Towards Justice and Virtue: A Constructive Account of Practical ReasoningTowards Justice and Virtue challenges the rivalry between those who advocate only abstract, universal principles of justice and those who commend only the particularities of virtuous lives. Onora O'Neill traces this impasse to defects in underlying conceptions of reasoning about action. She proposes and vindicates an alternative, more modest, account of ethical reasoning, a reasoned way of answering the question "who counts?", and constructs a linked account of the principles that are basic for moving toward just institutions and virtuous lives. |
Contents
Overview justice against virtue? | 9 |
ancient origins | 11 |
current confrontations | 16 |
some popular stories | 23 |
some alternative stories | 31 |
Practical reason abstraction and construction | 38 |
21 Abstraction and idealization | 39 |
Rawisian models | 44 |
51 Principles and requirements | 125 |
obligations with rights | 128 |
obligations without rights | 136 |
54 Taking obligations seriously | 141 |
55 Embodied obligations | 146 |
Content I principles for all towards justice | 154 |
61 Inclusive universal principles | 155 |
62 Conflict and consistency | 157 |
23 Constructing practical reason | 48 |
24 Constructing reason and constructing ethics | 59 |
Focus action intelligibility and principles | 66 |
intelligibility and consequences | 69 |
virtue and action | 71 |
33 Universality uniformity and differences | 73 |
34 Empty formalism rulefollowing and radical particularism | 77 |
35 Some conclusions | 89 |
Scope agents and subjects who counts? | 91 |
universalists and particularists | 93 |
42 Constructing the scope of ethical concern | 97 |
43 Acknowledging plurality connection and finitude | 100 |
44 Denying plurality connection and finitude | 107 |
distant strangers and future generations | 113 |
Structure obligations and rights | 122 |
63 Universalizability and the rejection of injury | 161 |
rejecting injury | 166 |
rejecting direct injury | 168 |
rejecting indirect injury | 174 |
principles design and judgement | 178 |
Content II principles for all towards virtue | 184 |
71 Required and optional virtues | 187 |
why justice is not enough | 189 |
73 Selective care and concern | 195 |
74 Varieties of social virtue | 200 |
75 Supererogation and optional excellences | 206 |
76 Towards justice with virtue | 209 |
| 213 | |
| 222 | |
Other editions - View all
Towards Justice and Virtue: A Constructive Account of Practical Reasoning Onora O'Neill No preview available - 1996 |
Common terms and phrases
abstract account of ethical account of justice account of practical activity Alasdair MacIntyre Amartya Sen assume assumptions basic capacities and capabilities chapter character claims commitments communitarian conception of practical connected consequentialist construction Constructivism contemporary context D. Z. Phillips demands discussion domain of ethical embodied ethical concern ethical consideration ethical principles ethical reasoning ethical requirements ethical standing example focus G. E. M. Anscombe hence human ideals imperfect obligations inclusive principles institutions and practices John Rawls judgement justice and virtue Kant Kantian liberty rights limited lives metaphysical moral natural and man-made Onora O'Neill particular plurality political practical principles practical reasoning principles of action principles of indifference principles of justice Rawls rejecting injury restricted rule-following rules scope of ethical social virtues sorts specific starting points structures supererogatory systematic or gratuitous Theory of Justice thinking thought traditions universal rights universalist vindication virtue ethics virtuous vulnerabilities writers on justice writing