Abstract
Traditionally, the debate between epistemological internalists and externalists has centered on the value of knowledge and its justification. A “value pluralist,” virtue-theoretic approach to epistemology allows us to accept what I shall call the “insight of externalism” while still acknowledging the importance of internalists’ insistence on the value of reflection. Intellectual virtue can function as the unifying consideration in a study of a host of epistemic values, including understanding, wisdom, and what I call “articulate reflection.” Each of these epistemic values is a good internal to inquiry. Thus, an inquiry-based conception of virtue is particularly well suited to help us account for a wide variety of epistemic goods, without reducing the value of those many goods to their contribution to the value of knowledge. Moreover, an inquiry-based conception of virtue can function as the unifying consideration in a general study of value, the scope of which is not restricted to epistemic value.
This is a preview of subscription content, log in via an institution to check access.
Similar content being viewed by others
Notes
I will use the substantive term, “articulate reflection” in place of the more cumbersome phrase, “the ability to give an account of one’s knowledge.” The latter phrase is a bit more accurate in that it expresses an ability or competence. I intend the more wieldy term, “articulate reflection,” to express this as well, though I admit that it does not do so as naturally or explicitly.
Crediting the origin of this term to Jonathan Kvanvig, Wayne Riggs adopts it to describe his own approach to epistemology.
According to Riggs, value-driven epistemology “yields the demand that theories of knowledge must provide, not just an adequate account of the nature of knowledge, but also an account of the value of knowledge” (Riggs 2009b, p. 331).
In “A Causal Theory of Knowing” Alvin Goldman claims that we can avoid Gettier-style counterexamples by reducing the epistemic dialectic between justification and knowledge to non-epistemic, causal processes (Goldman 1967). Goldman’s theory is externalist because the knowing subject need not be able to give an account of the causal processes that justify her belief. Goldman’s earliest efforts to develop a causal theory of knowing made the criteria for knowledge attribution too liberal. Goldman corrected this problem in “Discrimination and Perceptual Knowledge” by insisting that belief-producing causal mechanisms must be “in an appropriate sense, ‘reliable’” (Goldman 1976). Reliabilist epistemology had since become the dominant form of epistemological externalism.
As Christopher Hookway rightly points out, “[e]ven if it transpires that the concepts of knowledge and justified belief are as important as most philosophers suppose, this is an epistemological conclusion rather than being something which is definitive of the discipline from the beginning” (Hookway 2003, p. 201).
By “plurality” I mean that the value of virtue is not reducible to any one of virtue’s values—no more than the value of gold is reducible to its excellent conductivity.
Hilary Kornblith points out: “Sosa’s virtue perspectivism is itself a kind of middle ground between uncompromising externalism and uncompromising internalism” (Kornblith 2004, p. 126). It is unclear, however, whether Sosa’s virtue perspectivism acknowledges the epistemic value of the ability to account for one’s knowledge. Sosa seems to do so when he writes: “A belief constitutes not just animal but reflective knowledge… only under a supporting perspective by the subject, who must have some awareness of the source of that belief and the reliability of that source…. And it will do so through a kind of distinctive explanatory coherence, as it comes in tandem with the subject’s ability to explain how the relevant belief is bound to be true, given its source (Sosa 2004, p. 313 [emphasis added]). But in another passage (from the same volume) Sosa claims: “[c]onscious reflection on the sport is not required [for reflective knowledge]… since a second-order perspective can work beneath the surface of consciousness” (Sosa 2004, p. 292).
In his reply to Kornblith, Sosa insists that “reflective knowledge is indeed one more sort of knowledge to be listed alongside these others. Among these it deserves a special place, however, or so I will now argue” (Greco 2004, p. 291). In the ensuing argument, Sosa defends the importance of his distinction between animal and reflective knowledge against Kornblith’s claim that the distinction is no better than the equally unhelpful distinction between “consultative” and “non-consultative” knowledge (Greco 2004, pp. 131–132). But Sosa misses Kornblith’s deeper objection. For even if Sosa is right that reflection is of greater value than consultation, he has given us no reason to think that the value of reflection must consist in its contribution to the value of any kind of knowledge.
