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In search of lost time, Merleau-Ponty, Bergson, and the time of objects

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Abstract

The chapter on temporality in Merleau-Ponty’s Phenomenology of Perception, is situated in a section titled, “Being-for-Itself and Being-in-the-World.” As such, Merleau-Ponty’s task in the chapter on temporality is to bring these two positions together, in other words, to articulate the manner in which time links the cogito (Being-for-Itself) with freedom (Being-in-the-World). To accomplish this, Merleau-Ponty proposes a subject located at the junction of the for-itself and the in-itself, a subject which has an exterior that makes it possible for others to have an interior. This analysis will take Merleau-Ponty to an impasse where, on the one hand, there appears to be an objective world and the time of objects in that world, and on the other, there is the subject’s notion of events and the passing of time. Referring to Bergson’s notion of time, this essay proposes that there must be a temporal interval between perception, feeling and action in order for the subject to be “temporal by means of an inner necessity,” as Merleau-Ponty prescribes.

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Notes

  1. Merleau-Ponty (1992, p. 410; 1945, p. 469).

  2. See, for example, Dillon (1980, pp. 155–171). See also Merleau-Ponty (1964, pp. 159–190; 1993, pp. 121–149).

  3. Sartre (1984, pp. 9–16).

  4. Heidegger (1996, pp. 153–161).

  5. Ibid., pp. 82–87.

  6. Merleau-Ponty (1992, p. 369; 1945, p. 423).

  7. Merleau-Ponty (1992, pp. 370, 371; 1945, pp. 424, 425).

  8. This is the empiricist position of Hume (1968, pp. 251–262).

  9. Merleau-Ponty (1992, p. 371; 1945, pp. 424, 425).

  10. For a basic explanation see: http://mathworld.wolfram.com/CartesianCoordinates.html. The ability to make predictions arises with the development of differential calculus, generally attributed to Leibniz and Newton.

  11. Klein (1964, p. 106).

  12. Ibid., p. 107.

  13. Descartes (1972a, b, pp. 149, 13).

  14. Merleau-Ponty (1992, p. 372; 1945, p. 426).

  15. Schneider and Sagan (2005, pp. 26–28).

  16. Merleau-Ponty (1992, p. 372; 1945, p. 428) Translation altered. The translation “hermetically sealed” is not literal and does not reflect the thermodynamic idea of a closed or isolated system.

  17. Merleau-Ponty (1992, pp. 372–373; 1945, pp. 426–427).

  18. Merleau-Ponty (1992, p. 383; 1945, p. 439). “‘Je pense, je suis,’ les deux affirmations sont bien équivalentes … c’est … le Je pense qui est réintégré au mouvement de transcendance du Je suis et la conscience á l’existence” (emphasis added). Possibly this means simply “to” existence rather than “into.”

  19. It is fascinating to see how much of the chapter on the cogito in the Phenomenology discusses sexuality and love. Following this up is unfortunately outside the scope of this essay.

  20. Merleau-Ponty (1992, p. 412; 1945, p. 471).

  21. Deleuze (1986, p. 4). Certainly this progression is part of Deleuze’s general methodology. In departing from the Greek notions of Form and Substance, and by embracing the concept of the differentiable instant on a plane of immanence, developed by calculus, as well as the notion of time as an independent variable, Deleuze is simply formulating a metaphysics compatible with modern science.

  22. Dewitt (2004, p. 209).

  23. Durie (1999, p. xvii).

  24. Durie (1999, p. vii). Merleau-Ponty credits Bergson with rejecting physiological causal theories of memory but maintains that Bergson posits a theory of psychological preservation of memory (see Merleau-Ponty 1992, pp. 412–413).

  25. Bergson (1988, p. 8). It seems to me that Bergson is proposing a new image for science, but since he was a philosopher and not a physicist, he was and remains widely misunderstood.

  26. Depew and Weber (1995, p. 92).

  27. Bergson (1983, pp. 6–7). This corresponds to the static view of classical dynamics set forth by Stengers and Prigogine.

  28. Bergson (1983, p. 99). Photons are a quantum of electromagnetic radiation (see Margulis and Sagan 1997, p. 8, 24) Margulis is a well-known evolutionary biologist, Sagan a science writer.

