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Simulating Market Entry Rewards for Antibiotics Development

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  01 January 2021

Christopher Okhravi ,
Simone Callegari ,
Steve McKeever ,
Carl Kronlid ,
Enrico Baraldi ,
Olof Lindahl  and
Francesco Ciabuschi
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Extract

We design an agent based Monte Carlo model of antibiotics research and development (R&D) to explore the effects of the policy intervention known as Market Entry Reward (MER) on the likelihood that an antibiotic entering pre-clinical development reaches the market. By means of sensitivity analysis we explore the interaction between the MER and four key parameters: projected net revenues, R&D costs, venture capitalists discount rates, and large pharmaceutical organizations' financial thresholds. We show that improving revenues may be more efficient than reducing costs, and thus confirm that this pull-based policy intervention effectively stimulates antibiotics R&D.

Type
Symposium Articles
Information
Journal of Law, Medicine & Ethics , Volume 46 , Issue S1: Incentives to Stimulate Research and Development of New Antibiotics: Detailed Assessments of Select Incentives and Models , Spring 2018 , pp. 32 - 42
Copyright
Copyright © American Society of Law, Medicine and Ethics 2018

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