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**A DISCOURSE ON THE HUMAN PERSON BASED ON THE CONCEPT OF 「仁」: A PERSPECTIVE OF KAROL WOJTYŁA’S (SAINT JOHN PAUL II) PHILOSOPHICAL ANTHROPOLOGY**

**以「仁」之概念論「人」：從卡羅˙弗歐茲瓦（聖若望保祿二世）哲學人學之視角論之**

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**ABSTRACT**

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**Topic: A DISCOURSE ON THE HUMAN PERSON BASED ON THE CONCEPT OF 「仁」: A PERSPECTIVE OF KAROL WOJTYŁA’S (SAINT JOHN PAUL II) PHILOSOPHICAL ANTHROPOLOGY**

**Key Word:** **Wojtyła, Confucianism, Personalism, *Jenism*, Person, Act, 「仁。」**

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This work contends that the metaphysical understanding of the human person, simply as a rational and free being is incomprehensive, and for a comprehensive understanding of the human person, there is a need to understand the human person as a conscious being in action and in relationship within and without itself due to the shared consciousness of 「仁。」To guide this philosophical investigation, the writer posits the research question: How can the philosophy of Karol Wojtyła on the human person help to deepen the understanding of the Confucian philosophy of person as 「仁者」? Thus, in this research the writer has three main tasks. The first task is to substantially investigate and expound the philosophical anthropology of Karol Wojtyła. The second task is to investigate and expose the Confucian concept of 「仁。」The third task is to discourse the human person by the means of a re-interpretation of the concept of 「仁者」as the Wojtyłian concept of “Person-revealed-in-Action.” So, the entire Part One of this work, is aimed at achieving the first task, and the entire Part Two, is aimed at achieving the second and the third tasks of the investigation.

The Philosophical anthropology of Karol Wojtyła, is substantially influenced by the philosophy of Thomas Aquinas, and the Philosophy of Max Scheler. Hence, the writer creates the background for the exposition of Karol Wojtyła’s philosophical anthropology by presenting a discourse on Thomas Aquinas and Max Scheler. And to understand the concept of *persona* in Thomas Aquinas there is a need to discuss the philosophical anthropology of Socrates-Plato, Aristotle and Boethius. On the other hand, to understand the phenomenology of Max Scheler, which Karol Wojtyła employed in his analysis of human experience and action, the writer briefly exposes the phenomenology of Edmund Husserl the founder of phenomenological movement and the phenomenology of Heidegger the student of Husserl and the contemporary of Max Scheler. Hence, the writer considers an exposition of the concept of 「仁，」from the perspective of textual analysis of the meaning of 仁 as it is found in three classical text: 《 論語》, 《中庸 》and《孟子》. These three Confucian classics all consider 「仁」as not just an important concept in Confucianism, but as the concept that defines the human person, as the *quiddity* of the human person. The writer therefore, synthesizes Wojtyła’s concept of “person-revealed-in-action”, and the Confucian concept of 「仁者，」to affirm a philosophy of person that is indeed wholistic and comprehensive. This philosophy of person, the writer gives the name: *“Jenism.” “*Jenism” then, is the concept of the human person (人) understood from a synthesis of the Wojtyłian concept of human action and the Confucian understanding of 「仁。」This understanding of the human person, does not only explain the metaphysical *quiddity* of the human person, but also explains the specific difference of the human life. The writer, therefore, is persuaded to think that a philosophy of person has been developed that is capable of responding to the philosophical anthropological problematics of our contemporary times. Especially, with problematics that are related to Ethics, Bioethics, Human Dignity and Artificial Intelligence.

**摘要 （Abstract in Chinese）**

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**論文題目：以「仁」之概念論「人」：從卡羅˙弗歐茲瓦（聖若望保祿二世）哲學人學之視角論之。**

**關鍵詞：卡羅˙弗歐茲瓦（Karol Wojtyla）、儒家、哲學人學、Jenism、「人」、行動、「仁」。**

**論文總頁數：243**

此研究的論點是：以形上學來理解人，基本上為具有理性與自治之存在者是沒有所謂的全盤的，若欲對人有全盤的理解，必要理解人在於行動和自身內在與外在關係中是具有意識存在的，因為人共同具有「仁」。為了指導此哲學研究，作者的研究問題為：「卡羅˙弗歐茲瓦（Karol Wojtyla）的哲學人學，如何形成我們對儒家『仁者人也』哲學思想更深的理解？」因此，在此研究中作者有三個重任：一為充份的探究並闡述卡羅˙弗歐茲瓦的哲學人學。二為探究並闡述儒家「仁」的概念。三為以重新詮釋「仁者」的概念，來探索「人」之為卡羅˙弗歐茲瓦的「行動中所顯出之人」“Person-revealed-in-Action”。 所以，論文的第一部分以達到第一個重任為目的，而第二部分是為了達到此研究的第二及三目的。卡羅˙弗歐茲瓦的哲學人學，本質上受到多瑪斯˙阿奎納（Thomas Aquinas）和馬克斯˙謝勒（Max Scheler）二位哲學思想家的影響，因此，作者經由探索多瑪斯˙阿奎納和馬克斯˙謝勒的哲學思想，來形成闡述卡羅˙弗歐茲瓦哲學人學的背景。為了明瞭多瑪斯˙阿奎納思想中的「位格」（*persona*）概念，必要討論蘇格拉底、柏拉圖、亞里斯多德、波愛修斯的哲學人學。反之，為了明瞭馬克斯˙謝勒的現象學，即卡羅˙弗歐茲瓦因解析人生的經歷與行動所應用的方法，作者簡要的論述， 現象學的創立者胡塞爾（Edmund Husserl），他的學生海德格爾（Heidegger） 與謝勒二位同時代的現象學者的思想。然後，作者論述「仁」的概念，解析《 論語》、 《中庸 》、《孟子》中「仁」的意思，此三部儒家經典不僅皆以「仁」為儒家的核心概念，也都以「仁」為人之所以為人的概念。於是，作者以弗歐茲瓦的「行動中所顯出之人」“Person-revealed-in-Action” 的人的概念，和儒家「仁者」的概念，來綜合論證一個較全盤及整體的哲學人學，此哲學人學作者稱之為“Jenism”。因此， “Jenism” 是自弗歐茲瓦的行動概念與儒家對「仁」的理解，所綜合出來的「人」的概念。此「人」的理解，不只解釋形上學所定義的人的本質，也解釋人生命的特質，為此可以認為是作者要創立能夠回應當代哲學人學相關問題的人之哲學，尤其是針對倫理、生命倫理學、人權、人工智慧的哲學人學的相關問題。

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I echo the voice of the Psalmist (106:1), saying: “Give thanks to the Lord for He is good and for His mercy endures forever.” For as the Apostle Paul (Romans 9:16) says “It is not he that wills nor he that runs but to he that the Lord shows mercy.” I bless God for sustaining me with His grace of healthy body and soundness of mind throughout the period of my Doctoral study. I also believe I enjoyed the intercession of St John Paul II while researching his philosophical thought at the eve of his hundred years’ birthday.

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**Chronology of Karol Wojtyła**

1920 On May 18, Karol Wojtyła was born in Wadowice near Krakow. Nicknamed Lolek.

1929 His mother died.

1938 In September he began his studies in Polish language and Literature at the Jagiellonian University.

1939 His studies were frustrated due to the Germans invasion of Poland on September 1. He was sent to work in a quarry and in a chemical factory during the period of occupation. About this period, he started writing plays and drama, of which the first, no longer extant, is entitled *David*.

1940 During the Spring, he published his second play with the biblical figure *Job* as the theme and during the Summer *Jeremiah,* sub-titled *A National Drama in Three Acts*.

1941 From this year to 1944, he was part of a theater company, named Rhapsodic Theater.

1946 On November 1 he was ordained a Catholic Priest.

1948 He obtained a doctorate in Theology in Rome, with thesis on the *Doctrine of Faith According to St John of the Cross*, supervised by Réginald Garrigou-Lagrange.

1950 About this year through to 1966, he began writing and publishing poetry under an assumed name, “Andrzej Jawien.”

1953 He obtained a second doctorate in Poland with the thesis, *Evaluation of the Possibility of Founding a Christian Ethics on the Ethical system of Max Scheler*.

1954 He became professor of Ethics in the Catholic University of Lublin until 1978, when he became a Pope.

1958 In July he was named assistant bishop of Krakow, and was consecrated on September 28th.

1960 He published *Love and Responsibility,* and the play entitled, *The Jeweler’s Shop*.

1963 On December 30 he was named Archbishop of Krakow.

1964 On March 8 he became Archbishop of Krakow. He published his last play entitled, *Radiation of Fatherhood,* with the subtitle, *A Mystery*.

1967 On June 28 he was named Cardinal by Pope Paul VI.

1969 He published in Polish *Osoba i czyn*, when he was Archbishop of Krakow.

1975 On March 27 he gave a lecture on “Participation or Alienation?” at a conference organized by the International Husserl and Phenomenological Research Society.

1979 The English edition of *Osoba i czyn* was published as *The Acting Person*, Dordrecht: D. Reidel. He published his first Encyclical, *Redemptoris Hominis*, and after which he published 13 more encyclicals and other Papal writings, probably more than any other Pope in history. His third extant play, entitled, *Our God’s Brother*, was published and staged in 1980.

1978 On October 16, he was elected Pope at 58years old, and he took the name John Paul II. The first Slavic Pope adopted the title “Universal Pastor of the Church.”

1981 At 5:17pm on May 13, a member of the fascist Turkish group the Grey Wolves, Mahmet Ali Agca, attempted to assassinate him. He survived the fatal gun shots on him.

1991 He published his last purely philosophical work, *Man in the Field of Responsibility*, which reflection started around 1972.

1997 He published *Theology of the Body*.

2005 He died on April 2, after suffering Parkinson disease for more than a decade.

**Chronology of Confucius**

551BCE Confucius (孔夫子), surnamed 孔, given name is 仲尼 (Zhongni), also nicknamed, 丘 (qiou), sometime in this year was born. As the story goes he was conceived after a prayerful petition of his mother before the deity of 尼山 (the god of the mountain of shan). This explains the reason why his name has 尼. He lived during the Spring and Autumn period (春秋時代) of the Ancient Chinese history, in present day Shandong province (山東省) in China.

548BCE About this year when he was three years old his father died. This occasioned his migration together with his mother to 曲阜（Qufu.）Here regularly he visits a famous temple, 周公廟 (Zhougong Temple), where he leant how to perform religious rites (祭禮) and offer sacrifices (祭祀).

503BCE He started to work for the Prince of the state of Lu (魯國), and assumed several positions. After a few years, he abandoned administrative works to focus on living a humble life of learning and teaching the wisdom of his ancestors. In his teachings, he expounded and elucidated the six Classics already available before him: The *Book of Change*s, the *Book of History*, the *Book of Odes*, the *Book of Rites*, the *Book of Music* and the *Spring and Autumn Annals*. From these classics, he developed his basic philosophical thoughts: Self-cultivation and Political governance through living virtuous and moral life; the Rectification of Names; Learning and Education as a value for all. The central concept of his philosophical teaching is Jen (仁).

479 BCE He died in the state of Lu.

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**General Introduction**

The objective of this chapter on General introduction, is to present an overall perspective of this research work. It enables the reader to quickly grasp the background on which the writer decided to embark on this research. Very importantly, it clearly states the thesis of the work, otherwise known as the statement of problem; following the statement of problem, it states the purpose, scope and significance of the research. It also clearly states the methodology employed in the research and gives a statement on the organization of the entire work. Finally, it presents a concise literature review on the concept 「仁，」to ascertain the need for a different interpretation of 「仁」for a comprehensive discourse of the human person. This will launch the reader into the thought process of the philosopher, Karol Wojtyła, whose philosophical perspective will direct the movement of this philosophical adventure.

1. **Background to the Study**

The question on the human person, its origin, nature and end, is no doubt ancient. It is as ancient as the first conscious person and the first socio-political community that ever existed. Thus, over the human history, the following epistemic inquires: myths, theology, philosophy, observational and experimental sciences, are all human attempts to proffer explanations. With the epistemic dominance of the empirical sciences during the modern period of western history, the empirical sciences, not only on the phenomena of nature, but also on the human person, appear to claim exclusive authority on truth. This developed the tendency to make the theories of empirical sciences, **“the knowledge.”** The scientific works, of Charles Darwin (1809-1882), (first published in 1895) **“*On the Origin of Species: By Means of Natural Selection*”**; on psychoanalysis by Sigmund Freud (1856-1939); and by Karl Marx (1818-1883) on economic superstructure as the lens through which the human persons, no doubt have initiated a different perspective in the understanding of the human being. Notwithstanding the profundity and the potency of these outstanding breakthroughs in the understanding of the human species, the fact is, they only consider particular aspects of the human reality, not the entire reality of the human person.

There is one epistemic enquiry that claims a wholistic rational knowledge of the human person by investigating critically the *quiddity*, or *whatness*, of the human person. It claims to possess the epistemic method to grasping the fundamental grounds of things, including the human person. This epistemic enquiry is philosophy. The history of western philosophy has produced many philosophers and branches of philosophy that have aimed at investigating the human person from diverse perspectives. Since the time of Socrates, the human person has become the primary focus of western philosophy, and indeed that of every non-western tradition of philosophy. It does not matter, whether a philosophical investigation is metaphysics, epistemology, or axiology, the central part of their investigation directly or indirectly relates to the human person. Thus, philosophical investigations border on issues related to the human persons, for instance: what the human person speculates as the ultimate reality, what the human person can know and how one knows, how can the human person be a good person and do the right thing, what is beauty to the human person, how can human persons dwell peacefully and happily in a society, and so on. Therefore, over the span of the history of philosophy, speculations and critical reflections have been made and a great number of treaties and counter-treaties on the human person have been written. In the contemporary period, works of existentialist philosophers, since the Danish philosopher, Soren Kierkegaard, have paid radical attention to the human person as a free and responsible individual. Vastly before the existential philosophical outburst, the human person had been considered fairly from a metaphysical *cum* theological perspective.

During the first quarter of the twentieth century, there was a paradoxical synthesis of thought that existed between some key existentialist thinkers, such as Jean Paul Sartre and Communism or more specifically Marxism. To this effect, existentialism as a philosophical enquiry that seeks to understand the human person as a free, responsible concrete individual finds itself losing its luster and charm to some emerging thinkers. These thinkers, *ab initio* mostly French, such as Maurice Blondel, Emmanuel Mornier, Jacques Maritain, will later commence a philosophical reflection on the human person that is today known as philosophical anthropology or personalism. Philosophical anthropology and personalism, share one objective: to have a comprehensive understanding of the human person, by considering all the aspects of the human person both as a metaphysical *whatness* and a social or communal *thisness*. Thus, it focuses on developing as much as the human mind can carry, a comprehensive understanding on the nature, that is being, concrete condition of the individual as an agent or subject, and the destiny, that is to say the finality, of the human person. The scholastic Thomistic’s understanding of the person and the critical phenomenological method of Max Scheler have been a very handy tool for the development of philosophical anthropology and personalism. The slight difference between philosophical anthropology and personalism, if it is necessary to state one, is that philosophical anthropology considers itself as a system of philosophy which focuses on the human person as a being with ethical responsibilities towards its final destiny. Personalism does not consider itself as a unique philosophical system; it greatly emphasizes the human person as a subject, a self-conscious individual who is in constant interaction with the world of other persons and things around it.

The writer, a product of a world with a staggering record of scientific, technological and economic advancement, during his philosophical studies, has been besieged with the question: Philosophically speaking has the person changed? Is there a conclusive answer on the *quiddity* of the human person, that is to say on what makes the human person a person? The popular maxim in philosophical classes, of which philosophy professors constantly remind philosophy students is that: *philosophy raises more questions than answers or put differently it is the nature of philosophy to raise questions rather than to give answers.* Then one may ask: what is the most important question for philosophy? Is it the metaphysical question of the origin and nature of the universe? Is it epistemological question of what is knowledge and what can be known? Is it the moral question of who is a good person and how can one be a good person? Or is it the aesthetic question of what is beauty and what constitutes the beautiful? It is obvious that it is the human person that is both the questioner and the one who needs answers to the above questions.

Thus, it would be more persuasive to assert that the most important question of philosophy ought to be and perhaps is: **What is the human person?** The conviction that the question of the person is the most profound of all philosophical questions, informs the desire of the writer to embark on this philosophical project. The intention is to know if there is a comprehensive investigation of the human person, that attempts to comprehend the whole human being in his total reality. Personalism, the philosophy of the personal universe, begins its gradual development during the early period of the twentieth century, as mentioned above, makes a claim to investigating and comprehending humans in his total reality as a person. For a more comprehensive and complementary investigation on the human person the writer discusses the human person from the Western and Chinese philosophical orientations.

This search for a comprehensive understanding of the person leads to the investigation of the personalism and/or the philosophical anthropology of arguably the most profound Christian personalist or philosophical anthropologist of the twentieth century, Karol Wojtyła (1920-2005). This investigation of Karol Wojtyła’s Personalism, is in order to discuss *person* based on the concept of「仁」, a fundamental concept in the understanding of person in Confucianism. The writer feels strongly attracted to the assertions: **「仁者人也」and「仁也者，人也」**in Confucian philosophy, and thus feels challenged to explore a comprehensive and complementary understanding of the person by investigating both philosophical traditions. Interestingly, it will be worth noting that the philosophy of Karol Wojtyła and that of Confucius (550-478BC) and Confucianist in general, though they are about a millennium and a half years separated from each other, share a relatively similar contextual situation. Thus, the philosophical reflections, and core philosophical subjects of both Wojtyła and Confucius, are ethics and the nature of the person. Confucius, the Socrates of Chinese philosophy, lived and reflected during a period of socio-political unrest and chaos. There were wars and rumours of wars between the so called warring states of Chinese history. The Chinese use the figurative expression: 「禮崩樂壞」to describe this period. The expression literally means a period of which **“rites and music are in ruins”,** but figuratively it means a period of which **“the society is in total disarray.”**  Reacting to this, Confucius spends his adult life reflecting and teaching on the subject of the human person, his nature, ethical and political role in the family and the society and the end of the human person in respect to the Ultimate reality, 「天」 or 「道」.

Karol Wojtyła, likewise, about a millennium and a half years, after Confucius, in a faraway continent and different cultural tradition, begins his philosophical reflections during the period of socio-political unrest and chaos in and around his country Poland. Poland, like the biblical Israel nation, has suffered a long period of harassment and suppression from her neighbouring nations: Russia, Prussia, and Austria. At a time, Poland was partitioned among these neighbouring nations. The climax of this socio-political upheaval was the First World War (1914-1918). The war, was the communistic overhauling of Eastern Europe, that virtually destroyed everything Poland, save its culture. Like, Confucius, the philosophical subjects of Karol Wojtyła behind the aforementioned backdrop are ethics or morality and the understanding of the human person.

Having briefly exposed the philosophical backdrop of the two major philosophical thinkers that will be considered in this research, it is clear that in our restless world of different forms of violence and insecurity, there is no better person to go to, to seek the philosophical understanding of the human person, other than Confucius and Karol Wojtyła. Considering both of them in a complementary understanding of the human person, means seeking knowledge from both the ancient and modern perspectives. It is as such drinking from the intellectual deposits of two philosophical traditions.

In the western philosophical tradition, the nature of the human person from the period of ancient Greeks through the medieval period to the modern period has been understood and interpreted mainly from metaphysical standpoints. During the contemporary period, we have mainly an existentialist’s understanding and interpretation and sparingly a phenomenological understanding and interpretation, that arguably begins with the German philosopher Max Scheler and sees its expounding in Karol Wojtyła. Karol Wojtyła in his philosophy of the person, posits the **“Person-revealed-in-action,”** that is to say, a self-conscious individual, a free subject in action, as what ought to be considered in a comprehensive attempt to understanding the human person. Thus, the writer desires to continue with this philosophical anthropology of Karol Wojtyła by expounding a personalism which posits the **“Person-revealed-in-action”[[1]](#footnote-1)** as **「仁者」** in Confucian philosophy of the person. In this way, the writer hopes to bring these two philosophies of the person together to provide a more profound, comprehensive, and complementary understanding of the person.

1. **Statement of the Problem**

This work contends that the metaphysical understanding of the human person simply as a rational being is incomprehensive, and for a comprehensive understanding of the human person, there is a need to understand the human person as a conscious being in action and in relationship within and without itself due to the shared consciousness of 「仁」 ( a transcendental property of the human person in Chinese philosophy, that which can be roughly translated as humanness, humanity or human-kindliness in English).

From the metaphysical standpoint, the human person is discussed as a being. However, as a part of being, which is the primordial question of metaphysics, this implies, discussing the person within the problematic framework of metaphysics as the investigation of being *qua* being, being as the possible act of to be, being as *suppositum*, being as becoming, being as Existence. This logically leads to the investigation of the ontology of being as reality, the ontology of person as being and then the metaphysics of person as a rational being. Thus, this work is a critique of “rationality” as the *quiddity* of the human person, which so much characterizes the understanding of the human person in the western philosophical tradition. The sum of this tradition is simply seen in the famous Boethius’s definition of the person as: **“*naturae rationalis individua substantia*” (individual substance of a rational nature).**

This work thus, sustains a critique of the human person understood merely as “an individual”, “a substance,” and “as rational.” To this effect, this work is a philosophical discourse on the human person, based on the Confucian concept of 「仁，」a fundamental transcendental concept that defines the human Person in Chinese philosophy, through the perspective of Karol Wojtyła’s philosophical anthropology.

Hence, the question that will guide this research is**: How can the philosophy of Karol Wojtyła on the person help us to understand the Confucian philosophy of person as 仁者?** As such, **this work explores a personalistic philosophy that presents the “Person-revealed-in-action” of Karol Wojtyła as 「仁者」in Confucianism.**

1. **Purpose of the Study**

Since, the question that guides this research is: How can the philosophy of Karol Wojtyła on the person help us to understand the Confucian philosophy of the person as 仁者, it naturally follows that, we shall be asking: what is the relevance of this question to the scholarship of philosophy in general, and to philosophical anthropology and/or Personalism in particular? **Hence, this work aims at a comprehensive, integral and complementary understanding of the human person, through a discourse on the “Person-revealed-in-action” of Karol Wojtyła and 仁者of Confucianism.**

This implies a critique of the understanding of the human person from a particular aspect of its existence and as a purely metaphysical reality, a being among other beings, a substance that possesses attributes or a reality condemned in the eternal dialectics of being and becoming. Thus, this work intends to affirm not only the rational nature of the human person, but the phenomenological or consciousness nature of the person: consciousness within a person as an individual, and a consciousness experience that pulls a person towards relationship with the other. This means, it considers a person as a free, creative and self-conscious individual subject, who although lives in a subjective universe, is having constant interactions and influences with the objective universe of other persons and realities. This is also a person who is both immersed in nature and at the same time transcends nature. This work is therefore, an affirmation of the personalism and/or philosophical anthropological investigation of Karol Wojtyła that affirms the person-revealed-in-action. However, to complement this philosophical venture of Karol Wojtyła, this work attempts to take Karol Wojtyła’s Personalism into the thought of Confucian philosophy of the person, which in this work we shall call ***“Jenism.”*** Simply put, this work asserts that to be intelligent is not enough, a person must be humane and benevolent.

1. **Scope of the Study**

This work is fundamentally a critical and analytical philosophical discourse on the human person. It is a sincere effort to understand the human person by engaging in an activity of reason and human experience. It is not a theological discourse on the human person, that is to say, argumentations will not be based on any form of divine revelation or mysticism. It is also not a study in socio-cultural anthropology nor is it a psycho-empirical research on the human person. Even when data are collected from these other epistemic enquiries that investigate the human person, such data must be put through a philosophical crucible. In other words, this work will maintain an attitude of a critical philosophical responsibility in its speculations and analysis of data. The aim of the work is a comprehensive and complementary understanding of the human person. Therefore, to shed light to any argumentation on the subject under discussion, reflections shall be drawn from different philosophical traditions of the West, the East (especially the Chinese) and from African philosophy, when necessary. However, the primary focus shall be on the personalism and/or philosophical anthropology of Karol Wojtyła and the Confucian philosophy of the person.

1. **Significance of the Study**

In our fast advancing generation of science and technology this work will not only be significant but pertinent. With the passionate scientific and technological research going on in our time, the development of Artificial Intelligence (AI) and medical sciences with its bioethical problematics, make the philosophical research on the human person not only important but a matter of urgency. Before the advent of critical philosophical investigations and speculations, the human person was understood and defined in respect to the gods. With the advent of critical philosophy, the human person is investigated and defined with respect to other organisms especially other mammals. This explains the western philosophical tradition of emphasizing the human person as a rational animal. In our present generation with the development of super computers and progressive efficient development with machines that exhibit more precise and accurate intelligence on human events, than the human person does, there is a need to take a more serious philosophical look on the *quiddity* of the human person, that is to say, what makes a person a human person. And also, it is not a news that bioethical issues have been hijacked by contemporary politicians as a means of sustaining their political ambitions. **Therefore, this work is helpful to researchers and scholars who are reflecting on the ethical and anthropological implications of the scientific development and technological application of Artificial Intelligence and on bioethical decisions.**

More so, in our world scourged with violence and all sorts of inhuman acts, it is cogent to reinvestigate human nature for a better understanding of the human person. Thus, with the plurality and cosmopolitan nature of our generation, it is significant to embark on a complementary research from different philosophical traditions for a more comprehensive understanding of the human person. **Thus, this work is helpful for all those who have interest in global politics that are truly oriented towards the wholistic advancement of the human person.**

From the perspective of philosophical scholarship, this work does not only introduce the discourse of Karol Wojtyła’s personalist anthropology to Chinese scholarship and perhaps Asia at large, but sustains that it is scholarly possible to understand the Confucian philosophy of the person as 仁者, through the philosophy of Karol Wojtyła on the person. Hence, this work is of relevance not only to scholarship in the Catholic Church but to global philosophical scholarship. The reason for this, is that it aims to expound the personalist anthropology of a Christian Western philosophical thinker as a perspective in understanding and interpreting the person in the most systematized and renowned Chinese philosophical school of thought, Confucianism. **Therefore, philosophical and theological thinkers, especially the non-Chinese cultural peoples, who desire to understand the Chinese person will find this work useful.**

1. **Methodology**

This work will be a library research and the information gathered will be critically analyzed in the spirit and attitude of philosophy as an intellectual discipline that disinterestedly seeks the truth, the good, the beauty and the just. The writer is a person and a being in relationship with other persons, thus, the writer’s phenomenological experience as a conscious person in action, will no doubt be a useful philosophical material for this research. Furthermore, other non-philosophical epistemic enquiries shall be looked into, to see what claim they have on the human person. These claims will definitely enrich the intellectual raw materials for the philosophical reflection of this work.

1. **Organization of Work**

This work is divided as follows: The work begins with a general introduction to the entire work and a concise literature review of the concept under discussion. The main work is divided into two parts, and each of the two parts is subsequently divided into chapters. Part One, is an exposition of Karol Wojtyła’s Philosophy of Person and ethics. Part Two explores the concept of 「仁」 in Confucian Philosophy and discusses the “Person-revealed-in-action” as 「仁者。 」Finally, there is a general Conclusion.

1. **Literature Review**

The purpose of this section is to highlight the works of some scholars that attempt to explicate the concept of the person from the ground of the concept of 仁者. There are copious works on the concept of 「仁」and this review does not intend to review all. The writer decides to comment on the approaches of two notable contemporary scholars of Chinese philosophy in Taiwan that lived and work about the same period. They are 羅光, a Christian philosopher and 牟宗三, a non-Christian philosopher. Hopefully, from both perspective a complementary perspective on the interpretation of 「仁」in respect of the human person in Chinese philosophy, can be created.

羅光 (1911-2004), wrote a collection of work on Chinese philosophy, entitled, 《中國哲學思想史》[[2]](#footnote-2). In a different work, 《人生哲學》 (Philosophy of Human Life), he maintains that while the ancient Greek’s understanding of the human person is from a metaphysical perspective, that emphasizes the human person as a rational animal, ancient Chinese philosophy emphasizes the understanding of the human person as moral and ethical animal. He sustains that for Chinese philosophy, the specific property of the human being is in the possession of 「道德心[[3]](#footnote-3)」( moral consciousness).[[4]](#footnote-4) He maintains that the Confucian philosophical system considers the human person as an ethical being.[[5]](#footnote-5) And he alludes to two of the main works of the ancient Confucian philosophy, 《孟子》 (Mengzi) and 《中庸》(Zhongyong), as both asserting the concept, 「仁」 as the *quiddity* of the human person in Chinese philosophy. He interprets 「仁」as 「愛惜生命」(to treasure or cherish life).[[6]](#footnote-6) To treasure life, is not just to treasure one’s own personal life but is to treasure the life of all beings, just as Heaven and Earth (天地), that is the Universe, treasures the life of all things and causes all things to grow. Thus, 「仁」means the spirit or consciousness of Heaven and Earth, and to have 「仁」is to possess the spirit or consciousness of the Universe. He contends that Confucius maintains that the person who possesses 「仁」is 「己欲立而立人，己欲達而達人。」and appealing to 朱熹, he, thus, asserts that the consciousness of the human person（「人的心」） is「仁。」[[7]](#footnote-7) Hence, he concludes that **“Chinese traditional culture, not only considers the human person as a rational animal, but more so, as an ethical person, from birth, the spiritual nature of the human person possesses ethical seed, the *quiddity* of the human person, does not only constitute intellection but more so, constitute self-governance, to accord his or her life to laws.”[[8]](#footnote-8)** Following this conclusion, he therefore posits, the human person as: 「宇宙的主人」(the master of the universe), 「宇宙的廣大」(the extension of the universe), 「宇宙變化的神妙」(the marvel of the mutability of the universe).[[9]](#footnote-9) To say that the human person is the master of the universe, however, one should understand the universe not in the absolute sense.[[10]](#footnote-10)

As the title of his work indicates, the interpretation of the concept of 「仁」and 「仁者」 of 羅光 are from the point of 「人生」（human life）. As a Christian philosopher, he no doubt conceives God as the source, the giver and the sustainer of human life, and life in all things. And if 「仁」is understood as the treasure of life, it is by extension, natural to understand it in relation to 「愛」(love). A number of scholars of Chinese philosophy that are Christian, have followed the philosophical path of 羅光 in interpreting the concept of 「仁」from the perspective of human life and love. For instance, 陳福濱, in his works, 〈以「良心」與「仁愛」為內涵的全球化芻議〉[[11]](#footnote-11) and 〈孔子的「仁」與基督的「愛」〉[[12]](#footnote-12)discusses the concept of 「仁」from the perspective of human life and love. He contends that, **「生命在宇宙中是相連為一的，一個存有物的生命，和其他存有物的生命互相涵攝與影響。而人的生命也是互相聯繫，彼此有著相互的關係。宇宙的化育在於生生，化生萬物，就是生命中的仁，是對生命的愛。」**[“Life in the universe is connected as one, the life of a being, and the lives of other beings are mutually assimilated and have mutual influence. Thus, human life is also mutually connected, and there is a mutual relationship between humans. The nourishment of the universe consists in the generation and transformation of all that is.”][[13]](#footnote-13)

牟宗三, in his works, 《道德的形上學》and 《心體與性體》, influenced both by Buddhist thought and Kant’s philosophy, interprets and discusses the concept of 「仁」in relation with 「天」from an ethical-metaphysical perspective. He maintains that 「仁」is 「道德價值之源」[the source of moral values], 「德性生命之門」[the door of the virtuous life]. He emphasizes the interpretation of 「天」as the transcendental ultimate principle of things. And seems to focus on the Confucian propositions of 「仁」as it relates to 「天，」 which leads him to interpret 「仁」as the same transcendental reality「天」as it manifests itself within the human person. For instance, reflecting on the proposition 「踐仁之天」of 《論語》 ( the Analects) and 「肫肫其仁，淵淵其淵，浩浩其天」of 《中庸》 (Zhongyong), he seems to suggest: 「仁與天合一或為一，」which means positing 「仁」as uniting with「天」or becoming one with 「天。」To this effect, he contends that 「仁」and 「天」are one and the same reality, however, while「仁」 in the human person is the subjective manifestation of the objective transcendental principle 「天。」[[14]](#footnote-14)

Though 牟宗三, holds that specific nature of Chinese philosophy is around the problem and the investigation of human life, which he calls, 「生命的學問，」he generally tends to interpret the concept of 「仁」more in respect to 「天命／天性，」than in respect to 「愛」as maintained by 羅光。Hence, with these perspectives in mind, the writer shall exposed the philosophical anthropology of Karol Wojtyła. Using it to complement these perspectives for a more comprehensive understanding of the human person.

**PART ONE**

**On the Philosophical Anthropology of Karol Wojtyła**

**Chapter One: Exposition of Karol Wojtyła’s Philosophy of the Human Person**

This chapter explores Karol Wojtyła’s philosophy of person. The expectation is that at the end of this chapter, the reader should have a clear and comprehensive grasp of Karol Wojtyła’s philosophy of person. Wojtyła himself, in the preface of the 1977 edition of his work, *The Acting Person*, gives the secret on how to understand his philosophy of person, by revealing what motivated his engagement on the development of the concept of the Person-revealed-in-act, otherwise known as the Acting Person. He notes:

**The author of the present study owes everything to the systems of metaphysics, of anthropology, and of Aristotelian-Thomistic ethics on the one hand, and to phenomenology, above all in Scheler’s interpretation, and through Scheler’s critique also to Kant, on the other hand. At the same time, an individual attempt has been undertaken at reaching this reality which is the man-person as seen through his actions.[[15]](#footnote-15)**

Hence, to comprehensively understand and expose Wojtyła’s philosophy of person, justice must be done, first, to the critical investigations of the traditional Greco-Scholastic anthropology, metaphysics and ethics, with particular emphasis to the Aristotelian-Thomistic tradition. Secondly, it will be important to x-ray a concise but profound exposition of the contemporary philosophical methodology, Phenomenology, with special reference to Max Scheler’s interpretation of phenomenology and the ethical philosophy built on it. Thus, to execute this, the writer explores: the anthropological foundation of Karol Wojtyła’s philosophy of person, the metaphysical foundation of Karol Wojtyła’s philosophy of Person, the ethical foundation of Karol Wojtyła’s philosophy of person, Karol Wojtyła’s phenomenological analysis of person, the analysis of human dynamism and human action, and the dialectical synthesis of person and person’s action.

**1.1. Anthropological Foundation of Karol Wojtyła’s Philosophy of Person**

The purpose of this section is to give a concise review on the works of intellectual predecessors of Karol Wojtyła in their attempts to investigate the distinguishing property or the *quiddity* of the human person. As already mentioned above, in the section on the background of the work, a great number of philosophers philosophized on the human person. The aim here is not to discuss all philosophers who wrote a work on the human person. This would virtually require presenting the work of all western philosophers on the person. The writer, thus, discusses only four western philosophers of whose philosophical discourse on the human person, helps launch the reader onto the philosophy of person of Karol Wojtyła. These western philosophers are: Socrates-Plato, Aristotle, Boethius and Aquinas. The task is not to focus on all they have to say about the human being or person, but to critically appraise particular works of theirs which the writer has judged, relevant to the subject under consideration. References, are also made to other works of other philosophers towards casting light on any thought under investigation.

**I. Socrates-Plato (Socrates, 399-470 B.C.; Plato, 428/427-348/347 B.C.):** The combination of the names “Socrates-Plato” is used because, in virtually all of the dialogues of Plato, Socrates is presented as the speaker of the thought, and in most cases, it is not quite clear if it is the philosophical views of Plato the author, or that of Socrates. As a way of avoiding this conflict, Socrates-Plato has been used. The dialogue of Plato being critically appraised here, is the one entitled, *Phaedo[[16]](#footnote-16)*. The primary theme of *Phaedo*, is the discourse on the soul[[17]](#footnote-17), thus the ancient title of the dialogue is, *On the Soul*.[[18]](#footnote-18) *Phaedo*, is the work of Plato that gives us a dramatic narration of the last hours and death of the Philosopher and teacher of Athens, Socrates. It is mainly a conversation between Echecrates and Phaedo, of which the dialogue is named after.

*Phaedo*, by discussing the death of Socrates, raises the question of death as the inevitable fate of the human person. But the question of more philosophical interest by the interlocutor in *Phaedo*, is not the inevitability of death, but the reality of the immortality of the soul. This consequentially, raises the question of the nature of the human soul. Before discussing the question of the nature of the soul and that of the immortality of the soul, it will be expedient to note that in the work, Socrates-Plato adjudges that living a life of practicing philosophy is the best way not only to conquer death, but also to prepare for the immortality of the soul. Thus, he maintains: **“I want to make my argument before you, my judges, as to why I think that a man who has truly spent his life in philosophy is probably right to be of good cheer in the face of death and to be very hopeful that after death he will attain the greatest blessings yonder.”[[19]](#footnote-19)** By this he maintains that **“one aim of those who practice philosophy in the proper manner is to practice for dying and death.”[[20]](#footnote-20)** Why is philosophy conceived to have this role? Since, death is conceived as the freedom and separation of the soul from the body, the **“release and separation of the soul from the body is the preoccupation of the philosophers.”[[21]](#footnote-21)** Hence, the anthropology, is that the human being is made up of two distinct entities, the soul which is spiritual and incorruptible, and the body which is physical and corruptible. It is presupposed that every other natural being, including animals and plants are corruptible and thus do not possess immortal souls. Since, the philosopher is a lover of wisdom and contemplator of truth, the philosopher is interested in edifying and enriching the spiritual and incorruptible parts of the human being which is the soul. For it is with the soul that truth is grasped, never with the body which is prone to deception. The soul is considered the ruler and master of the body, for it is the soul that detects the activities of the body. Therefore, **“the soul reasons best when none of these senses troubles it, neither hearing nor sight, nor pain nor pleasure, but when it is most by itself, taking leave of the body and as far as possible having no contact or association with it in its search for reality.”[[22]](#footnote-22)**  Hence, **“the philosopher more than other men frees the soul from association with the body as much as possible.”[[23]](#footnote-23)** By despising the body and every activity that gratifies the body, the body has been adjudged as not the essential property or component of the human being. A true philosopher must disdain the body and flee from all its cravings, because the body is a burden to the soul in the activities of grasping the truth.

The two main argumentations given for the claim of the immortality of the soul in *Phaedo* are: argument of learning as recollection and argument against the harmony of distinct things. The argument of learning as recollection, claims that if it is agreed that human beings learn by recollection, it follows that **“this is possible only if our soul existed somewhere before it took on this human shape.”[[24]](#footnote-24)** Therefore, the soul is likely to be something immortal. This is posited as an example: **“When a man sees or hears or in some other way perceives one thing and not only knows that thing but also things of another thing of which the knowledge is not the same but different, are we not right to say that he recollects the second thing that comes into his mind?”[[25]](#footnote-25)** The soul possesses intelligence, which enables it to grasp transcendental realities that exist in themselves, such as the Beautiful and the Good. These realities, exist before we are born and for our soul to know them, the soul must exist before we are born. If the soul exists before we are born, it follows that it will exist after death. It is not very necessary for the trajectory of this review to engage in debate in affirmation or denial of the Socrates-Plato theory of learning by recollection. Thus, stating it as one of the arguments for the reality of the immortality of the soul, suffices.

