motivates his argument. He tells us that the *Moral Sentiments* is a clear book that has often been misinterpreted. He goes on to assert that, 'on that account it calls for an interpretation based on knowledge of what Smith wrote in his youth and in his relative old age' (1). Why? There would seem to be no clear connection between a clear book being misinterpreted and a need for a genetic interpretation of the text. Second and more significantly, there are lacunas in important parts of the argument. For example, Raphael admits that he 'may be mistaken in identifying Smith's propriety with right and wrong' (25). This is true. Smith is not explicit about the meaning of 'propriety', and moreover, neither Bailey's nor Ash's eighteenth-century dictionaries define 'propriety' as having anything to do with 'right or wrong'. Nevertheless, a few pages later Raphael confidently advances the conclusion that Smith retained 'Hume's reference to sympathy with the feelings of those affected by the action, but he brought this into his account of merit and demerit, not into his account of right and wrong' (31). Elsewhere, interpretive problems are dealt with by brute force. Passages in which Smith seems to advance a more Humean view of sympathy — or, for that matter, any unusual position — Raphael simply declares to be 'rhetorical lapse,' 'mistake' or 'error' (18, 20, 90).

Perhaps most problematically, in the last chapter Raphael surprises the reader with the claim that that he is advancing a philosophical thesis about Smith's 'enduring contribution', not a thesis in the history of ideas (127). This comes as something of a surprise since the book reads exactly like an exegetical piece in the history of ideas. Even more of a surprise is Raphael's assertion that Smith's psychological explanation of moral sentiments is normative: it is about what *ought* to be approved. Yet, no explanation is offered of how or why constructs of the imagination have normative force. Hume's tricky is-ought distinction is considered for a whole paragraph before it is concluded that, 'If we take the notion of a derivation in a broad sense that is not confined to deduction, I think it is not true to say that an "ought" cannot

be derived from an “is” ’ (133). Fair enough. But, on the crucial question of how such derivations take place, all that is offered is the opaque, question-begging claim that ‘the grounding is psychological not logical’ (134).

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**Robert C. Richardson**

*Evolutionary Psychology as  
Maladapted Psychology.*

Cambridge, MA: MIT Press 2007.

Pp. 248.

US\$34.00 (cloth ISBN-13: 978-0-262-18260-7).

Evolutionary psychology (EP) is the latest paradigm shift sweeping the field, and its sales pitch is seductive. The mind must be an adaptation, we are told, for only natural selection is capable of producing an organ of such complexity. But if the mind is an adaptation, it must have been fashioned by selection for solving the sorts of adaptive problems our ancestors faced in the late-Pleistocene African savanna. Thus, we ought to be able to make some headway in psychology by considering the sorts of psychological traits that *would have been selected for* in such an environment. We ought, that is, to be able to discover how the mind works by considering what it was ‘designed’ to do.

With this book, Richardson joins the growing ranks of EP skeptics. His strategy is to show that the explanations offered by EP don’t meet the rigorous standards of evolutionary biology. As Richardson repeatedly emphasizes, evolutionary explanation is a species of historical explanation; its aim is to account for the origin of a trait. What makes psychology so poorly adapted as an evolutionary science, in Richardson’s view, is that much of the record of our own evolution has been lost to history. We are the sole surviving representatives of the hominid line, and our closest living relatives parted ways with us millions of years ago. Moreover, the fossil record is of little help because the structure of the mind is recorded in the soft tissues of the brain, which don’t fossilize. As a result of this dearth of historical evidence, we can’t be sure when or where or in what sort of conditions our distinctive psychological traits first evolved and therefore can’t be sure of what our psychological traits are adaptations *for*, or whether, indeed, they are adaptations at all.

After some initial stage setting, Richardson begins to consider the explanatory strategies evolutionary science makes available to EP. In Chapter 2, the focus is on reverse engineering, the strategy of inferring a trait’s historical function (and, thus, its evolutionary origin) from its current structure. The

problem here is that current structure underdetermines historical function. Consider *Archaeopteryx*, the famous 'intermediate form' between reptiles and birds. Presumably, *Archaeopteryx*'s proto-wings were adaptations, but were they adaptations for increasing the speed with which an earth-bound *Archaeopteryx* pursued its quarry, as the so-called 'cursorial' hypothesis has it, or for slowing the rate with which a tree-dwelling *Archaeopteryx* descended to the ground, as the 'arboreal' hypothesis has it? An engineering analysis of *Archaeopteryx*'s reversed first toe (or 'hallux') seems to clinch the case for arboreality, for this fully opposable digit is ideally suited to grasping branches, and is present in all modern perching birds from warblers to ravens. But the hallux couldn't have evolved for perching. *Archaeopteryx* inherited its hallux from its theropod ancestors, and theropods evolved long before the lineage took to the trees. Only with this additional bit of historical evidence can we conclude that the hallux, which is useful for grasping prey and for grasping branches, was an adaptation for the former rather than the latter. The moral is that in the case of any trait with multiple possible functions — and surely human psychological traits are as multipurpose as they come — engineering analyses cannot deliver univocal verdicts without supplementary historical evidence.

