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Licensed Unlicensed Requires Authentication Published by De Gruyter June 11, 2018

Ich, Selbstbewusstsein und der psychologische Paralogismus. Zur möglichen Bestimmung reflexiver Subjektivität und zur unmöglichen Bestimmung einer Ich-Substanz bei Kant

  • Carsten Olk EMAIL logo
From the journal Kant-Studien

Abstract:

This article addresses the fact of possible and impossible determination of the I or the self-reflective I. In this context, two questions in particular are discussed: What epistemic functions of the I can be legitimately identified, and what kinds of determination of the I are invalid? A theoretical proof of the immortality of a single, persistent substance of the soul (anima) is not possible, because no material substance that corresponds to the I can be found or determined. As this article shows, however, at least a specific form of knowledge of the I, with a view to Kant’s unity of apperception and its actions, can be observed and is therefore epistemically justified.

Published Online: 2018-6-11
Published in Print: 2018-6-7

© 2018 Walter de Gruyter GmbH, Berlin/Boston

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