The second argumentation, is an argument against the theory of the soul as harmony. That is to say that the soul is an admixture of body elements, and will be the first to perish in the process of death. The theory of the soul as harmony is analogically based on the harmony that is created between musical instruments such as the lyre and strings. The harmony is invisible while the pieces of instrument are physical and visible. If the lyre and strings break, the harmony is the first thing that will perish before the musical instrument completely perishes. Socrates-Plato, considers the theory of the soul as harmony, as inconsistent. For harmony is not a composite thing, that exists before the musical elements from which it is composed. This is because, **“the lyre and the strings and the notes, though still unharmonized, exist; the harmony is composed last of all, and is the first to be destroyed.”[[26]](#footnote-26)**

A believer in the Christian religion may find the claim on the anthropology of the human body exposed above as very familiar. This anthropology portrays the human being as a composite of body and soul. In this anthropology while the nature of the soul is incorruptible and immortal, the nature of the body is corruptible and mortal. This is the very reason why the writer considers the review of Plato’s *Phaedo*, a drama on the soul, as important in understanding the philosophical anthropology of Karol Wojtyła. It is obvious that Plato, who is said to have certain contacts with the Pythagoreans, must have employed their religio-mystical doctrine on the soul in developing the first purely philosophical discourse on the human soul in the western tradition. Later, this Platonic philosophical discourse on the human soul will be a profound influence on the general anthropology of the early Christians, especially in regard to giving a rational foundation to the Christian belief on the immortality of the soul and the disdainful attitude toward the body and its craving, because of its corruptibility and warring with the soul. This influence of the Platonic philosophy on the soul remained active during the time of the patristics and only a very little adjustment is made in the Christian anthropology and belief in the immortality of the soul, even with the advent of Aristotelian influenced teaching of Scholastic thinkers like Aquinas. Karol Wojtyła being a very devout Christian will definitely have the background of his philosophical anthropology, the above major claims by Socrates-Plato in *Phaedo*, on the nature of the soul as immortal and incorruptible. Most important among these claims, that the very property that distinguishes the human being from every other created being is the possession of an immortal and incorruptible soul.

The Socrates-Platonic discourse on the immortal soul as the distinguishing property of human beings from other created beings, is strongly based on dialectic discourse on mytho-religio-mystical beliefs on death and the soul. The focus is on the human species in general and the philosopher is portrayed as the ideal human being who is living a life that will lead to the purification of the soul and attain immortality. Rationality as a distinctive property of the human species is not directly and copiously emphasized.

**II. Aristotle (384-322 B.C.):** Generally speaking, Plato and Aristotle’s philosophies have been distinguished as idealism and realism respectively. The general categorization holds to the fact that while Plato’s philosophical reflection is heavily influenced by the mathematical sciences, especially geometry, Aristotle’s is heavily influenced by the natural sciences, especially biology and medicine. To this effect, a more detailed analysis of living things or biological species in Aristotle’s anthropology should be expected. Aristotle has a number of works where he investigates and discusses the human being and other living things, but for the purpose of this review, critical consideration shall be given to one of his major works. References shall be made to others if they are considered necessary to elucidate a point under discussion. Hence, Aristotle’s work entitled, *On the Soul*[[27]](#footnote-27), popularly known by its Latin title, *De Anima,* shall be critically discussed*.*

Aristotle considers the discourse on the soul to be of a high rank, for he maintains, **“the soul is in some sense the principle of animal life.”[[28]](#footnote-28)** Unlike, in the *Phaedo* discussed above, where the soul is discussed exclusively with respect to the human being[[29]](#footnote-29), Aristotle makes the soul a principle shared by all living things, including plants and animals. If all living things possess a principle called soul, the thrust of this review is to understand how Aristotle distinguishes the human soul from that of other living things. This is because the seeking for the specific difference of the human person is the core of the investigation in the discipline of philosophical anthropology. Aristotle as a metaphysician, seeks to investigate the nature of the soul. He asks: **‘what it is; is it “a this-somewhat”, a substance, or is it a quale or a quantum, or some other of the remaining kinds of predicates which we have distinguished?’[[30]](#footnote-30)**

Besides investigating what the nature of the soul is, he also seeks to know if the soul is divisible or without parts; whether it is homogeneous or heterogeneous. Aristotle seems to conceive the soul as the principle that explains the movements of the body, but without positing movements as the essence of the soul.[[31]](#footnote-31) To this effect, all the rational, volitive, affective, sensitive, and nutritive movements or desires in living things are explained by the existence of soul. In *Phaedo*, Socrates-Plato concludes that the soul acts or rules the body. Aristotle, thereby, wishes to take this contention seriously, for he considers this contention as necessary to the holding of a claim of a separate existence of the soul. Thus, he maintains that: **“if there is any why of acting or being acted upon proper to soul, soul will be capable of separate existence; if there is none, its separate existence is impossible.”[[32]](#footnote-32)**  Aristotle seems to contend that the soul does not and cannot exist separately from the body, for every desire or movement caused by the soul one way or the other, needs the body. Thus, he contends, **“It seems that all the affections of soul involve a body—passion, gentleness, fear, pity, courage, joy, loving, and hating; in all these there is a concurrent affection of the body.”[[33]](#footnote-33)**

An exception, is thought. Is thought an act of the soul that is separable from body? Aristotle informs us that Democritus identifies soul and thought as one and the same, and Anaxagoras distinguishes soul and thought.[[34]](#footnote-34) As a primary principle of the soul, Plato, maintains that thought grasps truth, the forms of things, directly without body. Aristotle as a realist, who strongly opposes any form of Plato’s theory of the form, both as participation and as imitation, opposes knowing as recollection. Therefore, he posits that the body is necessary not only for imagination but for thought, for we know by learning and teaching based on natural phenomena.

Aristotle, having a rigorous investigation of his predecessors view on the soul as he wont to do, develops his own treatise on the soul. He conceives the soul as substance, in the sense of being a form. For Aristotle, substance exists in three kinds: form, matter and a composite of form and matter. Hence, he adjudges:

**Now given that there are bodies of such and such a kind, viz. having life, the soul cannot be a body; for the body is the subject or matter, not what is attributed to it. Hence the soul must be a substance in the sense of the form of a natural body having life potentially within it. But substance is actuality, and thus soul is the actuality of a body as above characterized.[[35]](#footnote-35)**

Hence, he conceives nutrition as the actuality that makes us to speak of a thing as living, but sensation as the actuality that makes us to speak of a thing as animal. He, thus maintains that all that should be rightly called animal, possesses one thing in common which plants do not have, and that is touch. For he claims, **“whatever has a sense has the capacity for pleasure and pain and therefore has pleasant and painful objects present to it, and wherever these are present, there is desire, for desire is appetition of what is pleasant.”[[36]](#footnote-36)** Aristotle, further maintains that human beings have in a greater proportion, the sense of touch than other animals. For this reason, he links a higher capacity of intelligence to human beings. He asserts:

**While in respect of all the other senses we fall below many species of animals, in respect of touch we far excel all other species in exactness of discrimination. That is why man is the most intelligent of all animals. This is confirmed by the fact that it is to differences in the organ of touch and to nothing else that the differences between man and man in respect of natural endowment are due; men whose flesh is hard are ill-endowed with intellect, men whose flesh is soft, well-endowed.[[37]](#footnote-37)**

Aristotle, in emphasizing the relationship of touch and intelligence, goes as far as claiming that discrepancies in the sense of touch in human beings also account for discrepancies in levels of intelligence among human beings. Without going into a serious investigation of this claim, it is clear in telling us how important Aristotle considers the sense of touch, or sensations in general, as a necessary condition for intellectual activities. Thus, he claims, that touch is the highest of all sensations.

Aristotle will therefore, assert the rational activities of the soul as the actuality of human beings. The acts of thinking, understanding and judgement become the actuality of the soul that not only distinguishes human beings from other living things, but are what define human beings for Aristotle. Aristotle endeavours to solve the problem of the relationship between thought and the soul, as contended by Democritus and Anaxagoras above. He asserts: **“the soul which is called thought (by thought I mean that whereby the soul thinks and judges) is, before it thinks, not actually any real thing; For this reason it cannot reasonably be regarded as blended with the body.”[[38]](#footnote-38)** Hence, he claims that whereas the faculty or sensation is dependent upon the body, the faculty of thought is separable from the body. However, this should not be understood that for Aristotle the faculty of thought, *intellectus*, can know without sense-perception. In this regard, he maintains that **“no one can learn or understand anything in the absence of sense, and when the mind is actively aware of anything it is necessarily aware of it along with an image; for images are like sensuous contents except in that they contain no matter.”[[39]](#footnote-39)**

Having ascertained rational activities as the most sublime of all the parts and activities of the soul, of which is the specific property or nature of the soul that distinguishes the human being from all other living things, Aristotle henceforth defines the human being as essentially rational. In his *Nicomachaen Ethics*, Aristotle posits the **“rational principle”** as the specific nature that defines human beings and separates humans from every other living thing.[[40]](#footnote-40) Furthermore, the nature of human being as a rational being, will thus define human beings as the creature capable of speech, who is thus a politico-social and ethical being.[[41]](#footnote-41)

**III. Boethius (480-524 A.D):** Boethius is considered qualified to be among the great philosophers, the writer decides to briefly expose his philosophy of person, for the very reason that no work can be seriously executed on the person in western philosophy without a direct or indirect mention of his famous definition of person. He is incontestably, the first thinker whose reflection on the person has improved the famous definition of Aristotle on the human as a rational animal. Thus, it seems logical to expose his thought on the concept of person, immediately after Aristotle. Moreover, not only his definition of person, but his work in general, had profound influence on the thought of Thomas Aquinas, whose work in turn exerted a great influence on Karol Wojtyła’s philosophy. Besides, Karol Wojtyła in his *opus magnus* on the person, *Osoba i cyzn* (*Person and Act/Acting Person)*, qualitatively engages on an exposition of the famous Boethius’ definition of the person.

Boethius, despite his attempt to assiduously translate the works of Aristotle from Greek to Latin, the greatest influence to his theological and philosophical thoughts is that of Plato and Neo-Platonic, Plotinus. His thought is in no doubt influenced by Aristotle and the Stoics. The work of Boethius which will be considered in this review, is his treatise entitled, “*Liber De Persona Et Duabus Naturis*”, subtitled, “*Contra Eutychen et Nestorium*.”[[42]](#footnote-42) This strictly speaking is not a philosophical treatise. It can be rather classified as a theological treatise, this is because, for Boethius, this work is in response to the theological controversy of the church on the nature of Jesus. This controversy is the reason for the fourth Ecumenical Council of Chalcedon in AD 451. It is not necessary for this work to go into the historical or theological details of this Church council, but only, to state the main problematic of the council. The definition of the council reaffirms the traditional teaching of the Church as already stated in the Council of Ephesus, that Jesus as the second person of the trinity has at the same time the divine nature of God and the human nature like all human beings, save sin; that is to say that Jesus is truly God and truly human. In the definition of this council and that of preceding councils the term “person” has been used to explain the Trinitarian God, as three Persons One Substance. But no clear and precise definition of person is proffered until the above-mentioned treatise of Boethius.

The thrust of Boethius’s engagement in the theological controversy between the traditional Church’s position and the heresy of both Eutyches and Nestorius[[43]](#footnote-43), is to ascertain the position that Christ is one person in and from two natures. The problem which will lead him to the definition of person is, how can there be one person but two natures? Thus, influenced by Aristotle’s metaphysical and especially logical science[[44]](#footnote-44), he sets out to define “nature” and “person.” Hence, after highlighting different definitions of nature, he seems to be more comfortable with, **“nature is the specific differentia which informs a thing.”[[45]](#footnote-45)**

Specifically speaking, the difference between a genus and its species is the nature. For instance, the specific difference of animal and man is rationality. Thus, rationality is the nature of humans, that differentiates human from other animals. “Person” in Latin, *persona*, and in Greek *prosopon* (after the 3rd and 4th century AD, the Greek term, *hupostasis* was used). Hypostasis (hupostasis) in Latin is translated as *substantia*. This gives birth to two senses of *substantia* (substance), as *ousia* and as *hupostasis*. He thus, defines person as **“individual substance of a rational nature.”[[46]](#footnote-46)** Thus, there are two categories of person: those with rational corporal substances, humans; and those that are rational incorporeal substances, God, angels and souls.[[47]](#footnote-47)

The writer shall not go into the theological implication of Boethius’s definition of person, which put God under Aristotle’s category of Substantia. This is always the theological challenge that occurs when a philosophical concept is used to solve a theological problem (better put a mystery), only to raise another problem. Boethius himself and subsequent mediaeval thinkers will try to rectify this problem. His attempt to rectify this problem, involves rigorous Aristotelian metaphysical and logical analysis of *substantia*, *subsistentiae* and *ousia*, as they relate to First-category universals and First-category individuals, which is not cogent at the present stage of this research.

The most important reason to review Boethius, is to show the importance of his definition of person in subsequent discourse on the philosophy of person. Thus, with Boethius, the rational metaphysical being, man, of Aristotle, is now in addition narrowly defined as an individual substance. Hence, when the rational being, human being, is conceived as an individual substance capable of an independent existence, that is, a subsistence substance, it becomes a person.

**IV. Thomas Aquinas (1225-1274 AD):** In a sense Aquinas’s philosophical anthropology is summarily a combination of that of Plato, Aristotle and Boethius as already exposed above. Indirectly, via Augustine and other neo-platonic-influenced Christian thinkers before Aquinas, Aquinas absorbed the anthropology of Plato, even though, systematically he cannot be said to be platonic but Aristotelian in respect to philosophical tradition. In respect to Aristotle, if Averroes (Ibn Rushd, 1126-1198 AD)[[48]](#footnote-48) is the most brilliant and profound commentator of the works of Aristotle, Aquinas is undoubtedly the most intelligent and proficient systematic scholar of the philosophy of Aristotle. Boethius, under the Chalcedonian Christological controversy on the nature and person of God, defines “person”, brings the concept of person from a mere logical terminology to settle a theological controversy, into a crucial philosophical issue that needs its own specific investigation.

Henceforth, the work shall focus on the concept of the person, not the generic idea man or human being. When reference to human being is made, it is because it necessarily concerns the concept of the person. Therefore, Aquinas in his two *Summae* and other works, discusses man, as human being in different aspects, but in this exposition, focus will be on his thoughts on the person.

While Boethius’s discourse on person, is under a Christological controversy, Aquinas’s discourse on person is not under any controversy *per se*, but under a need for a Trinitarian systematization. In the Question 28, “On the Divine Relations” of the *Summa Theologica* (ST)[[49]](#footnote-49), how the thought of Boethius in his *De Trinitate*, shapes and influences the thought of Aquinas on the person, can be seen. Aquinas, thus, in reference to Boethius’s definition of person, maintains that, **‘*Sicut cuicumque attribuitur homo, oported quod attribuatur ei rationale.*” [‘when “man” is attributed to anyone, a rational nature is likewise attributed to him.’][[50]](#footnote-50)** In other words, Aquinas remotely follows Aristotle and Boethius immediately, holding that a rational nature or rationality is the essence of “man”, and “man” cannot be defined without positing rationality.

In the prologue, “On the Divine Persons”, Aquinas considers (the divine) persons under two aspects: the Persons absolutely and the Persons comparatively to each other. By discussing the Persons absolutely, Aquinas makes clear the definition of Boethius on person, which he substantially accepted.[[51]](#footnote-51) Aquinas defends the definition of person as an individuation substance, by maintaining that, **“Although universal and particular exist in every genus, nevertheless, in a certain special way, the individual belongs to the genus of a substance. For substance is individualized by itself; whereas the accidents are individualized by the subject, which is the substance.”[[52]](#footnote-52)** When persons, thus, exist as individual substances, he argues that they are called **‘“hypostases,” or first substances.’[[53]](#footnote-53)**

Aquinas goes further, to make an important emphasis on the autonomy of the person as a rational substance who has dominion over its own actions. He contends: **“In a more special and perfect way, the particular and the individual are found in the rational substances which have dominion over their own actions; and which are not only made to act, like others but which can act of themselves; for actions belong to singulars.”[[54]](#footnote-54)** This understanding of the person not merely as substance, but furthermore, as a free ‘supposit’, is a very important addition of Aquinas to Boethius definition of person. A supposit or subsistence being, **‘“Is of the very nature of substance that it subsists; as it were, a being per se”; that is, its existence in itself is such as to require no external support other than the conservative power of the creative act.’[[55]](#footnote-55)** Hence, Aquinas, submission is that: **‘ the term “individual substance” is placed in the definition of person, as signifying the singular in the genus of substance; and the term “rational nature” is added, as signifying the singular in rational substances.’[[56]](#footnote-56)**

Hence, by emphasizing, subsistence and autonomy of action in Boethius’s conception and definition of person, Aquinas has made person a concrete reality, a “thisness”, or better put a real existence, *esse*. Hence, while “man” or “human being”, is second substance (*ousia* in Greek, *ens* in Latin), that is, a form; “person”, is first substance (*hupostasis*) a being with real existence, *esse*. Following, Aristotle’s definition of nature, as a specific difference, *nature* is used only to consider things that are capable of being born or generated, while *essence*, is only used to consider the forms of things in general. For instance, one can say: “the nature of human being”, but cannot say “the nature of a rock,” this is because human beings can be born but rock cannot. But one can both say “the essence of a human being” and “the essence of a rock.” He thus, defends Boethius usage of “nature” rather than “essence” in the definition of person.[[57]](#footnote-57) Thus, in respect to the person, Aquinas inspired by Aristotle’s metaphysics, clarifies the difference between the concepts which in different ways mean substance (nature, subsistence and hypostasis), thus:

**For, as it exists in itself and not in another, it is called “subsistence”; as we say that those things subsist which exist in themselves, and not in another. As it underlies some common nature, it is called “a thing of nature”; as, for instance, this particular man is a human natural thing. As it underlies the accidents it is called “hypostasis,” or “substance.” What these three names signify in common to the whole genus of substances, this name “person” signifies in the genus of rational substance.[[58]](#footnote-58)**

While Boethius, defines person more from a logical standpoint, Aquinas substantiates Boethius’s concept of a person, more from a metaphysical standpoint. As aforementioned, Aquinas accepts the definition of person by Boethius and only slightly but importantly substantiates the Boethius concept of person, by emphasizing the subsistence of the person as a supposit (***suppositum***), a rational substance with a capacity to be free and self-exist. The fact that Aquinas like Boethius, did not aim to construct a philosophical discourse on person *per se*, but as a means to systematize a theological truth, the concept of person remains yet not an independent philosophical subject. So, when the “thisness” of a person is considered, it is considered as a self-subsisting being, but not as the “thisness” of concrete self-conscious subject. Nevertheless, with Boethius and Aquinas, there is a better understanding of the concept of person. For the understanding of humans, has progressed from an embodied soul, by Socrates-Plato and a rational animal by Aristotle, to an individual substance with a rational nature by Boethius, to a rational and free self-existing supposition, by Aquinas.[[59]](#footnote-59)

Since, the concept of person considered by Boethius and Aquinas, includes the Trinitarian God, angels and humans, there is a need, to consider the concept of person that is exclusively human; a concept of person that considers a person as a concrete self-conscious subject. Thus, there is a need for a philosophical anthropology that is not only metaphysical and logical, but that which is a more comprehensive philosophical anthropology. It is the need to create a more comprehensive philosophical anthropology, that inspires Karol Wojtyła’s philosophical consciousness into developing the concept of the person-revealed-in-action/Acting Person. To create this more comprehensive anthropology, Karol Wojtyła complements the Boethius-Thomistic metaphysical conception of person, with the phenomenological methodology of philosophy. This, he does in order to have a better grasp of the consciousness of the person as a subject.

Thus, with this review, the writer in the next chapter gives a thorough investigation of how Karol Wojtyła engages in the project of developing a more comprehensive philosophical anthropology.

**1.2. The Metaphysical Foundation of Karol Wojtyła’s Philosophy of the Person**

Every epistemological system presupposes a metaphysical system and every metaphysical system presupposes an epistemological system. This is because what can be known is a presupposition of what exists, and what exists has the possibility of been known. Philosophy makes claim of truth, and truth is at the same time, a subject of epistemology and a subject of metaphysics. Hence, philosophical anthropology, is at the same time a sort of epistemology and a sort of metaphysics. This is to say, every philosophical anthropology, has an underlying metaphysics and thus, an underlying epistemology. The quest, in this section, is to investigate the metaphysical foundation of Karol Wojtyła’s philosophical anthropology, in other words, his philosophy of person.

A window into Wojtyła’s metaphysical foundation on his philosophy of person, is the metaphysical principle of which he exposes the “subject” as the ontological basis of action. He sustains, **“for something to act, it must first exist.”[[60]](#footnote-60)** This can be interpreted as existence precedes action; being precedes operation. Thus, the principle, ***operari sequitur esse*** (act of doing something follows the act of being); is a being that acts. Hence, the relationship between being (in particular person) and action or act, is the nucleus of Wojtyła’s philosophy of the person. Wojtyła presents an analysis of this metaphysical principle and in a way, gives it an epistemological bent:

**Although the adage (that is, *operari sequitur esse*) sounds as though it were referring to a unilateral relation, namely, to the causal dependence of activity on existence, it also implies yet another relation between *operari* and *esse*. If *operari* results from *esse*, then *operari* is also—proceeding in the opposite direction—the most proper avenue to knowledge of that *esse*. This is, therefore, a gnosiological dependence.[[61]](#footnote-61)**

To understand the acts or actions of being, it is important to understand being. And conversely, to better understand the human being as a person, his or her *operari[[62]](#footnote-62)*, that is, his or her actions, have to be investigated and understood. Thus, the investigation of the philosophy of being is necessary for the understanding of the philosophy of person. This is especially important since Wojtyła’s philosophy of person is grounded on the concept of action as the operation of being.

Wojtyła’s works show a profound understanding of the philosophy of being, especially as expounded by the scholastics philosophy, with particular reference to the Thomistic metaphysics of being. Thomistic metaphysics of being, cannot be discussed without reference to Aristotle’s metaphysics. Aristotle is the first philosopher to place being as the central object of metaphysics, being thus is the subject of metaphysics.

Wojtyła accepts the metaphysical analyses of being exposed by Aristotle and Aquinas. Especially the innovation of Aquinas in emphasizing being as *esse*, the very act of to be. However, he contends that it is necessary to establish a metaphysical or ontological reduction of being, not to the genera, human beings, but to person, as a subject. He picks a particular interest in the metaphysical reduction of being as ***suppositum***.[[63]](#footnote-63) He modifies the traditional metaphysical concept of ***suppositum*** in this way:

**To say that the human being—I and every other human being—is given in experience as a *suppositum* is to say that the whole experience of the human being, which reveals the human being to us as someone who exists and acts, both allows and legitimately requires us to conceive the human being as the subject of that existence and activity. And this is precisely what is contained in the concept of *suppositum*.[[64]](#footnote-64)**

By this understanding, he gives a phenomenological touch to the metaphysical concept of *suppositum*, by emphasizing *subjectivity* in the understanding of the concept *suppositum*. He adds, in clarification, that:

**By “metaphysical,” I mean not so much “beyond-the-phenomenal” as “through-the-phenomenal,” or “trans-phenomenal.” Through all the phenomena that in experience go to make up the whole human being as someone who exists and acts, we perceive—somehow we must perceive—the subject of that existence and activity.[[65]](#footnote-65)**

Hence, in a personalistic sense, the *suppositum* of the human person, is its subjectivity, thus, *suppositum* for the person becomes *subject*. This, explains the distinction between *suppositum* as in *being* generally and the *suppositum* as reduced to the *human person* in particular. Only to the human person, can *suppositum* exclusively be said to be subject. Following this line of thought, therefore, Wojtyła, argues:

**One could also say that the human *suppositum* becomes a human self and appears as one to itself because of consciousness. This in no way implies, however, that the human self is completely reducible to consciousness or self-consciousness. Rather, the self is constituted through the mediation of consciousness in the *suppositum humanum* within the context of the whole existence (*esse*) and activity (*operari*) proper to this *suppositum*.[[66]](#footnote-66)**

Having established suppositum of person as subject, he, thus, embarks on a critical analysis of the ontological difference between nature and person. Before exposing his thoughts on the ontological difference between nature and person, the ethical foundation of his philosophy of the person will be discussed. This is because for Wojtyła, ethics or morality is also very important for the understanding of person.

**1.3. The Ethical Foundation of Karol Wojtyła’s Philosophy of Person**

Karol Wojtyła was first a moral philosopher[[67]](#footnote-67) before he became a philosophical anthropologist. It was his moral and ethical investigations that led him onto the investigation of the human person. At a point in his philosophical sojourn he came to the conclusion that morality cannot be properly investigated without a proper and a comprehensive understanding of the human person, who is the only being capable of executing moral actions. The question that stimulates Karol Wojtyła into the investigation of person in his works according to Kenneth L. Schmitz, is: **“Why be moral? Why should I do what I should, rather than what I would? Why ought I to do what is right?”[[68]](#footnote-68)** These are no doubt perennial questions of philosophy, that could be said to be meta-ethical in nature. They are not querying: what is moral? But, why should a person be moral? Thus, in a sense they are not strictly speaking, questions within ethics but questions that transcend ethics. The ethicist presupposes these questions, since for the ethicist it is a given that humans should be moral.[[69]](#footnote-69)

Wojtyła thinks that the question, “Why be moral?” is more of a philosophical anthropology question than an ethical question. The question probes the human person, rather than morals. Hence, the questions put more clearly is: Why should a person be moral? Why should a person do whatever is considered or agreed to be right? He contends, **“Our experience and also our intellectual apprehension of the person in and through his actions are derived in particular from the fact that actions have a moral value: they are morally good or morally bad.”[[70]](#footnote-70)** If it is ethical or moral questions that arouse Wojtyła’s philosophy of person, it follows that to understand his philosophy of the person we need to grasp his conception of ethics and morality. Wojtyła, in order to better understand and investigate the person in *Osoba i czyn*, decides to bracket ethics, however, he never considers a complete separation of ethics and anthropology. For him the two are bedfellows.[[71]](#footnote-71)

He considers ethics as the common factor of the algebraic relationship between anthropology (person) and action.[[72]](#footnote-72) A study of Karol Wojtyła’s philosophical works in general, and those on Ethics in particular, clearly show that his ethical thought is influenced by the ethical philosophy of Thomas Aquinas, Immanuel Kant and Max Scheler. Scheler’s ethics of value is a critique of Kant’s ethics of duty, which in turn, is a critique of the Greco-Hellenistic *cum* Scholastic—reaching it crescendo in Aquinas—ethics of the good or purpose (which is also called virtue ethics). Wojtyła, though greatly influenced by the ethics of Scheler, especially in his critique of Kant’s ethics, using the phenomenological method, is not completely satisfied by Scheler’s ethics. Wojtyła affirms and applauds Scheler’s ingenuity in employing the phenomenological method in investigating ethical experiences. For he maintains that **“The proper interpretation of this lived experience has always been one of the main tasks of ethics, since ethical experience is the experiential fact upon which this science is based.”[[73]](#footnote-73)**  However, he contends that the interpretation of experience, is not enough for a comprehensive investigation of ethics. Thus, he posits that the investigation of the metaphysical foundation of ethics is necessary for any profound and comprehensive understanding of ethics.[[74]](#footnote-74)

One of the metaphysical foundations of ethics is the concept of free-will, simply put the will. This is because ethics deals with human actions, and actions (*operari*) is possible because of the self-determination of person by as a result of free-will. This will be expounded below. Fundamentally, as will be exposed below in this work, Wojtyła’s understanding of the will is substantially Thomistic. However, he acknowledges the investigation of the will by both Kant and Scheler. He critiques Kant for identifying the will with practical reason and which makes him unable to explore the essence of the will. He submits:

**Since Kant’s philosophy did not provide him with a proper vehicle for apprehending and depicting the dynamism that forms the essence of the will, he reduced this whole spiritual faculty along with its freedom to the noumenal order, asserting that if experience tells us anything at all about the will, it certainly does not tell us anything about freedom of will.[[75]](#footnote-75)**

The implication of this philosophy of the will as can be demonstrated from Kant’s Categorical imperative, Wojtyła claims is that, **‘Reason commands the will with a corresponding power, and the will passively submits its own “causality” to reason’s command. In such a treatment, however, all we see are causes operating on the will; we do not see the will itself operating as a cause.’[[76]](#footnote-76)** What it means then is that the activities of the will are caused by either feelings or practical reason, thus, the will becomes subservient to inclinations and reason. This is contrary to the position of Aquinas,[[77]](#footnote-77) according to Wojtyła, although **“an act of the will can be commanded by reason, but this command always relies on the will. Reason may formulate the command, but the will provides the power inherent in every command.”[[78]](#footnote-78)** Therefore, Wojtyła contends, **“As far as human activity in general is concerned, the will appears there as a faculty that acts in conjunction with reason—rather than one that merely submits to the causality of motives. In such a view, the immanent power of action proper to the will is no fiction.”[[79]](#footnote-79)**

Wojtyła’s main problem with Kant’s ethical philosophy, is Kant’s stripping off of experience from the dynamism of the will, making the will a mere analysis of practical reason. Since, Wojtyła asserts that, **“The most evident feature in an act of will is the efficacy of the personal self. This efficacy is immediately given: it is reflected in the awareness of the acting person as an act of will.”[[80]](#footnote-80)** Thus, he considers the phenomenological analysis of lived experience as necessary for the investigation of the will and action. The consideration of lived experience leads him to Max Scheler’s philosophy.[[81]](#footnote-81)

In respect to Scheler, Wojtyła states, **“Although Scheler is a phenomenologist in his assumptions, he derives his view of the ethical life of the human being primarily from the set of emotional factors he sees as comprising that life. He realizes that ethical experience is connected with the willing of value.”[[82]](#footnote-82)** Though, Scheler unlike Kant does not negate the will from experience, however, Wojtyła critiques him for connecting **“willing with the feeling of value and not with the efficacy of the person. For this reason, too, ethical experience is not contained immanently in willing, in the act of will, but has its source, according to Scheler, in emotion.[[83]](#footnote-83) The very core of ethical experience, in Scheler’s view, is not the efficacy of the person but the emotional experience of value.”[[84]](#footnote-84)** Wojtyła strongly opposes any attempt to reduce ethical experience to emotionalism, and that is what he claims Scheler does in his ethics of values. Hence, Wojtyła contends:

**From the point of view of experience, however, I cannot agree with his system, precisely because he completely disregards the efficacy of the person. If persons are not the efficient cause of their actions, then there is no explanation for where ethical values come from. The experience upon which ethics is based reveals that persons who experience themselves as the efficient cause of their actions simultaneously experience themselves as subjects of ethical values—moral good and evil.[[85]](#footnote-85)**

Contrary to Kant and Scheler, according to Wojtyła, **“St. Thomas arrived at his conception of the will by a different route, namely, through a metaphysical analysis of human reality, and especially of the substantial soul, whose essence (*essentia*) does not operate by itself but through the medium of faculties (*potentia*).”[[86]](#footnote-86)** In Thomas Aquinas, the will is not a servant of reason but shares an equal status with reason as faculties of the soul. Hence, of **“which spiritual substance of the soul itself is the subject, whereas the other faculties of the human soul are subjectified in the *compositum humanum* as a whole.”[[87]](#footnote-87)**

**1.4. The Influence of Thomistic Personalism**

The reading of any work of Wojtyła clearly shows Thomas Aquinas’s profound influence on his thought and methodology of philosophizing. This influence is mostly obvious in Wojtyła’s personalism and ethics. Aquinas has no conscious exposition on personalism but his discourse on person and ethics, even though they are within theological problematics and contexts, have clearly foundational positions for personalism as philosophical reflection. A number of contemporary Christian philosophers, especially the Neo-Thomistic philosophers, have developed what is now known as Thomistic Personalism. Karol Wojtyła, of course is one of those who has written a philosophical work on Thomistic Personalism.[[88]](#footnote-88) In an academic paper[[89]](#footnote-89), entitled in Polish, “*Personalizm Tomistyczny,*” referring to the work of Aquinas, he maintains, **“We find in his system not just a point of departure, but also a whole series of additional constitutive elements that allow us to examine the problem of personalism in the categories of St. Thomas’ philosophy and theology.”[[90]](#footnote-90)** By this Wojtyła is affirming personalistic thought in the philosophical and theological system of Aquinas. W. Norris Clarke, in a conference on the Aquinas Lecture, 1993, puts it thus:

**My own endeavour here is actually part of a loose, ongoing cooperation that has recently been developing among a growing number of Thomistic thinkers, some philosophers, some theologians, who feel the need, as I do, to draw out and highlight a dynamic and relational notion of person which seems to us clearly implied in St. Thomas’s own metaphysics of being as existential act, but was never quite made explicit by Thomas himself in his philosophical analysis of the person.[[91]](#footnote-91)**

W. Norris Clarke, affirms that Aquinas’s metaphysics of being as existential act, contains implicitly personalistic thought, which he thinks should be developed. He also mentions two prominent Catholic scholars, he thinks they perceived personalism in the system of Aquinas and of which they challenged Catholic scholars to develop. The two scholars are: Karol Wojtyła and Josef Ratzinger.[[92]](#footnote-92) W. Norris Clarke, posits the **“relational notion of the person”[[93]](#footnote-93)** in the system of Aquinas, as the implicit foundation of personalism that can be built on by contemporary scholars on Aquinas. From this foundation, he develops, self-possessing, self-communicative, and self-transcending as the characteristics definition that could explain the person in Aquinas’s personalism. This characteristic can be understood from the review of Thomas Aquinas’s philosophy of person above.

Before, investigating the implicit personalism of Aquinas and the influence on Wojtyła, it is expedient to see how Wojtyła conceives personalism.[[94]](#footnote-94) Wojtyła asserts, **“Personalism is not primarily a theory of the person or a theoretical science of the person. Its meaning is largely practical and ethical: it is concerned with the person as a subject and an object of activity, as a subject of rights, etc.”[[95]](#footnote-95)** For Wojtyła, personalism emphasizes the person as a subject and as an object to activity, by activity he means action. This also follows that the person is much more than having a rational nature, as theoretically formulated in metaphysical reflection of the human being. Wojtyła reflecting on Boethius’s famous definition of the person, which Aquinas affirms, in respect to Thomistic Personalism, contends, **“The person is a subsistent subject of existence and action—which can in no way be said of a rational nature. That is why God must be a personal being.”[[96]](#footnote-96)** This inspires, Wojtyła’s definition of the person, thus: **“The person, therefore, is always a rational and free concrete being, capable of all those activities that reason and freedom alone make possible.”[[97]](#footnote-97)** While, Aquinas expounded the person’s nature as rational and self-determined, he considers consciousness and self-consciousness of the person as accidentally important to the nature of person. Thus, Aquinas does not give any comprehensive and substantial investigation of the consciousness and self-consciousness nature of the person. Hence, Wojtyła maintains, **“St. Thomas gives us an excellent view of the objective existence and activity of the person, but it would be difficult to speak in his view of the lived experiences of the person.”[[98]](#footnote-98)**

According to Wojtyła, the person in Aquinas’s view is a concrete being of which its rational nature is realized by means of thought. This **“Human thought has a creative character; it is the basis of creativity and the source of culture.”[[99]](#footnote-99)** This creative character, enables the human person to be creative and innovative. Hence, **“We are by nature creators, not just consumers. We are creators because we think. And because our thought (our rational nature) is also the basis of our personalities, one could say that we are creators because we are persons.”[[100]](#footnote-100)** This creativeness of the human person according to Wojtyła is realized in action. The specific actions where the human person manifests this rational creativity is in moral actions. Freedom and Free will make the person to create not just good or bad actions, but more so to create himself or herself as good or bad person. Thus, Wojtyła maintains:

**According to St. Thomas, freedom is not given to us as an end in itself, but as a means to a greater end. Freedom for freedom’s sake has no justification in the Thomistic view of the cosmos; freedom exists for the sake of morality and, together with morality, for the sake of a higher spiritual law and order of existence—the kind of order most strictly corresponds to rational beings, which are persons.[[101]](#footnote-101)**

Following the place of thought, creativity, freedom and morality in the personalism of Aquinas, the relationship of the person and society is another key point in the personalism of Aquinas. The relationship of the person and society, has to do with correlation between the good of the person and the common good.[[102]](#footnote-102) According to Wojtyła, **“Thomistic personalism maintains that the individual good of persons should be by nature subordinate to the common good at which the collectivity, or society, aims—but this subordination may under no circumstances exclude and devalue the persons themselves.”[[103]](#footnote-103)** To the above characteristics of Aquinas’s personalism, Wojtyła affirms the person as a subject and object of love, the spiritual and immortal nature of the person, as important characteristics of Aquinas’s personalism.

The writer in exposing the personalism of Aquinas, has focused more on the reflection of Karol Wojtyła purposefully. The work by which Wojtyła exposes his thought on *Thomistic personalism* was in a paper published in 1961. This was a year after the first publication, of his work, *Love and Responsibility*, published in 1960 and eight years before his systematic work on philosophical anthropology, *Osoba i czyn* (Person and Act/Acting Person), was published in 1969. These two works in which Wojtyła investigates his philosophy of person and personalism, display not only the themes of Aquinas’s personalism, but more importantly reveal how the reflection of Aquinas’s personalism, profoundly influenced his thought and philosophy of the person.

**Chapter Two: Phenomenology and Karol Wojtyła’s Phenomenological Analysis of the Human Person**

Wojtyła strongly holds that metaphysical reduction is not sufficient for the comprehensive understanding of the human being as person. And thus, it is necessary to complement it with a phenomenological analysis and reduction. For him the understanding of person as a subject (*suppositum*), can only be achieved through a phenomenological analysis of the consciousness and the self-consciousness of the person. Wojtyła has no intention of building a phenomenological system, he only intends to use phenomenology as a tool for a thorough and critical analysis of the experience and actions of the human person. Hence, the next two sections give a concise view of this epistemological tool employed by Wojtyła.

**2.1. Brief Exposition of Phenomenology as a Philosophical System**

Etymologically the term phenomenology originates from two words, *phenomenon* and *logos*, which means “to show itself” (generally denoted as appearance[[104]](#footnote-104)) and study respectively. Thus, phenomenology, simply put is the study or science (general denotation of the Greek term *logos[[105]](#footnote-105)*) of phenomena or appearances.[[106]](#footnote-106) Though the term phenomenon predates Husserl[[107]](#footnote-107)it was he who founded phenomenology as a philosophical system and methodology.[[108]](#footnote-108) This philosophical system and methodology, during the contemporary period of western philosophy had an epistemic charm that many philosophers, and even socio-empirical scientists, could not resist. Among the philosophers, the following cannot but be mentioned: Martin Heidegger, Max Scheler, Emmanuel Levinas, Jean Paul Sartre, Maurice Merleau-Ponty, Simone De Beauvoir, Paul Ricoeur, Jacques Derrida, Hans-Georg Gadamer, and of course Karol Wojtyła. Looking at these philosophical giants named above, that are attracted to phenomenology, one may ask, why is the epistemic charm of phenomenology so powerful that it attracts both theist and non-theist philosophers? It is this charm that the writer intends to expose in this section of the work.