Reverse engineering is an attempt to infer from effects to their causes. In Chapter 3 Richardson considers the methods of population genetics, whereby one infers from causes to their effects — 'from evolutionary challenges to adaptive responses' (96). Here, one begins by cataloguing 'a set of conditions . . . sufficient to guarantee that there will be evolution by natural selection' and proceeds to determine whether these conditions did, in fact, obtain (96). The second component is what distinguishes population genetics from empty speculation, and it is, once again, dependent on our knowledge of historical conditions. If, among our hominid ancestors, there had been selection for noses capable of supporting spectacles, *and* nose shape is a heritable trait, *and* there were appropriately-shaped noses in the population, *and* there had been the right sort of population structure, etc., then noses would be an adaptation for holding up spectacles. Since, however, we know that these conditions did not obtain, we know that this cannot be why noses evolved.

In Chapter 4, Richardson considers the comparative method, which is essentially the application of Mill's methods to correlations between traits and environments. One begins by constructing a phylogeny for a lineage, revealing the ancestral relations among a group of closely related species. With a phylogeny in hand, adaptations can be found by identifying traits that are more-or-less perfectly correlated with specific environmental variables. If, for example, we find that all and only language using hominids were subject to environmental variable X, we can be reasonably confident that language use is an adaptive response to X. Application of the comparative method thus requires that we have excellent evidence concerning the distribution of traits within a lineage as well as the characteristic environments of different species. When applied to the extinct members of the hominid line, the comparative method requires, once again, having evidence of *historical* conditions.

As I've said, all of this is rather compelling. Since all of the strategies available to EP for explaining the origin of human psychological traits require detailed knowledge of human evolutionary history, and since we do not possess this knowledge, and likely never will, Richardson's conclusion seems unavoidable: 'psychology is poorly adapted as an evolutionary science' (148). This, however, is not to say that Richardson's project is entirely successful, for EP is probably not best understood as an evolutionary science, at least not in the sense that Richardson intends.

Evolutionary psychologists are likely to object to Richardson's interpretation of the EP research program: 'the central programmatic goal of evolutionary psychology . . . is to provide evolutionary explanations of our natural psychological capacities in terms of natural selection' (19). Richardson thus takes EP to be a branch of evolutionary biology — the branch that deals with specifically psychological traits — but its practitioners take EP to be a branch of psychology, as evidenced by their sales pitch. This matters because evolutionary biology is, and psychology is not, a historical science. In evolutionary biology one begins with a trait and attempts to explain its historical genesis, but this can't be what EP is up to because the point of EP is to discover what our psychological traits *are*. Evolutionary 'just so' stories thus function as heuristics of discovery, ladders to be thrown away after they've been ascended. Ultimately, the proof of EP is in the psychological pudding, and evolutionary psychologists believe that they have independent empirical evidence for their psychological hypotheses. If Richardson's critique is intended to cast doubt on these hypotheses, it commits the genetic fallacy. If it's intended to cast doubt on the reliability of the heuristic that generates them, it's successful, though slightly less ambitious than he makes it out to be.

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**Sandra B. Rosenthal**

*C. I. Lewis in Focus. The Pulse of Pragmatism.*  
Bloomington: Indiana University Press 2007.  
Pp. 200.

US\$55.00 (cloth ISBN-13: 978-0-253-34837-1);  
US\$19.95 (paper ISBN-13: 978-0-253-21895-7).

Clarence Irving Lewis (1883-1964) was a leading American philosopher, whose works significantly contributed to consolidate and expand the tradition of American pragmatism. Sandra B. Rosenthal's book is a comprehen-

sive attempt to explore Lewis' pragmatic vision and its continuity with the works of Charles S. Peirce, William James, John Dewey and George Herbert Mead. Rosenthal examines the lines of inquiry at the core of Lewis' pragmatic empiricism and places Lewis' epistemology at the basis of his metaphysics, his theory of valuation and his pragmatic reconstruction of rules, directives and imperatives.

The book comprises six chapters. In Chapter 1, Rosenthal presents an overview of Lewis' life and work and investigates the reasons of his neglect in contemporary philosophy: 'Lewis was a "philosopher's philosopher", an academic specialist who thrived on technical problems presented in professional journals or graduate lectures and whose primary interest was in addressing other philosophers' (7). The technicality of his works was a major obstacle to the spreading of his views, along with what Rosenthal defines as 'Lewis' pragmatic appropriation of Kant' (8). Yet, she points out that Lewis' inclination towards Kantian themes proved to be one of the strengths of his pragmatic vision, which nowadays opens novel paths for a dialogue between pragmatism and analytical philosophy.