This is Hookway’s phrase (Hookway 2003, p. 202). As I will explain below, this characterization of inquiry is inadequate though not always inaccurate.
Elsewhere, Hookway boldly asserts that in the absence of virtue “rational deliberation and inquiry would be impossible” (Hookway 2001, p. 197n).
Similarly, Hume concludes his Treatise with the following words: “An anatomist… is admirably fitted to give advice to a painter; and ‘tis even impracticable to excel in the latter art, without the assistance of the former. We must have an exact knowledge of the parts, their situation and connexion, before we can design with any elegance or correctness. And thus the most abstract speculations concerning human nature, however cold and unentertaining, become subservient to practical morality; and may render this latter science more correct in its precepts, and more persuasive in its exhortations” (Hume 1978, p. 621).
I thank Kelly Becker for suggesting this point to me.
My understanding is that they do not exist; but that is unimportant since the philosopher’s chicken-sexer merely stands for a type of case that is invented to expose certain intuitions regarding knowledge.
There remains much to be said about the difference between the intensity and extensity of values. I will not broach this broader axiological topic here; but I hope to motivate the point that the intensive valuation of knowledge (upon which most contemporary epistemologists focus) comes apart from questions concerning the extensity of the value of knowledge.
The handy term “zetetic” was introduced into contemporary epistemology by Guy Axtell, who uses it to refer to any inquiry-focused approach to epistemology—though the term may be used to denote an inquiry-focused approach to any subject matter.
References
Aristotle. (2000). Nichomachean ethics. (R. Crisp Trans. and ed.). Cambridge texts in the history of philosophy (K. Ameriks Series ed.). Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Axtell, G. (1996). Epistemic virtue talk: The reemergence of American axiology? The Journal of Speculative Philosophy, 10(3), 172–198.
Axtell, G. (2000). Virtue theory and the fact/value problem. In G. Axtell (Ed.), Knowledge, belief, and character (pp. 177–194). Lanham: Rowman & Littlefield.
Axtell, G. (2008). Expanding epistemology: A responsibilist approach. Philosophical Papers, 37(1), 51–88.
Axtell, G., & Olson, P. (2009). Three independent factors in epistemology. Contemporary Pragmatism, 6(2), 89–109.
Baehr, J. (2009). Is there a value problem? In A. Haddock, A. Millar, & D. Pritchard (Eds.), Epistemic value (pp. 42–59). Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Code, L. (1987). Epistemic responsibility. Hannover: University Press of New England.
Code, L. (2006). Ecological thinking. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Dancy, J. (1995). Supervenience, virtues and consequences. Philosophical Studies, 78, 221–235.
Elgin, C. (2006). From knowledge to understanding. In S. Heatherington (Ed.), Epistemology futures (pp. 199–215). Oxford: Clarendon Press.
Fine, G. (1990). Knowledge and belief in Republic V-VII. In S. Everson (Ed.), Companions to ancient thought I: epistemology (pp. 85–115). Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Goldman, A. (1967). A causal theory of knowing. The Journal of Philosophy, 64(12), 357–372.
Goldman, A. (1976). Discrimination and perceptual knowledge. The Journal of Philosophy, 73(20), 771–791.
Hookway, C. (2000). Regulating inquiry: Virtue, doubt, and sentiment. In G. Axtell (ed.) Knowledge, belief, and character (pp. 149–160). Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield.
Hookway, C. (2001). Epistemic Akrasia and epistemic virtue. In Z. Fairweather (Ed.), Virtue epistemology: Essays in epistemic virtue and responsibility (pp. 178–199). Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Hookway, C. (2003). How to be a virtue epistemologist. In Z. DePaul (Ed.), Intellectual virtue: Perspectives from ethics and epistemology (pp. 183–202). Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Hookway, C. (2006). Epistemology and inquiry: The primacy of practice. In S. Hetherington (Ed.), Epistemology futures (pp. 95–110). Oxford: Clarendon Press.