Edmund Husserl, the founder of Phenomenology, lived between 1859-1938, a period when the experimental and behavioral sciences were in their heyday. This is a period that philosophy and in particular metaphysics, was being buffeted and was almost excommunicated from the community of knowledge and science. Thus, there became the need to establish a new “first philosophy.” Aristotle in his *Metaphysics*, called his study of being *qua* being, that was later called metaphysics, the “first philosophy” (in Greek, *prote philosophia*). He calls it first philosophy because it aims at investigating the ultimate ground or principle of things.[[109]](#footnote-109) At the beginning of the modern period of philosophy, in view of Husserl, Descartes in his *Meditations*, also attemptes to establish a *first philosophy*, which is his method of “hyperbolic doubt.” By this method, Descartes had hoped to grasp a clear and distinct idea that gives firm foundations and establishes “first principles” of the knowledge of things. Descartes came to the conclusion that *cogito ego sum* is the first principle of knowledge.[[110]](#footnote-110)

For Husserl to decide to establish a new “first philosophy,” after Descartes’, it implies that epistemic events have taken over Descartes’ “first philosophy.” Descartes’ “first philosophy” was inspired by the rational methodology of geometry. Though it emphasized the subject “ego,” the “ego” is radically rationalistic in nature.[[111]](#footnote-111) After him, there were waves of radical systems of empiricism, that reached its crescendo in Hume. These systems strongly opposed the rationalism of Descartes and other Cartesian rationalists, to the point that the advent and establishment of modern science, led the positivists to declare rationalism, especially metaphysics as epistemically impotent. Husserl’s thus, intends to establish a “first philosophy” that would reconcile or bridge rationalism and empiricism. And this “first philosophy” is what is called and known as phenomenology or as Husserl prefers to put it, **“a science of transcendental subjectivity.”[[112]](#footnote-112)** Husserl thinks that from this science, **“all genuine sciences would have to derive the origin of all their method.”[[113]](#footnote-113)** For Husserl this science maintains the true philosophical atitude of skepticism and self-criticism as established by Socrates-Plato and Descartes. He describes this atitude thus:

**The philosopher, however, cannot begin by taking a fresh hold of things, since he is not permitted to have only what he has given himself in absolute justification. At the outset he has no objects; for him natural experience, which bountifully provides him with existing objects, has no automatic legitimacy. At the outset he is not permitted to allow any naively enacted self-evidence, of whatever experiential mode, to pass through unexamined, though it itself give rise to no cause for suspicion; nothing may be taken for granted and accepted in advance. Nothing may count as valid that has not been absolutely justified.[[114]](#footnote-114)**

Phenomenology is a science that aims at the absolute first beginning and absolute justification of things as they are given to the consciousness, for a universal absolute cognition. Husserl on the philosopher employing this science, puts it thus:

**From that point on, he no longer wants to know things in general and in just any manner at all, no longer wants to know things as he previously has known them (whether pre-scientifically or scientifically), but instead defines himself willingly as one who perpetually desires nothing but absolutely justified cognition, and cognition that is systematic and universal—a philosophy.[[115]](#footnote-115)**

This science, begins from the self, the ego, the philosophizing subject, thus, it is the science of the ego. This it does, by assiduously bracketing all pregiven cognition, and according to Husserl the ultimate of all the pregiven is *experience*, scientific/empirical, as well as all cultural cognitions. This atitude is very necessary for a perfect knowing of what the world is. Hence, Husserl contends, **“a perfect cognition of what the world is and what true theory determines for it cannot be attained without studying the transcendental subjectivity in which world and world-theory are constituted in a transcendental—subjective manner.”[[116]](#footnote-116)** Hence, for Husserl, phenomenology, is the science whose starting point of all systematic investigation of the ground of unity of all cognition especially of all sciences is the transcendental subjectivity.[[117]](#footnote-117) The end of this science is to grasp the knowledge of a thing in itself, the *it itself*, the essence of a thing. This is what he refers as the **“universal and absolute justification of cognition.”[[118]](#footnote-118)** A cognition based on a genuine grounding based on pure intuitive evidence (*apodictic* evidence) of the ego, that is absolutely self-giving. Husserl describes, pure “evidence” thus: **“We wish to accept nothing as cognized in the finally valid sense, that is, to accept nothing as existing and existing in such-and-such a way and in any particular mode of being, that does not *itself stand before our eyes*, grasped by us in itself precisely in the manner in which it is meant and posited in our cognitive belief.”[[119]](#footnote-119)** For him the end of the phenomenological method is to arrive at the knowledge of things as self-given to the ego (self). Therefore, he submits that, “self-giving” is **“the measure, and its absolute optimum the ultimate measure, by which we verify all judgements, all our beliefs concerning what is.”[[120]](#footnote-120)** This “self-givenness”[[121]](#footnote-121) is grasped in and by the consciousness as the “it itself.”[[122]](#footnote-122)

It is therefore, this claim of phenomenology as a “first philosophy,” that rigorously investigates the grounds of a thing as directly given to the ego of the philosopher, through the suspension of any precognitions, that indeed makes it charming to many philosophers of the contemporary period of western philosophy and even today. At a period when the experimental sciences are assuming pride of epistemic place over every field of human learning, and at a time when metaphysics is no longer respected and admired as the “first philosophy,” phenomenology becomes a fortified epistemic fortress for many philosophers, against the epistemic bullying of the experimental sciences.

Heidegger, employs the phenomenological method in his ontology. He maintains, that **‘The expression “phenomenology” signifies primarily a *concept of method*. It does not characterize the what of the objects of philosophical research in terms of their content, but the *how* of such research.’[[123]](#footnote-123)** Hence, he creates a maxim on phenomenology as a method, thus: **“To the things themselves!”[[124]](#footnote-124)** One ought to bear in mind that Heidegger strongly emphasizes, the meaning of “phenomenon” not as appearance, but rather as “self-showing in itself.” He contends: **‘*Phenomenon*—the self-showing in itself—means a distinctive way something can be encountered. On the other hand, *appearance* means a referential relation in beings themselves such that what does the referring (the announcing) can fulfil its possible function only if it shows itself in itself—only it if is a “phenomenon.”’[[125]](#footnote-125)** Thus, phenomenology could be said to be the method of self-showing *it itself*, the things themselves, that is, being of beings.[[126]](#footnote-126) Heidegger, following his analysis of the Greek words: *phenomenon* and *logos*, maintains that: **‘phenomenology means: αποφαινεσυαι τα φαινομενα—to let what shows itself be seen from itself, just as it shows itself from itself. That is the formal meaning of the type of research that calls itself “phenomenology.” But this expresses nothing other than the maxim formulated above: “To the things themselves!”’[[127]](#footnote-127)**

Positing the being of beings, as that needed to be shown, he defines phenomenology as **“the way of access to, and the demonstrative manner of determination of, that which is to become the theme of ontology. *Ontology is possible only as phenomenology*. The phenomenological concept of phenomenon, as self-showing, means the being of beings—its meaning, modifications, and derivatives.”[[128]](#footnote-128)** Hence, Heidegger reduces phenomenology to ontology—the meaning and interpretation of being (*Dasein*). He maintains that ontology and phenomenology are not different disciplines of philosophy but philosophy *per se.* Of which when the object of philosophy is in view, it is ontology but when its procedure is in view it is phenomenology.[[129]](#footnote-129)

Husserl founded phenomenology but restricted it within the realm of transcendental reduction. Heidegger, influenced by Husserl reduced and made phenomenology, ontology. But Karol Wojtyła, was not directly influenced by the phenomenology of either Husserl or Heidegger. He was influenced by the phenomenology of another philosophical giant, Max Scheler. Thus, below gives a brief exposition of the phenomenology of Max Scheler.

**2.1.1. The Influence of Max Scheler’s Phenomenological Method**

Unlike Heidegger, Max Scheler maintains that phenomenology is neither **‘new science nor a substitute for the word “philosophy.”’[[130]](#footnote-130)** He rather, thinks that it is **“an attitude of spiritual seeing in which one can see [er*-*schauen] or experience [er*-*leben] something which otherwise remains hidden, namely, a realm of facts of a particular kind.”[[131]](#footnote-131)** Thus, he emphasizes “phenomenology” as an epistemic atitude not as a method. According to him what is peculiar and unique about the “attitudeness” of phenomenology is that, what **“is seen and experienced is *given* only in *the seeing and experiencing act itself*, in its being acted out [Vollzug]; it appears in this act and only in it.”[[132]](#footnote-132)** For him what characterizes a philosophy that is based on phenomenology is that: there must be an **“immediate contact with the world itself”** and the things in the world as **“immediately given in experience.”**[[133]](#footnote-133) Thus, he emphasizes the **“lived experience of being”** as it reveals itself to the one seeing or experiencing the world.[[134]](#footnote-134) Thus, he maintains that the reflective gaze of the phenomenological philosopher, **“rests only on that place where lived-experience and its object, the world, touch one another.”[[135]](#footnote-135)**

By this phenomenological attitude, that is, phenomenological philosophy, Scheler claims, phenomenology is able to explain, in a more efficacious way than rationalism, not only science and its object, but also art, religion, and ethics. He denies, phenomenology as **“criticism,”** since it does not give criteria for the act of cognition, but rather, he emphasizes **“lived-experience.”** He makes bold to claim:

**The phenomenologist is convinced that a deep and living familiarity with the content and meaning of the facts in question must precede all questions of criteria concerning a particular domain, no matter whether these concern the distinction between genuine and false science, true and false religion, genuine and worthless art, or even involve questions like “what is the criterion for the reality of an intended object [eines Gemeinten] or for the truth of a judgment?”**

This means that to truly and properly know and judge a thing, be it a physical thing in the world, science, religion or art, one must be in direct contact with the thing. Thus, it is contrary to the traditional metaphysical atitude of speculation based on the so called first principles of demonstration or the Kantian critical philosophy based on *à priori* transcendental intuitions.[[136]](#footnote-136) Hence, the phenomenologist does not stand aloof as a judge over the things he or she intends to know, but rather he or she is in a living experience with the thing being known, *things-themselves*.

Besides the difference between phenomenology from empiricism (based on the sense of experience, *Erleben* against *Erfahrung*) and rationalism (knowing by lived-experience against judging by criteria), Scheler also maintains: **‘phenomenological philosophy is distinguished from the prevalent forms of empiricism and rationalism by the fact that it is interested in the total mental experience which takes place in intentional acts, or in any of the forms of “consciousness of something,” not only in the “representation” of objects.’[[137]](#footnote-137)** Though he affirms that both phenomenology and psychology deal with lived-experiences, he maintains that phenomenology is different from, and has little to do with psychology, just as it has little to do with the other sciences, such as physics and biology.[[138]](#footnote-138) He further asserts that, **‘the lived-experiences investigated by psychology are already real processes and things which can be “meant” in a multiplicity of acts and in acts of different individuals; in the course of these there can be characteristics and features which are not experienced and thus go all the more unnoticed and unobserved.’[[139]](#footnote-139)** Scheler, contends that these multiplicity of acts in the “lived-experiences” of psychology **‘can never be “self-given,” any more than a corporeal thing can be “self-given” in the natural perception of the external world.’[[140]](#footnote-140)** Hence, he claims that the **“self-givenness”** in phenomenology is not **“mental givenness,”** which could lead to psychologism.

Max Scheler, profoundly and copiously, uses his understanding of phenomenology as an attitude of seeing and experiencing grounded in lived-experience in his philosophical ethics and philosophical anthropology. This explains how among the three giants in phenomenology; Husserl, Heidegger and Scheler, it was Scheler’s phenomenology that attracted and influenced Karol Wojtyła thoughts and philosophy.

**2.2. Karol Wojtyła’s Phenomenological Analysis of the Human Person**

Karol Wojtyła was profoundly influenced by the emphasis of “lived-experiences” and phenomenology as an epistemic “atitude” in Max Scheler’s phenomenology.[[141]](#footnote-141) Thus, below shows an exposition of how Wojtyła uses phenomenology to uncover and analyze the inner life of consciousness and lived-experience, in his philosophy of the person and action.[[142]](#footnote-142)

**2.2.1. Experience as the Ground for the Understanding of the Human Person**

For Wojtyła, the establishment of the meaning and the analysis of experience—the human experience of himself, is necessary for the understanding of person. He asserts, **“The basis for understanding the human being must be sought in experience—in experience that is complete and comprehensive and free of all systemic *a priories*.”[[143]](#footnote-143)** It is based on the place of experience in the understanding of the human person, that Wojtyła radically differs not only from Aquinas and also from every other Greco-scholastic philosophers’s philosophical anthropology. Hence, he asserts unequivocally that, **“our prime concern in this study is *to allow experience to speak for itself as best it can and right to the end*.”[[144]](#footnote-144)** This assertion, clearly shows why Wojtyła considers it necessary to employ phenomenological methodology in his philosophical investigation of the person. Miguel Acosta sustains that, **“The starting point of Karol Wojtyła’s anthropology is the human action that can be verified through the experience that is objectified by consciousness.”[[145]](#footnote-145)**

Every human being has two realms of experience: the experience without one’s self and the experience within one’s self. The former is one’s experience of the realities or activities of the world besides one’s self, while the latter, is the experience of the realities or activities within the consciousness of a person, in other words, the experience of one’s self. He maintains that, **“this experience, which man has of himself, is the richest and apparently the most complex of all experiences accessible to him.”[[146]](#footnote-146)** This is because the experiences without one’s self, though they are activities that take place outside of the self, nevertheless, are still contained and are parts of the experiences within. For instance, when one sees a tree standing twenty meters away, one experiences the seeing of a tree outside himself, and also experiences the experience of seeing a tree within himself. In other words, he or she experiences himself or herself seeing a tree. It is in order to analyze and understand this experience of one’s self, the experience of one’s experience, that the employing of phenomenology, in particular Max Scheler’s phenomenological method becomes very important for Wojtyła.

What happens when one experiences oneself? Wojtyła says when one experiences oneself, one faces oneself. According to him at this experience one, **“comes into a cognitive relation with himself.”[[147]](#footnote-147)** It is an uninterrupted encounter of one’s self, otherwise known as the ego.[[148]](#footnote-148) It may appear interrupted, for instance, when one sleeps, but even while one is sleeping, a person never ceases to remain with one’s self. Hence, he contends that **“the object of experience is the man emerging from all the moments and at the same time present in every one of them.”[[149]](#footnote-149)** This contention is against, the phenomenalistic standpoint that **“seems to overlook the essential unity of the distinctive experiences and to attribute the unitary nature of experience to its allegedly being composed of a set of sensations or emotions, which are subsequently ordered by the mind.”[[150]](#footnote-150)** The point here is that Wojtyła, though agreeing to the very existence of singular events of experience, nevertheless, maintains that in **“the experience of man,”** there is a continuum of experience of oneself. He, thus, submits, **“the experience of man, of myself (the man I am), lasts as long as there is maintained that cognitive relation in which I am both the subject and the object.”[[151]](#footnote-151)**

Knowledge or understanding of oneself is possible because of the reality of **“the experience of man.”** This knowledge can be extended to the knowledge of the other. This is because in a relationship with the other, the other becomes part of one's experience of oneself. Wojtyła asserts: **“the experience of man is composed of his experience of himself and of all other men whose position relative to the subject is that of the object of experience, that is to say, who are in a direct cognitive relation to the subject.”[[152]](#footnote-152)** Thus, Wojtyła distinguishes the experience of the other, which he calls **“the experience of *man* (human being)”[[153]](#footnote-153)**, the object of experience. The word man, in the quote above, he puts in italics since he meant human beings in general and does not want to confuse it with the concept of **“the experience of man”** under consideration in this section, which he distinguishes as **“the experience of the ego.”** He maintains that, **“the two experiences differ but are not separable.”[[154]](#footnote-154)** Both are dealing with human beings but **“the experience of the ego”**, deals with the human being, that is, my very self, not the other person. Wojtyła, holds the intimacy of the experience of oneself very fundamental, for the very reason that: **“Everyone is the object of his own unique experience and no external relation to any other human being can take the place of the experiential relation that the subject has to himself.”[[155]](#footnote-155)** This emphasis on the subjectivity of the person, that is the subjective relation to oneself, is a very important mark in Wojtyła’s philosophy of person. Therefore, it means, the supreme epistemic judge over a person’s experience of oneself, is that particular individual person. The other, can only share in the knowledge of this particular individual person, if and only if, he or she communicates his or her experience of self to the other. Nevertheless, Wojtyła does not intend to underplay the importance of the experience of other human beings in the cognitive acts aimed at the knowledge of the human person in general. He notes, **“The nature of the whole cognitive acts directed at man, both at the man I am and at every man other than myself, is empirical as well as intellectual. The two aspects interpenetrate, interact, and mutually support each other.”[[156]](#footnote-156)**

The emphasis here is not to suggest the solution to the philosophical problem of understanding other minds, but to sustain that experience, as in the experience of the self, is the foundation for the knowledge of the human person. It is the very reason that traditional metaphysics did not explore the experience of the self, that prompts Wojtyła to engage in phenomenology as an epistemic methodology to analyze and comprehend the experience of the self. This he does without discarding the metaphysics of being or person. On the contrary, the cognitive dynamism that exists in the relationship of **“the experience of human beings”** and **“the experience of the ego,”** makes the employment of metaphysical reduction and phenomenological reduction indispensable for any comprehensive understanding of the person.

Wojtyła clearly holds that his understanding of experience is not and should not be exactly identified with the phenomenalistic conception of experience. And it is definitely not the empiricists understanding of experience. For he thinks that, **“To reduce the range of experience to the functions and the content of sense alone would lead to deep contradictions and serious misunderstandings.”[[157]](#footnote-157)** The central question that distinguishes the phenomenological path Wojtyła threads is, in a phenomenalistic reduction: **“What then is given directly in experience?”[[158]](#footnote-158)** Wojtyła holds that it is not merely the “ego” or an aspect of the human being, but **“man himself”**; man with his conscious acting or action is what is given as the object of experience in a phenomenalistic reduction[[159]](#footnote-159). Hence, for Wojtyła, the object of experience, **“the experience of man”** is **“man-acts”** (in polish, *czlowiek dziala*). This, “man-acts” or better put, a person’s action, is that which is phenomenologically given in a phenomenological reduction of human experiences.[[160]](#footnote-160) He adduces: **“our position is that *action serves as a particular moment of apprehending – that is, of experiencing – the person.*”[[161]](#footnote-161)** He understands **“action,”** thus: **‘Action is what most fully and profoundly reveals the human being as an *I*—and, indeed, as a person, for that which we express in categories of being by the concept “person” is given in experience precisely as a self (*soi*), as an *I*.’[[162]](#footnote-162)** By this position of his, a phenomenological relationship between human action and person is established. To comprehend this phenomenological relationship between human action and person, consciousness and subjectiveness of the person must be discussed. This is because the field of play of this phenomenological relationship is in the consciousness and subjectiveness of the person.

**2.2.2. The Analysis of the Human Dynamism and the Human Act**

Wojtyła in his philosophical anthropology takes a number of radical steps, which he followed through to their logical conclusions. One of these radical steps, regards the relationship between action (*operari*) and person (*persona*). Wojtyła, observed that the standard approach in different epistemic enquiries that investigate the human person as a whole or in part, **“have as their object man’s acting, and is especially true of ethics, which treats of action that presupposes a person, that is, presupposes man as a person.”[[163]](#footnote-163)** Simply put, this position holds that there are human actions because there are human persons, and thus, to understand human actions, persons ought to be observed and studied first. Wojtyła, clearly announces that he is following a different line of experience and understanding. He claims:

**For us action *reveals* the person, and we look at the person through his action. For it lies in the nature of the correlation inherent in experience, in the very nature of man’s acting, that action constitutes the specific moment whereby the person is revealed. Action gives us the best insight into the inherent essence of the person and allows us to understand the person most fully. We experience man as a person, and we are convinced of it because he performs actions.[[164]](#footnote-164)**

The quotation above is no doubt the theses of Wojtyła work, *Osoba i czyn* (Acting Person/Person and Act). Hence, the need to give a full quotation of his position. It means that the rest of the work is to demonstrate how action reveals person, and finally to demonstrate what person is for Wojtyła. The next line of investigation, logically, is to know what action is. From the traditional interpretation, **‘It is only man’s *deliberate acting* that we call an “act” or “action.” Nothing else in his acting, nothing that is not intended and deliberate deserves to be so termed.’[[165]](#footnote-165)** This kind of action or act, is what in Western philosophical tradition is called *actus humanus* (the human act), because it emphasizes purposefulness and deliberateness of the agent or actor. *Actus humanus[[166]](#footnote-166)*, is used in contradistinction to the “acts of man,” which is the acts or actions that reflexively happens in a person, beyond the capacity of a person to determine or control.

Wojtyła, understands, *actus humanus*, human act, beyond the practical sense of *agere*, the Latin word which could mean operation, action or act. But, rather, action understood as *operari,* conscious human activity. He understands it more metaphysically as in the interpretation of Aristotle and Aquinas, as *potentia-actus* (potential act). A concept Aristotle used to explain **“the changeable and simultaneously dynamic nature of being.”[[167]](#footnote-167)** Wojtyła indicates that the scholastic philosophers uses *actus humanus* interchangeably with *actus voluntarius* (voluntary act), to emphasize the importance of free will in any actions or acts that are worthy to be called human actions or acts. Thus, he asserts: **“The feature indicated by the attributive *voluntarius* is the decisive factor in the inherent essence of action as well as for its separateness from the acting of any other subject that is not a person.”[[168]](#footnote-168)** This is to say, what makes an action an *actus humanus*, a human action is *voluntarius*, free will. Hence, in the light of the Scholastics, he posits *actus* to have a close link with *potentia*. Which follows, that for him every action is closely connected with a corresponding *potentia*. Therefore, he submits that, **“This points to the potential substratum of actualization; it explains why *actus humanus* considers man as the subject who acts; less directly, it accounts for his potentiality as the source of action.”[[169]](#footnote-169)** Thus, he explains the importance of retaining the metaphysical aspect of understanding the subject, person as *suppositum* in Wojtyła’s philosophy of person.[[170]](#footnote-170) A subject is potential substratum, *suppositum.* When it is in action, an actualization is brought forth, by which it becomes *the Person-revealed-in-action/Acting person*. In this dynamic of the actualization of the Acting person, by the action of the potential substratum, *suppositum* (the subject), the *actus voluntarius*, is the power that brings forth the actualization.

Thus, *actus humanus* is interpreted by Wojtyła as **“conscious acting.”** A conscious acting or action, of which its metaphysical nature as the act of being is not denied. Hence, he conceives action not merely as human action but most importantly as the action of person. He maintains that, **“In approaching the person through his actions we shall have to retain that philosophical intuition which appears to be indispensable for the comprehension and the philosophical interpretation of any dynamism and thus also of the dynamism of action, that is, of conscious acting.”[[171]](#footnote-171)** Conscious acting by its nature is *actus voluntarius*, that is voluntary act, in the sense that it involves the human will. Since, he contends **“man not only acts consciously, but also has the consciousness that he is acting and even that he is acting consciously”[[172]](#footnote-172)**, he thenceforth, distinguishes between **“conscious acting”** and **“the consciousness of acting.”**

**2.2.3. Consciousness and Subjectiveness in the Nature of the Human Person**

In the exposition of the phenomenological methodology above, the centrality of consciousness and subjectiveness has been established and emphasized. This section is to show how Wojtyła understands and employs these concepts in his philosophy of person.

Wojtyła accepts the traditional interpretation of consciousness as dealing with human acts as voluntary acts. However, he posits a critique of this interpretation. He says: **“This interpretation neither isolates nor develops the aspect of consciousness.”[[173]](#footnote-173)** It rather conceives consciousness as **“something that was incorporated and subordinate, as if it was dissolved in man’s actions and in his being, the being of the rational nature; though man existed and acted consciously, it was not in consciousness that his being and acting had their specific origin.”[[174]](#footnote-174)** That is to say, it does not deal with consciousness *per se*. Human act as conscious act is seen in the traditional sense as an epistemological position and a metaphysical standpoint.[[175]](#footnote-175) Wojtyła, argues that the scholastics interpretation of consciousness, only implies its **“rationality”** and **“volition”** in their philosophy of person. To which, in respect to the analysis of consciousness in the understanding of the person, he maintains, **“It must be conceded that this aspect was not developed in the Scholastic tradition, where *actus humanus* was subjected to a detailed analysis chiefly from the side of *voluntarium*.”[[176]](#footnote-176)**

Though, not intending to accord any absolute interpretation to consciousness, Wojtyła conceives consciousness as **“an *intrinsic and constitutive aspect of the dynamic structure*, that is, of the acting person.”[[177]](#footnote-177)** The dynamic structure is the phenomenological activities that take place in the acting person. It is the experience of the person not only to act consciously, but also to be conscious or aware of the fact that he or she is acting consciously. Hence, there is an intimate phenomenological relationship between a person and a person’s action. Thus, every action of a person is a conscious action, or in the parlance of phenomenology, every action or act is an intentional action or act. However, the person enjoys an independent identity separate from his or her particular action. What mediates between a person and a person’s actions is consciousness. Wojtyła maintains that, **“Consciousness accompanies and reflects or mirrors the action when it is born and while it is being performed; once the action is accomplished consciousness still continues to reflect it, though of course it no longer accompanies it.”[[178]](#footnote-178)** So, it could be deduced that consciousness makes human persons the acting persons or the persons of action, and, makes human actions the actions of person.

Wojtyła, however, considers consciousness, beyond its cognitive functionality, that is to say, consciousness understood merely as a mirror or reflector of human activities: both as **“what happens in man”** and **“of his acting.”** Wojtyła strongly refutes any exclusively epistemological role of consciousness in the human person. Hence in opposition to the classic phenomenological view, he proposes, **“that the cognitive reason for the existence of consciousness and of the acts proper to it does not consist in the penetrative apprehension of the constitution of the object.”[[179]](#footnote-179)** Nevertheless, Wojtyła, by this contestation of the classical phenomenological view on consciousness, does not oppose the fundamental thesis of phenomenology that every consciousness or intentionality is a consciousness or intentionality of something. He rather aims at broadening the understanding of consciousness beyond it cognitive or epistemological function, to include the metaphysical function of consciousness in the human person.[[180]](#footnote-180) For, **“consciousness alone is not yet that *I*, but it conditions the full manifestation of the *I* through action. Through action, my own *I* is fully manifested for my *I*’s consciousness.”[[181]](#footnote-181)** To have this broad view of consciousness, Wojtyła suggests a broadening of the understanding of human acts or actions as understood by the classical phenomenologists to the Aristotelian-Thomistic understanding of human acts or actions. By this understanding, human acts become the manifestation of the potentialities (or powers) of a concrete person. Consciousness or intentionality becomes human structure that enables the possible manifestation of the powers of the person. This means that for Wojtyła, unlike Husserl, consciousness is not merely a philosophical transcendental *à priori* power of knowing.

A person’s whole world (reality) is contained in a person’s consciousness, but it does not mean that reality is intentional by nature or in-itself, **“even though all that is the object of our cognition, comprehension, and knowledge is also the object of our consciousness.”[[182]](#footnote-182)** Wojtyła is not Berkeleian, he refutes the thesis that posits *esse* as equal to *percipi*. Wojtyła fears that understanding consciousness only by its epistemological function, will result in epistemological idealism, where *esse* becomes *percipi* as in Berkeleian or where *esse* becomes appearance (in Greek, *phenomenon*) as in the post-Kantian transcendental idealists. Hence, Wojtyła conceives consciousness (in polish, *swiadomosc*), **“not as a separate and self-contained reality but as the subjective content of the being and acting that is conscious, the being and acting proper to man.”[[183]](#footnote-183)** His purpose of investigating consciousness, is not as reality in-itself, but as a reality that brings actions in relation to the dynamism and efficacy of the person.[[184]](#footnote-184) Wojtyła, calls this way of understanding consciousness, **“the substantival and subjective sense.”[[185]](#footnote-185)**

For Wojtyła, what determines the actual state of consciousness of a person is the sum total of a person’s acts of consciousness. Hence, it is not just a person’s ego or subject that is conscious of acts but the totality of a person. This is to say, it is the person that is conscious of an act, not merely the consciousness or ego of the person. Therefore, he maintains that consciousness entirely dissolves **‘in its own acts and in their specific character of “being aware”.’[[186]](#footnote-186)** This claim, brings to light the interiorizing role of consciousness besides it’s mirroring or reflecting role. Thereby asserting that, **“consciousness not only reflects but also interiorizes in its own specific manner what it mirrors, thus encapsulating or capturing it in the person’s ego.”[[187]](#footnote-187)** In this way he distinguishes two functions of consciousness: the mirroring or reflecting function and the interiorizing function of consciousness. By these differences in the function of consciousness, Wojtyła, also makes a distinction between, **“the conscious aspect of action”** and **“the conscious aspect of the person.”** Put differently, he calls it, **“the consciousness of an action”** and **“the consciousness of the person.”** The former deals merely with the mirroring function of consciousness, while the latter deals with the interiorizing function of consciousness, which consists in the person acting consciously. While the former emphasizes action, the latter emphasizes the person. The mirroring function of consciousness, reflects human actions, but it does not reflect the entire universe of the person, by not being able to **“objectivize the ego or anything else with regard to its existence and its acting.”[[188]](#footnote-188)** He maintains that it is rather, self-knowledge that makes the function of objectivizing the ego and action possible.

It is self-knowledge that enables the grasping of the ego of the acting subject as an object. By this function of self-knowledge, objective signification of the person and the person’s action is possible in consciousness. Hence, Wojtyła contends: **“The coherence of self-knowledge and consciousness has to be recognized as the basic factor of the equilibrium in the inner life of a person, especially so far as the intellectual structure of the person is concerned.”[[189]](#footnote-189)** By this contention he submits that, **‘the “subject” man is also the “object”; he is the object for the subject, and he does not lose his objective significance when mirrored by consciousness.’[[190]](#footnote-190)** For this very reason, he considers **“self-knowledge”** as prior to **“consciousness.”** He thus, thinks that self-knowledge limits consciousness to **“the process of subjectivation.”** The process of “subjectivation” is simply the process of knowing the self or ego. When a person is conscious of an act, the person is not only conscious of the act, but the person knows that he or she is conscious of the act. That is to say the person experiences his experiencing of an act, he experiences his or her self simultaneously as he or she experiences an act, and this is simply what is known as self-knowledge. This makes consciousness an object of self-knowledge.

In his work, *Subjectivity and the Irreducible in the Human Being*, Wojtyła raises the question of the irreducible in the human person. This question, is that which addresses the complete uniqueness of the human being from every other ontological reality. The question put differently, asks: What is the *quiddity* of the human being? It has been established that metaphysical anthropology championed by Aristotle, maintains that it is rationality, *homo est animal rationale*. To the rational nature of Aristotle, Boethius adds in emphasis, individual substance, in his famous definition of the person: *rationalis naturae individua substantia*.[[191]](#footnote-191) Attempting to complement, not to oppose the metaphysical understanding of the humans, Wojtyła opts for a philosophical anthropology that is also based on lived experience. Hence, he asserts the human being as a unique and unrepeatable person. He arrives at this conclusion by utilizing the phenomenological methodology. Being in possession of this extra epistemological tool, no doubt gives his philosophical anthropology a comparative profundity and extensive perspicacity.

Karol Wojtyła, maintains, **“In order to interpret the human being in the context of lived experience, the aspect of *consciousness* must be introduced into the analysis of human existence. The human being is then given to us not merely as a being defined according to species, but as a concrete self, a self-experiencing subject.”[[192]](#footnote-192)** He calls this approach of understanding the human person, **“personalistic.”** He sums up this personalistic approach thus: **“The experience of the human being cannot be derived by way of cosmological reduction; we must pause at the irreducible, at that which is unique and unrepeatable in each human being, by virtue of which he or she is not just *a particular human being*—an individual of a certain species—but *a personal subject.*”[[193]](#footnote-193)** He is convinced that, only by this complementarity of the cosmological or metaphysical reduction and personalistic approach (pausing at the irreducible), can there be **“a true and complete picture of the human being.”[[194]](#footnote-194)** By **“the irreducible”** he signifies **“that which is essentially incapable of reduction, that which cannot be reduced but can only be *disclosed* or *revealed*.”[[195]](#footnote-195)** This means employing phenomenological analysis, which he is convinced is the method that allows us to pause at the lived experience as the irreducible and enables us to have direct knowledge of the essence of things revealed or disclosed.

In sum, Wojtyła maintains that, **‘Consciousness is the “ground” on which the ego manifests itself in all its peculiar objectiveness (being the object of self-knowledge) and at the same time fully experiences its own subjectiveness.’[[196]](#footnote-196)** This implies for him that consciousness’s essential function in the dynamic of the person is to allow the human person to experience his or her own subjectiveness by means of experiences formed in his or her actions. Thus, he contends, **“without consciousness there is no human experience.”[[197]](#footnote-197)** Hence, consciousness makes the person the agents of his or her actions, and thus, it makes the person in his or her action to be an agent that can be morally good or bad. This is very important to Wojtyła’s philosophy, since he maintains strongly that action reveals the person.

**Chapter Three: The Efficient Causal Relationship Between Person and Action**

**3.1. The Efficacy of a Person in the Ontological Structure of the Human Person**

In this section, it is hoped that how Wojtyła understands **“the efficacy of a person”** and **“the ontological structure of the person”** will be understood and their relationship will be exposed.

The phenomenological fact in the dynamic of the human person is, **“I act.”** From the standpoint of consciousness and intentionality this fact has been exposed above. But how does it explain the dynamism of the person? **“Man-acts”** is not the same as **“I act.”** The **“I”** is **“ego”**. It could be the ego of “you”, “he”, “she”, “me” or “anyone else.” Thus, it is an individual subject acting. The experience of the **“I act”** of others and their dynamic objectivation, gives rise to **“man-acts.”** The concept of **“dynamism”** employed by Wojtyła, is **“dynamism”** in the sense of **“potentiality”** of the traditional metaphysical sense. He maintains, **“The dynamism in question is the total dynamism that is present in the complete experience of man.”[[198]](#footnote-198)** This means, those dynamisms that are reflected in consciousness. It excludes **“vegetative dynamism of the human body.”[[199]](#footnote-199)** Thenceforth, he distinguishes two kinds of dynamism in the human person: the dynamism that is **“something-happening-to-one”** and the dynamism that is **“one-acting or doing-something.”** In Wojtyła’s terms, it is **“To Happen”** and **“To Act”** respectively. The first dynamism is not within the control or volition of the person, this means the person is passive. But the second, is within the control of the person, thus the person is active. Not to misunderstand the sense of passiveness or activeness, he uses the difference in the ideas of **“Something happens in man”** and **“Something happens with man,”** to explain the sense of passiveness meant in the dynamism of the person. He argues, **“in speaking of something happening *with* a person, we actually think of what takes place *in* him. Actually, when speaking of what happens with a person we refer to what the person undergoes from outside.”[[200]](#footnote-200)** Thus, passiveness here should not be understood as one being coerced to carry out an action contrary to one’s volition. Rather, the broader idea of conscious actions of human dynamism should be understood. Wojtyła posits it thus: **“Indeed, he experiences acting and doing as something essentially different from the mere happening, that is to say, from what only takes place or goes on in him and in what he as man takes no active part.”[[201]](#footnote-201)**

Put differently in the Thomistic scholastic parlance both dynamism in action[[202]](#footnote-202) is the difference between **“human acts”** and **“the acts of man.”[[203]](#footnote-203)** He asserts that, **‘The two objective structures, “man-acts” and “something-happens-in-man,” determine the two fundamental lines of the dynamism proper to man.’[[204]](#footnote-204)** Due to the importance of the will in the philosophy of action, as conscious action or intentional act, as explained above, it is clear that Wojtyła in his philosophical anthropology is interested in the dynamism of **“one acting or doing-something”** not in **“the acts of men.”**

In the line of thought of the Aristotelian metaphysics of being, Wojtyła asserts that the understanding between the dialectical relationship between potency and act is important for a proper investigation of the relationship between person and act. For the understanding of act is indispensable for the understanding of potency and vice-versa. He upholds the traditional definition of potency (*potentia*) as **“something that already is but also is not yet,”[[205]](#footnote-205)** and act (*actus*), as **“the actualization of potentiality, its fulfillment.”[[206]](#footnote-206)** What is most notable for Wojtyła in the philosophical conjugation of potency and act is not the difference between the two concepts but the metaphysical transition that exists between the two. He adjudges that, **“It is these transitions that objectivize the structure of all dynamism inherent in being, in being as such, which constitutes the proper subject of metaphysics, and at the same time in every and any being, regardless of the branch of human knowledge whose specific concern it constitutes.”[[207]](#footnote-207)** Simply put the metaphysics of being (and becoming) or in a specific sense the philosophy of potency and act, is the philosophy and metaphysics of existence. In the dynamism of being as potency, being exists as possibility, while in the dynamism of being as act, being exists as actuality. Thus, **“Every actualization contains in itself both the possibility and the act, which is the real fulfillment of the possibility; hence it contains them not as two entities but as two interrelated forms of existences.”[[208]](#footnote-208)**

Wojtyła argues that the acting truly proper to the human person is **“human acting.”** However, he submits that *human act*, though different from *act of man*, generally speaking is also an *act of man,* that is, they are both actions about the human person. He employs the concept of **“the experience of efficacy”** to explain what is the particular difference between **human act** and **act of man**. This experience, he posits, as the experience of **“being the actor.”** He explains that, **“This experience discriminates man’s acting from everything that merely happens in him. It also explains the dynamic contraposition of facts and structures, in which activeness and passiveness are distinctly manifest.”[[209]](#footnote-209)** Hence, if when a person acts, he or she experiences oneself as the agent of the action, not merely as the subject, this dynamic of efficacy, therefore, is that of **human act.** On the other hand, when this dynamic of efficacious experience of action as agent is absent, it implies *something happening to one*, thus, the **act of man.** In sum, the human act, is the human dynamism in which the person is conscious of his or herself as the cause of action, that is, the agent of action; while the human dynamism whereby the person neither experiences nor is conscious of the moment of efficacy, is *something happens in man*. [[210]](#footnote-210) Hence, it is the presence or the absence of the **“moment of efficacy”** that radically distinguishes **human act** from **something happening to man.[[211]](#footnote-211)**

This being the case, a thorough understanding of “Efficacy” (in polish, *sprawcosc*)[[212]](#footnote-212) in respect to the acting person is germane to this discourse. Wojtyła gives an explanation with the aim of facilitating the understanding of the experience of Efficacy in respect to human action. He says:

**To be the cause means to produce an effect and to sustain its existence, its becoming and its being. Man is thus in a wholly experiential way the cause of his acting. There is between person and action a sensibly experiential, causal relation, which brings the person, that is to say, every concrete human ego, to recognize his action to be the result of his efficacy; in this sense he must accept his actions as his own property and also, primarily because of their moral nature, as the domain of his responsibility. Both the responsibility and the sense of property invest with a special quality the causation itself and the efficacy itself of the acting person.[[213]](#footnote-213)**

From the above exposition, the following can be deduced: Wojtyła is concerned with moral causality, or moral causal relations;[[214]](#footnote-214) the human person must recognize his or her action as the result of his efficacy; Wojtyła does not believe in any moral determinism, rather he holds that every human person is morally responsible for his or her actions. These three points, besides their relevance in anthropological and ethical discourses, which will be exposed in the next chapter, have a greater importance in respect to this research. These three points will be important hermeneutic tools in the discourse and reflection of what the writer calls one of the perennial problems of Chinese Philosophy, the problem of human nature as good or evil, 「人性善惡問題。」This discourse will be delayed until the second part of this work.

By this submission Wojtyła, wishes to underpin that the human person is the efficient causation of his or her actions. His conceptualization and usage of efficient causation should be understood from the perspective of Aristotle’s theory of causation in general and that of the efficient cause in particular. This being the case, it gives to human an ethical relationship to his or her actions and also a metaphysical relationship to his or her actions. From the reflection on Aquinas’s cosmological argument for the existence of God, the First cause, which is the argument based on the causal relationship between the efficient cause and the effects, which is existence, something can be deduced from the human person as the efficient cause of his or her actions. Just as Aquinas argues that the existence of God can be deduced from the effects of God, the first and efficient cause of all that is, one could argue, that, the actions of a person reveals the person who is the efficient cause of one’s actions. This as already noted, is one of the main theses of Wojtyła’s philosophical anthropology. To emphasize, Wojtyła, contends that, **“Man is not only the agent of his acting, he is also the creator of it.”[[215]](#footnote-215)** This is unequivocally the quintessential thesis of Wojtyła’s *opus magnus*: *Osoba i czyn*. And he refers to this thesis on the human person being the creator of his or her actions, as the ground of human ethos. As will be discussed below, any understanding of Wojtyła’s Ethics or moral philosophy must take this proposition as its starting point and thinking compass.