Chapter 2 draws on Rosenthal's established philosophical interest in the relations between pragmatism and pluralism, which emerged in her previous works such as *Charles Peirce's Pragmatic Pluralism* (SUNY Press 1994). Rosenthal discusses Lewis' groundbreaking work in logic, which originated from his objections to the concept of material implication and its development in the extensional logic of Russell and Whitehead's *Principia Mathematica*. Lewis saw material implication as problematic because it deviates from ordinary inferences: Russell and Whitehead conceived it as the principle by which a false proposition implies any proposition, while a true proposition is implied by any proposition. In contrast to this, he developed an intensional logic hinging on the concept of strict implication, which reflects his claim that inference depends on meaning and intension rather than formal truth-values. It was the quest for an alternative to material implication that led Lewis to explore the possibility of alternative logics and develop a genuinely pluralistic approach, in which the choice of a certain logical system is guided by pragmatic criteria. Rosenthal relates Lewis' pluralistic view of logic and his pragmatic understanding of the origin of logical truths to his broader epistemological concerns about the nature and function of a priori knowledge. His doctrine of the pragmatic a priori resulted from his intensional view of meaning and its pragmatic determination, and it offers an important alternative to W. V. O. Quine's attack against the analytic-synthetic distinction.

In Chapter 3, Rosenthal explores Lewis' pragmatic empiricism and assesses his formulation of 'the given' as the sensory basis of experience. Lewis' pragmatic empiricism accounts for the richness of what is immediately presented to the senses, and it hinges on the assumption that sense data are imbued with interpretations. More importantly, Rosenthal places Lewis' conception of the sensory given at the basis of the pragmatic workability of certain conceptual schemes, as well as the truth of empirical predictions:

'There must be some "hard" element in our experience that is independent of our purposes and that cannot be altered by our thinking about it; rather, the workability of our purposes and concepts depends upon their conformity to it' (70). Rosenthal articulates Lewis' concept of the sensory given as an effort to resolve the ambiguity between its inherent mind-dependence and its being constitutive of an independently existing reality. This characterization has the important function of stressing the relevance of Lewis' notion of 'the given' in the process of verification of empirical knowledge and of showing that such a process rests upon criteria of workability in pragmatic contexts. Lewis' focus on pragmatic certitude eliminates the ontological difference between 'the given' (the way things 'really are') and the given as 'taken' (appearances). Rosenthal stresses that for Lewis the difference is in fact epistemic, as it involves the absolutely given and the given as 'taken' in terms of their functions with respect to practical purposes.

In Chapter 4, Rosenthal characterizes Lewis' metaphysics as a 'systematic epistemology' (98) entailing a concept of reality as 'reality in the making' (97). According to Lewis' conceptual pragmatism, knowledge arises after the application of categories to an independently given element. Categories are thus principles of interpretation that condition the sensory given: reality results from an ongoing and fallible process of restructuring what is given for the purposes of interpretation. Rosenthal relates this aspect of Lewis' metaphysics to his theory of meaning as disposition, showing that this is also the basis of his 'process realism' (102), in which real modes of action govern what occurs.

In Chapters 5 and 6, Rosenthal discusses Lewis' theory of value and his pragmatic ethics. Lewis argued for the cognitive nature of valuations, and he defined value judgments as a type of empirical knowledge. He distinguished the empirical character of goods, values and purposes from the normative function of rules, obligations and imperatives, and argued that, despite their importance in the understanding and application of imperatives, value judgments alone cannot determine what is right or what ought to be. In the final chapter, Rosenthal explores Lewis' pragmatic ethics and shows that its ultimate justification lay in his articulation of the pragmatic *a priori*. Lewis defined human behaviour as rule-guided problem solving in which rules are imperatives directing action. The ultimate justification of imperatives is pragmatic and is consistent with Lewis' justification of the laws of logic: 'just as the *a priori* arises from past experience but is legislative for future experience, so the rules of rightness arise from the interactions of past experience and prescribe ways of acting in the future' (150-51).

This book is a remarkable scholarly effort to explore Lewis' original pragmatic vision. Rosenthal addresses a specialised audience. This might be a significant drawback, considering that her research aims to elicit a fresh philosophical interest in Lewis' often neglected ideas. The book is perhaps better approached by the non-specialised reader as a complement to Lewis' own writings. Despite this, Rosenthal's articulation of Lewis' pragmatism will provide scholars and philosophy students with a resourceful guide to

explore the most subtle implications of Lewis' thought and to appreciate its wide-ranging effects in contemporary philosophy.

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**Yannis Stavrakakis**

*The Lacanian Left:*

*Psychoanalysis, Theory, Politics.*

Albany: SUNY Press 2007.

Pp. 328.