Hume, D. (1978). In L.A. Selby-Bigge (ed.), A treatise on human nature (2nd ed.). Oxford: Clarendon Press.
Kornblith, H. (2004). Sosa on human and animal knowledge. In J. Greco (Ed.), Ernest Sosa and his critics (pp. 126–134). Malden: Blackwell.
Kvanvig, J. (2003). In E Sosa (ed.), The value of knowledge and the pursuit of understanding. Cambridge studies in philosophy. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Napier, S. (2008). Virtue epistemology: Motivation and knowledge. London: Continuum.
Plato. (1963). Meno. (W. K. C. Guthrie, Trans.) In E. Hamilton & H. Cairns (eds.), The collected dialogues of Plato (pp. 353–384). Princeton: Princeton University Press.
Riggs, W. (2008). The value turn in epistemology. In V. Hendricks & D. Pritchard (Eds.), New waves in epistemology. Houndsmills, UK: Palgrave Macmillan.
Riggs, W. (2009a). Luck, knowledge, and control. In A. Haddock, A. Millar, & D. Pritchard (eds.), Epistemic value (pp. 204–221). Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Riggs, W. (2009b). Understanding, knowledge, and the Meno requirement. In Epistemic value (pp. 331–338). Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Roberts, R. C., & Wood, W. J. (2007). Intellectual virtues: An essay in regulative epistemology. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Sosa, E. (1980). The raft and the pyramid: Coherence versus foundations in the theory of knowledge. Midwest Studies in Philosophy, 5(1), 3–26.
Sosa, E. (1991). Knowledge in perspective. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Sosa, E. (1997). Reflective knowledge in the best circles. The Journal of Philosophy, 94(8), 410–430.
Sosa, E. (2004). Replies. In Greco (ed.) Ernest Sosa and his critics (pp. 275–326). Oxford: Blackwell.
Sosa, E. (2007). A virtue epistemology: Apt belief and reflective knowledge (Vol. 1). Oxford: Clarendon Press.
Sosa, E. (2009). Reflective knowledge: Apt belief and reflective knowledge (Vol. 2). Oxford: Clarendon Press.
Thomas, A. (2008). The genealogy of epistemic virtue concepts. Philosophical Papers, 37(3), 345–369.
Zagzebski, L. (1996). Virtues of the mind: An inquiry into the nature of virtue and the ethical foundations of knowledge. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Zagzebski, L. (2000). From reliabilism to virtue epistemology. In G. Axtell (ed.), Knowledge, belief, and character (pp. 113–122). Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield.
Zagzebski, L. (2003a). Intellectual motivation and the good of truth. In M. DePaul & L. Zagzebski (eds.) Intellectual virtue (pp. 135–154). Oxford: Clarendon Press.
Zagzebski, L. (2003b). The search for the source of epistemic good. Metaphilosophy, 34(1–2), 12–28.
Zagzebski, L. (2004). Epistemic value and the primacy of what we care about. Philosophical Papers, 33(3), 353–377.
Acknowledgments
I owe many thanks to Guy Axtell, Heather Battaly, Kelly Becker, Mark Risjord, Michael Sullivan, and an anonymous reviewer at Metaphilosophy for their helpful comments on earlier drafts of this paper. I am also grateful to the faculty and graduate students in the Philosophy Department at Virginia Tech, who asked insightful and challenging questions when I presented a rougher version of this paper to them in the Spring of 2009.
Author information
Authors and Affiliations
Corresponding author
Rights and permissions
About this article
Cite this article
Olson, P.R. Putting knowledge in its place: virtue, value, and the internalism/externalism debate. Philos Stud 159, 241–261 (2012). https://doi.org/10.1007/s11098-011-9700-y
Published:
Issue Date:
DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s11098-011-9700-y