It is now clear that Wojtyła’s conceptualization of Efficacy, has to do with the relationship between cause and effect. But, not merely the ordinary semantic sense of producing a desired result. Efficacy becomes an experience in the dynamics of human actions. This experience is both immanence and transcendence. Wojtyła asserts that, **“The moment of efficacy, the experience of efficacy, brings forth first of all the transcendence of man relatively to his own acting.”[[216]](#footnote-216)**This means that though a person’s action reveals the person, the person should not be said to be his or her action, for the person transcends his or her actions. It follows that there is an immanence of a person in his or her actions and a transcendence of the person over and beyond his or her actions. The immanent and the transcendent person is one and the same person in the efficient causal relationship between the person and action. To this effect, Wojtyła posits two **“egos”**, the **“efficacious ego”** and the **“acting ego.”** These two “egos” are ontologically the same person, but could be said to be different phenomenologically. Wojtyła maintains that, **‘The “efficacious ego” and the “acting ego” each time form a dynamic synthesis and a dynamic unity in any particular action. It is the synthesis and unity of person and action.’[[217]](#footnote-217)** This helps to understand the human person as an agent or as a subject. In human act, the **“efficacious ego”** is in play and the person is an agent in respect to his or her actions because he or she is the cause of the actions and thus has responsibility for his or her actions. On the other hand, when something happens to a person, the human person is not the agent, but **“something”** else, that which is responsible for the something happening in the person, thus, the person is merely a passive subject of what happens to him or her. The **“dynamization”** of the person, who is a passive subject but not the agent of action, because he or she does not experience the efficacy of the action, Wojtyła calls, **“activation.”[[218]](#footnote-218)** In other words, the dynamism of **“something happening in man”** is activation.

Having established that the human person experiences the duo dynamism of subjectiveness (when something happens to the human person) and efficacy (when the human person acts), that is, to say the human person being the subject or the agent (actor) of his or her actions. It is important to present an ontological structure of the person as subject. Although, **“efficacy and subjectiveness seem to split the field of human experiences into two mutually irreducible factors”[[219]](#footnote-219)**, both dynamisms take place in the same person. Or put differently, it is one and the same person that experiences, the experience of **“something happening”** in him or her and the experience of him or her acting. Therefore, the dynamic unity of the person having these duo experiences must be sustained. Thus, Wojtyła calls the human being, **“the dynamic subject.”[[220]](#footnote-220)** The origin of both efficacy and subjectiveness, is the dynamic subject. Note, the sense of **“subject”** in **“the dynamic subject”** is different from the sense of subject that was contrasted with agent in respect to something happening in the human person and human acting. The dynamic subject is an ontological subject, the being—human person, that has both the experience of something happening to him or her and the experience of acting. Wojtyła maintains: **‘It is in the subject as a being that every dynamic structure is rooted, every acting and happening. It is given as a real, actually existing, being, the man-being that actually exists and hence also “really” acts.’[[221]](#footnote-221)** Simply put, for the human person to act or to be acted upon, it must first exist; *operari sequitur esse.[[222]](#footnote-222)* Nevertheless, **“action is an enactment of existence or actual being.”[[223]](#footnote-223)**

Wojtyła affirms that this ontological subject, the human person, is a concrete human person, as in the Boethian conception of *persona est rationalis naturae individua substantia*, but the human person is not only this; the human person is not only “somebeing” or “something”, the human person in a full sense is “somebody”. Boethian definition above covers the human person as being, but does not cover the human person as body. A comprehensive understanding of the human person has to conceive the human person both as being and as body. This is important to understanding the person as subject. Wojtyła, contends:

**The person, the human being as the person – seen in its ontological basic structure – is the subject of both existence and acting, though it is important to note that the existence proper to him is *personal* and not merely individual – unlike that of an ontologically founded merely individual type of being. Consequently, the action – whereby is meant all the dynamism of man including his acting as well as what happens in him – is also personal.[[224]](#footnote-224)**

Therefore, this understanding of the person as personal, not merely as individual, is very important in the discussion of the person as a relational subject.

**3.2. The Dialectical Relationship of Nature and the Human Person**

In the discussion of the concept of person in Aquinas above, the concept of nature as it differs from or relates to essence was discussed. Aquinas reflecting on Aristotle’s definition of nature and essence, maintains that nature is used only to consider things that are capable of being born or generated, while essence, is only used to consider the forms of things in general. Wojtyła agrees on Aquinas’s understanding of nature and how it differs from the essence of a thing. Though, he acknowledges that both nature and essence are often times used interchangeably. However, he asserts that, **“Nature does not denote a real and actual subject of existing and acting; it is not to be identified with the ontological foundation of a being. It can only apply to an abstract subject.”[[225]](#footnote-225)** By this assertion, Wojtyła intends to thoroughly deny any form of extreme realism, which holds that essences or forms of things have real existence, without being a nominalist. Thus, humanness, which is human nature (when nature is understood loosely as essence), does not have any real existence outside an actual human being. Hence, he argues that nature is an abstract subject with no ontological foundation of being. So, he tends to be more drawn to the etymological understanding of nature from it Latin root, *nascor* (present indicative passive of *nasco* meaning to be born) and *naturus* (future participle of *nasco* meaning about to be born).[[226]](#footnote-226) This sense of nature, shows nature as an action word, and thus, shows the possibility of human dynamism towards actualization.

Wojtyła, considers this later understanding of nature as that which is a consequent of phenomenological reduction. By phenomenological reduction, he means, **“the moment of the fullest and simultaneously the most essence-centered visualization of a given object.”[[227]](#footnote-227)** The phenomenological reduction is possible because of the inborn or innate dynamism in the human person, that is, to say because of the specific nature of the human person. He contends: **“Nature reveals the dynamism of the subject, that is, it reveals that activeness which is wholly and entirely contained in the subject’s dynamic readiness; as if this activeness was from the start an attribute of the subject and was entirely prepared in its subjective dynamic structure.”[[228]](#footnote-228)** The point that Wojtyła is aiming at is to make a distinction between, **“the world of the person”** and **“the world of nature.”** It should always be remembered that for Wojtyła, the person is the self-conscious concrete ego that can cause or create actions. And thus, **“the world of person”** is the world of **“action or acting.”** The world of **“happening”**, is **“the world of nature.”** Thus, **“the world of the person”** is the experience of **“efficacy”**, while **“the world of nature”** is that of **“subjectiveness.”** He maintains that there should be synthesis of **“the world of the person”** and **“the world of nature,”** but not their opposition. Thus, the integration in the human being of person and nature. An understanding of the integration of person and nature, requires not only a metaphysical reduction or explanation as found in both Boethius and Aquinas above, but, Wojtyła thinks that it also requires a phenomenological reduction. Thenceforth, he considers it necessary to employ the dual methods of phenomenological and metaphysical reductions in philosophical anthropology, not as mutually exclusive methodology but as a complementary methodology for a more comprehensive understanding of the human person.

As discussed above, while nature is identified by the moment of activation (happening), person is identified by the moment of efficacy (action). Wojtyła contends that it is the latter, not the former, that reveals the person in the human being. However, the unity and identity of the ego requires the integration of person and nature. He maintains that, **“The integration does not abolish the differences in the manner the very structural core of a being is dynamized, but simply prevents any tendency to treat person and nature as two separate and independent subjects of acting.”[[229]](#footnote-229)** The full integration of nature in the person requires metaphysical reduction. Wojtyła asserts that, **“In the metaphysical approach nature is identical with essence, and thus nature in man is the same as the whole of his *humanness*, though humanness that is dynamic rather than static –because conceived as the basis of all the dynamism proper to man.”[[230]](#footnote-230)** While in the phenomenological reduction, he considers nature as **“a basic property of the acting subject”**, in the metaphysical reduction, nature is considered as **“essence.”[[231]](#footnote-231)** And, by essence here, he understands **“the basis for the dynamism of this being.”[[232]](#footnote-232)** Therefore, humanness is the basis for the dynamism of human beings. Hence, if phenomenological reduction leads one to the ego, metaphysical reduction, leads one to the essence of the human being. Thus, the combination of both phenomenological reduction and metaphysical reduction lead to the human person.

The human person, exists and acts. Wojtyła argues that, **‘There is a real difference between the two manifestations of man, “man as existing” and “man acting,” even though it is the same man who exists and who acts.’[[233]](#footnote-233)** Since, not all things that exist act (action being considered in the Wojtyłian line of thought under this discourse), he considers the distinguishing of **“man as existing”** and **“man acting”** cogent for the understanding of the person. Person does not only exist, person acts. A stone exists but do not act. Wojtyła makes the existence of acting to depend on the existence of the human being. This is in accordance to the principle referenced many times in this work, that existence precedes action.[[234]](#footnote-234) As regards this principle, Wojtyła clarifies, that, **“The statement that action is subsequent or follows existence is meant to indicate a specific cohesion of the acting process and the acting agent. This cohesion is impossible to express otherwise than by resorting to the conception of nature.”[[235]](#footnote-235)** What Wojtyła desires to underline is that nature, **“provides the basis for the essential cohesion of the subject of dynamism with all the dynamism of the subject.”[[236]](#footnote-236)** This is to say that both the subject, ego, and the dynamics of action (efficacy) and happening (activation) in the human being is possible because of the human nature; it is human nature, humanness, to have the possibility of these dynamism. For emphasis, Wojtyła contends that, **“There is cohesion whenever an *action* is operated by, or proceeds from, the human being as its agent. It is based on human nature, that is, on the humanness pervading all the human dynamism and shaping it so that it becomes really human.”[[237]](#footnote-237)** This proposition will be crucial in the discussion of the concept of 「仁」as the *quiddity* of the human person in Confucius philosophy.

To be a person is to be personal; it is not just a metaphysical abstraction of individualizing the essence, humanness. Hence, Wojtyła asserts that, **“the peculiar type of being proper to mankind is personal.”[[238]](#footnote-238)** He presents the relationship between, nature, subject and person, in respect to the dynamic cohesion of the humans thus: **“nature as the basis of this dynamic cohesion really inheres in the subject, while the subject itself having personal existence is a person.”[[239]](#footnote-239)** Only human beings, Wojtyła argues, have real individual existence as a person. And this is possible because of its humanness that enables the being and acting as a person.

**3.3. Freedom as the Dynamic Ground of the Human Person as a Becoming Being**

The place of the will, not merely as a human faculty but more so as to be very important in any action or act worthy to be called human actions or acts, has been discussed above. This section presents Wojtyła’s understanding of freedom and why he posits freedom as the dynamic ground of person as a becoming being.

Wojtyła identifies freedom with self-determination.[[240]](#footnote-240) Hence, he maintains, that, **‘Freedom thus manifests itself as connected with the will, with the concrete “I will,” which includes, as noted, the experience of “I may but I need not.”’[[241]](#footnote-241)** The first thing to note, is the distinction between the will and freedom. By will, Wojtyła, means **“not only what reveals and actualizes the structure of self-governance and self-possession but also what man resorts to, and even in a way makes use of, in order to achieve his aims.”[[242]](#footnote-242)** The two experiences of **“I will”** and **“I may but I need not”**, are both possible because of the will of the person. That is to say, they are possible due to the self-determination or rule of the person. Freedom comes into play when these experiences are manifested by the person. Thus, it **“exhibits itself as identical with self-determination, with that experiential, most complete, and fundamental organ of man’s autonomous being.”[[243]](#footnote-243)** The autonomy of the human person in the world is grounded in freedom, a freedom that is real.

He contends that any discourse concerning free will, must start with the reality of human existence, not from the concept of freedom as such. For there is freedom because there is an existing person who is self-determined by the power of the will.[[244]](#footnote-244) By self-determination, Wojtyła means, self-governance and self-possession. Phenomenologically he describes this experience of self-determination, thus:

**In phenomenological experience, I appear as someone who possesses myself and who is simultaneously possessed by myself. I also appear as someone who governs myself and who is simultaneously governed by myself. Both the one and the other are revealed by self-determination; they are implied by self-determination and also enrich its content.[[245]](#footnote-245)**

He maintains that, **“self-determination manifests itself as the force holding together the human dynamism and integrating it at the level of the person.”[[246]](#footnote-246)** Hence in a later work, he explains the manifestation of self-determination thus: **“Self-determination manifests itself both in elementary willing (“I will”) and in choice and decision, which arise from an awareness of values, a weighing of motives, and also not infrequently a struggle and conflict of motives within an individual.”[[247]](#footnote-247)** The human dynamism has been established above as, efficacy and activation, by which **“the world of person”** and **“the world of nature”** or **“the level of person”** and **“the level of nature”** are distinguished.[[248]](#footnote-248) It is freedom that holds these dynamics together, thus, it is referred to as the ground of the person as a becoming being. Through these dynamics, the human being not only manifests itself, it more so, becomes person and transcends itself.

It has been established that in the human dynamism called **“happening”** or **“the dynamism of nature,”** there is no action or actions, but **“activation.”** But, that it is an activation, does not make this dynamism an act of human instinct. Nature has been understood to be **“the basis of this dynamic cohesion really inheres in the subject.”[[249]](#footnote-249)** That is to say, the dynamism of nature (as well as the dynamism of person), is possible because it is of the nature of the human person. Thus, Wojtyła asserts, **“nature may to some extent be identified with the potentiality that lies at the origin of activations themselves.”[[250]](#footnote-250)** So, one can say it is the potentiality of the human person to have the experience of activation. Nevertheless, **‘The significance of “nature,” however, is broader than the sphere of activations alone and extends also, or even primarily, to the direction of, or the general trend in, the integration of these activations.’[[251]](#footnote-251)**

Instinct is an aspect of nature but it is not nature *per se*. Wojtyła conceives instinct, thus: **‘The subjective basis for both the integration and the purpose at the level of nature is called—especially in animals— “instinct.”’[[252]](#footnote-252)** Wojtyła denies acting to animals, thus maintaining that only **“something happens”** to animals. He contends further: **“It is by instinct that in an individual animal everything that, strictly speaking, only happens in it receives direction and is brought together into a whole, which may give the impression of acting even though it is—however splendid in its own way it may appear—but a coordination of activations.”[[253]](#footnote-253)** Hence, it means that animals do not possess self-determination, and thus, no freedom as identified with freewill. This means, they have no acting because they lack self-determination. Therefore, only the human person, can be rightly said to have action or acting. Hence, like animals when we are propelled by instincts we are not acting but activated. The crux of this paragraph is not the exposition of the difference between the human person and animals. But to make clear the difference between acting and activation. According to Wojtyła:

**The point to be made here in connection with these comparisons is that the dynamism at the level of nature is in opposition to the dynamism at the level of the person, and that the cause of this opposition is the fact of self-determination. In the dynamism at the level of nature there is no self-determination to serve as the basis from which acting itself as well as its direction and purpose are derived. The dynamism at the level of nature lacks that special dependence on the ego which is the characteristic mark of the specific dynamism of the person.[[254]](#footnote-254)**

This emphasizes, the place of self-determination, not only in distinguishing the dynamism at the level of nature from the dynamism at the level of the person, but more so, shows the place of self-determination as the ground for human action. Hence, by self-determination, the metaphysical and moral concept of determinism should not be understood. Wojtyła takes **“necessity”** to be the opposite of freedom, not determinism.[[255]](#footnote-255) Necessity operates at the level of the dynamism of nature, of which instinct is an integral factor. He maintains that animals, for lack of the structural dynamism that enable the manifestation of free will, do not constitute ego. For, **“the necessary factor in constituting the ego, that is, the person in his strictly experiential profile and content, is the presence of consciousness and self-determination.”[[256]](#footnote-256)** Self-determination is not only an essential property that defines the person for Wojtyła. But, more so for him, it is important for the transcendence of the person in his action.

**Chapter Four: Person and Transcendence**

One of the main manifestations in the dialectical relationship between person and action, is the transcendence of the person in action. Hence, in this chapter Wojtyła’s understanding of transcendence is exposed and its relationship with the person is expounded.

**4.1. The Person as a Transcendental Being**

Beyond the etymological meaning of the word transcendence from its Latin root, “*trans-scendere,*” which means “to go over and beyond a threshold or a boundary,” Wojtyła provides a more profound meaning of transcendence. He maintains that transcendence, **“may refer to the subject’s stepping out of his limits toward an object, as is in different ways the case in what is known as intentional acts of external (“transcendent”) perception.”[[257]](#footnote-257)** He employs the term **“transgress”** to explain his idea of how the subject steps out of his or her limits in cognitive acts. To transgress is to cross a mark. It thus follows that the ego of the person in transcendence crosses a mark. A mark which is for him cognitive rather than conative. He distinguishes what he calls the **“horizontal transcendence”** from the transcendence at work in the transcendence of the person in action. Horizontal transcendence, involves the subject or the ego, transgressing its limits in the direction of an intentional object of an external perception. Thus, Adrian J. Reimers, maintains that, **‘Horizontal transcendence is “essential” to human experience; without such transcendence we cannot speak of human experience.’[[258]](#footnote-258)**

Wojtyła attributes, **“horizontal transcendence,”** to the traditional approach to the study of the will, whereby **‘some philosophers and psychologists in their discussions and analyses have treated it as if it were an “appetite.”’[[259]](#footnote-259)** He rather considers the transcendence which is as a result of self-determination whereby, **“the person transcends his structural boundaries through the capacity to exercise freedom; of being free in the process of *acting*, and not only in the intentional direction of willings toward an external object.”[[260]](#footnote-260)** He henceforth, calls this kind of transcendence, **“vertical transcendence.”[[261]](#footnote-261)**

The **“vertical transcendence”** happens in the process of acting by the person who possesses self-determination. Therefore, only the human person who operates besides the dynamism at the level of nature, but more uniquely, operates in the dynamism at the level of person, the level of efficacy, can experience the vertical transcendence. As has already been established, freedom is identified with free will and free will is identified with self-determination. Hence, **‘To say that man “is free” means *that he depends chiefly on himself for the dynamization of his own subject.*’[[262]](#footnote-262)** This self-determination of the ego by the power of the free will that accounts for freedom, makes the **“vertical transcendence”** possible. According to Reimers J. Adrian, **“Vertical transcendence is that in terms of which self-determination is made possible by the subject’s directing himself toward the truth about the good. It is a consequence of the spiritual nature of the person, by which he is centered or focused on goodness and truth.”[[263]](#footnote-263)** This vertical transcendence, demonstrates that the human person can be independent from objects of his or her acts of will, and it makes possible the ascendancy over the dynamism of the person, that results in the transcendence in action.

Hence Wojtyła, conceptualizes **“transcendence”** not from the sense of metaphysics nor from the sense of the philosophy of consciousness. In metaphysics, “transcendence” is discussed around the notion of being: truth, good, and beauty. While in philosophy of consciousness, “transcendence”, **“means reaching out and beyond the subject, which is characteristic of certain human acts, or the directing of these acts out of the cognizing subject beyond the objectifiable realm.”[[264]](#footnote-264)** Nevertheless, his conceptualization of “transcendence” does not completely negate that of metaphysics nor that of the philosophy of consciousness. Rather, they are implied in his conceptualization of “transcendence” for the explanation of the relationship of self-determination and action in the integral dynamism of person.

**4.2. The Place of Free Will in the Transcendence of the Person**

Freedom is an intentional act directed to a value as its end. Hence, one does not only will, but one, wills-something. **“I will”** and **“I will something,”** are thus not the same experience. It is in free will and by freedom that one manifests the experience of **“I will something.”** This is because one is free to will **“this something”** rather than **“that something.”** However, when one is limited in willing this or that something, it becomes a sort of determinism. Nevertheless, Wojtyła maintains, **‘even in this determination the experience of “I may, but I need not” is somehow continued; the definition of value as the end or aim of conation does not abolish altogether my intrinsic independence from the object of volition.’[[265]](#footnote-265)** Hence, one also has the experience of **“I may, but I will not.”** This is to say one may have the option of willing **“this”** or **“that”**, but can will neither **“this”** nor **“that.”** Therefore, the human person has the capacity not to desire the object of his or her willing. This shows that the human person can transcend the object of his or her desires. Thus, this shows the inner independence of the ego, the human subject. This is possible because of the self-determination of the ego.[[266]](#footnote-266) As a result, Wojtyła contends that, **“any interpretation of the free will, if it is to conform to reality, must rely on man’s *autodeteminism* instead of floating in the air by stressing merely *indeterminism*.”[[267]](#footnote-267)** The concept of **“autodeterminism”** here, should be understood by the idea of **“I may, but I will not”** explained above. *Autodeterminism* explains the potential of the person to be self-determined, self-governed and self-possessed.

Wojtyła warns that, **‘the expression “free” will does not mean some kind of independence of will from the person. If we agree that the freedom of will manifests itself in experiencing that “I may but I need not” (in polish, *Moge—nie musze*),[[268]](#footnote-268) then it expresses the person who may but need not use his freedom as a power.’[[269]](#footnote-269)** This means, though freedom is a power, but is not a power that is independent of the person nor supersedes the person. It is the person that ought to use freedom of the free will, not freedom using the person.[[270]](#footnote-270) Therefore, **“It is because of the person’s exclusive power over the will that *will is the person’s power to be free.*”[[271]](#footnote-271)** Reimers J. Adrian, elucidates it thus: **“According to Karol Wojtyła, freedom is the power of self-determination. The evidence of freedom is neither the feeling “I did it myself” nor the judgment “he [or I] could have done otherwise,” but rather the experience “I can, but I do not have to.”[[272]](#footnote-272)** Freedom is, thus, important for the human person’s striving toward a value-end. This is why freedom is always connected to value judgement and ethics in general.

Willing, like thinking, is an intentional act.[[273]](#footnote-273) According to Wojtyła, **‘An intentional act of man’s experience consists in being oriented or directed outward toward an object. Its “intention” is a special kind of going out toward an object, a motion in which the limits of the subject are overstepped.’[[274]](#footnote-274)** As have been already asserted, when one wills, one wills something. However, Wojtyła distinguishes the intentionality of the will from the intentionality of cognition. Both are similar in that, **“they are directed toward their object and thereby overstep the limits of the subject; but they differ in their whole specific nature.”[[275]](#footnote-275)** He maintains that the act of the will, **“crystallizes into a peculiar “intent.”’[[276]](#footnote-276)** When one wills, one is **“being intent upon something.”[[277]](#footnote-277)** Thus, he exemplifies, **“when I will something, I myself am moving outward toward the object, toward whatever I will.”[[278]](#footnote-278)** Hence, in willing, the subject is not passive, as when something happens to the subject, but the willing subject is active, toward the object of willing. And this is the experience of the transcendence of the person in action. Thus, the relationship of the will and action, **“brings into full view the person in his efficacy as well as in his transcendence and, what is more important, it shows the person as a person.”[[279]](#footnote-279)**

What is willed could be a good or a bad value. Wojtyła contends that, **“Indeed, there are no grounds to assume that there is a neutral attitude to all values, a kind of indifference to their attractiveness and to their visible hierarchy in the world, lurking somewhere deep at the bottom of the person, at the origin of all the dynamizations that are proper to the will.”[[280]](#footnote-280)** The human person lives in a world deluged with values. The world of the human person is the world of values. The person lives each moment of the day, each day of the week, each week of the month, each month of the year and each year of one’s lives span willing one value or the other. And every act of willing leads to an action or correlation of actions, and in this action or these actions, the person goes beyond the threshold of its structural borderlines, transgresses its own limitations and thus, transcends itself. Thus, **“The person’s transcendence in the action seems much more connected with the praxis—that is, the truth of the objective reality, in which man continuously strives to make right choices and decisions—than with the intellectual function of judging.”[[281]](#footnote-281)**

**4.3. Value Judgement as Core Experience of the Transcendence of Person**

To will is to will something, but what arouses or causes the willing of something? It is motivation. The human person is directed toward the values in the world based on its motivations. The noun motivation and motive is derived from the Latin present infinitive tense of the verb, *movere*,**“to move.”[[282]](#footnote-282)** Thus, motivation deals with a sought of movement of the will. Wojtyła asserts that, **“We owe to motivation the impulsion, the movement of the will toward the object that is being presented—not just a turn toward it but an outright movement. To will means to strive after a value that thereby becomes an end.”[[283]](#footnote-283)** It follows that motivation is the phenomenon that is between the will and value judgements. Motivation plays an important role in the act of willing, and therefore in the experience of the transcendence of the person in action. Its role is such that, **“Motivation meets the variable intentionality of man’s willing, it meets the possibility of attaching his willing to different objects that present themselves as values.”[[284]](#footnote-284)**

Wojtyła asserts that, **“Willing is striving, and as such it carries in itself a form of dependence on objects, which does not however in any way abolish or destroy the independence that we find expressed in every simple willing and even more so in every choice—the independence that in either case is due to the fact of decision.”[[285]](#footnote-285)** To this effect, Wojtyła opposes any form of moral determinism. For those who assert moral determinism, **‘reject freedom and indirectly also the person, indeed, the whole reality, that we have here defined as “the acting person.”’[[286]](#footnote-286)** Every philosophy of determinism, whether metaphysical or moral is an antithesis to freedom. He contends that, **“All determinism, not only by intentional objects (values) but also by the presentation of objects, is contrary to the original dynamism of decision. This is so because decision involves and reveals that relation to intentional objects as values which is proper solely to the will.”[[287]](#footnote-287)** Hence, there is an intimate relation between will and cognition. For one cannot will what one does not know.

Another dynamism of the will, well considered by Wojtyła, is the will in reference to **“truth.”** He expounds thus:

**The reference to truth forms an intrinsic part of the very nature of a decision and is in a special manner manifest in choice. The essential condition of choice and of the ability to make a choice as such, seems to lie in the specific reference of will to truth, the reference that permeates the intentionality of willing and constitutes what is somehow the inner principle of volition. To “choose” does not mean to turn toward one value and away from others (this would be a purely “material” notion of choice). It does mean to make a decision, according to the principle of truth, upon selecting between possible objects that have been presented to the will.[[288]](#footnote-288)**

This exposition, clearly shows the relation between “to will”, “to know” and “truth”, and the experience or action that sustain this relation is judgement. The philosophical concept of truth accepted by Wojtyła is the correspondence theory of truth, propounded according to the Aristotelian-Thomistic tradition as: *adequatio intelletus et rei*.[[289]](#footnote-289) This shows the importance of judgement in the apprehension of truth. At the level of judgement, truth is targeted. Our judgements of what we know direct our willing. We will things because we judge them to be of a particular value, which we know to be of a sort of good. Hence, Wojtyła posits what he calls, **“surrender to truth.”** He explains that, **“it is the essential surrender of will to truth that seems finally to account for the person’s transcendence in action, ultimately for his ascendancy to his own dynamism.”[[290]](#footnote-290)** By willing the truth in action, one surrenders to truth and so transcends oneself in action by being independent of the object of one’s action. Wojtyła asserts that, the person’s **“independence in the intentional sphere is to be explained by this inner reference to truth and dependence on truth inherent in the will.”[[291]](#footnote-291)**

The human person wills objects of value because it has what Wojtyła calls, **“the experience of value.”** The human person does not only have the cognition of value, it experiences value. More so, there is a cognitive experience of value, which is, **“the apprehension of the good of this or that object.”[[292]](#footnote-292)** Hence, Wojtyła holds, that, **“the cognitive experience of value is of paramount importance for the understanding of the person, of his specific dynamism in action, and the transcendence that is strictly related to the moment of truth in acting.”[[293]](#footnote-293)** Having established the cognitive experience of value, Wojtyła, also establishes the **“cognitive experience of truth.”** He maintains that, cognitive experience of truth is an axiological (or moral) truth and he distinguishes it from the ontological and logical “truth.”[[294]](#footnote-294) He also maintains that axiological truth is not **“practical truth”** and does not belong to what is known as **“practical knowledge.”[[295]](#footnote-295)** Axiological truth deals with the apprehension of the value of an object rather than the ontological existence nor logical correctness of a thing. It is like the apprehension of the beautiful in a thing or the moral good of an action.

**Chapter Five: The Ethical Person and the Person-revealed-in-action**

The take-off point of the discourse on the ethical person and the acting person, is Wojtyła’s thesis that, **“Man is not only the agent of his acting, he is also the creator of it.”[[296]](#footnote-296)** This means, in his or her actions, the human person creates itself, that is to say manifests itself. He also asserts that, **“Morality and acting differ essentially, but at the same time they are so strictly united with each other that morality has no real existence apart from human acting, apart from actions.”[[297]](#footnote-297)** These theses, should be the lens by which the argumentation on the discourse of the ethical person will be seen through.

**5.1. Question on the Ethical Person**

To begin, it is important to understand Wojtyła’s conception of ethics. He conceives ethics as a science. In his more or less, last purely philosophical book, entitled, *Man in the Field of Responsibility[[298]](#footnote-298)*he discusses the question of ethics as a science, which was the fruit of the ethical discourse in the Lublin circle during his time as an active professor in the university in Lublin. He supposes that the discussion of ethics as a science, is a kind of study of metaethics. And by ethics he means, **“the set of cognitive steps which have as their goal the validation of ethics precisely as a science.”[[299]](#footnote-299)** He conceives morality as **“a reality subjectivized in the person.”[[300]](#footnote-300)** Morality is an experience of the person. He maintains that, **‘The experience of morality must be extracted from the entirety of the experience of the human being as a reality “in itself.”’[[301]](#footnote-301)**That being the case, **“the experience of morality”** is a sort of **“understanding of morality.”** This follows from his thesis on the analysis of experience in connection with the cognition of the subject exposed above. He defines ethics as, **‘nothing other than the process of understanding the reality which constitutes morality, brought “to completion.”’[[302]](#footnote-302)**

Hence, the discussion on the ethical person, must take **“the experience of morality”** as its ground.[[303]](#footnote-303) He maintains that:

**The *proper element* of morality is contained in *the experience of duty*, the lived experience strictly connected to every concrete subject when that subject is the cause of an act and experiences its own efficacy. The lived experience of duty (“I ought to…”) is always strictly personal and connected to the concrete “I act” even when that action is performed “together with others.”[[304]](#footnote-304)**

Kenneth W. Kemp and Zuzanna Maslanka Kieron,[[305]](#footnote-305) on the idea of **“the lived experience”** mentioned in the above quotation, note that, it’s based on Edmund Husserl’s distinction between *Erfahrung* and *Erlebnis*. This distinction is difficult to render into English, for the ordinary English word renders both as experience. They further state that, **“*Erfahrung* (Polish *doswiadczenie*) refers to the objective content of a person’s contact with some reality, whereas *Erlebnis* (Polish *przezycie*) refers to the subjective dimension reflected in consciousness.”[[306]](#footnote-306)** Wojtyła distinguishes three levels or layers of the experience of morality, namely: the axiological layer (moral good or evil as a state of a person or society), the praxiological layer (moral good or evil as manifested in acts) and the deontological layer (moral duty as the element that constitutes all moral fact).[[307]](#footnote-307)

**5.2. The “Person-revealed-in-action” as an Ethical Person**

It has been already established above, that there is not only phenomenological relation between person and action, but that there is also an ontological relationship. The relation between person and action, involves willing of objects of values and the cognition of the experience of truth. This means that in the transcendence of person in action, morality is presupposed. Actions not only reveal person, actions reveal a person as either a good or bad person. This explains the objectivization of the ego in the experience of efficacy as expounded above. Wojtyła asserts, that, **“It is in the modality of morality that this objectification becomes clearly apparent, when through an action that is either morally good or morally bad, man, as the person himself becomes either morally good or morally evil.”[[308]](#footnote-308)** He sustains, **‘This objectification of the person is in no sense a “reification” of the person: I cannot become a thing for myself, although I myself am the first and most basic object that I determine. In this determination of myself, my subjectivity is revealed in its deepest possibilities, in the essential qualifications that testify to what is both human (*humanum*) and person.’[[309]](#footnote-309)**

Action is performed in order to have certain fulfillment. This proposition, affirms fulfillment in actions, that is, the fulfillment of the performer of an action. According to Wojtyła, **“To fulfill oneself means to actualize, and in a way to bring to the proper fullness, that structure in man which is characteristic for him because of his personality and also because of his being somebody and not merely something; it is the structure of self-governance and self-possession.”[[310]](#footnote-310)** This idea, calls to mind the whole exposition above on the relationship between efficacy and self-determination. It emphasizes the person’s freedom, and of course responsibility in performing an action. He maintains, **“The point of departure for an analysis of the personal structure of self-determination is the kind of experience of human action that includes the lived experience of moral good and evil as an essential and especially important element; this experience can be separately defined as the experience of morality.”[[311]](#footnote-311)** He contends that, **“This structure serves as the basis of morality—or of moral value as an existential reality—and it is owing to it that morality as a modality of conduct participates in the innerness of man and achieves a measure of durability in him.”[[312]](#footnote-312)** Thus, Wojtyła comes to a conclusion that has strong implications for the morality of a person, and for moral philosophy. He adjudges: **‘Human actions once performed do not vanish without trace: they leave their moral value, which constitutes an objective reality intrinsically cohesive with the person, and thus a reality also profoundly subjective. Being a person man is “somebody” and being somebody he may be either *good* or *bad*.’[[313]](#footnote-313)** While performing good action leads to self-fulfillment, performing bad action leads to nonfulfillment. Hence, he posits, morality as existential reality which has a sort of ontological connection with the human person. For this reason, morality cannot be studied separate from the human person. This explains his approach to the study of ethics or morality, which involves the **“bracketing”** or **“factoring out”[[314]](#footnote-314)** of the existential moral reality or experience. Because his work, *Ozaba i czyn*, is not aimed at investigating Ethics, but the human person, he brackets Ethics, which he gives particular attention in his later work, *Man in the Field of Responsibility*. He submits that, **“the traditional problem in ethics of the person-action relation, when we look at it as if it were withdrawn from brackets, may reveal itself more fully not only in its own reality but also in that abundant reality which is expanded by human morality.”[[315]](#footnote-315)**

Wojtyła, makes a distinction between the moral value of action, and what he calls the **“personalistic”** (or personal) value of action. By personalistic value of action, he intends to stress the fundamental value inherent in the performance of action *per se*. While all moral values, according to him, belong to the normative nature of action performed, he maintains, that, **“The personalistic value, on the other hand, inheres in the performance itself of the action by the person, in the very fact that man acts in a manner appropriate to him, that self-determination thus authentically inheres in the nature of his acting and the transcendence of the person is realized through his acting.”[[316]](#footnote-316)** The **“personalistic”** value of action, is prior to moral value of action. For actions are first performed before any moral or axiological judgement is made on the actions performed as to be good or bad. At the court of law, it is first determined if an action is performed by someone, before a judgement is ruled on the morality or ethical position of the action. Thus, he considers, the **“personalistic”** value of the human action as **“the most fundamental in the manifestation of the *worth* of the person himself.”[[317]](#footnote-317)** For the person fulfills his or her self in the action performed. To this effect, the argumentation that the action performed by the person, is and should be the ground for the investigation of the person, is thus, strengthened and fortified.

The fact that the performance of actions is connected to the desire for self-fulfillment, implies that in a sense the human person ontologically speaking is not completely actualized being. For the desire for self-fulfillment underpins potentiality. Wojtyła asserts this thus: **“In the ontological perspective man’s fulfillment of himself—which is achieved every time he acts and concretizes positive moral virtualities—shows us the human person to be a potential and not a fully actual being.”[[318]](#footnote-318)** The fact of this longing for fulfillment, demonstrates incompleteness in the human person, thus, the human person is a contingent being, for it is subjected to actualization. It shows that there is still an **“ontological space”** in the human person. By this line of thought, Wojtyła contends, that, **‘If the human person were to be seen as a “pure consciousness” constituted of a stream of acts, then there would be no possibility whatever of his actualization. It seems obvious, however, that the person, the action, and their dynamic union are more than an enactment of consciousness; indeed, they are a reality that exists also apart from consciousness.’[[319]](#footnote-319)** This is a strong critique to contemporary philosophy of consciousness or mind, that tends to reduce the human person to a mere natural entity of force and energy. Physicalistic reduction of the human person in this sense, tends to deny the spiritual and transcendental dimension of the human person and tends to equal the human person to the ontological level of animals. More so, such reduction of the human person merely as an enactment of consciousness, in this age of advanced research and the development of artificial intelligence, will confuse or completely blot out the ontological specificity of the human person.

**5.3. The Place of Morality in the Transcendence of the Person**

Morality does not just deal with performing good or bad actions and becoming good or bad persons, it deals with truth. Traditional metaphysics tells us the relationship between truth and being, truth as one of the transcendental properties of Being. Thus, there is the place of morality in the transcendence of the person in action. Wojtyła maintains, **‘The transcendence of the person in the action does not consist solely either in the ontological autonomy, or self-centered dependence on the ego. It includes also the indispensable and essential moment of reference to “truth,” and it is this moment that ultimately determines freedom.’[[320]](#footnote-320)** As maintained earlier, the experience of freedom or self-determination is necessary for the transcendence of the person in action. And of course, one cannot speak of morality without *ipso facto*, implications of freedom. It is because the human person is free to perform actions, actions which in turn reveal and make the person, that makes the transcendence of the person possible. Hence, for the transcendence of the person in action to be actualized, the person must freely surrender to “truth.” Wojtyła submits that, **“It is this moral freedom that more than anything else *constitutes the spiritual dynamism of the person*. Simultaneously it also shows us the fulfilling as well as the nonfulfilling dynamism of the person.”[[321]](#footnote-321)**

The transcendence of the person in action is not only related to truth, but also relates to the other transcendental properties of beings, namely, Good and Beauty.[[322]](#footnote-322) Either from the metaphysical tradition of Plato or that of Aristotle, as regards the transcendence of the person in relation to the transcendental properties or absolutes, truth, good and beauty, Wojtyła, maintains:

**The vision of the transcendence of the man-person that is formed through his relation to these absolute points of reference does not, however, lose anything of its significance, when reference is made to experience—in particular, to the experience of morality. For the transcendence of the person understood metaphysically is no abstract notion; the evidence of experience tells us that the spiritual life of man essentially refers to, and in its strivings vibrates with, the reverberations with the experientially innermost attempts to reach truth, goodness, and beauty.[[323]](#footnote-323)**

The human person in freedom, surrenders to truth. From the standpoint of theological personalism,[[324]](#footnote-324) God remains the only complete and perfect transcendent Being. The human person can experience transcendence because of the possession of the unique presence of the image of God given by God the Creator. The person in freely choosing to surrender to the Truth, which is God, experiences transcendence, that is to say the perfection of its being, the fullness of its personness or personhood. Collaborating this point, Wojtyła sustains, **“St. Thomas presents the matter in the following way: whatever is a true perfection in the created world must be found in the highest degree in God, and so the person, too, which signifies the highest perfection in the world of creatures, must be realized in an incomparably more perfect degree in God.”[[325]](#footnote-325)**

For Wojtyła, **“Freedom, on the other hand, carries within itself the surrender to truth, and this fact is most vividly brought into prominence in man’s conscience.”[[326]](#footnote-326)** For Wojtyła who maintains the reality of a spiritual life in the human person, conscience is a reality in the experience of the human person. He conceives the function of conscience, thus: **“The function of the conscience consists in distinguishing the element of moral good in the action and in releasing and forming a sense of duty with respect to this good.”[[327]](#footnote-327)** He contends that the function of the conscience is not merely cognitive, to know and discern moral good or evil, but that it has a more complete function which consists, **“in relating the actions to the recognition of the truth that has been made known.”[[328]](#footnote-328)** Hence, conscience plays a key role as the source of the ethical or moral norms in the actions performed by the human person. This is very important because a person’s action makes him morally good or evil. Wojtyła further asserts that, **“The persistence of an action in the person, because of its moral value, derives from and depends on the conscience. On the other hand, man’s conscience is connected with the mind not only by consciousness but also by moral truthfulness.”[[329]](#footnote-329)** Conscience is not the mind that plays the cognitive role of judging truth in general. Conscience aims at grasping moral truth in a specific sense of moral values.