US\$80.00 (cloth ISBN-13: 978-0-7914-7329-0).

Stavrakakis has done some of the best writing there is on the relation between the real and the symbolic in Lacanian theory, especially in his earlier *Lacan and the Political* (Routledge, 1999). On his reading, the real and the symbolic are not the rigorously distinct regions they are often set out to be, but are explicitly co-present and intermingled in such late-Lacanian notions as *signifiance*, *jouis-sens* and *lalangue*, all of which are terms for when signifiers do not function primarily to convey meanings, but become things of enjoyment, charged with a libidinal kick. For political theory, Stavrakakis argues that these can be crucial ideas.

Lacanian theory has long been used among some political thinkers to support a basically constructivist position on identity, upholding that any identity, insofar as it is a thing supported by a use of signifiers, is therefore shot through with instability and inconsistency. There is no social, political, or even personal identity that is a hard essence; and this, allegedly, is what makes us so anxious about identity, constantly haunted by its blurring away into something other, and by its ever possible collapse. One might conclude from this that if we could but understand and appreciate the fluid nature of identities, perhaps social and political overreactions to their ambiguity and dissolution (such as racism, intolerance, homophobia, etc.) would lessen. In fact, this suspicion gave rise to an entire political and ethical project.

Stavrakakis' view is that such a project has run into a dead end from which a 'left Lacanian' political theory offers an escape, by working on something other than language and cognition. Thus, he claims that 'it is not an epistemic deficit which is the problem; it is rather an affective deficit' (282). In other words, attempts to change our knowledge and beliefs about identity, attempts to heighten our political and ethical consciousness, run aground on

what a Lacanian, paraphrasing Freud, might call the rock of the real, which is what really needs to be targeted by political thought. The main point of Stavrakakis' book, then, is to show that this real needs to be addressed, and to show how a relation to it can be shaken up, thereby buttressing a project for 'radical democracy'.

The first part of the book contains solid presentations and criticisms of other thinkers who have used Lacanian theory in political philosophy in different ways: Cornelius Castoriadis, Ernesto Laclau, Slavoj Žižek, and Alain Badiou. Stavrakakis' criticism of each is distinct. He finds that Castoriadis errs by conceiving of alienation as a not irreducible part of social life (58ff.). Laclau, despite his attempts to address them, basically neglects the factors of the real and *jouissance* in his analyses of political identities and movements, while Žižek overemphasizes them, turning his theory into one that is too 'positive' (in the sense that 'Lacanian negativity is ultimately disavowed' by it [18]). Then, in a brief treatment, Stavrakakis eventually finds Badiou to be less guilty of Žižek's error, and to be rather close to his own position for developing a theory of a political 'act' that is 'more faithful' to a '(non-Hegelian) negativity/positivity dialectics' (158).

After this first, critical, part of his book, Stavrakakis gets into his own account of what a proper left Lacanian perspective offers. It remains committed to the notion that identities are constructed, yet it does not commit the error of discursive reductionism. At the same time, his view tries to give lack and negativity a central place. A left Lacanian perspective is going to pay attention, for example, to the persistence of the 'negative' (death, castration, loss) in human life, and will address our inability and unwillingness to live with and acknowledge it.

The project Stavrakakis proposes involves some type of 'traversing' of our political fantasies, such as our unconscious enjoyment of authority and our tendency to act as if the lack that is constitutive of human life is overcome. In Lacanian psychoanalytic practice, the traversing of a fantasy is a period during the cure characterized by a dis-identification, when a re-articulation of the core not just of one's self-identity, but of one's basic mode of enjoyment, one's basic orientation to satisfaction and libidinal connections, is occurring. On a political level, Stavrakakis hopes that such a traversal would come out this way: 'What is at stake is to find a way to *relate ethically to antagonism and jouissance*, as opposed to the unethical, unproductive and even dangerous standpoint of eliminating or mythologizing them: to sublimate instead of repressing, to inject passion into the radicalization of democracy and the reinvigoration of political discourse' (226). The trouble with sublimation, though, is always the margin lost by it: the fact that it is a replacement, a substitute satisfaction, which, as such, will generate the illusion of a lost plenitude, and will thus generate dissatisfaction with satisfaction itself. This is what worried Freud about politics and community life in general, and led him to speak of civilization and its inevitable discontents. It also worried Lacan. Advocating for sublimation is therefore risky, but consistent with a Freudian perspective, since there is little choice but to sublimate.

The left Freudians, with whom Stavrakakis engages only a little, saw things differently. Finding the Freudian perspective far too pessimistic about human beings and social life, they opted for a different picture of humanity: in a non-alienated society, we would be different creatures, and would not suffer from community. Enjoyment itself would even be better. Stavrakakis, rightly so, does not buy this. He thinks alienation and lack are inevitable parts of human life, and wants us to be able somehow to affirm or at least live with them. It remains difficult to see how translating this perspective into the political sphere can be politically satisfying. However, the alternatives, consisting of denials of lack or a naïvely utopian politics, are certainly worse.