  29. Margulis and Sagan (1997, p. 28). Life is only one example of thermodynamic systems, but as the authors admit, it is among the most interesting.

  30. Bergson (1983, p. 102). Margulis and Sagan seem to evade mechanism as well as finalism altogether.

  31. Bergson (1983, p. 88). This corresponds to what Deleuze calls ‘force’ (see Deleuze 1994, p. 141).

  32. For this reason, Creative Evolution is a thorough critique of empiricism and empirical principles as well as of Kantianism and Kantian principles.

  33. Merleau-Ponty (1992, p. 415; 1945, p. 474).

  34. Merleau-Ponty (1964, p. 173).

  35. Ibid., p. 161.

  36. Ibid., p. 167, 162.

  37. Olkowski (2006, pp. 113–139). The relevant argument from this essay is that without a temporal interval of sensibility and reflection on feeling between active perception and action, between perception and objectification, there is no reference to oneself and there is no reflection on how to respond. Such reference is here provided by feeling, and insofar as this is the case, feeling must be a necessary though not sufficient condition of objectivity.

  38. Sartre (1984, p. 258).

  39. Merleau-Ponty (1964, pp. 168, 170).

  40. Ibid., p. 173. This is Merleau-Ponty’s definition of depth. Merleau-Ponty is critical of Descartes for eliminating acting at a distance but not to do so is to reinforce the model of magical relations between things that are purely external to one another (see also Casey 1991, pp. 1–30).

  41. Merleau-Ponty (1964, pp. 166–167).

  42. I have addressed this “normative” perception in Olkowski (2000, pp. 185–205).

  43. Merleau-Ponty (1963, p. 125). “Behavior…. does not unfold in objective time and space like a series of physical events; each moment does not occupy one and one point of time; rather, at the decisive moment of learning, a ‘now’ stands out from the series of ‘nows,’ acquires a particular value and summarizes the groupings which have preceded it as it engages and anticipates the future of behavior; this ‘now’ transforms the singular situation of the experience into a typical situation and the effective reaction into an aptitude. From this moment on, behavior is detached from the order of the in-itself (en-soi) and becomes the projection outside the organism of a possibility which is internal to it. The world, inasmuch as it harbors living beings, ceases to be a material plenum consisting of juxtaposed parts; it opens up at the place where behavior appears.”

  44. Merleau-Ponty (1963, p. 125). “I am aware of perceiving the world as well as behavior which, caught in it, intends numerically one and the same world, which is to say that, in the experience of behavior, I effectively surpass the alternative of the for-itself (pour-soi) and the in-itself (en-soi)” (p. 126).

  45. Merleau-Ponty (1992, p. 280, 281; 1945, p. 324, 325).

  46. Merleau-Ponty (1992, p. 267; 1945, p. 309). “We shall have to discover, beneath the objective idea of movement, a pre-objective experience from which it borrows its significance, and in which movement, still linked to the person perceiving it, is a variation of the subject’s hold on this world.”.

  47. A simple introduction to calculus can be found at www.mueller.com/precalculus.

  48. Merleau-Ponty (1992, p. 27; 1945, p. 315). “The perception of movement is not secondary to the perception of the moving object.”.

  49. Merleau-Ponty (1992, p. 267, 268; 1945, pp. 309–310).

  50. Merleau-Ponty (1992, pp. 267–268; 1945, pp. 310–311). The limit of this point of view is that once a strict distinction is made between the identical body in motion and movement, the implication is that there are spatial and temporal positions identifiable in themselves.

  51. Merleau-Ponty (1992, p. 272; 1945, p. 315). These are not, it seems to me, Merleau-Ponty’s most lucid pages.

  52. Merleau-Ponty (1992, p. 272; 1945, p. 319). Thus, “the unity of movement is not a real unity. But neither is multiplicity real… a real multiplicity which consciousness has to surmount.”

  53. Merleau-Ponty (1992, pp. 273–274; 1945, p. 317). “It is the circle as a thing in the world which possesses in advance and in itself all the properties which analysis (la pensée thétique) is destined to discover in it.”