Unlike Kant, Wojtyła argues that, **“The conscience is no lawmaker; it does not itself create norms; rather it discovers them, as it were, in the objective order of morality or law.”[[330]](#footnote-330)** He contends that to maintain that the human person’s individual conscience enjoys autonomy that enables the individual to establish moral norms as Kant holds is problematic.[[331]](#footnote-331) For as a consequent, it will lead to distortions between individual persons, society or community, and more so, in the relationship between the human creature and the Creator. Nevertheless, conscience plays a creative role in its integration of norms and truth. This creative role of the conscience, **“consists in the fact that *it shapes the norms into that unique and unparalleled form they acquire within the experience and fulfillment of the person*.”[[332]](#footnote-332)** This leads to his assertion of the drama between values and obligations. Obligation here, implies moral norms or laws. The person realizes himself or herself in a more profound manner in his or her obligations. By the efficacy of his or her self-determination, the person is self-governed and self-possessed. In this drama of value and obligation, the human person is revealed. Wojtyła submits that, **“Outside of the drama man cannot fulfill himself as a person.”[[333]](#footnote-333)**

Fulfillment comes as a result of acting in accordance with conscience. This brings the experience of **“felicity.”** Wojtyła distinguishes felicity from pleasure, following the distinction already made earlier between **“man actions”** and **“something happens in man.”** While, felicity is related to **“man actions”**, and thus with the transcendence of the person in action, pleasure on the contrary is related to, **“something happens in man.”** It follows that, felicity brings about the experience of personal fulfillment but pleasure does not. Hence, Wojtyła maintains that, **“Felicity points to the *personal* structure while pleasure can be related to what may be viewed as the simply *natural* structure of the individual, with reference to some aspects of the comparison between the person and nature made earlier.”[[334]](#footnote-334)**

The transcendence of the person in action, which reveals the person as a good or evil person, is necessarily connected to the spirituality of the human person. By spiritual, Wojtyła means, **“an immaterial factor which is inherently irreducible to matter.”[[335]](#footnote-335)** It is obvious that the ongoing discourse on the transcendence of the person is a reality taking place within the realm of the spiritual. The spiritual nature of the human person, has an ontological foundation as a being that is spiritual. That means, the human person is not only a being of a natural existence, it is also a being of which its essence transcends nature. In sum, he says: **“we recognize that man is the person; next, that his spiritual nature reveals itself as the transcendence of the person in his acting; and finally, that only then can we comprehend in what his spiritual being consists.”[[336]](#footnote-336)** Asserting that the human person is a spiritual being does not undermine the ontological reality that the human person is a unity, a unity of corporeality and spirituality. Wojtyła maintains that, **“The fact that in the performance of the action man also fulfills himself shows that the action serves the unity of the person, that it not only reflects but also actually establishes this unity.”[[337]](#footnote-337)** Hence, the transcendence of person in action from a phenomenological standpoint sustained by an ontological standpoint manifests the unity of the human person of which is determined by the spiritual nature.

**5.4. The Psychosomatic Nature of the Person**

The human person is a unity that constitutes diverse experiences. There is the ontological, phenomenological, spiritual, corporal, psychological, physiological and other experiences. Every action performed by the human person, requires a dynamic integration of these experiences. This is not only because the human person is a unity, but more so because it operates as a unity in its transcendence in action. Wojtyła asserts:

**In the analysis of the dynamism of man, transcendence of experience passes into the immanence of the experience of acting itself: when I act, I am wholly engaged in my acting, in that dynamization of the ego to which my own efficacy has contributed. The fact that “I am wholly engaged in my acting” cannot be explained by transcendence alone but requires for its interpretation also the integration of the person in the action.[[338]](#footnote-338)**

By **“integration”**, Wojtyła means the philosophical and psychological sense that **“denote the realization and the manifestation of a whole and a unity emerging on the basis of some complexity rather than the assembling into a whole of what was previously disconnected.”[[339]](#footnote-339)** The complexity referred to in his philosophy of person, is that which is in the structure of self-determination, that is to say, self-governance and self-possession of the person in action. When there is a lack of cohesion of this structure of self-determination, he considers it as **“disintegration.”** The idea of **“disintegration”** as referred to the human person, is used by several fields of learning. And when used, especially in psychology, according to Wojtyła, **‘the integrated man is seen as simply the standard or “normal” man and the disintegrated man is sub- or abnormal.’[[340]](#footnote-340)** Hence, **“disintegration,”** will be a defect in the dynamic of the structure of self-governance and self-possession of the human person in action. It could be a psycho-ethical or psychosomatic defect that results in the inability of a person to govern or to possess one’s self.[[341]](#footnote-341) According to Wojtyła, **“In this condition the creature, that is, a man and hence ontologically a person, is, or at least appears to be, completely destitute of the specifically “personal” structures manifested in and with the action; indeed, this condition consists in the disintegration of the person in the action.”[[342]](#footnote-342)** He distinguishes three stages of disintegration, namely: the actual disintegration, the habitual disintegration and the “potential” disintegration.[[343]](#footnote-343) With this exposition on “disintegration” in and of the human person, the concept of the “integration” of the human person is being made even clearer. For thus, is the motif for the brief discourse on “disintegration.” For Wojtyła, contends: **“The crucial problem for understanding man’s dynamic reality is to establish the fundamental significance of the integration and disintegration of the acting person.”[[344]](#footnote-344)**

The psychosomatic unity of human person, implies, the integration and the transcendence of the person in action. Hence, **“The subordination of the subjective ego to the transcendent ego also includes both the psychosomatic complexity and unity of man.”[[345]](#footnote-345)** Psychosomatic unity is simply put the integration and the unity of the *soma* and the *psyche* of the human person in action. Wojtyła maintains that, **“the dynamisms of the psyche and the soma take an active part in integration, not at their own levels but *at the level of the person*.[[346]](#footnote-346)** By considering the dynamism of the psyche and the soma, essentially in relation to the person and action, Wojtyła, intends not to follow the epistemic path of the empirical sciences, but to remain in the domain of philosophy. He only employed the epistemological fruits of these other sciences in his reflection on the integration and unity of the psyche and the soma.[[347]](#footnote-347) He submits:

**We must here emphasize that trait of the dynamism which determines its inner content and makes possible its unity (or integration). Man in his psychosomatic complexity constitutes a highly diversified manifold, the particular elements of which are strictly interrelated, in such a way that they mutually condition each other and depend on each other.[[348]](#footnote-348)**

In the strict interrelation between the psyche and the soma, **“the relation between them consisting in the fact that the psychical functions are conditioned by the sum total of the somatic functions and especially by some particular somatic functions.”[[349]](#footnote-349)** That the psychical functions of the human person are conditioned by the sum total of the somatic functions, should not be stretched to the point of reducing psychical phenomena singularly to a physiological phenomenon of the soma. Thus, he explains, that, **‘“psyche” and “psychical” apply to the whole range of manifestations of the integral human life that are not in themselves bodily or material, but at the same time show some dependence on the body, some somatic conditioning.’[[350]](#footnote-350)**

Though the Greek word “psyche” means soul, Wojtyła by “psyche” does not mean the soul as juxtaposed with the body in the metaphysics of the human being. It also does not mean the religious “soul” understood as immortal. By “psyche”, he refers to **“that which makes man an integral being, indeed, to that which determines the integrity of his components without itself being of a bodily or somatic nature.”[[351]](#footnote-351)** This means, that which correlates with the “soma”, with a function that is at the same time “internal” and “immaterial”.[[352]](#footnote-352) Wojtyła gives, “emotivity”, that is the emotive function of the human person, generally referred to as the emotion, as a characteristic example of the psychical dynamism of the human person.[[353]](#footnote-353) Most times, the human person experiences a sort of disintegration between its emotivity and efficacy in respect to action. Thus, Wojtyła maintains:

**Inasmuch as self-governance and self-possession are elements in the structure of the person, these problems consist in the need for integration in human emotivity and emotionality, a need fully justified by the person’s self-determination; for there is a clearly marked tension between the spontaneous efficacy of the human psyche and the efficacy of the person.[[354]](#footnote-354)**

This tension between emotivity and efficacy in the person in respect to his action, leads to a creative development of the integral person’s personality and morality. Wojtyła, roots emotional dynamism of the person in the subjective ego. Thus, he considers emotion as **“a special source of subjectivism.”[[355]](#footnote-355)**

**5.5. The Faculties of the Body as Essential in the Personhood of the Person**

In the section above, it has been established that the *soma*, that is, the body, in relation to the *psyche* is essential in the understanding of the person. Notwithstanding, the body should not be discussed as an independent reality, but must be discussed as the body of the human person. Wojtyła contends that, **“we cannot discuss the human body apart from the *whole that is man, that is, without recognizing that he is a person.*”[[356]](#footnote-356)** To an extent, Wojtyła thinks this idea reflects the realist vision of the Aristotelian theory of hylomorphism—the theory that every reality is composed of the two substances: form and matter. However, Wojtyła does not *in toto* accept this theory, but intends to employ it in rethinking the dynamic of human reality as person-revealed-in-action.

In the exposition on the philosophical investigation of the human person exposed at the beginning of part one of this work, the human person, understood as a composite of body and soul with slight differences in Plato and Aristotle has been exposed. While Plato emphasizes the soul, as the human being, inhabiting in the body of which it animates, Aristotle emphasizes the rationality of the human being due to the possession of the soul with a rational part well integrated with the body. Following Aristotle’s metaphysics, it is the body that individuates the human being and gives it its **“thisness”**, that is, makes it concrete. It is through the body, that a person manifests his or her self. The body, according to Wojtyła, should be understood as the **“visible”** or the **“external”** constitutive part of the human person. He notes that this visible or external part, **“does not coincide exactly with the externally visible build of the body and seems to extend also to the internal system of bodily organs, which accompanies and, indeed, determines the external somatic whole.”[[357]](#footnote-357)**

The question of the relationship between the *soma* and the *psyche*, is thus, the question of the links or connections that lay between the **“visible outwardness”** and the **“invisible inwardness”** of the human person. In respect to this relationship, Wojtyła asserts that, **‘Strictly speaking, the personal structure of self-governance and self-possession may be thought of as “traversing” the body and being expressed by the body.’[[358]](#footnote-358)** The highlighted word, “traversing” etymologically is from the Latin verb, *transverso*, *transversare*, *transversavi*, *transversatus*, meaning to pass across from one side to another. Thus, it is to be said that Wojtyła’s interest here, is how the personal structure of self-governance and self-possession passes across to the body and in turn is manifested by the body. Hence, he maintains that, **“In this way the dynamic transcendence of the person – spiritual by its very nature —finds in the human body the territory and the means of expression.”[[359]](#footnote-359)** His, import, is that the body is both the means by which the person performs action and it is the means by which the person experiences fulfillment in actions performed. This follows that, in the objectification of the person,[[360]](#footnote-360) that is to say, the person becomes the object of his own action, the body participates essentially. Wojtyła contends:

**Whenever the person externalizes himself by means of the body he becomes simultaneously the object of his acting. The objectification of the body then becomes an integral element in the objectification of the whole personal subject, to whom the body “belongs” and of whose subjectivity it forms a structural part. The body is not a member of the subjective ego in the way of being identical with the ego; man *is not* the body, he only *has* it.[[361]](#footnote-361)**

Put simply, the structure of the self-determination of the person in the efficacy of action, enables the person to possess his or her body, and employs the body as a tool or instrument in performing actions. This has ethical or moral implications, which is, the person must take responsibility of not only the actions performed through the body, but more so, must take responsibility of the body itself. To this effect, Wojtyła submits, that, **“The ability to objectify the body and to employ it in acting is an important factor of the personal freedom of man. It is through this somatic moment—and also somatic factor—in the personal subjectification that the specific structure of self-governance and self-possession of the human person is accomplished and manifested.”[[362]](#footnote-362)**

Another perspective by which Wojtyła discusses the essential role of the body, is on the revealing of the person as a part of nature. He maintains that, **“because of his body, the man-person genuinely belongs to nature.”[[363]](#footnote-363)** The body makes the human person one among many beings in the natural world or universe, and also it is the body that makes it possible for the person to interact with other natural realities in the universe. In the interaction of the person with the other things in nature, the body reacts to its surroundings. Nevertheless, he warns, **‘A person must not be put on the same level as a thing (or for that matter as an individual animal): the person possesses spiritual perfectibility, and is by way of being an (embodied) spirit, not merely a “body” magnificently endowed with life.’[[364]](#footnote-364)** Though the human person possesses body, still there is that dynamism that distinguishes it not only from things in nature generally, but from other animals with body. Wojtyła refers to this as the **“somatic dynamism of man.”** He says, **‘It seems that this dynamism may be contained and expressed in the concept of “reactivity” and also by the attribute *reactive*.’[[365]](#footnote-365)** Reactivity or reaction, can be used in reference to various activities of human behavior or moods. Thus, it could be emotional, psychological, physiological, neurological and so on. But the reaction, which Wojtyła has interest in is, **“the reactions of the body that constitute the body’s own vitality.”[[366]](#footnote-366)** The vitality of the human body is essentially vegetative which begins with conception and ends with death.[[367]](#footnote-367) The body suffers the fate of every other thing in nature in respect to atmospheric and climatic changes. It also needs to survive like other animals by having the necessities to sustain biological life, in order to carry out all the biological functions of all living things, including growth and reproduction. These biological functions happen independent of the direct effect of the dynamism of self-determination. Though one needs to eat for the growth and development of the body, the actual growing and development of the body is not within the power of the person’s will. Thus, Wojtyła maintains that, **“The dynamic fabric of all the vegetative vitality of the human body consists of a sequence of purely instinctive reactions, that is, reactions that follow the way of nature itself.”[[368]](#footnote-368)** Hence, these somatic reactions, are rightly called activation, that is they happen to the person, and are not actions performed by the person. Therefore, **‘In this case “reactivity” denotes an instinctive and dynamic relation to nature conceived as a definite biological “environment,” as a system conditioning both vegetation and reproduction. The relation is purposeful inasmuch as the particular, instinctive somatic reactions have as their object either vegetation or reproduction.’[[369]](#footnote-369)**

**5.6. The Human Person as a Being in Participation**

Aquinas’s metaphysics of person, in his Trinitarian discourse, emphasizes the nature of the person as participation or communion, the communion between the three persons of the Trinitarian God: Father, Son and Spirit. Wojtyła, in his discussion of the person as a being in participation, moves the participation of the person beyond Aquinas’s theological *cum* metaphysical limit to a broader scope.[[370]](#footnote-370) In his discussion of participation, Wojtyła investigates, **“that aspect of the dynamic correlation of the action with the person which issues from the fact that actions can be performed by human individuals together with others.”[[371]](#footnote-371)** In other words, it deals with the communal and social dimensions of person and action. Wojtyła asserts that, **‘The fact that man lives and exists together with others, as well as the effect this has on his manifesting himself in acting, on the action as such, relates to that reality we usually refer to as “society” or “community.”’[[372]](#footnote-372)** However, it should be noted, that the emphasis is neither on the “society” nor on the “community”, but on the person in action together with others.[[373]](#footnote-373) This justifies, **‘the fact that the dynamic correlation of the notion of “action” with that of “person” is also the basic and fundamental reality in all the multifarious actings that have a social, communal, or interhuman character.’[[374]](#footnote-374)**

Wojtyła, explores the significance of one acting **“together with others”** for the personalistic value of the action. Does a **“communal action”**, that is to say acting together with others”, enrich or affect the fulfillment of the person in action? To deal more substantially with the participation of the person **“together with others,”** he presents a more distinguishing explanation of the concept of **“participation”** from how it is conceived in traditional philosophy. He contends:

**The notion of “participation” as conceived in traditional philosophy seems to have been more connected with nature. It is the person’s transcendence in the action when the action is being performed “together with others”—transcendence which manifests that the person has not become altogether absorbed by social interplay and thus “conditioned,” but stands out as having retained his very own freedom of choice and direction—which is the basis as well as the condition of participation.[[375]](#footnote-375)**

In other words, while the traditional philosophy emphasizes the rational and social nature of human beings in its exposition of the concept of **“participation,”** Wojtyła’s conceptualization of **“participation,”** emphasizes the dynamics of efficacy, integration and transcendence of the person in action performed **“together with others.”** The person retains its personalistic value in participating **“together with others”** in action, that is to say, in a **“communal action”** even as the person shares from the result of the fulfillment in the **“communal action.”** Thus, **“communal action,”** when positively manifested, does not inhibit or decrease the fulfillment of the personalistic value, but rather enriches and increases it. There is a mutual edification of individual persons personalistic value in a **“communal action.”** On the other hand, it is possible that the self-determination of the person can be inhibited or restrained in a **“communal action.”** When this takes place the person no longer performs actions, due to lack of efficacy, which is as a result of the inability to exercise freedom. This rather, shows that it is, **“something happens to the person.”**

Wojtyła adjudges that personalistic value, that is, self-fulfillment in action, is a right of a person. The person has the right not only as intrinsic in its nature to perform action, but more so to be self-fulfilled in the performance of actions. He further maintains the apogee of this fulfillment manifests when action is performed **“together with others.”[[376]](#footnote-376)** Hence, he maintains that, **“it is in acting together with others that the performance of actions—the performance that is simultaneously the fulfillment of the person in action, and the performance and fulfillment of the person in action, and the performance and fulfillment in which the personalist value of the action consists—can be limited or definitely thwarted.”[[377]](#footnote-377)** This limitation in participation could be caused by the individual person or by the community of persons. The individual can thwart his or her own self-fulfillment by obstructing his or her active participation with others. The lack of self-fulfillment, on the other hand, could be obstructed by the community, by thwarting the active participation of a person in action with others. Wojtyła calls these two aspects of limitations, **“individualism”** and **“objective totalism”** which can also be called **“anti-individualism.”** He explains both limitations, thus, **“Individualism sees in the individual the supreme and fundamental good, to which all interests of the community or the society have to be subordinated, while objective totalism relies on the opposite principle and unconditionally subordinates the individual to the community or the society.”[[378]](#footnote-378)** It follows, that, as much as the person is a social being and should participate in a community, individual persons ought not to be subjuncted in the community or society.[[379]](#footnote-379)

Hence, Wojtyła posits what he calls **“the principle of participation,”** thus: **“The person has as his specific attribute the right to perform actions and the obligation to fulfill himself in action. This obligation results from the personalistic value inherent in fulfillment.”[[380]](#footnote-380)** This simply reaffirms his position, that to be a person is to be capable of participation. Hence, he strongly opposes any form of **“impersonalism”** and **“antipersonalism”** as offspring of individualism and anti-individualism. And thus, posits **“alienation”** as the negation of participation. He maintains, **“Alienation basically means the negation of participation, for it renders participation difficult or even impossible. It devastates the *I—other* relationship, weakens the ability to experience another human being as another *I*, and inhibits the possibility of friendship and the spontaneous powers of community (*communio personarum*).”[[381]](#footnote-381)**

**5.7. Participation as the Ground of Community Life**

It takes at least two persons to form a community. No individual person can form a community. Hence, the difference between the individual life and the community life. Since, it takes at least two persons to form a community, participation becomes the ground of community life, be it friendship, marriage, family, society, nation-state or the global community. If there is no participation of persons in any of the forms of community living, the community dies. Hence, Wojtyła asserts, **“participation as an essential of the person is a constitutive factor of any human community.”[[382]](#footnote-382)**

The expression of **“together with others,”** repeatedly referenced in the discussion of the above section, actually refers to community. Wojtyła maintains:

**The notion of “community” is correlated with this expression while simultaneously it introduces a new plane of action or a new “subjectiveness” in the acting. Indeed, as long as we are speaking of acting or being “together with others” the man-person remains the manifest subject of the acting and being, but once we begin to speak of the *community*, then what so far has been contained in an adverbial sentence, can now be expressed in substantival and abstract terms.[[383]](#footnote-383)**

He suggests that, in the action of the community, the community of persons in performing an action, forms a **“subjectivity”** or a **“quasi-subjectiveness.”** Wojtyła, maintains that, **“The new subjectiveness is the share of all the members of a community, or, in a broader sense, of a social group. In fact, it is but a quasi-subjectiveness, because even when the being and acting is realized together with others it is the *man-person who is always its proper subject*.”[[384]](#footnote-384)** This leads him to distinguish, **“community of acting”** from the **“community of being.”** While in the **“community of being”** the emphasis is on the communal existence of persons, in the **“community of acting”** the emphasis is on the communal action and the coalescences of the persons acting together. In other words, in the **“community of acting”** there is participation of persons in the performance of action. In the **“community of acting”**, therefore, there is an objective goal of which every person in the community desire to attain or achieve. Hence, it becomes the **“objective community of acting.”[[385]](#footnote-385)**

Nevertheless, he holds that, **‘the “community of being” always conditions the “community of acting,” and so the latter cannot be considered apart from the former.’[[386]](#footnote-386)** This is because there must first be the community of the existence of persons before there can be a community of persons in action toward achieving a goal. On the community level, it follows the same metaphysical principle mentioned in respect to an individual person: *operari sequitur esse*. The essential relationship between the **“community of being”** and the **“community of acting”** is that, **‘from the reality constituted by “common acting” and “common being,” participation emerges as a dynamic factor of the person and the action and also as the basis of every authentic human community.’[[387]](#footnote-387)** This sustains and confirms what was said at the beginning of this section, that if there is no participation in a community, the community perishes

Members of the **“community of being”**, are individually another person, that is another *I* (ego). The basis of understanding participation **“together with others,”** is to be conscious that the *other* is another *I*.[[388]](#footnote-388) He maintains that human beings are capable of participating in the humanity of others. To this effect, he opines that every human being can be a neighbour. He asserts:

**“The *other*” does not just signify that the being existing next to me or even acting in common with me in some system of activities is the same kind of being as I am. Within the context of this real situation, “the *other*” also signifies my no less real—though primarily subjective—participation in that being’s humanity, a participation arising from my awareness that this being is another *I*, which means “also an *I*.”[[389]](#footnote-389)**

Thus, “the other” is a “neighbour” and conversely a “neighbour” is “the other.” A neighbour is not just someone next door, or a colleague at work, a neighbour is another *I* as *I* am. This follows that, **“Another person is a neighbor to me not just because we share a like humanity, but chiefly because the other is another *I*.”[[390]](#footnote-390)** This participation in the humanity of the *other* or *neighbour,* he maintains, is not a cognitive act of understanding the essence of “human being” but rather it comes about through the lived experience of one’s own *I*. This means that experience of participation by which the other is known through the experience of a personal *I*, is phenomenological rather than metaphysical in nature. I know the *other* to being a person phenomenologically, while I know the person to being a human being metaphysically. Wojtyła asserts, **“An understanding of this essence opens the way to participation, but it does not itself determine participation. It also does not itself give rise to an *I—other* relationship. This relationship does not emerge from having a universal concept of the human being, a concept that embraces all people without exception.”[[391]](#footnote-391)** This means that participation is not a given, living in a **“community of being”** does not automatically guarantee the actualization of participation in the **“community of being.”** Wojtyła contends: **“The actualization of participation in relation to every other human being arises before each of us as a task.”[[392]](#footnote-392)** This follows, that the **“other,”** a **“neighbour,”** stands before me as a specific task, a task which means affirming and relating with the “other” as another *I*, that is as another person.[[393]](#footnote-393)

**PART TWO**

**Discourse on the Human Person Based On the Concept of 『仁』: “Jenism”**

In chapter one, an intensive exposé and analysis of Karol Wojtyła’s philosophical anthropology has been explored. This means that the philosophical perspective intended to employ for the discourse on the human person in this work has been established. Hence, the writer will interpret and understand the person by and from the Wojtyłian’s stand point and perspective. Since, this work intends to understand the human person based on the Confucian concept of 「仁，」by the perspective of Wojtyła, the main thrust of the second part of this work is to expose the following: Confucius philosophy and the concept of 「仁」and an interpretation of 「仁者」in the perspective of Wojtyła’s philosophical anthropology as **“person-revealed-in-action.”** The conception of the human person by the means of an interpretation of 「仁」inspired by Wojtyłian philosophy of person, is what the writer calls: **“Jenism.”** This second part of the research, also constitutes five chapters, divided into sections.

**Chapter One: An Exposition of Confucian Philosophy**

The aim of this chapter is to create the intellectual framework to understanding Confucian philosophy in general. This is important because philosophy do not develop in a vacuum. Every philosophy develops within a given worldview and geographical environment. And Confucius philosophy is not an exception. However, the objective is not to trace the history of the Chinese people in general nor the history of Confucian philosophy in particular. The objective is simply to create the intellectual framework that initiated what is today referred as Confucian philosophy. This is in order to launch into the exposition and analysis of the concept of 「仁。」

**1.1. The Metaphysical Framework of Confucian Philosophy**

This subtitle, seems to presuppose an understanding of what Confucian philosophy is. The Chinese term for what is being referred to as Confucian philosophy is 「儒學」or 「儒家。」A literal translation of both, will show that none explicitly speaking makes reference to the name Confucius (「孔夫子」，) of which the philosophical system or tradition, Confucian philosophy, is named in the English language. 「儒學」and 「儒家」 has in common the Chinese character「儒，」which shares the same main part, 「需」(which means the noun need or the verb to need), with the Chinese character, 「懦」 which is an adjective that means, weak or cowardly. But while the later has the person-radical 「亻，」the former has the heart-radical「忄。」Classically, the character 「儒」is being understood as referencing the character 「柔，」which could mean “soft” or “mild,” [(「儒柔也，術士之稱。」)][[394]](#footnote-394) Be that as it may, it will not be wrong to say that 「儒」connotes a person who has a need of something. And tradition posits that which is needed as wisdom, hence, the character, is denoted as a scholar or a learned person (「術士」。)[[395]](#footnote-395) Since, the Chinese cultural people considers Confucius as the scholar *per excellence* and the paragon of all scholars, one can understand why 「儒學」or 「儒家」 is interpreted as Confucian study or Confucian doctrine or Confucian philosophy.

In a more general sense, Confucian philosophy is the Chinese philosophical system that follows the intellectual tradition conceived by Confucius (「孔子」，) gestated by Mengzi (「孟子」) and birthed by Xunzi (「荀子」。) Hence, to understand Confucian philosophy one must understand the thought and philosophy of Confucius, Mengzi and Xunzi. To properly understand their thoughts and philosophy one needs to understand the metaphysical underpinnings of their thoughts.

By metaphysical framework or underpinnings, what is actually meant? It means the cosmogonic, cosmological, ontological, psycho-spiritual and transcendental worldview that were prevalent at the period Confucius (孔子), Mengzi (孟子) and Xunzi (荀子), reflected and developed their philosophical thoughts. Though the subject of their thoughts is basically on the moral person, nevertheless, their thoughts have metaphysical underpinnings. 項退結, maintains that, **“Confucianism, though takes morality and politics as its main subjects, but from the onset, it already possessed metaphysical foundation. The two main representatives of Confucianism, Confucius and Mengzi both already has outstanding metaphysical thoughts.”[[396]](#footnote-396)** He posits this against the disputation that metaphysical underpinnings in Confucianism only began with the Neo-Confucianist during the Song-Ming Dynasty. That the metaphysical thought of Confucianism becomes systematized with the Neo-Confucianist, does not deny the assertion that Confucius and Mengzi’s thought has metaphysical frameworks.

Putting the question differently is to ask: how did the ancient Chinese people conceive reality? How do they conceive the Absolute Ultimate Reality? How did they try to explain the ultimate contraries[[397]](#footnote-397): being and becoming, immutability and change, unity and diversity, spirit (mind) and matter, eternity and time, infinity and finitude, necessity and contingency, actuality and potentiality, immediate and mediate, transcendence and immanence?[[398]](#footnote-398) Ultimate contraries, **“are ultimate to the extent they are definitive or fundamental features, which mark reality as a whole understood as the totality of all things that exist or can be conceived and their ultimate origin and support.”[[399]](#footnote-399)** The metaphysics of a people, whether systematic or unsystematic, is their conception of the Ultimate Reality and the Ultimate Contraries. The Ultimate reality is the supreme and first cause or origin and the ultimate ground and support of all things, which has its nature as unitary and indivisible. From an anthropo-psycho-ethical perspective, it includes how a given people conceive the human person as composite being of mind and body or spirit and matter, freedom and determinism, cause and effect, good and evil.

The Ultimate Reality of which the classics of Daoism, 道德經, conceives as 「不可知，不可名」[(“the unknowable” and “the Unnamable”)，][[400]](#footnote-400) for the sake of communication has been given different names in the collections of classical Chinese works. It includes, 「帝」,「上帝」, 「黃天上帝」,「天」, 「上天」, 「皇天」,「道」, 「太極 」,「太和」, 「太虛」and「太一。」[[401]](#footnote-401) These are the names given to the Ultimate Reality in classical Chinese thought.[[402]](#footnote-402) They are used to explain the Ultimate Contraries mentioned above as conceived by the Chinese people. They explain the origin and the coming to be of all things by the two primordial substances of 「氣／陰陽」. They are used to explain the fundamental principle 「理」of all things. They are also used to explain the fundamental nature of the human person「命」,「 性」, 「心」, 「誠」 「禮」「義」「智」and 「仁。」These are key concepts in Confucian philosophy. The understanding of the concept 「仁」, which is the crux of this work, is connected to the following concepts: 「命」,「 性」, 「心」, 「誠」 「禮」「義」「智。」And one cannot understand these concepts without a proper understanding of the concepts for the Ultimate reality: 「上帝」, 「天」, 「道」, 「太極 」,「太極 」,「太和」, 「太虛」and「太一。」

In Chinese philosophy, virtually all scholars agree that, Chinese philosophy in the proper sense of a rational discourse based on human experiences, begins with Confucius. Before him, there are literary works, many which are materials that forms the thought and reasoning of Confucius and his successors. These literary works includes the so called six classics (《六經》): 《詩經》（Book of Songs）, 《尚書》（Book of History）, 《儀禮 》（Book of Rites）, 《樂經》（ Book of Music）,《易經》（Book of Changes ）, and《 春秋》（Spring and Autumn Annals）. These classics though are literary works of mainly poetic genre, contains words of wisdom that involves religious rite and rituals, arts and crafts, divination and magic, politics and governance, ethics and morals, family and social relations.

For instance, in 《詩經》, there is the concept of 「天，」as the Ultimate Reality.[[403]](#footnote-403) It conception of the Ultimate Reality 「天，」basically can be understood from two main perspectives: personalistic (anthropomorphic) (「人(位)格之天」) and metaphysical (形上之天).[[404]](#footnote-404) Personalistic perspective has a more religious undertone, where the Ultimate reality is conceived similar to the manner in which the Judeo-Christian religion conceives the God revealed in the sacred Scriptures, which possesses consciousness and freewill. Where God is manifested not only as possessing freewill but also as having passion and emotions. He gets angry and punishes the wicked, but on the other hand, He is gracious and blesses the righteous.

While in the metaphysical perspective, the Ultimate reality is understood more as nature or phenomenon and laws of nature; it neither possesses consciousness nor freewill. In a more philosophical and scientific parlance of the western discourse, it is the Intelligent that causes and governs all that is. The personalistic or religious perspective of 「天」was more prevalent and dominant before Confucius. However, the metaphysical conception of the Ultimate reality started developing before Confucius. For example, the concept of 「天」 in the assertion:「維天之命，於穆不已」[[405]](#footnote-405) has a metaphysical conception of 「天。」 According to 勞思光, this metaphysical 「天之命」 is the principle and direction of the heavens 「天」which the latter period of Chinese philosophy refers to as「天道。」[[406]](#footnote-406) Even, during the period of Confucius and Mengzi, though, the metaphysical or natural conception of 「天」as the Ultimate reality has started becoming prevalent in the thought of the thinkers of the time, however, there is still present the personalistic or religious conception of 「天。」[[407]](#footnote-407)

In fact, in many occasions both conceptions of 「天」overlaps in certain discourse. In respect to how the concept of the Ultimate Reality 「天」 is understood by Confucius and his successors during the Han Dynasty, 勞思光, maintains that, concerning the metaphysical concept of 「天，」there are two popular perspectives: the first is that the metaphysical concept of 「天」belongs to the thought system of the Daoist after Confucius, this is based on the postulation that Confucius did not discuss the metaphysical principle of 「天，」which is the Daoist conception of 「道，」that is a metaphysical concept of 「天。」The second perspective, considers the metaphysical concept of 「天」as an orthodox Confucian thought. This second perspective, takes the source of Confucianism back to the very distance ancient times, by maintaining that the metaphysical concept of 「天」constitutes the heart of Confucian doctrine, as the very central point of the Confucian spirit.[[408]](#footnote-408)

勞思光, further contends that strictly speaking, the above two perspectives of the concept of 「天」is not accurate. Because, on one hand it is known that there is the conception of the metaphysical 「天」during the beginning of the Han Dynasty. But, one should not say that the conception of the metaphysical 「天」necessarily originates in the Daoist thought that began after Confucius. On the other hand, we certainly know from the system of Confucius to Mengzi of the early Chin period of Confucianism, the nucleus of their philosophizing is moral subject or subjectivity. Thereby, not considering the conception of the metaphysical「天」as the highest and key notion. In addition, in the doctrine of Confucius and Mengzi, from the point of view of theoretical construction, also it is not needed. Thus, we cannot say that the conception of the metaphysical 「天」is the philosophical notion of Confucius and Mengzi. In other words, the conception of the metaphysical 「天」is not the notion that defines the central point of the early Chin period. More so, Confucius who is the person that initiated Confucianism, does not have a doctrine of the metaphysical 「天，」but before Confucius there exist the imagination of the concept of the metaphysical 「天，」hence, it cannot be said to be an original notion of Confucius.[[409]](#footnote-409) But, to say that is not an original notion of Confucius does not mean that 「天」is not the Ultimate reality in the metaphysical framework of Confucius, it simply means that the concept 「天」 does not originate from Confucius or during his period. Though the concept predates him and his period, the evolution of the meaning of the concept to the sense of a natural phenomenon, stripped of divine nature and attributes, no doubt, in a more pronounced manner, began with Confucius and during his period.

Beside the concept of the Ultimate Reality,「 天」in 《詩經》, the classic, 《易經》, presents a classical cosmogony and cosmology of the ancient Chinese people. It presents a theory of substance that is similar to that of the Pre-Socratic Philosophers and in a sense even to that of Aristotle in the ancient period of Western philosophy and to that of Leibnitz in the modern period of Western philosophy. Just as the pre-Socratic cosmologists, the 《易經》 attempts to rationally understand the cosmos, notwithstanding, that this understanding is a combination of cosmogony, cosmology, divination, and mysticism. It maintains that the cosmos is not a disordered accident. But that it is a well-ordered system of consistent and coherent permutation of a form that possesses mathematical principles and logic. It posits that all entities, all that is, possess the metaphysical principle 「氣，」which is a substance of an inherent negative and positive nature of 「陰陽」or 「乾坤，」[[410]](#footnote-410) as the two main primordial or remote substances of all that is. The ceaseless intercourse and disintegration of 「陰陽」or 「乾坤」brings about the generation and corruption of things in the cosmos. The cosmos itself has an eternal and infinite existence. Thus, motion in the sense of change, is an eternal phenomenon in the cosmos. Whereas, the cosmos itself is eternally constant, every other thing in the cosmos is in the state of becoming. The Chinese character, 「易，」has its original meaning as change. Hence, the English translation of the classic, 《易經》, by some scholars as the *Book of Changes*.

Therefore, it can be said that the work, 《易經》, is an attempt to explain the process of change in the cosmos as it relates and affect the human person. However, it does not present the Western sense of a disinterested understanding of the cosmos. In Chinese philosophy, not just the human person, but the human life is the central point of its cosmology. This is sustained by the assertion in 《易經》, that maintains the human life or existence as change [(「生生之謂易」。)] 《易經》, also posits: 「生生為仁，」which maintains that「生生」which means the human life (「生命」，) implies the concept 「仁。」This follows that the ground of human life is 「仁，」to truly live or exist is to manifest and be governed by the principle of 「仁。」This explains why《易經》 had a substantial influence on the thinkers during the period of the 宋明代（Song Ming Dynasties）, now known as the Neo-Confucianist. It also explains why the Neo-Confucians expanded the interpretation of the concept of 「仁」as essentially related to the changes and becoming of cosmic phenomena.

**1.2. The Methodology of Confucian Philosophical Discourse**

Philosophy is a rational discourse on human reality or experience. Philosophy is always a human activity. And where ever there is human being there is always a sought of philosophizing that takes place. For the human person always desire to make sense of wonders encountered around him. Aristotle, in the very beginning of his work, *Metaphysics*, articulates it simply that: **“All men by nature desire to know.”[[411]](#footnote-411)** Every human being is endowed with the capacity to think, however, it does not follow that every human being engages in the activity of philosophizing. Philosophizing requires certain level of critical and rigorous thinking and reasoning. The etymological meaning of philosophy, from the Greek root *philo sophia* as *love of wisdom* only says a very tiny part of what philosophy means. The question is what kind of *wisdom* does philosophy deals with and philosophers love? The philosopher loves the *wisdom* that involves the ground or principle that underpins or explains reality or human experience, that is the first causes or principles of things. The philosopher then, is that person who loves to investigate the ultimate ground or rational of reality or human experience. Philosophy thus, deals with the ability to conceptualize what is given to experience, either, intuitively or empirically. This is done in such a way that concepts of a universal and necessary nature are developed, for continuous rational reflections and discourses. This means that philosophers in their reflections produces concepts that help to explain certain human experiences or phenomena. For instance, when the Chinese character 仁 generally mean the human experience of love, it is not yet a philosophical concept. But, when it becomes a principle that explains the human nature, the human ethics and morality and or the human society and politics, either of a particular people or for the entire humanity, then 「仁」becomes a philosophical concept.

Hence, it is the writer’s view that irrespective of the place or culture where a philosophical tradition is developed, it must have the nature of a rigorous thinking or reasoning. The literary genre employed could be different but the essential attitude and spirit of investigation of the underlying principle or principles of reality must be present. Having said this, there is no debate whether or not the Confucian philosophy or Chinese philosophy is philosophy. Anyone who patiently and thoroughly studies it will affirm that individuals and group of individuals rigorously made effort to understand the experiences given to them and attempts to come up with certain universal explanations. The question, rather, is what is the methodology of Confucian philosophy and in particular that of Confucius, the founder and forerunner of Chinese philosophy?

Any Christian who is conversant with what is scholarly referred to as the Wisdom Literatures in the Judeo-Christian Sacred Scriptures and the several parables of Jesus in the Gospels, and who reads the texts of Chinese philosophy, for example the Analects (《論語》), would agree on their having literary similarities. There is presence of diverse forms of figure of speech and symbolisms employed, such as metaphors, simile, allegories, typologies, dialogues, orations, exultations, and so on. To this effect, readers who are used to philosophical treatises and critical writings, that characterize western philosophy will find it very difficult appreciating the philosophical content of the texts that contains Chinese philosophy in general. But it should be noted that the early years of the Greek philosophical texts are also of these nature and form. Even the works of the great Greek philosopher, Plato, is in the form of dialogue, with the use of many metaphors and allegories.

Another factor that makes understanding Chinese philosophy difficult is the language. These Chinese classical texts, besides that they are written in Chinese language which many non-Chinese people cannot comprehend, but more so, they are written in the ancient classical Chinese language (文言文) which many Chinese people themselves find it very difficult to comprehend. Besides the difficulties that have to do with literary forms and Chinese language comprehension, another major difficulty in studying Chinese philosophy, is that the texts are not purely philosophical texts. The texts rather contain philosophy or better put philosophical concepts and philosophical thinking, which the writer prefers to call philosophical attitude and spirit. Hence, it is the task of the philosophical scholar today, to investigate these texts and to encounter and develop the concepts established and developed that are of philosophical nature. For example, as mentioned in the first section of this chapter, the idea 「天」was present in the world-view of the ancient Chinese people before Confucius, but how does Confucius make it a philosophical concept and develops it into a principle that helps to explain and understand a certain aspect of human experience in purely rational manner, is the task of a scholar of Chinese philosophy. The same applies to the concept「仁」being investigated in this work. How does Confucius develop it from love among kin (愛親), to the fundamental principle of ethics, politics, education and aesthetics? This question the writer hopes to expound in this part of the research.