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#### **Savas L. Tsohatzidis, ed.**

*John Searle's Philosophy of Language:  
Force, Meaning and Mind.*

New York: Cambridge University Press 2007.

Pp. 306.

US\$85.00 (cloth ISBN-13: 978-0-521-86627-9);

US\$34.99 (paper ISBN-13: 978-0-521-68534-4).

One of the major contributions to the philosophy of language in the twentieth century was John Searle's book *Speech Acts* (1969). Searle clearly superseded Austin's earlier work and introduced a framework that defined the field, including its appropriation in linguistics. Later Searle shifted his area of research to the philosophy of mind, and one might ask oneself what the relation between the two fields is, in Searle's view, and why the move to *Intentionality* (1983) was no break with issues raised in *Speech Acts* and *Expression and Meaning* (1979). The present collection of papers provides some insights into the development and connectedness of Searle's work, bringing together eleven original essays concerned both with the relation of mind to meaning (Part 1) and with the relation of meaning to force (Part 2), a topic within speech act theory.

Prior to the two parts, Searle himself sets out (in about 35 pages) his current view on the philosophy of language. He unifies his work on language and mind in a perspective which sees 'language as a natural extension of non-linguistic biological capacities' (15), and which accords primacy to the mental/intentional over the linguistic. The subject-predicate structure we find in sentences is already 'built into the very logical structures of biologi-

cal intentionality' (35). The intentional and the theory about 'directions of fit' between the mind and the world — beliefs as having the direction 'mind fitting the world', desires making the world fitting to the mind — ground the corresponding classification of some illocutionary forces (like assertions and orders); other illocutionary forces (like declaratives such as 'I herewith baptize this ship . . .') arise only within a community governed by social institutions (like baptizing arrangements). As language is 'essentially social' (17), a social ontology of norms and commitments (e.g., in making speech acts of some type) supplements the theory of mind. Institutional reality (from money to government) 'is essentially linguistic' (40). The 'first primary function' (28) of language is, according to Searle, communication (i.e., *not* mental representation). Searle restates his thesis that the pragmatic rules are not components of individual languages but are universal. What language provides beyond intentionality are 'indefinitely manipulatable structures with semantic content' (24). A speaker expresses her beliefs, imposing some conditions of satisfaction on expressions, and conventions ensue as this regularly succeeds. Nevertheless 'speaker intentionality must be logically prior' (32).

The papers in the first part take on Searle's work in the philosophy of mind. Francois Recanati and Kent Bach each aim at Searle's well known analysis of perception, which claims that part of the *content* of a perception is a self-reflexive claim that the object perceived is (partially) causally responsible for the perceptual state. Recanati levels the criticism of *misplaced information* at Searle, arguing that this self-reflexive claim is not part of the (narrow) propositional content of the perception, as Searle claims, but part of the content provided by the *mode* of the state (i.e., being a perception). In a way this is ironic, since in *Speech Acts* Searle accused ordinary language philosophy of confusing conditions of semantic content with conditions of illocutionary mode. Placing the reflexive content in the structure of the act fits better with ascribing perceptions to newborns and animals, which both lack concepts of causality. Bach also addresses the mode/content distinction, arguing that Searle's causal self-reflexive condition in the (narrow) content does not account for reference to *particular* objects. Bach opts for considering the mode as carrying a token-reflexive condition of satisfaction to the confronted situation.

A much more radical criticism by Christopher Gauker denies the primacy of the intentional. He contends that natural language 'is the medium of conceptual thought' (125). Speech acts are not defined in terms of intentions, but in terms of the conventions of appraisal that constitute them. In the end this theory is not as radical as it sounds, since Gauker admits that much of our mental life does not consist in conceptual thought in his sense. Strangely enough, conceptual thought consists in 'imagining conversations', but 'is not to be identified with verbal imagery' (141).

The papers in Part 2 focus mainly on speech act theory, especially on the relation between force and meaning. Somewhat mediating between Parts 1 and 2, Mitchell Green asks how speech acts express psychological states. One expresses a psychological state using some linguistic device by taking respon-

sibility according to the constitutive rules/commitments of language (e.g., reporting a conviction one is prepared to meet challenges as to one's honesty and takes on the responsibility of providing reasons for that conviction). This understanding of *expressing thought*, i.e., an understanding not in psychological but in normative terms, is close to Searle's own perspective.