  54. Merleau-Ponty (1992, p. 276, 1945, p. 319). The positive references to Kant here are striking since Kant is often the recipient of a great deal of Merleau-Ponty’s criticism. The bulk of these comments are directed against Henri Bergson who Merleau-Ponty reads as a realist with a dualist notion of matter and memory, and who is criticized as “ambiguous” (l’équivoque)!

  55. Tasić (2001, pp. 54–55). Phenomenological reduction of experiences of the external world “could potentially be problematic when it comes to language. It is not immediately clear how the evidence of anything could be collected in a cognizant manner if language were finally bracketed off.” Even if it turns out that there are universal “deep” language structures, no one speaks without being spoken to.

  56. Martin (1961, pp. 22–23). This explains why Kant’s explanation of time is modeled on space.

  57. Kant (1965, A26, B42; A34, B50; cited in Martin 1961, p. 39).

  58. Merleau-Ponty (1992, p. 275; 1945, p. 318). Only objective time is made up of successive moments.

  59. This useful and clear account of wave behavior can be found at one of the many excellent websites for students: http://www.physicsclassroom.com/Class/waves/U10L3a.cfm.

  60. http://www.physicsclassroom.com/Class/waves/u10l1b.cfm. Additionally, when two waves meet, the medium changes shape resulting from the net effect of the two individual waves; however, the waves themselves continue unabated on their path.

  61. Husserl (1971, pp. 40–46).

  62. Ibid., p. 45.

  63. Ibid., p. 48.

  64. Ibid., pp. 46–52.

  65. Ibid., p. 47.

  66. Ibid., pp. 53–54.

  67. Ibid., p. 95.

  68. Ibid., p. 96, 97.

  69. Ibid., p. 98.

  70. Ibid., p. 97.

  71. See note 54 above.

  72. Ibid.

  73. Merleau-Ponty (1992, p. 456; 1945, p. 520). “Your abode is your act itself. You act is you…You give yourself in exchange…Your significance shows itself.”

  74. Merleau-Ponty (1992, p. 279; 1945, p. 323). “C’est une marche au réel.”

  75. Merleau-Ponty (1992, p. 280; 1945, p. 325). In part, the idea that we are temporally committed to the spaces we inhabit implies that the network of temporal relations that constitute human spatiality are also the basis of our ethical commitments.

  76. Merleau-Ponty (1992, pp. 282–283; 1945, pp. 326–327).

  77. Lakoff and Johnson (1999, p. 268). I have addressed cognitive theories more fully in Olkowski (2003, pp. 4–21).

  78. Lakoff and Johnson (1999, p. 54).

  79. Merleau-Ponty (1992, p. 285; 1945, p.330).

  80. Ibid.

  81. Merleau-Ponty (1992, p. 286; 1945, p. 331).

  82. Bergson (1988, p. 186). What makes Bergson’s concept of memory so complex is that the whole of psychical life is reinterpreted with each new perception (see also ibid., pp. 161–162).

  83. Bergson (1983, p. 5).

  84. Bergson (1988, p. 71). In the real, perception and recollection interpenetrate.

  85. Ibid., p. 102.

  86. Husserl (1971, sect. 37, p. 101).

  87. Merleau-Ponty (1992, p. 283; 1945, p. 327). Emphases added.

  88. Merleau-Ponty (1992, pp. 284, 285, 286; 1945, pp. 329, 330, 331).

  89. Merleau-Ponty (1992, p. 286; 1945, p. 331).

  90. Beauvoir (1976, p. 27). For this view of Beauvoir’s ethics see my forthcoming essay, “Letting Go the Weight of the Past, Beauvoir and the Joy of Existence,” in a volume being edited by Sylvia Stoller.

  91. Merleau-Ponty (1992, p. 452; 1945, p. 517, 518).

  92. Merleau-Ponty (1992, p. 410; 1945, p. 469).

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    Dorothea Olkowski

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Olkowski, D. In search of lost time, Merleau-Ponty, Bergson, and the time of objects. Cont Philos Rev 43, 525–544 (2010). https://doi.org/10.1007/s11007-010-9152-7

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