The first thing to understand in the study of Chinese philosophy generally and Confucian philosophy in particular, is that the text is not intended to be a discourse on metaphysics, epistemology, logic and/or even ethics in the strict sense. Rather, the texts strictly speaking are actually intended to be discourses on human life. Hence, one can say that Chinese philosophy is the philosophy of life (生命哲學 or 人生哲學).[[412]](#footnote-412) This should not be understood, to mean, that there are no metaphysical, epistemological, logical or ethical thoughts in Chinese philosophy. It simply means that they are not the object and the drive that spurred the Chinese philosophers into writing. As 梁啟超, puts it, that the take off point and the end point of Chinese philosophy, is not disinterested search for knowledge.[[413]](#footnote-413) What spurred them to philosophize and write are the questions about the human person and the human life. 梁啟超, sums up the end of Chinese philosophizing with this proposition in the Analects: 「修己安人」[(the moral cultivation of oneself and the peace and serenity of the human person.)] and in Zhuangzi’s thought (《莊子》), 「內聖外王」[(interior sanctity and exterior kingship or royalness.)][[414]](#footnote-414) This is simply to say that the end of Chinese philosophy is practical human questions, and hence, it is a practical philosophy. Notwithstanding, because human life involves metaphysical, epistemological, logical, ethical, political, educational, aesthetical and social issues, these are present in one way or the other in their writings.

Having established the above, it is now proper to discuss how Confucian philosophers, focusing on the founder, Confucius, develops his philosophical concepts. The first and most important method he employs is what is called the method 「正名」(translated in English as Rectification of Names). What it proposes in Chinese is 「名實相符。」Simply put, it states that a thing (reality) should correspond to its name (the idea in the mind) and vice versa.[[415]](#footnote-415) He makes this proposition based on the fact that he desires to challenge personages in the society, especially those at the helms of political affairs, to be and live up to the name they are called.[[416]](#footnote-416) And by doing this he believes his chaotic society at the time will be in peace and prosperity. Hence, Confucius famous expression of this proposition is: 「君君、臣臣、父父、子子。」Which means, **“let the prince be prince, let the officers be officers, let fathers be fathers and let sons be sons.”** When they thus be, then according to Confucius, there will be political stability and peace in the society. To this effect, efforts to be what one is called, that is to say, a thing should be identical to its concept, is considered very important to Confucius.

There may be no clear and systematic Aristotelian formal logic, nor the informal symbolic logic of the Western contemporary period of philosophy, explicit in Chinese philosophy. But it is explicit that there is present conscious display of logical thinking and reasoning in the literary works of Chinese philosophy. A constant appeal to nature or natural phenomena, history, human experience of day to day activities and common sense, in reasoning and philosophical speculations and imaginations are copiously employed. Thus, deduction from general principles to particular reality, induction from particular experiences to establishing general proposition; use of metaphors and analogies for clarification or persuasion of argumentations are abundantly present in the literary works of Chinese people that are of philosophical relevance. For example, when Mengzi, contends that human nature is universally good, he went further to appeal to a natural human response of empathy or compassion in an experience of a sudden accident of a little baby falling into a well. Of which he argues that everyone will be moved to save the little baby out of compassion and not for any other purpose.

**Chapter Two: The Concept of「仁」 in Confucian Philosophy**

The general view of Chinese philosophers and scholars in Chinese philosophy maintains that among the concepts raised and discussed in the thought and philosophy of Confucius, the concept 「仁」 is the epicenter of the intellectual force of gravity of Confucius philosophy in particular and Confucianism in general. Richard William, considers the concept 「仁 」to be, **“the central concept which crystallizes the doctrines of Confucius in the oldest sources.”[[417]](#footnote-417)** While, 勞思光 and 葉經柱consider it as the heart of Confucius doctrine and the central point of the main thought of Confucius.[[418]](#footnote-418) In the most reliable work that contains the thought and philosophy of Confucius, [《論語》] (the Analects ), the term 仁 and 君子 statistically appears more than any other term. The Chinese character 「仁」appears more than 100 times in the Analects alone,[[419]](#footnote-419) and this shows how important a concept it is to Confucius and his disciples. In Mengzi’s work, the character 「仁」 is used 158 times,[[420]](#footnote-420) which also shows how important the concept is considered. In fact the two main concept in the philosophical thought of Mengzi are 「仁」and 「義，」and in most occasions, he uses them together as 「仁義。」

One of the Challenges among English speaking scholars of Chinese Philosophy is not only how to understand the concept 「仁，」but also how to translate it into the English language. Richard Wilhelm listed the following as translations of 仁: mankind, humanity[[421]](#footnote-421), humanitarianism, kindness, morality.[[422]](#footnote-422) However, he preferred and uses, humanitarianism[[423]](#footnote-423) as the translation of 仁. Many also uses Benevolence, a synonym of kindness to translate it. Some, mostly Scholars of Christian faith persuasion, use charity or love to translate it.

A reading of the Analects, shows that Confucius himself uses the term 仁in different ways and to mean different realities. Hence, for a better understanding of the term 仁as a philosophical concept, it is important to discuss, even if briefly, the textual analysis of the meaning of 「仁」and the historical interpretation of 「仁」as a Confucian philosophical concept.

**2.1. Textual Analysis of the Meaning of 仁**

Many scholars of Chinese philosophy, especially those of Chinese heritage are wont on investigating the meaning of concepts in Chinese philosophy such as 「道」, 「德」, 「仁」, 「理」, 「禮」, 「樂」and so on, by exploring the etymology of the Chinese character. Julia on the interpretation of the character 「仁」adumbrates:

**The Chinese word jen has been interpreted variously by those who claim to know its etymology. The most common explanation is that the human radical next to the two horizontal strokes represents a virtue practiced in interaction with others. Another is that the two strokes represent the ancient symbol for “upper,” bringing to mind an upper, or superior, man and the virtue that is enjoined upon such a person. A third explanation is that it resembles a man carrying a heavy burden, hence signifying “bearing and enduring.”[[424]](#footnote-424)**

While this scholarly industry is laudable, it is important not to remain on the level of etymology and semantics but to move to the level of conceptualization of reality or human experiences by the use of terms. Though this (etymological analysis) could be helpful in understanding the semantic origin and evolution of a particular Chinese character, this however, should be left for scholars of Chinese philology and literature. As have been maintained in Chapter one above, philosophy deals with concepts and principles. For it is on the level of concepts that philosophy strives. 勞思光, without mincing words, reproves any attempt to remain on the etymological or semantic level, in the assumption or pretense of engaging in the scholarship of philosophy. He sums up the paragraph where he makes this reprove, thus: **“The Confucianism of the Ching period, is certainly not deep enough, for this period erratically explain the bases of philosophical thoughts by the means of etymological research, this however, cannot but be ridiculous.”** [ (「清儒固不足深責，然現代人倘若仍誤以字源研究為解釋哲學思想之根據，則未免荒謬可笑。」)[[425]](#footnote-425) ]

Thus, this work shall only highlight the etymology of the character 仁as much as it is necessary to understanding the formation of the Chinese character. Since, philosophy deals with concept, focus shall be on the philosophical conceptualization and understanding of the concept 「仁。」To achieving this end, the writer considers a few classical texts of Chinese philosophy.

「仁」as a Chinese character pre-date Confucius, but it neither appears in the 〈甲骨〉text of the Shang dynasty nor in the 〈金文〉 of the West Zhou (西周) period. It occurs once both in the 《商書》 and twice in the 《詩經》. It was rather until the period of 《春秋》 that the uses of 「仁」becomes more abundant.[[426]](#footnote-426) It probably originated during the 「上古三代。」[[427]](#footnote-427) As the character shows, it is a combination of the radical that represents the human person and the character that represents the number two. This implies that it takes more than oneself to manifest 「仁，」which follows that it deals with the interaction and relationship between persons. In an individual, the reality 「仁」remains a potentiality, it only becomes an actuality when an individual interacts or relates with “the other.” During the period before Confucius, the concept 「仁」is basically used as the value of loveliness in human relationship and interaction. Especially in the loving experience among family members and kin, 「愛親。」As it could be found in the text 《國語》 and 《左傳》, 「仁」 has the meaning of 「愛人」(“love humanity or human love.”) As time progresses it meaning extends beyond family or kinship love, to include a moral value in the society [(「道德價值」。)]

At the time of Confucius, in a society that has lost its moral hold and social cohesion, the so called period termed 「禮崩樂壞」 of the ancient Chinese history,[[428]](#footnote-428) the term「仁」 gradually takes up more of a nature of philosophical concept. It meaning hence, includes, the fundamental principle and source of morality and ethical values. Before, considering scholarly analysis, commentary, expositions and explorations on the concept of 「仁，」it is *ad rem* to allow the Confucian texts to speak for themselves. For the sake of brevity and clarity only the following texts are considered here:《 論語》, 《中庸 》and《孟子》.

1. 《論語》：

「里仁為美。擇不處仁，焉得知？」[[429]](#footnote-429)

This is the first proposition in the Analects that makes use of the concept 「仁。」Here, 「仁」 signifies moral virtue. it is the (moral) standard of the choice of a beautiful neigbourhood to reside. The wise person, in deciding for a place to reside, will make a choice for a neigbourhood with high moral standard, which is based on the virtue of 「仁」as a priority. This establishes a transcendental relationship between the beautiful and the good. In a similar way as it is expounded in the philosophical thought of Plato, where the beautiful is the good. This thus, makes the beautiful 「美」the good「仁。」

「不仁者不可以久處約，不可以長處樂。仁者安仁，知者利仁。」[[430]](#footnote-430)

Here, 「仁」still signifies moral virtue. But the reference is on the person who possess the virtue 「仁。」It posits a contrast between the person of 「仁」and the person of the privation or deficiency of 「仁。」「仁」is the source for not only moral tranquility but for a tranquil and serene happy living. The privation of 「仁」leads to the in ability to persevere in adversity and the in ability to be self-controlled and modest in bountifulness. Hence, the wise person will seek 「仁。」It has been referenced that the end of Chinese philosophy in a sense is 「修己安人。」This actually contains two ends in one: the first is 「修己」which means self-cultivation, and the second is 「安人」which means serenity of humanity. The purpose of self-cultivation 「修己」is to develop and enhance the principle of 「仁」in the human nature. And when this principle of the human nature is developed and enhance then there can be peace and serenity in the human society.

「唯仁者能好人，能惡人。」[[431]](#footnote-431)

Here 「仁」does not merely signifies virtues, but the principle of discerning good and bad. It is the moral principle that enables the possession of 「仁，」in order to make social judgement on whom to interact or whom not to interact with. Only the person of 「仁，」thus can in the true sense be able to love or to hate the other. Which means that, contrary to the often position of 「仁」as love, (「仁者愛人」，) it is not just love but it is the principle that enables love, as well as the principle that could enable hate in the human person. Love and hate, are neither good nor evil in themselves, it is rather what is loved or hated that is good or evil. 「仁」enables a person to know who and what to love and who and what to detest. It is 「仁」that makes a person to love and desire to be with the wise and holy, but makes the same person to hate and despises the senseless and sordid companionship. 「仁」becomes a very critical principle not just for morality but also for social existence and social intercourse, a principle that initiates, sustains and perfect the **“I and thou”** relationship.

「苟志於仁矣，無惡也。」[[432]](#footnote-432)

Here, 「仁」still signifies the principles of moral judgements and actions. This is very important since, moral actions are exclusive to the human person. Thus, it is very relevant to the thesis of Wojtyła’s philosophical anthropology, whose fundamental claim is that the human person is revealed in and by his or her actions. Moral actions, intrinsically requires moral judgements, and moral judgements intrinsically requires self-determination which is free will. This has been expounded above in the perspective of Wojtyła philosophical anthropology. The term「志」in the reference above, actually means to determine or resolve. Therefore, if a person is determined to manifest 「仁」 the person will not perform evil or bad actions. The person of 「仁」 will always perform actions of 「仁，」which are always moral and virtues actions.

「富與貴，是人之所欲也；不以其道得之，不處也。貧與賤，是人之所惡也；不以其道得之，不去也。君子去仁，惡乎成名？君子無終食之間違仁，造次必於是，顛沛必於是。」[[433]](#footnote-433)

「仁」here, signifies not just the principle of moral judgement but more importantly the moral law *per se*. The concept of 「道」in 「不以其道得之」is actually used in reference to 「仁」as 「仁道，」which also implies 「仁德。」It becomes the moral law that ought to govern the ideal person in the society, (君子), irrespective of the circumstances of life, in comfort or in adversity. This moral law cannot be suspended due to the vicissitude of life, for it is life itself. To despise it is to despise and forsake life. Thus, the concept of 「仁」could be understood as the concept of the **“natural law”** in the scholastics moral thought such as in Aquinas. Or in **“the moral law within”** of Kant. Here, 「仁」has assumed a transcendental metaphysical moral principle, hence a meta-ethical concept. Since, it does not deal with individual moral actions but the ground of moral actions, the moral calculus of the life of the ideal moral person.

「我未見好仁者，惡不仁者。好仁者，無以尚之；惡不仁者，其爲仁矣，不使不仁者加乎其身。有能一日用其力於仁矣乎？我未見力不足者。蓋有之矣，我未之見也。」[[434]](#footnote-434)

Here too, 「仁」signifies the moral law, 「仁道」or 「仁德」. It maintains the transcendental metaphysical moral principle of 「仁」, which is the principle of universality and the principle of necessity. Thus, it emphasizes the objective nature of 「仁」as a metaphysical moral principle. Therefore, it opposes any moral relativity/subjectivity or utilitarian moral hedonic calculus. Confucius denials encountering this two kind of persons:「好仁者」and 「惡不仁者。」They are both not Confucius’s ideal moral person (君子), because in the concept of this two kinds of persons 「好仁者」and 「惡不仁者，」「仁」appears to be relativized. They are not the ideal moral person, for the desire towards the moral law, 「仁，」cannot be towards a subjective or an utilitarian end.

「人之過也，各於其黨。觀過，斯知仁矣。」[[435]](#footnote-435)

The use of 「仁」here, returns to it signification as moral action or behavior. However, it discusses 「仁」from the perspective of human relationship and the perspective of the propensity of the human person to err. Every person share the common moral denomination to err, thus, the saying **“to err is human.”** No human person is born *á priori* morally perfect. However, every human person has the potential to grow onto moral perfection. And this explains why in the Confucian philosophy the internal cultivation of the moral law, 「仁道，」through the principle of 「樂」and the external cultivation of the social-ethical person, 「仁德，」through the principle of 「禮」is strongly emphasized, especially by Confucius and later by Xunzi (荀子). Therefore, to aim and strive towards the moral law, 「仁，」is to grow onto moral perfection.

From what has been exposed above, besides the sense of love, therefore, the Analects alone contains diverse conceptions of 「仁。」Scholars refers to this as 「全德，」in the sense of the general reference to many virtues「諸德」 rather than as the complete or whole virtue. [[436]](#footnote-436)。And from the notion「仁者靜、敬…，」the concept 「仁」is the source and foundation of every other virtues and values. Wing- Tsit Chan, Commenting on the concept of「 仁」in the Analects , maintains that: **“As a general virtue, jen means humanity, that is, that which makes a man a moral being. As a particular virtue, it means love. This is the general interpretation during the Han and T’ang times. Later in Neo-Confucianism, it was modified to mean man and Nature forming one body.”[[437]](#footnote-437)**

The Analects also posits 「仁」as the cosmological principle of the human life. Confucius maintains: 「知者樂水，仁者樂山，知者動，仁者靜，知者樂、仁者壽。」[[438]](#footnote-438) 羅光explicates this assertion thus:

**Confucius takes the human life and unites it with everything in the cosmos. Mountains and waters, are all in the cosmic change and transformation, mountain represents stillness, water represents motion. The motion and stillness of mountains and waters symbolize the life of the cosmos. The possessor of wisdom and humanity (virtue) [「仁者」] among the human race, are able to integrate into one’s own life, the life of the cosmos, and this exactly is what is meant by, to obtain joy and longevity. Confucius does not say the wise will obtain knowledge, and the virtuous will obtain moral perfection, but he says the wise will obtain joy and the virtuous will obtain longevity. Thus, for a direct entering into the depth of human life, joy and longevity, are evidences of the manifestations of life.[[439]](#footnote-439)**

This does not only demonstrates the intimate connection between the cosmos and the human person, but more so, the intimate relationship between the concept of 「仁」and the human life for Confucius. For he maintains that the person of 「仁，」that is to say the person who lives a live governed by the principle of 「仁」obtains life (仁者…取得壽。)

《中庸》：

「取人以身。修身以道。修道以人。仁者人也，親親為人。」[[440]](#footnote-440)

Here, the concept of 「仁」is clearly asserted as the *quiddity* of the human person (「仁者人也」。) And as maintained in the Analects, the concept of 「仁者」as 「親親也」is implied here. More so, the concept of 「仁」is maintained in the concept of personal discipline and moral cultivation (「修身以道」。) Hence, the person as defined by the concept of 「仁」in Confucian philosophy is essentially a moral person.

「知、仁、勇三者，天下之達德也。」[[441]](#footnote-441)

The concept 「仁」here, is placed alongside the concepts 「知」(wisdom) and 「勇」(courage), as the cardinal virtues by which the duties of universal obligations are executed. Here, the concept 「仁」is understood as virtue (「德」。) The virtue of 「仁」is, however, the virtue that informs and sustains the virtues 「知」and 「勇。」

「好學近乎知。力行近乎仁。」[[442]](#footnote-442)

This proposition explains how the cardinal virtues 「知」and 「仁」are obtained. While 「知」is obtained by a determined love of study and learning, 「仁」is obtained through constant and consistent vigorous moral discipline and cultivation.

「成己，仁也。成物，知也。性之德也，合外內之道也。」[[443]](#footnote-443)

Here, the concept「誠」is posited as the concept「仁。」The concept 「誠，」which some English scholars translates as “sincerity,” the writer thinks, strips it of it philosophical potency, just as when the concept 「仁」is translated as “kindness” or “benevolence.” The concept 「誠」is a very important philosophical concept in Confucianism, which during the Song-Ming dynasty of the history of Chinese philosophical thought, was rationalized into an ontological concept of the Ultimate principle 「太極」by 周敦頤. In 《中庸》, the concept 「誠」is the ground for ethical and moral universality and necessity that enables the possibility of ethical and moral judgement. The writer thinks it is a kind of the concept of Natural Law in the Scholastics philosophy, especially as expounded by Thomas Aquinas. Hence, the concept 「誠」is the principle that explains the ethical mean in moral behaviours. Thus, positing the concept 「誠」as the concept 「仁，」is asserting that 「仁」is not just one among the cardinal virtues, but that it is the principle of all virtues. Julia Ching, sustains the relationship between the concepts 「誠」and 「仁」thus: “Jen is the supreme ethical goal, but to realize it actively is to become ch’eng.”[[444]](#footnote-444)

「夫焉有所倚？肫肫其仁！淵淵其淵！浩浩其天！」[[445]](#footnote-445)

Finally, here the relationship between the concept of 「仁」and the concept of the Ultimate principle 「天」is seen. The expressions: 「肫肫」，「淵淵」and 「浩浩」symbolize the purity, greatness and vastness of the universe or nature. Hence, suggesting the importance of the concept 「仁」in the unitive relationship between the human person not only with 「天」as Nature but more so, with 「天」as the Ultimate reality.

《孟子》:

「惻隱之心，仁之端也」and 「無惻隱之心，非人也」

In these assertions of Mengzi, 「仁」literarily speaking is the springboard of the feeling of compassion or empathy. It will not be precise to understand it as a mere feeling or emotion, but as the principle that stimulates the feeling of compassion or empathy. Definitely it is not a physiological substance, as in hormone, or psychosomatic drive, but a philosophical principle. It is an experience in the subjectivity of the human person. It is not consciousness but a principle of consciousness, the interior part of the human person. And it is also posited as that without which the human being cannot be a person.

「天之尊爵也，人之安宅也。莫之禦而不仁，是不智也。不仁、不智、無禮、無義，人役也。」[[446]](#footnote-446)

Here, 「仁」is the principle that defines and makes possible other three principle that intrinsically defines the human person, namely, 「智」, 「禮」and 「義。」While, 「仁」is a theoretical substance or principle, 「智」, 「禮」and 「義，」are practical principles.「仁」is the principle that does not only make the manifestation of these three principles possible, but that which is the philosophical substance of this practical principles.

「仁也者，人也。合而言之，道也。」[[447]](#footnote-447)

Here, 「仁」is clearly a philosophical concept. It is the concept that defines the *quiddity* of the human person. It unequivocally asserts that it is that being that possesses 「仁」that is indeed a person.

**2.2. Historical Interpretation of 「仁」**

It has been maintained that the Chinese character 仁 started assuming a philosophical concept with Confucius. But like must philosophical concepts, the concept 「仁」has evolved in interpretation through time. Thinkers in the history of Chinese thoughts and philosophy, in the attempt to understand the concept 「仁」has developed the concept. This section aims at briefly navigating the interpretation of the concept 「仁，」 by few thinkers after the founders of Confucian philosophy, Confucius and Mengzi, whose thoughts are in many ways grounded on the concept 「仁。」

董仲舒conceives 「仁」as「性之表現也」[[448]](#footnote-448)[( the manifestation of the nature of the human person.)] He also emphasizes 「仁」as love not for oneself but towards others (「仁者愛人，不在愛我。」[[449]](#footnote-449))

周敦頤conceives 「仁」as the moral principle of love (「德：愛曰仁」[[450]](#footnote-450)) , along side 「義」he conceives 「仁」as 「聖人之道」[[451]](#footnote-451)[(the principle of the Holy Sage)]. He also conceives 「仁」as the cosmological principle of 「天」, by which everything comes to be and by which everything is nurtured (「天以陽生萬物，以陰成萬物。生，仁也；成，義也。故聖人在上，以仁育萬物，以義正萬民。」[[452]](#footnote-452))

程顥 conceives 「仁」as the moral virtue of the human nature (「仁者，性之德也。」[[453]](#footnote-453)) In another work he asserts: 「仁者，渾然與物同體。」[[454]](#footnote-454)This implies that 「仁」is the principle that enables the person of 「仁」to integrate, unite and be one with all things. 「仁, thus, as an ontological substance (「仁體」), becomes the transcendental principle (「理」) of the Ultimate reality 「天」(「仁體即所謂天理也。」[[455]](#footnote-455)) Hence, he contends: 「義、禮、智、信皆仁也。」[[456]](#footnote-456)(「義」、「禮」、「智」、「信」are all the principle「仁」.「仁」becomes the principle of all these basic moral principle of which Mengzi assertes as separate individual principle of the human nature.

程頤conception of 「仁」is not very much different from that of his brother 程顥。He criticizes the traditional conception of 「仁」as love (「愛」), he contends that 「愛，」arises from emotion (「情」，) whereas 「仁」arises from nature (「性」) . He rather maintains: 「生之性便是仁，」which implies that 「仁」is the nature that defines human existence or life, so following his brother he also asserts: 「仁者性之德也。」

朱熹somewhat criticizes 程頤 criticism of the traditional interpretation of 「仁」as 「愛，」 by maintain that though 「仁」is not 「愛」*per se*, nevertheless, 「仁」is the principle of 「愛」(「仁者愛之理」。) [[457]](#footnote-457) He explicates, his position by contending: 「仁者愛之理」，理是根，愛是苗。」(「仁」is the principle of love, the principle (理) as the ground or foundation, while love (愛) as the description or manifestation of the principle, which is 「仁。」「愛」he maintains, is the flavour or the taste of the substance (candy), which is 「仁。」He further explains the relationship between 「仁」and 「愛」, thus: 「仁是未發，愛是已發。」[[458]](#footnote-458) What is experienced as love (愛), substantially is that principle 「仁」when it is in an un-expressed state. Hence, if 「仁」is the principle of 「愛，」then 「愛」is the application of 「仁」(「仁是愛之理，愛是仁之用。」)[[459]](#footnote-459) Therefore, he sustains the position that：「仁」is the ground or principle of love, it is the moral ground of 「心」(「心之德。」)[[460]](#footnote-460) 羅光, sustains this when he maintains, that both 朱熹and 王船山, both considers 「仁」to be 「心之德」[(「朱熹和王船山都以仁為心之德。」)][[461]](#footnote-461) According to Julia Ching, 朱熹definition of 「仁」is the **“principle of love and the character of the mind.”[[462]](#footnote-462)**

**Chapter Three: Philosophical Understanding of 「仁」**

「仁」 is generally accepted by scholars of Confucian philosophy as the central point of Confucius thought and the foundation of the main philosophical concepts or categories of Confucian philosophy, such as: 「禮」, 「義」, 「樂」, 「道」, 「德。」These concepts or categories are the concretization of the concept 「仁」. This means that only a person who indeed is conscious of his being as a possessor of 「仁」 can truly execute, 「禮」, 「義」, 「樂」, 「道」, 「德。」Julia Ching puts it thus: **“Jen is the principle of love precisely because, as a universal virtue, it encompasses other virtues: yi, li chih, and hsin. Indeed, it is the source from which other virtues flow.”[[463]](#footnote-463)** And in a narrow sense, 「仁」means 「愛人，」in a broader sense, it could be said to be the virtue of all virtues.

Having said this, it is important to posit a pure philosophical understanding of the concept of 「仁，」since it is the ground of many other philosophical concepts and doctrines in Confucian Philosophy. As 孫小金maintains,

**The philosophy of 「仁」is the summation of all the thought of Confucius. In Ethics, 「仁」is the content, 「禮」is the form. In Politics, 「仁」based governance is the fundamental principle. In Education, the implication of education for everyone, irrespective of background, is the embodiment of the principle of 「仁愛.」 Confucius in constructing his personal thought, he makes it centered on 「仁,」 and he elevates and substantiates the meaning of 「仁」to become the ultimate and central point of his philosophy.[[464]](#footnote-464)**

This means that though there are many references of 「仁」 in the Analects, that implies love or benevolence as many prefers to translate it. It should be noted, that when the concept 「仁」is understood as 「愛人，」Confucius does not intend an equal love for all humanity. He rather, intends a family blood related love, which becomes the fundamental love of loving others in the society and to be loyal to the nation-state. Hence, his concept of love should not be confused with the Moist (墨家) concept of universal love (「博愛」，) which the Confucian, Mengzi in particular seriously critique in his work. Or should it be understood or interpreted as the Christian love, where Jesus Christ commands his disciples to love one another as he has loved them. Therefore, by 「仁」 Confucius means 「愛親」, [「愛親之謂仁」and 「人者人也，親親為大」。] It follows that any claim based on this concept of love to maintain that Confucius philosophy is humanism or humanitarian or philosophy of human equality, is a claim that critically speaking does not represent Confucius concept of love.[[465]](#footnote-465) However, being inspired by his concept of love, one can build these philosophies.

According to 李祥俊, **“The Confucius’s 「仁」has the following main significations: main virtue, source of virtues and virtue in general. It implies the main area of moral life and value judgement. It also becomes the basic threshold for the development of the philosophy of 「仁」by successive Confucianist.”[[466]](#footnote-466)** From the sense of 「主德，」the concept 「仁」deals with love 「愛親、愛人。」This sense of the concept is a carryover of the ancient sense of the term 「仁，」it explains the love that should exist among the members of a big family, nuclear and extended families, and even the love towards other members of a kin that has a blood relation and live and share their lives together. This deals with the strong concept of “three generational consanguinity” (三代內之血緣) among the Chinese cultural people.

However, during the time of Confucius, there was already an evolution of the society and historical inevitabilities that have led to a slight change of the structure of family livelihood and which in turn resulted to a change in the concept of the **“three generational consanguinity.”** The concept of 「仁」as 「愛親」then becomes less emphasized, and the concept of 「仁」as 「愛人」becomes more emphasized. However, 「愛親」and 「愛人」are not in contradistinction and do not exclude each other. They are actually fundamentally related in the sense that 「仁」as「愛親」is the foundation for 「仁」as 「愛人。」[[467]](#footnote-467)

Explaining Confucius proposition: 「老者安之，朋友信之，少者懷之。」[[468]](#footnote-468) 羅光, maintains thus: **“the scope of「仁愛」extends to all humans on earth, it works however is toward assisting the life of all humans on earth, to cause it to develop.”[[469]](#footnote-469)** This is to say, the concept of 「仁」as love among kin, is extended to the love of all human being under heaven. And this happens when one does not only share in the Universal life of the cosmos, but more so, allows the cosmic life to become one’s own life. A person of this sort loves and cherishes all things in the universe, and thus said to have 「仁心。」

Therefore, the writer thinks that if 「仁，」is a philosophical concept it must contain a meaning that is beyond the general understanding of the practice of love or benevolence. It must be the conceptualization of a reality that is both universally and necessarily true. For, philosophical principles as ground or essence of things, must be universal and necessary. To this effect, the conception of 「仁，」in 《中庸》 in the assertion, 「仁者，人也，親親為大，」[[470]](#footnote-470) seems to the writer as possessing a clear and profound philosophical nature. Of course, the assertion 「人者人也，」is also found in the Analects and even with detailed explication in the work of Mengzi. In this assertion 「仁」is clearly posited as the *quiddity* of the human person, of which the one who possesses the principle「仁」 is actually the one who is a person. Nevertheless, the concept of 「仁，」as the ground of ethics and political principle in the society as demonstrated in the Analects of Confucius, is very important in the understanding of the Confucian concept of person as a moral person. It is through this understanding that he makes the conscious possession and cultivation of 「仁，」the guiding principle of the ideal person in the society, 君子, and as the ideal person in the Confucian philosophical system, 聖人 (the ideal person in Confucianism, of which is considered by Confucius as「生而知之者」。)

Following the exposition of 羅光, the term 「仁」as a philosophical concept can be understood, in a general sense and in a narrow sense. He maintains that in a general sense, Confucius understanding of 「仁 」represents the general principle of all good virtues (「孔子的仁，代表一切善德的總綱。」)[[471]](#footnote-471) Hence, 葉經柱 avers, that in a general sense 「仁」is the general moral signification for the following concepts in Confucian moral philosophical thought: 「忠、孝、仁、愛、信、義、悌、恕。」[[472]](#footnote-472) This means 「仁」is the principle upon which judgement can be made on what constitutes a virtuous action. No action, qualifies to be a virtuous one, if it does not spring from and is not a manifestation of 「仁」. Therefore, to become a person of 「仁」(仁者), 「仁」should be the aspiration of any one who truly desire to be a good and virtuous person. This follows that, to be a good person or a virtuous person is to have 「仁心。」Which means, that to possess and express any virtue, is only possible because a person has the spiritual constitution or nature of 「仁」(「仁心」/「仁之精神。」Other virtues of morality, for instance, 「忠」、「恕」、「禮」、「義」「樂」are effects of 「仁。」

「仁」understood in the narrow sense as love of humanity「愛人，」philosophically, becomes more of a principle rather than social value or emotional principle. In this sense, it is the principle that guides and sustains interactions between persons. It is the principle that makes the I and thou relationship possible.[[473]](#footnote-473) Self-interaction or intra-action and interaction, between individual and the other, are possible because each human person possesses「仁。」This point shall be developed below using Karol Wojtyła’s discourse on the principle of participation between individual and together with the community of others, the person as a being in participation. This conceptualization of 「仁」as the principle that makes participation between persons possible is maintained by 羅光 thus: **“The Confucian principle of 「仁」and life has an intimate connection, it is both the foundation of human living and also the strength for human living. Though it is very profound, but it is very close to the human person. The human nature, though originally is 「仁，」 however, efforts must be made to pursue it.”[[474]](#footnote-474)**

It is important to discuss the principles on which the philosophical concept 「仁」stands. This shall be briefly discussed below.

**3.1. 「道」as the First Principle of 「仁」**

The concept「道」in Confucian philosophy is mostly used alongside the concept 「德」as 「道德，」which in a general sense means morals. From the assertion in the Analects: 「志於道，據於德，依於仁，游於藝，」[[475]](#footnote-475) we can see that Confucius maintains a relationship not only between the concept 「道」and 「德」but also with the concepts「仁」and 「藝。」葉經柱, explains the notion「志於道」from the above Confucius assertion, thus:

**The principle of「志於道」, is the great principle the disciples of Confucius considered should be obeyed by all human persons. For the generation, growth and advancement of the human race, there should be a principle to adhere to. Not only the human race; for the existence, growth and advancement of the entire universe and human race, there must also be principles to obey. The principle of existence, growth and advancement of the entire universe and the human race in sum is what is called 「天道」, that is the principle or law of Nature.[[476]](#footnote-476)**

Following this line of thought, 「道」could be said to be the moral law of nature. Hence, the Confucian conception of 「道 」is rather more of an ethical ground and principle. It is radically different from the metaphysical, natural and mystical conception of 「道」of the Chinese philosophical tradition of 老子 and 莊子. In their philosophical tradition, usually called “Daoism”, they conceive 「道」in the cosmogonic and cosmological sense as the Ultimate Cause of all things and as Nature *per se* (大自然。) For the Confucians, 「道」is not Nature *per se*, but the moral law of nature. It does not completely mean the concept of Natural law in the tradition of Western philosophy, but it could be understood alongside its meaning.

Originally 「道」means “path” or “way”; 朱熹maintains, 「道，猶路也 」, [(道as in way).] It also means “principle” or “course”. The dual sense of path (「道路」) and principle (「道理」). [[477]](#footnote-477) As 「天道」it has the sense of 「規矩、規律、規則」[(rule, law, precept or principle)]. Thus, it implies 「禮」, which could be said to be 「人道」(the moral principle between person and person’s interaction and relations). Later below, it would be demonstrated that 「人道」is also 「仁道」. As 「天命」, 「道」 has both the sense of fate and the sense of “that which has been given” by Nature[(「天所賦之。」)] And that which is given in the human person is 「性」, which becomes the human nature. As 「道理」or「天理」 it has the sense of fundamental principle of things. Following this understanding, the Neo-Confucianist, especially in the thought of the two brothers 程顥and 程頤and the great 朱熹, considers the 「理」of the human person as 「性。」 The logical inference of this line of thought is the assertion that the human nature 「性」is 「仁，」which follows that the reduction of「道」in Nature to the human nature becomes 「仁，」which is thus called 「仁道。」

孫小金, maintains that Confucius concept of 「道」 is 「知人、行仁和知義、行義」[[478]](#footnote-478)[（「道」is to know 「仁」 and to execute 「仁」 and to know 「義」and to execute 「義」。）] It could be deduced from this that Confucius understanding of 「道」is in respect to 「仁義。」 As will be shown in the section following the present discussion, 「仁」and 「義」are both 「德。」 「德」is the practical manifestation 「道」, as in living out, of 「道」by the moral person. This is implied in the assertion of 葉經柱, “「仁」is morality, it is in behaviours that it has to be manifested” [(「仁是道德，要在行為上表現出來。」)] [[479]](#footnote-479) The human person can be said to be a moral person, if and only if, he or she possesses 「仁。」 And to possess 「仁」, is to be a moral person. For the Confucian philosophers, to be a person is to be a moral person, （「仁者，人也」）, this will be expounded later in this work.

Therefore, 「仁道」as the moral reduction of 「天道」in the human person, becomes that which makes the transcendental union of the human person with the Heavens possible (「天人合一」。) The end of 「道」or better put, of 「道德」is 「仁」as in 「愛人」and by extension the love of all things (「天地」。) This is, thus, for the Confucian philosophers the only ground by which 「天人合一」and 「天人合德」 is possible.

**3.2. 「德」as the Manifestation of 「仁」**

Generally, the Chinese term 「德」has been translated into English as virtue. Sometimes it appears in the compound sense as 「德行，」which means virtuous behaviours or actions, and 「德性，」which means virtuous nature. And when it is combined with 「道」as 「道德，」it means morals or morality. Fundamentally 「德，」is the internalization of 「道」 (「道的內化」。)[[480]](#footnote-480) This means making the path and principle of 「道」 the principle of one’s life and actions. Therefore, it is the genus of all the species of virtues in Chinese philosophy, especially in Confucian philosophy. Hence, the following virtues emphasized in Confucian philosophy are different species of 「德」: 孝、悌、仁、義、禮、忠、恕、信、恭、儉、慈、敬、值、廉、智、勇、和、恥、愛、慎、溫、良、遜讓、莊重、友、寬、清、弘、剛毅、勤敏、惠、公、正、木訥[[481]](#footnote-481) and many others. As can be seen, one of them is the concept 「仁 。」 As have been explained, even though 「仁」is one of many virtues, since the time of Confucius and then followed by his successors, 「仁」 has been elevated, abstracted to become a transcendental universal principle of morals and ethics in general.

Hence, as a philosophical concept, 「仁」has become 「德」*per se*. And this means that every other「德」is not only possible because of 「仁」but more so, is a practical manifestation of 「仁。」 What 「德」is to practical ethics, 「仁」is to normative ethics. Hence, if 「德」is employed in the discourse of practical ethics, 「仁」will be employed in the discourse of normative ethics. 「仁」thus, deals with the fundamental question of morality, which as Karol Wojtyła puts it in his work *Man in the Field of Responsibility*, it is: **“what is morally good or evil and why?”** For the Confucian philosophers, 「仁」is the moral norm that explains what is morally good or evil. Hence, any action springing from 「仁心」is morally good and if not the action is morally evil. Furthermore, 「仁」does not only explains what is morally good or evil and why, it reveals the personhood of a person, as having 「德」or not, hence, defining a person as a good person or a bad person.

According to 羅光, Confucius, **“does not consider 「禮」and 「義」as virtue, rather he considers them as conditions of virtues, for if they are not present, then there is no virtue.”[[482]](#footnote-482)** Hence, he contends the position of 朱熹, who he claims considers 「德」as 「理」[(「朱子把德解為理」),][[483]](#footnote-483) by maintaining that, **“「德」is not 「理」, but it is rather the good action of「仁」according to the principle of 「天」.”[[484]](#footnote-484)**

**3.3. 「孝悌」 as the Ground of 「仁」**

The take off point of not only Confucius ethics, but his philosophical thought in general is the family. The family is considered as the nucleus of the nation-state, the microcosm of the macrocosm, which is the nation-state. This is unlike the case of Western philosophy, especially in the ancient Greek, where the individual is emphasized in its relationship with the city-state. This explain the understanding of the person as subsistence being, a *suppositum*, in the Western philosophical tradition. Confucius and Confucianism at large, strictly speaking do not have the conception of person, *persona*, in their philosophical discourse.[[485]](#footnote-485) They have rather in their discourse the concept of the human being or person, as a specie different from other animals. You are a human being first and foremost because you are and belong to a family, and through the family belongs to a nation-state.

The individual-family relationship, is really emphasized in the Confucian philosophical thought. This is not to say that it does not hold the general understanding of the human being as a social-being or social-animal. This postulation, rather than diminishing the philosophical value of the Confucian philosophy, it instead gives it a peculiar strength. For it is its emphasize on the individual relations and interaction in the family and of its emphasize on the human person as ethical and moral being, that lies its importance and relevance in this research. Since, Karol Wojtyła’s philosophical anthropology is to make up the insufficiency in the traditional understanding of the human person only from its objective perspective as a metaphysical being or substance. Which he does by emphasizing the subjective perspective of the human person from the phenomenological and ethical perspective of experiences of action and participation.

