Abstract
We treat a class of multi-person bargaining mechanisms based on games in coalitional form. For this class of games we identify properties of non-cooperative solution concepts, which are necessary and sufficient for the equilibrium outcomes to coincide with the core of the underlying coalitional form game. We view this result as a non-cooperative axiomatization of the core. In contrast to most of the literature on multi-person bargaining we avoid a precise specification of the rules of the game. Alternatively, we impose properties of such games, which give rise to a large class of mechanisms, all of which are relevant for our axiomatization.
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Okada, A., Winter, E. A Non-cooperative Axiomatization of the Core. Theory and Decision 53, 1–28 (2002). https://doi.org/10.1023/A:1020811218051
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1023/A:1020811218051