Other papers in Part 2 take up the discussion about content and mode in the form of the inner linguistic distinction between content/meaning and force. Editor Tsohatzidis attacks the *content invariance thesis*, which states that the (propositional) content stays the same when we switch from one illocutionary force to another. Searle claims this to be the case, *inter alia*, with respect to assertions and yes-no questions. Tsohatzidis shows that this will not work. The content of a yes-no question remains the same whether we use a sentence or its negation (e.g., 'Is Peter drunk?'/ 'Is Peter not drunk?'), which, of course, does not hold for assertions. Tsohatzidis proposes that yes-no questions have no propositional content at all, but are 'higher order illocutionary acts' the content of which are 'sets of possible first-order illocutionary acts' (265), i.e., sets of possible answers. He also shows that Searle's claim that questions are reducible to directives (i.e., ordering a statement by the addressee) is inconsistent with the *content invariance thesis*, as the content of a directive concerns an act by the addressee (like *speaking about Peter*) and not the (supposed) content of the question (like Peter's drunkenness). Kepa Korta and John Perry take up the idea of reflexive truth/satisfaction conditions. Perry himself has developed a theory of reflexive truth conditions of utterances. Relating this theory to the more traditional speech act framework, they see referential content (in Perry's theory) corresponding to the locutionary act (in speech act theory), and reflexive content to force.

With Searle's essay this anthology provides an update of his view of the relation between the philosophy of language and the philosophy of mind. Not all essays discuss Searle's work in detail: some rather explain their own alternatives views. There is also no reply by Searle to those essays challenging his position. Some of the essays, nonetheless, put forth state-of-the-art criticism of Searle's position and develop refinements within speech act theory. Everyone interested in speech act theory — especially the relation between force and content — will benefit from reading this book.

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**Michael Weinman**

*Aristotle, Ethics and Pleasure.*

New York: Continuum 2007.

Pp. 192.

US\$110.00 (cloth ISBN-13: 978-0-8264-9604-1).

This book is born out of a dissertation supervised by Claudia Baracchi, whose praise for the project is recorded on the back cover. In it, Weinman argues that a failure to consider accounts of pleasure in Aristotle's physical works (esp. *Physics*, *Metaphysics* and *De Anima*) leads to an impoverished understanding of pleasure and its role in Aristotle's *Nicomachean Ethics* (*NE*). The central purpose of the book is 'to provide an account of the role of pleasure and desire in Aristotle's account of the human, but not *merely* human, good' (1).

Following the introduction, the book is divided into two parts. Part 1 focuses on the idea of pleasure in the physical works. Weinman argues that Aristotle espouses the 'unity of desire and pleasure' within a natural and cosmological context (27). On this view, all pleasures are unified 'insofar as they are the expression of the fundamental nature of all things that are *phusei*' (70); all desires and pleasures are 'united in their cosmological character' (34). Weinman insists that Aristotle's account of desire and striving for what is best (complete, even divine) 'never for a moment exceeds or denies [a human's] fundamental existence as a desiring, sensing, and self-sustaining being' (33). Spelled out, that character is of an inferior yearning for its superior. The order and good of the *cosmos* is causally responsible for the possibility of human goodness — it is a precondition of human good — on this account.

In Part 2 Weinman works through what he identifies as 'impasses' facing current interpretations of *NE*, by drawing on the 'lessons' learned from the accounts of pleasure in the physical works. He argues that reason and desire are 'partners and true friends' insofar as they direct our ethical actions and development (85). This fits with the more controversial claim that 'the objects of desire *are* the objects of thought . . . to be an object of thought just is to be an object of desire, and vice versa' (54). It also fits with Aristotle's insistence in *NE* VI 2 that choice is deliberative desire or desiderative thought.

Considering the *ergon* argument of *NE* I 7, Weinman builds on the interpretive thesis that the human good — the being-at-work related to one's natural *ergon* — is an expression ('one flowering among many' [100]) of the cosmological good. Thus, he argues, the human good is *the* human, but not *merely* human, good.

In the final chapters, Weinman argues that pleasure is the good: 'that being a good human being precisely is experiencing pleasure proper to the human being as such,' and that this is only seen fully in the account of the contemplative life (111). Not any pleasures count: only those *proper* to humans are identified with the human good. If Weinman's interpretation of the physical works is adopted, these are the pleasures proper to us by nature, and the alignment of the proper pleasures and the human good is cosmologically

underwritten: it is in our nature to experience pleasure when completing our *ergon*.

Weinman consistently returns to the idea of a 'cosmologically-underwritten good for all living things, both as individuals and as part of an ordered whole (*kosmos*)' (34). This good is 'the universal good of the whole of nature — if one is even prepared to allow that such an over-arching good exists' (63). Weinman puts aside the 'if' and argues that Aristotle conceives of the human good as a 'natural, and thus cosmological, good' (136). Given this emphasis, it is unfortunate we aren't told more about Aristotle's conception(s) of nature(s) in relation to the *cosmos*.