Though the metaphysical individual of persons in the genera of the human being as emphasized in traditional western metaphysics is not strongly present in Confucian philosophy, nevertheless, the human person as a relational-being is strongly emphasized. This is because, the Confucian philosophy understands the human person as a moral and ethical being. Hence, there is the concept of the five cardinal relationships in the Confucian thought, which is referred to as, 「五倫。」「五倫」is 「君臣、父子、夫婦、兄弟、朋友」[( the relationships between: ruler and subject, father and son, husband and wife, brother and brother, friend and friend).][[486]](#footnote-486) 中庸, has it thus: 「天下之達道五，所以行之者三，曰：君臣也、父子也、夫婦也、昆弟也、朋友之交也。」[[487]](#footnote-487) The philosophical spring board of these five cardinal relationship is the concept 「孝。」In many occasions the concept 「孝」 is used alongside with the concept 「悌。」 Hence, the crux of this section is to expose the concept of 「孝」／「孝悌」and it’s relationship with the main concept under discourse, 「仁。」

As a working definition, the difference between 「孝」 and 「悌」is: whereas 「孝」is the moral virtue that ought to exist between parents and children,[[488]](#footnote-488) 「悌」is the moral virtue that ought to exist between siblings, brothers and sisters of a family.[[489]](#footnote-489) This is the rationale behind the conjoining usage of both concept as 「孝悌，」 to reference the moral virtue that ought to exist in the family. According to 林安弘, whereas, 「孝」explains the 「上下的倫理關係」(up and down ethical relationship), the 「悌」explains the 「左右的倫理關係」(right and left ethical relationship).[[490]](#footnote-490) Hence, 林安弘 contends:

**If there is no 「孝」, the normal relationship between parents and children cannot be sustained, the continuation of life will be on the brink of being severed. More so, the ethics of reverence to the elderly and respect to the virtuous in the society will be certainly lost. If there is no 「悌」, the normal relationship between siblings cannot consolidated, life will be on the brink of being narrowed. And the feeling of loving friendship in interpersonal relations in the society will definitely be insipid. The whole ethics and morality of the family and the society, will no longer exists.[[491]](#footnote-491)**

It could be said that it is with Confucius, that 「孝」becomes a philosophical concept. However, before Confucius, there is the notion of reverence. This notion of reverence has evolved from the reverential worship of the Ultimate principle 「上帝，」 to the reverence of emperors and kings and then to the reverence of one’s ancestors (「敬祖」。) This religious reverence and worship to ancestors, with time extends to the reverence and piety of children to their parents, not only when parents are departed, but even during their earthly existence. This practice has not changed, for up to the present time it exists among the people of Chinese heritage. However, it was with Confucius that the concept 「孝悌」began to take up the nature of a philosophical notion, and then a philosophical concept, that is today interpreted purely as an ethical concept, or as an ethical-metaphysical concept.

In the Analects it is maintained: 「孝弟也者，其為仁之本歟！」[[492]](#footnote-492) In this assertion, the relationship between 「孝悌」and 「仁」is clearly maintained. It simply states that the concept「孝悌」is the ground of the concept「仁。」 It should be noted however, that there have been debates on whether, it is 「仁」that is the ground of 「孝悌」or rather「孝悌」 is the ground of 「仁。」 朱熹, quotes 陸伯振, as maintaining that「仁」is the ground of 「孝悌」(「仁，乃孝弟之本也」，) while 程子, as maintaining 「孝悌」as the ground of the actions of 「仁」(「謂孝弟為行仁之本，則可；謂是仁之本，則不可。」) But 朱熹, reaffirms the position as in the Analects, that 「孝悌」is the ground of「仁。」 However, he contends that, 「仁」is intrinsically contained in the substantial nature of 「孝弟，」 which is manifested as the expression of 「孝弟」(「孝弟固具於仁。以其先發，故是行仁之本。」)[[493]](#footnote-493) Hence, 朱熹, seems to have reconciled the position of 陸伯振and 程子.[[494]](#footnote-494)

Since it has been maintained that the concept of「仁」is not just the center of gravity of the Confucian ethics and philosophy in general, but it is its heart beat. This clearly sustains the aforementioned thesis, that the entire Confucian philosophy and not only its ethics has the family as its take-off point. The concept of「孝悌」is the ground of the concept「仁，」 because the family is the spring board of the Confucian philosophical thinking and speculation. According to 葉經柱, 「孝」is the most important and the most fundamental expression of 「仁。」[[495]](#footnote-495) This further explains, the thesis: 「仁者愛親。」 「仁者愛親」is only possible because there exist 「孝悌，」 for 「孝」is the love of children to their parents. 葉經柱 gives a narrow and general sense of the concept of 「孝」thus: in the narrow sense, it means the love of parents and the reverence of elders (「孝親敬長」), while in the general sense, it means 「立身、齊家、治國、平天下的大道」[(great moral responsibilities such as, to behave oneself, to govern one’s family, to administer a nation and to pacify the country).][[496]](#footnote-496) 「孝悌」, hence, becomes very important for the formation of 「仁德，」 the first principle of the Confucian ethics and morality.

「父在，觀其志；父歿，觀其行；三年無改於父之道，可謂孝矣。」[[497]](#footnote-497) This postulation, is an important one in the Analects, whereby Confucius tries to give a practical and realistic explanation of the meaning of 「孝。」 Simply put, he maintains a prove that a child truly possesses the moral principle 「孝，」 if the child maintains the moral principle without departing from it, even after three years of the death of the child’s father. To stress the importance of the concept as it relates to the concept 「忠」, 羅光maintains thus:

**The moral cultivation of oneself is not the private affair of a person, but it is a matter of the reverence of one’s family and respect of the virtuous. The reverence of one’s family member and the respect of the virtuous, thus, becomes the most important two items of good morals in Confucianism, and this is what is known as 「孝」and 「忠。」 The first deals with the governing of the family, and the second deals with the governing of the nation-state. 「孝」is applied in the life of the family , whereas 「忠」is applied in the life of the nation-state.[[498]](#footnote-498)**

Therefore, what the concept 「孝」is to the family, that is what the concept 「忠」is to the nation-state. Though both concepts are inseparable, however one must have the former in order to have the latter. And the concept 「仁」could be said to be the principle that keep both 「孝」and 「忠」inseparable.

**Chapter Four: 『仁者人也』：Positing 「仁 」as the Quiddity of the Human Person**

It has been shown above in the discussion of the textual explication of the Chinese character仁, that the three Confucian classics, 《論語》, 《中庸》and 《 孟子》, all maintains the assertion: 「仁者人也。」This is to say, they posit the *quiddity* of the human person as 「仁。」 They maintain that the human person essentially speaking is a moral person. This chapter therefore, aims at briefly discussing the concept 「仁」: as the ground of the human person, as the ground of Confucian ethics and as the ground for harmonious society.

**4.1. 「仁 」as the Ground of the Human Person (人)**

Mengzi unequivocally maintains that 「仁」is the quiddity of the human person, the ground that makes a person, person. His famous assertions: 「惻隱之心，仁之端也」and 「無惻隱之心，非人也」, clearly contends that 「仁」is the spiritual or immaterial substance in all human person that makes a person, person. Anyone who does not have it cannot be considered a person. The character 「端」in the idea「仁之端」, means, to begin or to sprout. Philosophically speaking it can be said to be a potential that needs to be developed to actuality. Just as in the Western philosophy that emphasizes *intellectus* as the *quiddity* of person, but it does not follow that every person actualizes the potential of *intellectus* into *ratio* activities.

Alongside 「惻隱之心，仁之端也」, Mengzi also posits 「羞惡之心，義之端也」、「辭讓之心，禮之端也」、「是非之心，智之端也」 as what make the human being, a person.[[499]](#footnote-499) This has exactly the same philosophical meaning to the assertion in 《中庸》：「仁者人也。」[[500]](#footnote-500) Hence, 「惻隱之心，仁之端也」is the ground that sustains and makes these other fundamental principles of the human person:「羞惡之心，義之端也」、「辭讓之心，禮之端也」、「是非之心，智之端也」possible. Granted that 「仁義禮智」, are the four main concepts of Mengzi’s philosophy, however, 「仁義」are the nucleus of his philosophical thought. And between the two concepts 「仁」and 「義」, he considers 「仁」 as having the pride of place in defining the *quiddity* of the human person. Explicating Confucius proposition: 「里仁為美。擇不處仁，焉得智？」, he asserts: 「天之尊爵也，人之安宅也。莫之禦而不仁，是不智也。不仁、不智、無禮、無義，人役也。」[[501]](#footnote-501) In this assertion, he clearly contends that if there is no「仁」 there cannot be 「 智」「禮」「義。」 And his argument is that 「仁」is the most noble endowment of the Heavens in the human person (「天之尊爵」。)

Mengzi asserts: 「仁也者，人也。合而言之，道也。」[[502]](#footnote-502) By this assertion, he maintains that the human person is substantially inseparable from 「仁」。The understanding of this inseparableness existing between 「仁」 and 「人」, according to Mengzi is 「道。」 Hence, 朱熹, commenting on this postulation maintains thus: **“「仁」is the principle that defines what makes the human person a person. 「仁」is the ontological principle; 「人」(the human person) is the ontological object. When the human person is considered from the perspective of the ontological principle 「仁，」that is exactly what is meant as 「道。」”** [(「仁者，人之所以為人之理也。然仁，理也；人，物也。以仁之理，合於人之身而言立，乃所謂道者也。」)][[503]](#footnote-503) To emphasize the importance of the concept 「仁」as the ground of the human person in Confucianism, 羅光maintains that, **“Confucius evaluates the value of the human person by the principle of 「仁」, and thus creates the standard for the ranking of the different human personality in the Chinese society: the holy sages, the virtuous persons, the princes, and the ordinary persons. However, he considers the 「仁人」as the greatest.”** [(「按照仁道評判人的價值，孔子造成了中國社會的標準人格：聖人、賢人、君子、小人。而以仁人為最高。」)][[504]](#footnote-504) The principle 「仁」is the standard employed by Confucius. It is how a person cultivates the principle of 「仁」of which he or she possesses, that places one into any of the standards of the human personality in the Confucian society. This explains Mengzi’s position that every human being has the principle of 「仁」only in a potential state, which needs to be actualized through self-cultivation.

**4.2. 「仁」as the Ground of Confucian Ethics**

Ethics is concerned with providing the ground for morality, that is, the fundamental reason why the human person should be who he or she ought to be, or the fundamental reason why the human person should do or not do what he or she chooses to do. It defines the good and bad or evil action, right and wrong behaviours. Hence, ethics is a practical science, science in the sense of *scientia*, knowledge.[[505]](#footnote-505) The Confucian ethics, is a personalistic ethics, in the sense that it is person centered, and it is basically virtue ethics.

As *eudaimonia*, is the ground of the Aristotelian ethics, the categorical imperative or duty the ground of the Kantian ethics, happiness/pleasure the ground for the utilitarian ethics, so is the concept 「仁」the ground of the Confucian ethics. Contrary to the other ethical grounds mentioned above, the concept「仁」is not only the ground of ethics, it is the ground of the human person and the ground of human life. That is to say, 「仁，」explains human morality, human life and human essence. Julia Ching, puts it thus:

**In interpreting Confucian morality, Jen is always pointed out as the virtue par excellence, the source and foundation of all other virtues. And this universal virtue of the classical age takes on life-giving qualities in later times with the philosophers Chou Tun-yi and Chang Tsai, attaining even cosmic proportions with the Ch’eng brothers.”[[506]](#footnote-506)**

Therefore, the concept 「仁」contains substantially, the Aristotelian *eudaimonia*, Kantian categorical imperative, and the utilitarian happiness.

For instance, Mengzi asserts: 「仁，人之安宅也，」[[507]](#footnote-507) that is to say 「仁」 is the most comfortable place for a human person. Following this line of thought, it will not be wrong if 「仁，」is thus interpreted in Aristotelian parlance, as the *Eudaimonia* of the human person. So, just as Aristotle posits *eudaimonia* as the ground of his ethics, 「仁」 is posited as the ground and the highest good of Confucian ethics. Julia Ching avers:

**The preferred concern of Confucian ethics is the pursuit of the highest good, as articulated in the text Chu loved, the *Great Learning*. The language is therefore of self-transcendence in the moral and spiritual sense. The goal is to become a sage, after the examples of Confucius and Mencius, as well as others who were *their* moral examplars. The preoccupation is therefore not with what is or is not moral but with *how* to achieve sagehood, granted the presupposition that all have the innate goodness and potential to become sages.[[508]](#footnote-508)**

羅光 puts it thus, **“The human life springs out from 「仁」, it is in 「仁」that it develops. In respect to ethics, all moral good are connected to 「仁」, without 「仁」there cannot be the perfection of the human person.”[[509]](#footnote-509)** Both assertions, clearly demonstrate not only how important the concept「仁」is in Confucian ethics and morality, but it shows how it is the principle without which there cannot be the perfection and transcendence of the human person.

**4.3. 「仁」 as the Ground for a Harmonious Society**

Confucius in the Analects maintains: 「為政以德，」[[510]](#footnote-510) by this he contends that for the purpose of the governance of a society or nation-state, the principle that is needed, is the cultivation of morals. This means, leaders must govern by the instrumentality of virtue and morals (「以德治國」，) not with force or punishment. Confucius principle for family cohesion is 「孝悌，」[[511]](#footnote-511) for social cohesion is 「禮」[[512]](#footnote-512)and for cohesion with oneself is 「樂。」 He maintains that leaders should lead their subjects by the principle of 「禮」and not by brutal force or penal punishments, 「法刑。」

What Confucius recommends, are principles of self-cultivation. This is to say the principles that cultivate the being of the human person, which is the principle「仁。」When Confucius was asked how a person of authority should conduct his or herself, he replies thus: **“When the person in authority is beneficent without great expenditure; when he lays tasks on the people without their repining; when he pursues what he desires without being covetous; when he maintains a dignified ease without being proud; when he is majestic without being fierce.”[[513]](#footnote-513)** This simply put, is that Confucius recommends those in authority to govern their subject by the means of moral virtue, and this means leaders ought to be humane, which is being conscious of one’s nature—「仁心。」

As have been maintained, the fundamental ground of Confucius morality and ethics in general is 「仁。」 If the leader should govern with morality, then, it means that Confucius proposition is that the leader should be one who possesses 「仁」, and the leader should govern the society by the means of 「仁。」Mengzi asserts:「賊仁者，謂之賊；賊義者，謂之殘。殘賊之人，謂之一夫。」[[514]](#footnote-514) Which could be explain as meaning, anyone who destroys 「仁 」and 「義」 is dangerous and evil to the society. In the same line of thought, 朱熹, comments: 「害仁者，凶暴淫虐，滅絕天理，故謂之賊。」[[515]](#footnote-515)

「仁則榮，不仁則辱，」[[516]](#footnote-516) this emphasizes that , when the society is governed by the principle of 「仁」 there will be glory in the society but when it is not, there will be shame and disdain in the society. Hence, the idea of 「仁政」(「王政」／「王道」) is very central in the socio-political thought of Mengzi.[[517]](#footnote-517) And the foundation of this socio-political thought is Confucius postulation of the concept of 「仁」 as the personalistic and ethical ground for any possible harmonious society. For instance, he contends that: 「堯、舜之道，不以仁政，不能平治天下。」This is to say that the exemplary ancestral leaders 堯 and 舜, if not because they governed with the principle of 「仁 ，」 they would have been unable to bring peace, harmony and stability to all under their rule. Hence, a leader must be one who possesses 「仁」; When a leader cultivates his or her「仁心，」then the leader would be said to be 「仁者。」 Hence, Mengzi agrees with Confucius that the principle (道) of governing a society or nation-state is either to govern with 「仁」 or not to govern with 仁 (「道二，仁與不仁而已矣。」)[[518]](#footnote-518) Therefore, the rise and fall of a leader or a king and his kingdom and dominion is determined by and rest on the concept「仁。」 Hence, the assertion of Mengzi: **“Benevolence brings glory to a prince, and the opposite of it brings disgrace.”[[519]](#footnote-519)**

From the discussion on 「仁」above, the philosophical concept of 「仁」, could be summed up as follows: 1. 「仁」is the *quiddity* of the human person. 2. 「仁」is the principle of human relations and interaction. 3. 「仁」is the principle of ethical and moral judgement. 4. 「仁」is the principle of good leadership and harmonious society. 5. 「仁」is the principle of human life and human transcendence.[[520]](#footnote-520)

The writer considers these five natures of 「仁」as a philosophical concept, as the natures which make the concept 「仁，」 to be very adequate for a wholistic and comprehensive understanding of the human person. But it has to be substantiated and further systematized by the philosophical anthropology of Wojtyła. This will be the task of the last chapter of this second part of this research.

**Chapter Five: Person As「仁者」: A Wojtyłian Perspective**

This chapter is the center of gravity of this work. Having exposed the philosophical anthropology of Karol Wojtyła in the first part of the work and in the first four chapter of the second part, the Confucian philosophy has been exposed with particular interest on the concept of 「仁。」 This chapter discusses the thesis of this work. It hopes to deepen the Confucian understanding of the human person as 「仁者」 from the philosophical anthropology and personalism of Karol Wojtyła. To achieve this the following shall be exposed: The Subjective and Objective Experience of 「仁」 in human act; 「仁」in the Consciousness and Self-knowledge of the human person; 「仁」 as the Perfection of the Transcendence of the human Person; 「仁」 as the Ground of Participation in the Community and「仁」 as the Ground for Authentic and Non-authentic Ethical Values.

**5.1. The Subjective and Objective Experience of 「仁」 in Human Act**

The human life and human action have not been the central issues of the Western Philosophy until the contemporary period. On few occasions in the ethical discourses of the ancient Greco-Hellenistic philosophy and aspects of the Scholastic philosophy, brief attention has been given to human life and human action with no strong emphasis. This is because the Western philosophy basically has been metaphysically and epistemologically driven. It has always been the thinker or philosopher investigating realities and experiences beside him or herself. Such as the cosmos, Being: Truth, Good, One, Beauty; knowledge and logic, the human nature, society, ethics and politics. Thus, the Western philosophy generally speaking, is more objective in nature and approach. Very little focus has been given to the subjectivity of the human person, until recent times. This explains why Existentialism and Personalism becomes late comers in the history of Western philosophical tradition. And when they came they were embraced by many across different philosophical schools and intellectual interests.

But the reverse is the case with Chinese philosophy. The Chinese philosophy through its existence, has fundamentally been the philosophy of human life and human actions. The human person has always been the central subject of Chinese philosophy. And when theories are made about the society and politics it is because it has to do with human life. And its cosmological theories are always connected to the human life and existence. This goes to further explain why the end of Chinese philosophy is union with Nature as the entire cosmos (「天人合一」。) So, it is fundamentally subjective in nature and approach. And this is the strength of Chinese philosophy, an aspect of philosophy worthy enough to be shared with global philosophy, especially Western philosophy.[[521]](#footnote-521)

It is to this effect, therefore, with more systematization of the concept of 「仁」with the philosophical anthropology of Karol Wojtyła, which has been alreaded expounded in the first part of this work, that this research discusses the concept of person. Taking off, from the claim of 羅光 that the Confucius philosophy of 「仁」is the philosophy of the human life or existence (「孔子仁的哲學，便成了生命哲學」) and if aiming at the thesis of Karol Wojtyła’s Philosophical Anthropology and Personalism, is to have a more comprehensive understanding of the human person, by investigating human actions, that is to say, human life and experiences, it follows that a re-interpretative investigation of the concept of 「仁」will help to achieve this objective.

Henceforth, what the writer does in the sections of this chapter, is to re-interpret the concept of 「仁」and actions of 「仁」, as Karol Wojtyła’s concept of subjectivity and human action respectively. This thus, assumes Wojtyła’s understanding of ***operari*** as **「仁-actions」**or **「仁-acts。」** The hope is to initiate a system of philosophy of person that is: the-***person-revealed-in-the-action* as「仁者。」** This philosophy of person is what the writer calls, ***Jenism***.

It has been established that Confucian philosophy maintains that human acts ought to be a manifestation of 「仁」and thus should arise from 「仁心。」 The ethical evaluation of any act in Confucian philosophy in the final analysis is to ascertain whether or not it is a manifestation of 「仁。」 The specific difference that defines a human action for Confucian philosophy is thus 「仁。」The concept 「仁，」 is at the same time a transcendental metaphysical substance and an ethical objective principle. It is a transcendental metaphysical substance that one experiences in one’s subjectivity (「惻隱之心」。) It is an ethical experience that one experiences in the objectivity of one’s relationship with others (「仁德」。)

Wojtyła, as have been expounded, maintains that, **“The basis for understanding the human being must be sought in experience.”** By this experience Wojtyła means human action. The human person experiences his or her own actions and also experiences his or her own experience of his action. These double levels of experience are very important dynamics of experience in the human person. These dynamics of experience are possible because of the subjectivity of the human person, that enables consciousness and self-consciousness possible in the interior or spiritual nature of the human person. Wojtyła strongly contends that the experience he is interested in his philosophical anthropology is that of **“human action”** not the experience of **“something happening”** to one. Therefore, it is fitting to say that the experience and action that Wojtyła is actually interested in is the experience and the action of 「仁 」in Confucian philosophy. Since, the actions of 「仁」are actions of morality, and all moral actions are actions of self-determination.

The experience of compassion or empathy as in Mengzi’s thought,「仁」as (「惻隱之心」，) is simultaneously a subjective and objective experience. When one feel compassion towards an event or a reality outside oneself, the dual dynamics of experience explained above manifest. One has the objective experience of compassion of the reality outside one’s self and also simultaneously one has the subjective experience of one’s experience of compassion towards the reality outside one’s self, **“ego.”**

Since for Wojtyła, the establishment of the meaning and the analysis of human experience is necessary for the understanding of person, and this work posits 「仁」as the common human experience by which the human person could be comprehended. It is thus, proper to reconstruct the concept of 「仁」as the signification of the experience as understood and interpreted by Wojtyła. If according to Wojtyła, **“The basis for understanding the human being must be sought in experience,”[[522]](#footnote-522)** and if this experience is posited as the experience of 「仁」, **it follows that the basis for understanding the human being must therefore be sought in 「仁。」** Hence, it is important to investigate the possibility of conceiving the human person revealed in and by 「仁。」

There is thus, two natures of 「仁，」 the phenomenological and the metaphysical or the ontological.「仁」as experience has a phenomenological nature. While 「仁」as the *quiddity* of the human person, has a metaphysical or ontological nature. It is this dual philosophical natures of 「仁」 that gives it the philosophical advantage of being the concept that will bring to fruition Wojtyła’s philosophical anthropological objective, which is to establish a more comprehensive understanding of the human person. This initiated his attempt to use the phenomenological methodology, which helps to understand the human person as **“subject,”** to complement and substantiate the metaphysical understanding of person, as *persona*.

Every human action should be the action of 「仁，」 as Miguel Acosta sustains that, **“The starting point of Karol Wojtyła’s anthropology is the human action that can be verified through the experience that is objectified by consciousness,”[[523]](#footnote-523)** it should be ascertained that the starting point of the philosophical anthropology hoped to be developed and established in this work should have 「仁」as its starting point, which should be the action of any being worthy to be called human person according to the Confucian philosophy.

「仁」manifests a dual level of experience: the experience without oneself and the experience within oneself. 「仁」as the essence of 「心」, 「仁心」, is the experience of the realities or activities within the consciousness of a person, in other words, the experience of one’s self. 林安弘, put it thus: 「『仁心』才是生命真機，精神活力，以及自制力的源泉。」[[524]](#footnote-524) While 「仁」as the essence of 「愛」,「仁愛」, is the experience of the realities or activities of the world besides oneself, it is the experience that pulls the human person towards relationship and interaction with the other. 「仁愛」is only possible because of 「仁心。」 Hence, this sustains Wojtyła’s assertion that, **“this experience (「仁心」), which man has of himself, is the richest and apparently the most complex of all experiences accessible to him.”[[525]](#footnote-525)** According to Mengzi,「惻隱之心」is 「仁」and 「仁」is 「人心」, this is deduced from his assertions 「惻隱之心，仁也」[[526]](#footnote-526)and 「仁，人心也。」[[527]](#footnote-527)Therefore, 「人心」is in substance「仁心。」[[528]](#footnote-528) It is the universal experience in the nature of all human person, which distinguishes the human person from animals. It makes 「愛親」and 「愛人」possible, according to Mengzi’s assertions:「親親，仁也」[[529]](#footnote-529)and 「仁也者，人也。」[[530]](#footnote-530) One is expected to be conscious of this inner experience of 「仁心」and to make constant effort to cultivate this inner experience through a persevered practice of moral and virtuous living. This explains the constant emphasis on 「修養工夫」in Confucian philosophy. Only persons who are faithful to this moral and virtuous actions can truly perform the actions of loving the other.

Through the habitual practice of 「修養工夫，」 one experiences one’s self, that is to say, one faces one’s self. To put it differently, through 「修養工夫」one responses to the Socratic exhortation: **“Know thy self!”** To know thy self, is to know that one is 「仁者，」because one possess, 「仁心。」And this is implied when Wojtyła avers that in the experience within, the human person **“comes into a cognitive relation with himself.”[[531]](#footnote-531)** Therefore, 「修養工夫」is that practice recommended to the being who truly desire to be a human person. It is the practice which enables an uninterrupted encounter of one’s self, otherwise known as the ego. To this effect, it will not be out of place if 「仁心」is henceforth, posits as the **“ego。”** This, **“ego”** inevitably becomes more important as the **“moral ego”** not just a **“cognitive ego，”** as obtainable in phenomenology. 「仁心」as **“ego”** is a **“moral ego.”** This assertion is very much Wojtyłian in nature, whose analysis of the person is rooted in the person as a moral person. As established in the philosophical anthropology of Wojtyła, human actions, including cognitive actions, are always moral actions, and these actions are not only to be judged as good or evil actions, but more seriously, they make a person, good or evil.

To understand one’s self, is to be aware of oneself as 「仁心」, as a **“moral ego.”** A person ought to experience oneself as a **“moral ego,”** in the sense of Wojtyła’s conception of **“the experience of man.”** Thus, Wojtyła’s **“the experience of man”** becomes Mengzi’s experience of「惻隱之心。」 This knowledge that arises from the experience of 「惻隱之心」pulls the human person out of himself in extension towards the knowledge, of the experience of the other. And by this relationship with the other, one shares in the life of the other and in turn the other becomes part of one's experience of oneself. Hence, Wojtyła’s assertion that: **“the experience of man is composed of his experience of himself and of all other men whose position relative to the subject is that of the object of experience, that is to say, who are in a direct cognitive relation to the subject.”[[532]](#footnote-532)**

However, the human person does not only share a cognitive relation with the other, but more importantly, the human person shares a moral relationship with the other, and of course with oneself. The Confucian person, as 「仁者」, has a moral relationship with itself. This explains the intrinsic relationship between 「仁者」and 「仁道」or 「仁德。」 The subjective experience, which is the experience of one’s self as 「仁心，」 **“moral ego,”** could be understood as the Wojtyłian’s subjective experience, **“the experience of man,”** “man” as “ego.” The objective experience, as the moral experience in the relation with others and everything that is, 「天地」, is the experience of 「仁道。」 The human person, thus, is not only in a moral relationship with itself, and with other human persons, but it is also in a moral relationship with all existence, 「天地。」And this objective experience with all realities besides oneself, is what Wojtyła calls **the experience of human being**, the **“objectivization”** of experience.

The subjective experience of 「仁心」 and the objective experience of 「仁道」though aredifferent but they are not separable. Their common denominator is that both experience are substantially moral experiences, which involves immediately human beings and remotely 「天地。」Nevertheless, the experience of 「仁心」has a uniqueness and enjoys a pride of place not only as the antecedent of 「仁道，」 but as the property that endows the human person, with the capacity to be distinguished as a responsible moral individual. It is one’s manifestation of 「惻隱之心」that distinguishes one as either a morally good person or a morally evil person. Hence, Wojtyła’s contention: **“Everyone is the object of his own unique experience and no external relation to any other human being can take the place of the experiential relation that the subject has to himself.”[[533]](#footnote-533)** This emphasis on the subjectivity of the person, that is the subjective relation to one’s self, just as it is a very important mark in Wojtyła’s philosophy of person, it is also very important in the Confucian philosophy of person. For both emphasizes the person as a moral subject. A moral subject must enjoy a substantial level of subjective experience of one’s self, that is to say, must know thyself.

The experience of 「仁」 as 「惻隱之心」is cognitively subjective, whereas, the experience of 「仁」 as the moral principle as 「愛人 」(人道), is cognitively objective. It is cognitively subjective in the sense that it has a phenomenological nature of a direct experience in the ego. And it is cognitively objective in the sense that it is empirical and practical and share in the objectivity of practical science which have it objective ground on human experience. Wojtyła, explains the human cognitive acts thus: **“The nature of the whole cognitive acts directed at man, both at the man I am and at every man other than myself, is empirical as well as intellectual. The two aspects interpenetrate, interact, and mutually support each other.”[[534]](#footnote-534)**

Following the re-interpretation of 「仁」 in this work, the response to the central question that distinguishes the phenomenological path of Wojtyła: **“What then is given directly in experience?”[[535]](#footnote-535)** can be confidently answered. It is not merely the moral ego 「仁心」, an aspect of the human being, but 「仁者」the human person *per se*. The human person with his conscious acting or action is what is given as the object of experience in a phenomenalistic reduction. Hence, the object of experience, **“the experience of man”** is the actions or acts (「仁-actions」 or「仁-acts」) in the sense of the polish term, *czlowiek dziala*, as employed by Wojtyła. This, 「仁-acts」 or better put, a person’s action, therefore will be that which is phenomenologically given in a phenomenological reduction of human experiences. From Wojtyła’s claim: **“that *action serves as a particular moment of apprehending – that is, of experiencing – the person.*”[[536]](#footnote-536)** It then could be asserted that 「仁，」 serves as a particular moment of apprehending the person. Hence **「仁」 becomes what comprehensively and profoundly reveals the human being as an *I*— as a person.**

**5.2. 「仁」 as Consciousness and Self-Knowledge of Person**

During the Song-Ming period of the history of Confucian philosophy, the concept「仁」not only possesses the meaning: the experience of 「惻隱之心」of Mengzi, it evolved to having the meaning of consciousness *per se*, especially in the thought of 程顥. 「仁」as consciousness becomes the principle not only of life, but more so, the principle that enables the human life to be one with the entire cosmic life. This conception of 「仁」, as will be demonstrated below, makes the transcendence of the human person possible.

According to 梁啟超, when the concept「仁」is considered superficially it is understood merely as empathy or compassion (「同情心」，) but in a deeper sense, it is awareness or consciousness.[[537]](#footnote-537) 葉經柱, sustains 梁啟超 position on 「仁」as the consciousness of the human person. He maintains: 「仁」 is **“the universal actualization of the human personhood”** or **“the perfection of the human personhood** [(「『普遍人格之實現』或 『人格完成就叫做仁』」)][[538]](#footnote-538) 林安弘, also from the perspective of self-actualization, contends that 「仁」is **“the actualization of self-consciousness of life”** [(「生命的自覺實踐」。)][[539]](#footnote-539) And 勞思光, sustains that **“「仁」is the state of freewill of the grand duke”** [(「『仁』是大公之意志狀態」。)] The writer considers these understanding of the concept 「仁」as the state of human consciousness or awareness as striking. And will attempt to employ the perspective of Wojtyła’s exposé on consciousness and self-knowledge, to cast a brighter light on the understanding of 「仁」as consciousness and self-knowledge. By so doing a better understanding of 「仁，」 could be obtained as the human reality that enables the universal actualization and perfection of the human person, that is to say the transcendence of the human person.[[540]](#footnote-540)

In this section thus, the concept「仁，」 is re-interpreted from the perspective of Wojtyła’s phenomenological interpretation of consciousness and subjectiveness as human experience. This section thus, deals with the discussion of the human person from the standpoint of Wojtyła’s phenomenological interpretation of a philosophy of person.

The leading question here is: **what constitute the being and acting, that is to say, the consciousness, of the human person?** This work agrees with Wojtyła that what constitute the consciousness of the human person is not just the rational nature and the interpretation of consciousness as dealing with human acts as voluntary acts. So, there is need to re-interpret the scholastics interpretation of consciousness, only in the sense of: **“rationality”** and **“volition”** in their philosophy of person. And this will be done, by the employment of the concept「仁」following the philosophical reasoning of Wojtyła.

Following the affirmation of Wojtyła’s conception of consciousness as **“an *intrinsic and constitutive aspect of the dynamic structure*, that is, of the acting person.”[[541]](#footnote-541)** In this work, the intrinsic dynamic structure of the human person, henceforth, is considered to be「仁。」This does no injury to the Confucian traditional conception of 「仁，」 it rather enriches it. The traditional conception of 「仁」posits it to be an intrinsic phenomenon, which defines the person capable of executing moral actions. So, 「仁」, the dynamic structure of the moral person, is the phenomenological activities that take place in the moral person. It is said to be the phenomenological activities in the moral person, because the concept 「仁」is the conscious activities of the moral subject, the **“moral ego.”** The moral person is conscious of his or her possession of 「仁」and is always aware of his conscious actions of 「仁。」 Hence, there is an intimate phenomenological relationship between a 「仁者」(the moral person) and 「仁-acts」(moral actions). Every action of a 「仁者」 is a conscious action, an intentional action of 「仁-acts。」 「仁」becomes what mediates between 「仁者」 and 「仁-actions。」 It could be deduced that 「仁」 makes the human person, the person of action, and, in turn it makes human actions the actions of person.

「仁」thus, is not only a metaphysical property that defines the substantial nature of the human person. But the human person is fully manifested in the person who carries out 「仁-actions。」The human person is only manifested or revealed through performing「仁-actions。」 This is exactly what is implied when Wojtyła maintains that, **“The person becomes the object of his own acting.”[[542]](#footnote-542)** And that **“the human being forms himself by his acting.”[[543]](#footnote-543)** When a person performs 「仁-actions，」 the person becomes 「仁者。」 And if a person desire to be 「仁者，」 the person needs to perform actions of 「仁。」Wojtyła asserts that, **“consciousness alone is not yet that *I*, but it conditions the full manifestation of the *I* through action. Through action, my own *I* is fully manifested for my *I*’s consciousness.”[[544]](#footnote-544)** Following this line of thought, it means that, 「仁」conditions the full manifestation of the human person through execution of moral actions. By this understanding, human acts, that is 「仁-acts，」 become the manifestation of the powers of a concrete moral person. 「仁」becomes the human structure that enables the possible manifestation of the powers of the moral person.

A person’s reality, that is his or her worldview, is contained in his or her nature as 「仁者。」 Every reality, human life and existence, cosmology, ethics, moral, aesthetic, socio-political experience, all springs out from 「仁。」 Hence, 「仁」, could be said to be “**the subjective content of the being and acting that is conscious, the being and acting proper to man.”[[545]](#footnote-545)** 「仁」is the being (essence) and action proper to the human person. This goes to explain, the Confucian world or cosmos, as a moral universe. The human person is not only moral, the human person is existing in a moral universe. The human person interprets everything, all realities from a moral perspective. This is because as by nature a moral being, the nature of the human understanding is in accordance to his substantial nature, which is 「仁。」

What then, determines the actual state of 「仁」 of a person is the sum total of a person’s 「仁-acts。」It is the totality of a person’s 「仁-actions」 that defines a person. A person therefore must be always conscious of his or her nature as 「仁者」and endeavours to execute actions in the nature and spirit of 「仁。」Hence, it means 「仁」mirrors and reveals a person. The mirroring function of 「仁，」not only reflects a person’s actions as human actions, but it does reflect the entire universe of the person, by concretizing the being of a person as *this* individual moral person.

One ought to then know oneself as 「仁者。」For it is self-knowledge that enables the grasping and manifestation of 「仁-acts。」By this function of self-knowledge, the objectification of the person as 「仁者」 and the person’s action (「仁-actions」) is possible. There must be coherency between 「仁者」and 「仁-actions。」As in the coherency of being and action. Knowing oneself as 「仁者」becomes Wojtyłian process of **“subjectivation,”** which for him is simply the process of knowing the self or ego. When a person is conscious of an act of 「仁，」the person is not only conscious of the act, but he or she is conscious of his or her person, as 「仁者。」The person is conscious of his or her conscious acting of actions of 「仁。」That is to say the person is conscious of his or her self as a moral person. Self-knowledge, then becomes knowing one’s self as a moral person, that is to say as 「仁者。」

「仁」thus, becomes *the Irreducible* in the Human Being, that which distinguishes the human person from every other beings. It is what defines the complete uniqueness of each concrete individual as a person from every other ontological reality. It is thus the *quiddity* of the human being. It thus complements the *homo est animal rationale* of Aristotle, the *rationalis naturae individua substantia* of Boethius and the *persona est sui iuris et alteri incommunicabilis* of the ancient Roman law. 「仁」is thus, essentially that which is incapable of reduction, that is, that which cannot be reduced in the nature of the human person but can only be disclosed or revealed.

The person understood as 「仁者」is an understanding of the human person from a lived experience. It is not a philosophical anthropology that is purely a fruit of metaphysical speculation and dialectics. It is rather in the spirit of Karol Wojtyła, who aims to develop a philosophical anthropology that is based and grounded on lived experience. This is clear in his claim: **“In order to interpret the human being in the context of lived experience, the aspect of *consciousness* must be introduced into the analysis of human existence. The human being is then given to us not merely as a being defined according to species, but as a concrete self, a self-experiencing subject.”[[546]](#footnote-546)** This approach of understanding the human person, which Wojtyła calls the **“personalistic”** approach, the writer thinks is inherent in the Confucian philosophical anthropology that is based on 「仁。」Hence, the effort to proffer a clearer understanding of 「仁者」from Wojtyła’s personalistic approach. A personalistic approach of 「仁者」no doubt gives us the Wojtyła’s aspiration for: **“a true and complete picture of the human being.”[[547]](#footnote-547)**

**5.3. 「仁 」as the Perfection of the Transcendence of the Human Person**

The ideal person in the Confucian socio-political life is 「君子。」Contrary to 「小人」,「君子」is one who seeks to live and lead the moral life based on 「仁，」one whose passion and commitment is to be 「仁者。」But the ultimate end of the ideal person in the Confucian philosophy is to be the transcendent person, 「聖人。」Julia Ching, on the understanding of transcendence in 朱熹maintains, **“For Chu Hsi, the goal of human existence is self-fulfillment, but the definition of self-fulfillment is also self-transcendence, that is, transcending one’s selfish desires and becoming a sage.”[[548]](#footnote-548)** This sustains the point above that the transcendence of 「仁者」is to becoming 「聖人。」The way to becoming 「聖人」is the way of constant moral cultivation of 「仁」through the practice of 「修養工夫。」[[549]](#footnote-549) Those categorized as 「聖人」in Confucianism are in a different realm of existence, 「境界。」[[550]](#footnote-550) They are in the realm of existence by which the 「仁者」becomes united with 「天，」(「天地合德」、「天人合一」之境界。)[[551]](#footnote-551) This line of thought is sustained in the position of 項退結 on Confucius conception of the human person, thus:

**The human person originally is an extension of Cosmic Life. So he should by imitating the ultimate substances of the cosmos, 「陰陽柔剛」, cultivate the principle of 「仁義，」because not to possess 「仁義」is to transgress against the virtue of good life of the cosmos. If the human person puts into practice the moral order, he then will become 「聖人」、「君子，」thus he will 「動天地」 and unites with the cosmos into an integrated virtue. If not, on the contrary he becomes the despised of the cosmos, 「小人。」[[552]](#footnote-552)**

In this thought, the transcendental nature of the 「仁」could be easily grasped, and it importance in the transcendence of the human person is clearly demonstrated. The transcendence of 「仁者，」is not exactly in the same sense with the transcendence of the Christian God. Wojtyłian concept of transcendence is helpful in the understanding of the transcendence of 「仁者。」 From the Latin root, “*trans-scendere*”, which means **“to go over and beyond a threshold or a boundary”**, Wojtyła maintains that transcendence, **“may refer to the subject’s stepping out of his limits toward an object, as is in different ways the case in what is known as intentional acts of external (“transcendent”) perception.”[[553]](#footnote-553)** For him transcendence is a kind of, to **“transgress”**, to cross a mark, a given limit towards an end. It thus follows in this re-interpretation, that the 「人心」 of the 「仁者」 in the act of transcendence crosses a mark. Whereas, the mark crossed in Wojtyła’s transcendence is cognitive rather than conative, the mark crossed by 「仁者，」is moral. If it is moral then it is conative because self-determination, the will, is involved. If the **“horizontal transcendence”** happens on the realm of being a 「君子，」the **“vertical transcendence”** happens on the realm of being a 「聖人。」The concept of **“horizontal transcendence”** and **“vertical transcendence”** in Wojtyła have been amply expounded in the first part of this research.

