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Theoretical Commitment and Implicit Knowledge: Why Anomalies do not Trigger Learning

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Abstract

A theory consists of a mental model, laws that specify parameters of the model and one or more explanatory schemas. Models represent by being isomorphic to real systems. To explain an event is to reenact its genesis by executing the relevant model in the mind's eye. Schemas capture recurring structural features of explanations. To subscribe to a theory is to be committed to explaining a particular class of events with that theory (and nothing else). Given theoretical commitment, an anomaly, i.e., an event that cannot be explained, is an occasion for theory change, but in the absence of commitment, the response is instead to exclude the anomalous event from the domain of application of the theory. Lay people and children hold their theories implicitly and hence without commitment. These observations imply that the analogy between scientist's theories and children's knowledge is valid, but that the analogy between theory change and learning is not.

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Ohlsson, S. Theoretical Commitment and Implicit Knowledge: Why Anomalies do not Trigger Learning. Science & Education 8, 559–574 (1999). https://doi.org/10.1023/A:1008604626856

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