It is also unfortunate that we don't find a fuller engagement with the arguments in *NE* I 6 to make clear how we are to understand the idea that, for Aristotle, 'human good . . . is subordinate to, and only identifiable in light of, the good of the cosmos' (67), in contrast to the Platonic account which attributes all goodness to a single Idea which, to use Weinman's language, certainly *underwrites* the good of all that is in nature.

Weinman employs a number of non-traditional translations in this book. For examples, *hexeis* is rendered 'so-holdings' and *energeia* is rendered 'being-at-work'. This succeeds in reminding us of the limitations of traditional translations. It also yields some cumbersome results. *Entelechia*, for instance, is rendered 'ceaseless-setting-to-work' (36), 'at-work-staying-complete' (39) and 'never ceasing setting-to-work' (39). The movement, say, of acorn to oak is described as the informing of material that is the 'never-ceasing being-at-work (the being-at-work-staying-itself)' (11). Here we might fare better with the Greek.

Weinman presents his arguments with a refreshing efficiency and his interpretations of passages from both the physical works and the *NE* are worth considering, even if they are not always entirely compelling. That the book is not over-burdened with references to others' interpretations is a strength even with the result that some of the arguments put forward lack the detail needed to put Weinman's interpretive theses to the test fully. For one example, Weinman's interpretation of the notoriously difficult passages on *akrasia* is, in its general approach, not new to the literature, yet we can only guess how Weinman's work would help us address challenges raised by competing interpretations of these same passages. More to the point, it isn't clear that Weinman relies on the lessons learned in the first half of the project to resolve the puzzle of *akrasia* in *NE* VII 3 though his interpretation is certainly consistent with those lessons.

The real value of this project comes from the move towards reading the *NE* in the context of the wider Aristotelian corpus. We should count ourselves lucky if Weinman's book leads to more work in this direction.

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**Roslyn Weiss**

*The Socratic Paradox and its Enemies.*

Chicago: University of Chicago Press 2006.

Pp. 240.

US\$35.00 (cloth ISBN-13: 978-0-226-89172-9);

US\$25.00 (paper ISBN-13: 978-0-226-89173-6).

One of the features of Plato's Socratic dialogues that lend them such a high degree of verisimilitude is the vivid way that fifth-century intellectual currents enliven the disputes that Socrates is made to pursue with his interlocutors, a variety of Sophists, politicians, professionals, and ordinary citizens. Sophistic attacks on *nomos* and hence, on justice, are evidenced both within and (if we are to take seriously the evidence of Antiphon's *On Truth* or Aristophanes' *Clouds*) outside the Platonic corpus. One man, however, roamed the streets of Athens in search of Sophistic theses to hunt down and destroy. Socrates' mission? To defend justice and to defeat her enemies, one Sophist at a time. Socrates was armed and dangerous: he came prepared to use whatever means were at his disposal to oppose the enemies of justice. The most powerful weapons he used came from the arsenal of the enemy: Socrates most effectively combats Sophists and Sophistic theses in their own terms.

With this appealing insight into the origin of the language that Socrates employs in the well-known paradoxes, Weiss offers an original interpretation of their purpose, and arrives at conclusions that challenge what might be thought of as a growing orthodoxy. Focusing especially on the purportedly Socratic denial of *akrasia* and its variants in the dialogues, Weiss attempts to show that what have now come to be theses or even tenets attributed to Socrates, eudaimonism (the view that an agent primarily or even exclusively pursues her own well being) and its attendant psychological egoism (the view that an agent acts in her own self-interest), are not in fact endorsed by Socrates or even recognized by Socrates as legitimate ways of characterizing rational behavior.

Weiss' book begins in the world of philology, tracing the formulations that supposedly underwrite Socratic egoism to their Sophistic counterparts: since, e.g., Thrasymachus argues that no one is willingly just (*Republic* I), Socrates will argue that no one is willingly unjust, i.e., that all wrongdoing is involuntary. Therefore, Socrates does not actually endorse what Weiss calls 'a host of odd ideas' associated with the denial of *akrasia*, i.e., ethical or psychological egoism. On the contrary, 'Socrates presumes no inability of the part of people to act against their own judgment of where their interests lie.' Nevertheless, according to Weiss, Socrates does have a distinctive 'moral position'. He holds that out of desire and fear people fail to do what is best for themselves and deliberately commit injustice, thereby voluntarily bringing upon themselves a condition of ill being or wretchedness (22).

Here as everywhere the devil is in the details, so Weiss goes on to analyze key passages in the Socratic dialogues that are often taken to demonstrate the Socratic denial of *akrasia* (*Protagoras* 358c6-d4: ch.2), the Socratic claim

that no one commits injustice willingly (*Gorgias* 509: ch. 3), the Socratic claim that the good man is an intentional wrongdoer (*Hippias Minor* 372: ch. 3), the Socratic claim that no one wants bad things (*Meno* 78-79: ch.4), the 'Socratic' objection that no desires are independent of the good (*Republic* IV: ch. 5), and the claim that just punishment is fine or noble in *Laws* 9 (ch. 6). In this space, we can do no more than give the essential grounds of Weiss' alternative reading, beginning with the *Protagoras*.

Weiss stakes out her ground by disclosing the character defects of Socrates' interlocutor, emphasizing his calculating, self-protective precautions in the face of the Athenian democracy, in other words, the extent to which fear governs his self-presentation. The heart of the exchange involves Socrates' securing the agreement that 'for the many' there is no substantive difference between pleasure and the good; correct calculation of pleasure and pain will secure well being. Weiss insists that the hedonism Socrates postulates merely targets the values of the many; his reduction of good and bad to quantities of pleasure and pain effectively does away with the possibility of *akrasia*; yet, in reality, Socrates is acutely aware of how often people choose pleasure over the good.

In a similar vein, Weiss shows that Polus' intoxication with power has blinded him not only to the ills associated with injustice, but even to the obvious revulsion that acts like murder, theft, and genocide ought to occasion. Socrates uses outright ambiguity to guide Polus into a verbal agreement, and so, to a defeat that will be necessary, for the law of force and power is the only authority that Polus, under Gorgias' tutelage, now recognizes.

Another example of Weiss' investigation into Socrates' eristic *via* philology may be found in Chapter 4, where her subject is the paradox as it is articulated in the *Meno*, that no one desires bad things. Again Weiss shows how Socrates' approach to his target is *ad hominem*: Meno is a young man, fascinated by the world of wealth and ambition that are associated with aristocracy. His considered definition of virtue, expensive taste and the power to gratify it, is little more than a reflection of greed and aspiration, dressed up as elite refinement. Socrates advances against Meno by insinuating justice and moderation into the conversation, virtues that naturally work against these acquisitive tendencies. He aims to destroy Meno's pretensions by reducing all agents to the status of everyman: everyone wants good things — here we are all on level ground. At this point Socrates introduces the distinction, easily overlooked in translation, between kinds of objects: fine and good (*kala* and *agatha*); bad and unrefined (*kaka* and *aischra*), and he manages to substitute Meno's vocabulary of refinement with his own vocabulary of harm and benefit. Again, Socrates distinguishes between wanting (*boulesthai*) and desiring (*epithumein*), verbs which refer, respectively, to objects of rational choice, or questions of value, and objects of appetitive wish, or impulsive desire, irrespective of other considerations. Hence, Socrates forces Meno to concede no one wants, ultimately, to fare poorly or to be in a state of misery. Nevertheless, Socrates still allows plenty of scope for people to desire all kinds of things, and in this sense, recognizes the extent to which untamed desires and

unchecked resolve lead those who lack moderation and justice into profound but voluntary unhappiness.

Weiss' subtle reading of *Republic IV*, which denies the 'standard view' that Glaucon's objection to the good independent desires pursued by *epithumia* and *thumos*, represents the views of an earlier Socratic position that Plato now wishes to refute, is actually endorsed by a number of newer interpretations. For example, Lorenz writes, 'the idea of these three kinds of motive (appetitive, spirited and wisdom) already appears to be in Plato's *Apology*' (*The Brute Within*, 18). According to Weiss, at any rate, Socrates has all along recognized and even lamented that most desires proliferate at the cost of overall well being, of justice, and of rational choice. Weiss' point is that for Socrates, people invite this evaluation by virtue of how they act on desires that proliferate owing to a variety of causes. Although they are free to choose the good, most people lack courage, temperance, justice, and ultimately wisdom, without which their *arête* is rendered ineffectual. Socrates, far from being an intellectualist, one who thinks that knowledge alone determines virtue, sees a place for resisting those fears and desires; moreover, far from being a *eudaimonist*, Socrates regrettably witnesses most people choosing precisely to pursue desires that will never lead to any degree of secure well being; finally, far from being an egoist, Socrates thinks that, very often, people will have occasion to go against their own self interests, to choose what is right over what is advantageous, and in so doing, will be decidedly better off.

Weiss' Socrates, to my mind, is distinctively less anachronistic than other modern versions of Socrates and even the majority view of Socrates, which can be summarized as follows: Socrates was a theorist who discovered one fundamental fact about the structure of human motivation, namely, all human beings seek their own happiness, whether or not they are aware of it. For Socrates, according to this thesis, it is impossible for an agent to be motivated to do anything other than what is in the agent's interest.

Can it really be that Socrates is to be credited with the discovery of egoistic *eudaimonism*, the idea that I seek my own good before all else? Rather, for Weiss, this doctrine is part of the Sophistic world that the Socratic dialogues portray. Weiss is right to insist that it is the Sophists, not Socrates, who offer doctrinal pictures of human nature: Socrates uses their theses against them without thereby committing himself to any psychological theories, other than those entailed by common sense.

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