The transcendence that happens on the realm of being 「聖人，」is the transcendence which is as a result of self-determination. This self-determination becomes a kind of「修養工夫，」whereby, **“the person transcends his structural boundaries through the capacity to exercise freedom; of being free in the process of *acting*, and not only in the intentional direction of willings toward an external object.”[[554]](#footnote-554)** Through the constancy in freely performing「仁-acts，」one experiences a level of transcendence that transforms one onto becoming 「聖人。」This happens in the process of 「仁-acting」 by the person who possesses self-determination. Just as for Wojtyła without self-determination there cannot be the experience of **“vertical transcendence”**, without 「修養工夫，」there cannot be the transcendence in the Confucian philosophy, 「聖人境界。」

Therefore, only the human person who operates, besides, the dynamism at the level of 「君子，」but more uniquely, operates in the full dynamism at the level of person, as 「仁者，」the level of efficacy and self-determination, can experience the vertical transcendence, 「聖人境界。」Efficacy and self-determination here, means that the human person depends chiefly on his or herself to experiencing the transcendence of 「聖人境界，」and this is exactly what is implied in the practice of 「修養工夫。」This self-determination of the 「仁者，」by the power of the free will to freely engage in the practice of 「修養工夫，」makes the 「聖人境界」( **“vertical transcendence”)** possible. In this 「聖人境界，」the 「仁者」directs his or herself towards the truth about the transcendental good which is reflected in the goodness of his or her nature.[[555]](#footnote-555) The 「仁者」thus focuses on goodness and truth, properties considered by the scholastic philosophers as transcendental properties of Being. It follows that in the transcendence of 「聖人境界，」the person ascends beyond the limits of performing particular socio-ethical and moral actions, onto the realm of been a good person, a 「德者。」This line of thought is sustained by these radical assertions of Karol Wojtyła: First: **‘Man fulfills himself as the person, as “somebody,” and as such he may become either good or bad, which means that he may or may not achieve self-fulfillment.’[[556]](#footnote-556)** Second: **“When performing an action the person fulfills himself also from the ontological point of view.”[[557]](#footnote-557)** Third: **“When man acts, he at once fulfills himself in the action, for as a human being, as a person, he becomes either good or evil.”[[558]](#footnote-558)** The implication of these assertions, is that there is by necessity an ontological nature of human actions, that makes human actions, to not only reveal the human person but creates and re-creates the human person. The concept 「仁」in Confucian philosophy perfectly demonstrates this ontological necessary connection between the human person and human actions, in essentially making the human person a moral person.

For the transcendence of 「仁者」to take place, the freedom to perform 「仁-acts」is indispensable. For the vertical transcendence happens to a person through the performance of actions. Hence, the 「仁者」must not only will, but must always will to perform 「仁-actions。」「仁者」does not merely contemplate good actions, he or she practically performs good actions. It is not a matter of the contemplation of the good, but a matter of the performance of good actions. For it is in the performance of 「仁-actions」through a constant practice of 「修養工夫」that 「聖人境界」happens.

Even though according to Mengzi’s philosophical anthropology, the human nature is intrinsically good, 「人性本善，」however, it would be erratic to base on this assertion to make a case for moral determinism in Confucian philosophy, or for Mengzi’s ethics in particular. One must through education and moral cultivation freely will to be a morally good or bad person. One is freely disposed to choose to perform 「仁-acts」and becomes a 「仁者」or not. One is freely disposed to choose and perform moral virtues and values and becomes a 「德者」or not. And this is exactly what Wojtyła conceives as the dynamism of efficacy and self-determination. Therefore, in the practice of 「修養工夫」, the 「仁者」 has the capacity not to desire to do the object of his or her willing. For instance, he may desire not to accept a position of honour even though he can will a position of honour. Or using the classical parable of Mengzi, one can naturally be moved by 「惻隱之心」(compassion), to safe a child who falls into a well, but freely decides not to go ahead to rescue and safe the child. This shows that the 「人者」 can transcend the object of his or her natural and social desires, for a transcendental desire, which is 「天人合一。」

The underlying principle of Mengzi’s philosophy of person, is that everyone can freely choose to be good. There is inherent power in every person to be good, to become 「仁者。」Hence, the concept of 「天命」is not understood in the deterministic sense of “fate,” but in the ethical sense of the moral nature or order. So, 「仁者」has the Wojtyłian experience of **“I may but I need not” (in polish, *Moge—nie musze*)**. From the popular analogy of Mengzi, in explicating the human person’s nature as good, the person who saw a child fall into a well and quickly goes to rescue the child, did not do it by an act of moral determination in his nature. He has the freedom to choose not to rescue the child, even though he knows by his nature that it is a good action. Thus, it takes a 「仁者」to go for the rescue of the child. Therefore, Mengzi’s concept of 「惻隱之心，仁之也」, that is 「仁心」should not be understood as moral determination to do good, 「仁-acts。」The performance of 「仁-acts，」remain acts of the free-will, that is to say of self-determination, thus the reason for the emphasis of 「修養工夫。」To become 「仁者，」thus, must be an intentional experience or act that is directed towards the performance of 「仁-actions。」When the moral person wills to perform 「仁-acts，」he or she is moving outwards towards 「仁」to becoming 「仁者。」Thus, this movement of the moral person towards 「仁，」following the thought of Wojtyła, **“brings into full view the person in his efficacy as well as in his transcendence and, what is more important, it shows the person as a person.”[[559]](#footnote-559)**

The moral person needs, through proper education and the practice of 「修養工夫」to apprehend and actualize 「仁，」which from the standpoint of value ethics is the principal of all values. 「仁」is not just a good value, it is the good every moral person should will. Every human person, as Mengzi says, has the natural attitude toward good value, more so toward the good, 「仁。」But this natural attitude must become a conscious attitude, in order for a person to become 「仁者。」The human person lives in a world deluged with values. The human person lives in a value-loaded world, some are good and some are bad. 「仁者」 by the fundamental and transcendental principle of 「仁，」can know and perform good values.

If the human person by nature is good as Mengzi contends, does it follows that every person seeks good values? If 「仁-acts」becomes the definition of good value, then experience tells us no. Hence, there is need for motivation to seek good values. As Wojtyła maintains: **“We owe to motivation the impulsion, the movement of the will toward the object that is being presented—not just a turn toward it but an outright movement. To will means to strive after a value that thereby becomes an end.”[[560]](#footnote-560)** This means, the phenomenon between the will and value judgements is motivation. What then is the motivation of 「仁者」? It is to experience the transcendence of 「聖人境界，」which is 「天人合一。」

The transcendental experience of 「天人合一，」is the truth that 「仁者」seeks. 「仁者，」wills the truth. As Wojtyła contends, there is an intrinsic relationship between values and truth. It is on the bases of truth that values are judged as being good values or bad values, and on the level of morality, as being good person or bad person. 「仁者，」is one who wills not only to be intelligent person full of wisdom 「智者，」but more so, to be one who wills to be a good person 「善人」(仁者). It takes the transcendental unification of being a 「智者」and 「仁者」to becoming a 「聖人。」At the point of becoming a 「聖人，」a person, 「仁者，」surrenders to truth. And as Wojtyła maintains: **“it is the essential surrender of will to truth that seems finally to account for the person’s transcendence in action, ultimately for his ascendancy to his own dynamism.”[[561]](#footnote-561)**

**5.4. 「仁」 as the Ground of Participation in the Community**

The Chinese character 仁，simply shows that it intrinsically exists in participation. Besides the radical of the character which symbolizes person (人), there is the character, 二, which means two. So it takes at least two for 「仁」to exist, and once there are more than two, there is need for participation on different levels. Hence, when it is asserted, 「仁者，愛親」and 「仁者，愛人」they both underscores the point that 「仁」is possible only in a community of persons. 「仁」is not only possible in a community of persons, it is the ground that makes participation in a community possible. Hence, in this section a better understanding will be given to the concept of 「仁」as the ground of participation, employing Wojtyła’s understanding of participation.

Wojtyła emphasizes action in his concept of participation. This action, is that performed by a person together with others. Therefore, it has a communal and social dimension of person and action. In Wojtyła’s concept of participation, the emphasis is on persons who perform actions together with others, not on the society or community as an abstract sociological and ethnological entity. The concept of participation, helps to bring even clearer not only the ontological relationship between the notion of action and person, but even more, Wojtyłian thesis that action reveals a person.

Thus, following the line of thought of this work, it can be asserted that, without 「仁-actions」participation **“together with others”** is not possible. It is the experience of 「仁，」that pulls a person toward the other. The Martin Buber’s **“I and thou”** relationship cannot be possible without 「仁。」「仁」not only pulls a person toward participation with the other, it enriches and sustains participation **“together with others.”** Hence, 「仁」has personalistic values, in the sense that it brings self-fulfillment to the performer of 「仁-actions，」which is 「仁者。」There is fulfillment in the performance of 「仁-actions，」because 「仁者」in his or her freedom, manifests the dynamics of efficacy, integration and transcendence of the person in action performed **“together with others.”** 「仁者」in participation **“together with others”** does not inhibit or diminish his or her personalistic value, his or her personalistic value is rather enriched and increased. 「仁」makes it possible for 「仁者」not to be lost in a community, 「仁者」asserts his or her existence while recognizing the assertion of the existence of other persons in a **“communal action.”** Hence, Confucian philosophy encourages active participation of persons in the community or society. It discourages inaction of person as emphasized in the philosophy of Zhuangzi.

「仁者，」experiences self-fulfillment in action, that is personalistic value, not only as the moral experience that comes with performing 「仁-actions，」but as an ontological right in his or her nature as a person. Every person acting **“together with others”** in the community has the right to be self-fulfilled in and through the actions performed in the community. 「仁者，」performs actions alone, for example the actions of 「修養工夫，」 and he or she can be self-fulfilled in the actions performed alone. But the fullness of self-fulfillment, is in actions performed **“together with others,”** and this is the 「仁-actions。」 The end of actions performed alone is for actions performed **“together with others.”**

「仁，」as the ground of participation in the community does not make what Wojtyła calls the limitations of participation possible: **“individualism”** and **“objective totalism”** or **“anti-individualism.”** If **“individualism”** and **“anti-individualism”** are possible for the “epistemological *cum* metaphysical person” of Western philosophical tradition that emphasizes “reason,” they are not possible for Confucian philosophical tradition that emphasizes 「仁。」A person cannot be 「仁者」and be **“individualistic”** or **“anti-individualistic,”** for a person is a person because he or she exists in participation with others. The Confucian person, that derived it existential meaning from the family, cannot in the true sense be individualistic. The concept of 「五倫」is so fundamental in the communalistic nature of the Confucian person, that both **“individualism”** and **“anti-individualism”** are contrary to the nature of the Confucian person. The person participates in the community as a particular concrete person. So, a person individuation is preserved in the participation **“together with others.”** However, the person’s ontological meaning is in such a way that it cannot be divorced from the **“communal action.”** 「仁，」also makes other non-personalistic values impossible, such as: **“impersonalism,”** **“antipersonalism”** and **“alienation.”**

Since, it takes at least two persons to form a community, it follows that it takes 「仁」to form a community. And just as no individual person can form a community, 「仁」is a phenomenon impossible outside human relationships in a community. 「仁，」obviously becomes the ground of community life: family, society, nation-state, marriage or friendship. If there is no 「仁」 in the persons in any of the forms of the community living, the community dies. This underscores Wojtyła’s assertion that, **“participation as an essential of the person is a constitutive factor of any human community.”[[562]](#footnote-562)** It is therefore important to note that the basis of understanding participation **“together with others,”** is to be conscious that the *other* is another *I*. This means that 「仁者，」is always conscious of the other person as 「仁者，」that is from the angle of 「愛人。」The other as a neighbour, is not necessarily the person at one’s next door, but **“the other person”** as **“another I.”**

**5.5. 「仁」 as the Ground for Authentic and Non-authentic Ethical Values**

Karol Wojtyła discusses the issue on authentic ethical values within the general framework of the problem of participation of a person **“together with others”** and that of community. He posits the concept of the **“common good”** as the solution lurking in the problem of participation and community. Though, Wojtyła understands the **“common good”** as the **“good of the community,”[[563]](#footnote-563)** he nevertheless, maintains that there is a difference between the **“good of the community”** and the **“goal of the community.”** While the formal is more axiological, the latter is more teleological in nature. The **“goal of the community”** is not necessarily the **“good of the community.”** The goal of a community may be to expand her territory through the instrumentality of war, but this **“goal of the community,”** does not necessarily imply the **“good of the community.”** Hence, he refers to the **“goal of the community”** as the **“goal of common acting.”** To this effect, he asserts:

**To identify the common good, however, with the goal of common acting by a group of people is manifestly a cursory and superficial simplification. The preceding examples lead to the conclusion that the goal of common acting, when understood in a purely objective and “material” way, though it includes some elements of the common good and has reference to it, can never fully and completely constitute it.[[564]](#footnote-564)**

Following Wojtyła’s line of thought on the **“common good”**, the common good must be the good not of the community or the society as an abstract entity, but the concrete and existential good of individual persons in participation in the community.[[565]](#footnote-565) This is needed in order to effect what Wojtyła calls **“a subjective community of acting.”** This implies, the consideration of the subjectivity of the human person. This subjectivity of the human person, as an ethical person, in this work has, been re-interpreted as 「仁。」Hence, the **“common good”** must be the actions that enhance and sustain the *quiddity*, 「仁」, of the person.[[566]](#footnote-566) This claim is reflected in Wojtyła’s contention that: **“the common good primarily as the principle of correct participation, which allows the person acting together with other persons to perform authentic actions and to fulfil himself through these actions.”[[567]](#footnote-567)**

The human person in Confucian philosophy can only fulfil his or herself by aspiring and striving to be 「仁者。」And this explains the relationship between 「君子」 and 「仁德，」in Confucian philosophy. 「君子」 the ideal person in the Confucian society or community, is that person who constantly strife to live the perfect and ideal life of 「仁德」; one who does not seek one’s own gain but the common good of the community (「君子喻於義，小人喻於利」。) Wojtyła explains the person that strives for the common good as one who, **“will readily relinquish his individual good and sacrifice it to the welfare of the community.”[[568]](#footnote-568)** Little wonder, Confucian philosophy, especially in the socio-political thought of Confucius and Mengzi, it is emphasized that the society must be established and governed by the principle of 「仁，」which here thereof, means the **“common good.”** This is sustained by Wojtyła’s submission:

**The common good becomes the good of the community inasmuch as it creates in the axiological sense the conditions for the common existence, which is then followed by acting. If we can say that in the axiological order the community, the social group, or the society are established by the common good, then we can define each of them according to its appropriate common good. Acting is then considered jointly with being, with existing.”[[569]](#footnote-569)**

Acting in accordance to 「仁，」is acting according to the common good. This has been established. But, could the personalistic fulfillment *per se* of acting, be in accordance to 「仁」? Wojtyła’s personalism maintains that the performance of actions leads to the fulfillment of the person and the transcendence of person. Likewise, the performance of actions of 「仁」do not only lead to the common good of the society (Solidarity)[[570]](#footnote-570), 「仁-actions」, first and foremost lead to the fulfillment and the transcendence of person. Hence, the performance of actions of 「仁」do not only have ethical values but more importantly, they have personalistic value. For 「仁」makes one a person (「人也」) first, before making one a moral person (「德人」。)

Holding to the fact of the personalistic aspect of actions, a person with the ideal of the common good, that is, solidarity in view, can express opposition in his or her acting together with others. This affirms his self-determination and efficacy. Hence, solidarity should not stifle opposition, for one have the capacity to transcend towards ideal and values that is beyond the present experience of the rest of the community or society. Confucius and Mengzi could be mentioned as examples of those who in their personalistic values transcends those of their contemporary. It is these attitudes that sustain and encourage the actualization and transcendence of person in solidarity and in acting together with others. This is what Wojtyła calls, **“Authentic”** attitudes.

Hence, both solidarity and opposition in acting together with others are, **“authentic inasmuch as *each respects the personalistic value of the action*.”[[571]](#footnote-571)** On the contrary, when they do not respect and encourage the personalistic value of action, they are **“Non-Authentic”** attitudes. Wojtyła gives the touchstone for the discernment of the difference between **“Authentic”** and **“Non-Authentic”** attitudes thus:

**The dynamic subordination of action to truth that is so essential for the person’s transcendence in the action. This subordination is reflected in the righteous conscience, the ultimate judge of the authenticity of human attitudes. Also, the common good as recognized has to manifest itself in its relation to the righteous conscience, which safeguards its dynamism and the viability of participation.[[572]](#footnote-572)**

To this effect, Wojtyła mentions the following non-authentic attitudes: **“conformism”** and **“noninvolvement.”** They are both the extremes of solidarity and opposition respectively. According to Wojtyła:

**Conformism consists primarily in an attitude of compliance or resignation, in a specific form of passivity that makes the man-person to be but the subject of what happens instead of being the actor or agent responsible for building his own attitudes and his own commitment in the community and allows himself to be carried with and by the anonymous majority.[[573]](#footnote-573)**

Conformism, thus, stifles self-determination and the transcendence of person. Conformism destroys the personhood of a person and is a denial of the personalistic nature of person. On the other hand, Wojtyła considers noninvolvement thus: **“Noninvolvement is nothing but a withdrawal. It may sometimes manifest as protest, but even then, it still lacks the active concern of participation; moreover, it characterizes man’s absence from his community.”[[574]](#footnote-574)** Both conformism and noninvolvement are weaknesses. They do not only denial, but they alienate and estrange the person in a human being. They bring uniformity rather than unity, differences rather than diversity.

From, Wojtyła’s perspective how can the concept of 「仁」be understood as the ground for **“authentic”** and **“non-authentic”** ethical values? The answer could be located in his assertion below:

**The man-person is capable not only of partaking in the life of a community, to be and to act together with others; he is also capable of participating in the *very humanness of others*. It is in this ability to participate in the humanness of every human being that all types of participation in a community are rooted, and it is there that it receives its personal meaning.”[[575]](#footnote-575)**

The emphasized words by Wojtyła in the above assertion, the **“very humanness of others,”** is simply the concept of 「仁」in Confucian philosophy. A person is not only able to participate in the being of and action with others, he is even more, capable of participating in the **“very humanness of others,”** because the person possesses 「仁。」Hence, all kinds of participation in a community, be it social, political or ethical is rooted in 「仁。」It is interesting that Wojtyła calls this notion of participating in the very **“humanness of others”**: **“neighbour.”[[576]](#footnote-576)** And, Mengzi maintains: 「仁者，親親也。」 「親親，」and thus 「仁者，」 could be simply understood as Wojtyła’s notion of **“neighbour.”[[577]](#footnote-577)**

Simply put, by **“neighbour,”** Wojtyła means, **“that humanness which is concretized in every man just as much as it is in myself.”[[578]](#footnote-578)** Hence, the ability to share in the humanness, 「仁，」of others, **‘*is the very core of all participation and the condition of the personalistic value of all acting and existing “together with others.*”’[[579]](#footnote-579)** Therefore, the correlation between the Judeo-Christian command: **“love your neighbour as yourself”** and the Confucian assertion: 「仁者，愛人，」is not only understood but further explicates the claim of positing Wojtyła’s notion of **“neighbour”** as 「仁者。」Hence, Confucius maintains, the rule of practice for one’s life thus: **“What you do not want done to yourself, do not do to others.”[[580]](#footnote-580)** Which substantially means the Judeo-Christian commandment: **“love you neighbour as you love yourself.”[[581]](#footnote-581)**

**General Conclusion**

This research, begins with a general introduction and should end with a general conclusion. The general conclusion is a recapitulation of the investigation in this research on the, “**Discourse on the Human Person Based on the Concept of 「仁」: A perspective of Karol Wojtyła’s Philosophical Anthropology.”** The general introduction states the problematic, thesis, methodology, significant, relevance, and a brief literature review of this research. The general introduction, is followed by the main body of the work which is divided into Two Parts. Part One, is divided into Five chapters with sub-sections. Part Two, is also divided into Five chapters with sub-sections.

The general conclusion, thus, contains three tasks: First, is a Summary of the two parts. Second, is an Evaluation of the entire investigation and the third, gives recommendations for further research.

1. **Summary**

As stated in the Statement of the Problem in the general introduction of this research, the writer contends that: **The metaphysical understanding of the human person simply as a rational being is incomprehensive, and for a comprehensive understanding of the human person, there is a need to understand the human person as a conscious being in action and in relationship within and without itself due to the shared consciousness of 「仁。」**To help to guide the investigation of the above contention, the writer posits the research question: **How can the philosophy of Karol Wojtyła on the human person help us to understand the Confucian philosophy of person as 「仁者」?**

With the contention and research question stated above, it is clear that the writer has three main tasks in this research work. The first task is to substantially investigate and expound the philosophical anthropology of Karol Wojtyła. The second task is to investigate and expose the Confucian concept of 「仁。」The third task is to discourse the human person by the means of a re-interpretation of the concept of 「仁者」as the Wojtyłian concept of **“Person-revealed-in-Action.”** So, the entire Part One, is aimed at achieving the first task, and the entire Part Two, is aimed at achieve the second and third tasks of the investigation.

The Philosophical anthropology of Karol Wojtyła, is substantially influenced by the philosophy (especially Metaphysics and Ethics) of Thomas Aquinas, and the Philosophy (especially phenomenology and ethics) of Max Scheler. This necessitated the discourse on Thomas Aquinas and Max Scheler. But to understand the metaphysics of being of Thomas Aquinas one needs to understand the philosophy both of Plato and most especially Aristotle. And to understand the concept of *persona* in Thomas Aquinas one necessarily need to discuss Boethius. Hence, the need for the investigation of Socrates-Plato, Aristotle, Boethius and Aquinas, before the investigation of Karol Wojtyła’s philosophical anthropology. On the other hand, to understand the phenomenology of Max Scheler, which Karol Wojtyła employed in his analysis of human experience and action, the phenomenology of Edmund Husserl the founder of the phenomenological movement and the phenomenology of Heidegger the student of Husserl and the contemporary of Max Scheler, needed to be briefly exposed.

Having, established the philosophical foundations and pillars of Karol Wojtyła’s philosophical anthropology, a detailed investigation and analysis of Karol Wojtyła’s philosophy of person was expounded. The basic claim of the philosophical anthropology of Karol Wojtyła is: **“The basis for understanding the human being must be sought in experience—in experience that is complete and comprehensive and free of all systemic á *priories*.”** By experience as has been established, Wojtyła means *lived experience.* Not the empiricist’s notion of experience as perception, sensation or appearance. By a phenomenological analysis, he makes a distinction between, **“the experience of man”** and **“the experience of the ego.”** **“The experience of man”** he calls **“man-acts.”** While **“the experience of the ego”** is the experience of one’s experience, a double level of experience. He contends that though both experiences are distinct but they are inseparable. Wojtyła focuses more on **“the experience of man”**, that is to say on **“man-acts”**, human action.

The concept of action, as *operari* is very central to Wojtyła’s philosophy of person. As he contended: **‘Action is what most fully and profoundly reveals the human being as an *I*—and, indeed, as a person, for that which we express in categories of being by the concept “person” is given in experience precisely as a self (*soi*), as an *I*.’** Hence, the thesis of Wojtyła’s philosophical anthropology: **“Action reveals the person, and we look at the person through his action.”** To put it, even clearer is to say, human action (*actus humanus*, “man-acts”, the deliberate actions of humans) reveals the person. Undeliberated actions he calls **“what happens in man.”** Therefore, he distinguishes, the dynamism of **“something-happening-to-one”** and the dynamism of **“one-acting or doing-something”**; the dynamism **“to happen”** (act of man) and the dynamism **“to act”** (human act).

He employs the concept of **“the experience of efficacy,”** to explain the difference between **“human act”** and **“act of man.”** He argues, that, **“the experience of efficacy,” “discriminates man’s acting from everything that merely happens in him.”** That is, it discriminates **“efficacy”** and **“activation.”** The concept of **“the experience of efficacy,”** is the ground principle that explains the following concepts in Wojtyła’s philosophy of person: **“efficacious ego”**, **“acting ego”**, **“dynamization”**, **“integration”**, **“activation”**, **“the dynamic subject”**, **“the world of person”**, **“the world of nature”**, **“subjectiveness”**, **“man as existing”**, **“man acting”**.

The concept of **“The experience of efficacy,”** substantially, is the experience of freedom, that is, the dynamism of **“self-determination”** and **“self-possession.”** This concept, is very important to Wojtyła in his explanation of the concept of the **“Transcendence of person.”** He understands transcendence as **“the subject’s stepping out of his limits toward an object.”** He distinguishes two kinds of transcendence, **“horizontal transcendence”** and **“vertical transcendence.”** He considers the **“vertical transcendence”** as that which happens in the process of acting by the person who possesses **“self-determination.”** This is to say, that **“vertical transcendence”** happens as a result of the dynamism of **“the experience of efficacy.”** On his discourse on Free will and the transcendence of the person, he makes a distinction between, **“autodetermism”** and **“indeterminism.”** And emphasizes the concept of the experience of **“*Moge—nie musze*”** (I may but I need not/ I will but I will not/ I can but I will not).

Another very important claim of Wojtyła is that: **“Man is not only the agent of his acting, he is also the creator of it.”** This claim cast more light on his thesis: “**“Action reveals the person, and we look at the person through his action.”** Action reveals the person by creating the person. As God is reflected and revealed in his actions(works), that is creatures, so also does the human person is reflected and revealed in his actions. This leads him into asserting: **‘Human actions once performed do not vanish without trace: they leave their moral value, which constitutes an objective reality intrinsically cohesive with the person, and thus a reality also profoundly subjective. Being a person man is “somebody” and being somebody he may be either good or bad.’** What follows is the claim that: A person’s action does not only have the moral judgement of being good or bad actions, it morally judges a person to be a good or bad person.

He further, maintains that the person is not only the **“ego,”** a spiritual conscious being. The personhood of the human person, has the faculties of the body as an essential part. But he warns that the human body should not be discussed in itself as something apart from the whole that is man, as a person. He discusses the relationship between **“the soma”** and **“the psyche”**, which he calls the **“visible outwardness”** and the **“invisible inwardness”** of the human person. It is the body that genuinely makes the person belong to nature. And human actions are carried out or manifested by the means of the body.

The body is very necessary for the person as a being in participation. The human person lives and participates in a community or society, and engages together with others in a **“communal action.”** He maintains that human action has a personalistic value, that is, action brings about self-fulfillment to the performer. Self-fulfillment in action, he argues, is a right of a person. He points out factors that inhibit and limit this personalistic value as: **“individualism”** and **“objective totalism”** or **“anti-individualism.”** On the participation of person together with others in a community, he further, distinguishes, the **“community of acting”** and the **“community of being.”** From where, he discusses **“the other”** as a **“neighbour”** and conversely a **“neighbour”** as **“the other.”** He maintains that **“the other,”** a **“neighbour,”** stands before me as a specific task, as another **“I.”**

Part one is followed by part two, which main task is to expose the concept of 「仁」in Confucian philosophy and to present or to proffer a re-interpretation of the concept of 「仁」using the line of thought of Wojtyła’s philosophical anthropology. This part begins with an exposition of the metaphysical frame work of Confucius philosophy and of course of the Confucian philosophy in general. This is important because the writer is of the view that every philosophical thought, not only epistemology, has metaphysical foundation or underpinning. For this gives philosophy it nature of universality and necessity as a theoretical/ demonstrative or exact science. The concept of 「天」as the ultimate reality in Confucian philosophy was exposed. And the different nomenclatures used to name the existence of the Ultimate reality, that is metaphysically grasped, was also discussed, whether as 「道」, 「太極」, 「理」and so on, was exposed. Though in the Analects, Confucius did not give an elaborate or intensive discourse on the concept of 「天，」but it is clearly presupposed in his practical philosophical discuss. This concept of 「天」is clearly discussed in Mengzi and Xunzi’s works, the two great Confucian philosophers after Confucius.

Following this, the methodology of Confucian philosophical Discourse was exposed. The specific nature of Chinese philosophizing in contra-distinction with that of the Western philosophy was briefly exposed. The use of diverse forms of figure of speech and symbolisms, such as: metaphors, simile, allegories, typologies, dialogues, orations, exultations and so on, were exposed. The specific problems of studying Chinese philosophy which is not only because it is the thought of ancient times. But more so, because the Chinese language form (文言文) used, at the time, posits a grave challenge for every scholar of Chinese philosophy and a graver challenge for a non-Chinese heritage person and speaker.

Then the concept of 「仁」in Confucian philosophy was exposed. The writer observed that the concept 「仁」occupies a greater amount of space in the atmosphere of Chinese philosophy, especially in Confucian philosophy. It is thus a concept of study in Chinese philosophy which appears to have abundant sources to consider. This makes the study of 「仁」to be advantageous and disadvantageous. Advantageous in the sense that there are many sources to consider, and thus it shows how important a concept it is in Confucian philosophy. However, it is disadvantageous because it makes the grasping of a clear and distinct concept of 「仁」difficult. For many wordings inhibit clarity. Another challenge is that each scholar who discusses the concept of 「仁」does so for different end and by a different means. Many discusses it in the framework of moral and ethical discourse, some in the framework of political and sociological discourse, some in the framework of education, while some, as in the case of present writer, in the framework of philosophical anthropological discuss.

Hence, the writer considers an exposition of the concept of 「仁，」from the perspective of textual analysis of the meaning of 仁 as it is found in three classical text: 《論語》、《中庸》and 《孟子》. These three Confucian classics all consider 「仁」as not just an important concept but as the concept that defines the human person, as the *quiddity* of the human person. However, it does not define the human person as a metaphysical substance but as a moral person in a practical interactive relationship with another human person. 「仁」as the principle of love 「仁者愛人」and as the principal foundation for Confucian philosophy generally was established. This is shown clearly in the historical interpretations of the concept 「仁」during every epoch after the period of 孔孟. It is shown in the thought of 董仲舒 during the Han dynasty and in the thought of the thinkers of what is now called the Neo-Confucianist: 周敦頤, 張載, 程頤, 程顥and 朱熹. But the writer has particular interest in the line of thought, that posits 「仁」as the *quiddity* of the human person, 「人者人也。」This was amply discussed. This leads to the exposition of「仁」: as the ground of the human person, as the ground of Confucian ethics, and as the ground for a harmonious Society. At the end of these expositions the writer comes up with the following as the underlining principles in the understanding of 「仁」as a philosophical concept: 1. 「仁」is the *quiddity* of the human person. 2. 「仁」is the principle of human relations and interaction. 3. 「仁」is the principle of ethical and moral judgement. 4. 「仁」is the principle of good leadership and harmonious society. 5. 「仁」is the principle of human life and human transcendence.

The chapter five of this second part is considered the epicenter of this work. Here, the writer attempts to re-interpret the Confucian concept of 「仁」from the perspective of Wojtyła’s philosophical anthropology. The end of this re-interpretation is to present a synthesized philosophy of person, which the writer calls, ***Jenism.*** The writer does this by discussing the subjective and objective experience of 「仁」in human act. In sum, here the writer re-interprets 「仁」as the experience of the human person which Wojtyła calls the human act. This does not change the traditional Confucian concept of 「仁，」but it enriches and makes it even clear, by asserting that 「仁」as the human actions that expresses the dynamic of efficacy and self-determination. 「仁」in the consciousness and self-knowledge of the human person was also discussed. Here, the writer, posits 「仁」as *the irreducible* in the human being, that which distinguishes the human person from every other being; as what defines the complete uniqueness of each concrete individual as a person from every other ontological reality. Following this, is the discussion of 「仁」as the perfection of the transcendence of person. It is demonstrated that, the transcendental experience of 「天人合一」is the truth that 「仁者」seeks. After this 「仁」as the ground of participation and integration in the community and 「仁」as the ground for authentic and non-authentic ethical values, were demonstrated. The writer contends that, without 「仁-actions」participation **“together with others”** is not possible, and that the experience of 「仁」pulls a person towards **“the other.”** The writer, following Wojtyła’s notion of **“neighbour,”** defines a **“neighbour”** as 「仁者。」

1. **Evaluation**

Western philosophy as a critical and speculative disinterested pursuit for knowledge began with Thales and his successors, generally called the pre-Socratics. Their primary interest was on cosmogonic and cosmological problematics. It was the Sophists, who brought philosophical discourse from the heavens down to the earth, by contending that the human person and the affairs of the human person should rather be the central problematic of philosophy. Socratics following this line of thought makes ethical and socio-political issues of the human person the central themes of his philosophical discourses and dialogues. Since then, as demonstrated in the dialogues of Plato and the discourses of Aristotle every philosophical discourse has the human person in view.

Since, Plato and Aristotle, the soul or the rational part of the soul, which is the principle that explains the human faculty of reason and freedom, has been the exclusive definition of the human person in Western philosophy. The Scholastic philosophers, inspired by the Judeo-Christian faith, only basically added the theological principle of **“the image of God”** to the faculty of reason and freedom as the distinguishing difference of the human person. This concept of person fundamentally explains the metaphysics of the being of person. Which is clearly summed up in the famous Boethius’s definition of *persona*.

Karol Wojtyła, contends that the metaphysical understanding of the human person as being, is not a comprehensive philosophical anthropology. This is because it does not consider *this concrete individual person out there*. And this writer, completely agrees with him. To complement the personalistic lack, in the metaphysical conception of the human person, Wojtyła posits the experience of human action as the ground for a comprehensive philosophical anthropology. And in order to properly analyze the experience of human action, he employs the descriptive phenomenological method of Max Scheler as a tool of analysis of the human action. Standing on the Aquinas’s metaphysics of the human person as *suppositum*, he asserts that through the dynamics of efficacy, the dynamics of self-determination and self-possession, the actions performed by the human being creates and reveals the human person. The person for him becomes: that being by which through the exercise of the dynamics of efficacy performs actions and thus can participate together with others in a community. The person by implication, thus, is a moral person. For as he contends actions performed are not only good or evil actions, they make the person who performs an action, a good or evil person. This thesis of Wojtyła, that a person is created and revealed by his or her action, the writer totally agrees.

The philosophical anthropology of Wojtyła, goes a long way to explaining the rational free and concrete individual human person in nature. However, there are still challenges when one considers the problem of the *quiddity* of the human person vis-à-vis the problematic of who is a person as it is related to Bioethics and Artificial Intelligence. Wojtyła, probably did not consider this problematic in his philosophical anthropology. For as a Christian and even more a high ranking ecclesiastical authority, the human person as, *imago Dei*, **“the image of God,”** with an immortal soul, makes the question of the person as related to Bioethics and Artificial Intelligence either irrelevant or negligible.

The grand question in Bioethics is the philosophical anthropological question: **Who is a person?** The laws of every nation are in the final analysis for the protection of the life and property of the human person, it citizens. Therefore, on the bioethical question of abortion and euthanasia for instance, the ethical judgement on the rightness or the wrongness of them, is subsequent on the judgement on whether the embryo or the zygote is a person in respective to abortion, and whether a person who is now in the so called “vegetative state,” is still a person, in respect to euthanasia. Though this project is not a critique on the philosophical anthropology of Karol Wojtyła, but the writer, thinks it will be difficult to answer the question whether or not the “embryo” or “zygote” or the person in a “vegetative state,” is a person, using Wojtyła’s philosophical anthropology, especially as expounded in his work, *Ozoba i cyzn*.

As regards the problem of Artificial Intelligence, Wojtyła’s philosophical anthropology deals with the challenge of understanding the human person only as a rational being. For today, Artificial Intelligence is being developed that displays more profound, exact and accurate acts of intelligence than the human person. But Wojtyła’s philosophical anthropology that emphasizes the personalistic value and the transcendental nature of the human person in performing actions, definitely does help in addressing the question on whether or not an Artificial Intelligence is a person. But the problem is that if human action is understood in a general sense of a lived experience of a phenomenological nature, there will probably be problem in explaining the interaction of an Artificial Intelligence with human beings and its environment.

To fully accomplish the objective of Wojtyła’s philosophical anthropology, which is to complement the metaphysical understanding of person, in order to have a wholistic and comprehensive understanding of the human person, the writer has decided to expand Wojtyła’s reflection. To do this, the writer discusses the human person, based on the Confucian concept of 「仁，」by a re-interpretation of the concept of 「仁」using the philosophical anthropology of Wojtyła. The writer posits Wojtyła’s understanding of the experience of human action as the experience and action of 「仁，」which he calls 「仁-acts」or 「仁-actions。」The writer is persuaded to contend that the concepts of 「仁-actions」collaborates Wojtyła’s concept of the human lived experience as *actus humanus* (human action), and even more contains and explains the specificity of human life in any complete conception of the human person.

The concept of human life, which Western philosophy basically explains theologically, in Chinese philosophy, especially in Confucian philosophy, it has been explained naturally, that is to say philosophically. The concept of 「仁」in Confucian philosophy, simultaneously explains the metaphysical being or essence of the human person and the specificity of human life as it is distinguished from other ontological existences. It further, explains the ground contention of Wojtyła: that the human person, because of its nature as acting and participating concrete being, is a moral person. Every action and participation the human person performs, is either in accordance to 「仁」or not. If it is in accordance to 「仁」then it is a good action, if it is not, then it is an evil action.

The writer therefore, synthesizes Wojtyła’s concept of **“person-revealed-in-action,”** (which has been popularly called “Acting person”) and the Confucian concept of 「仁者，」to affirm a philosophy of person that is indeed wholistic and comprehensive. This philosophy of person, the writer gives the name: ***“Jenism.” “*Jenism” then, is 「仁者人也。」**With the concept of the human person (人) understood from a synthesis of the Wojtyłian concept of human action and the Confucian understanding of 「仁。」With this understanding of the human person, that does not only explain the metaphysical *quiddity* of the human person, but also explains the specific difference of the human life, the writer is persuaded to think that the question of the philosophical anthropological problematic related to Bioethics and Artificial Intelligence can be more fruitfully explained.

1. **Recommendations for Further Research**

This research, that attempts to have a more wholistic and comprehensive conception of the human person based on the Confucian concept of 「仁，」via the perspective of the philosophical anthropology of Karol Wojtyła, has richly deepen the writer’s understanding of the human person. More importantly it has revealed to the writer, that there are many ways the philosophy of Karol Wojtyła can help to understand certain aspects of the Confucian philosophy. Hence, the writer recommends further Wojtyłian perspective research, not only on the philosophical anthropology of Confucian philosophy. A special aspect that a Wojtyłian perspective could be further employed is on the question of the transcendence of the human person in the Christian (theological) anthropology and the Chinese anthropology. It may provide a possible clearification or enrichment in the debate on the understanding of transcendence and immanence in both the Christian anthropology and the Chinese anthropology. In addition, further Wojtyłian perspective research on its ethics or moral philosophy and meta-ethics, and also on its concept of subjectivity and community on Confucian philosophy could be explored. More so, a research on the Confucian philosophy of family, society, love and friendship from Wojtyłian perspective would also be interesting.

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**Selected Glossary of Chinese Character**

Below is the pinyin (Romanized) form of selected characters in this work to aid non-chinese speaking readers, to read the characters where they appear. The writer has retained the traditional Chinese characters, for he thinks the use of translations or Romanized forms in the text may waterdown the nature of the characters as philosophical concepts and not mere terms as in ordinary useage.

|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
| Number of strokes | 2 and 3 | 4 | 5 and 6 | 7 and 8 | 9 and 10 | 11 | 12 | 13 | 14 and above |
| Chinese character  and Pingying form. | 人jen  子zi  土tu  之zhi  也ye  工gong | 仁Jen  天 tian  友 you  公 gong  孔kong  中zhong  火huo  水shui  心xin  夫fu  太tai  文wen  王wang  公gong | 生sheng  正zheng  弘 hong  正 zheng  代dai  老lao  刑xing  朱zhu  光guang  牟mou  合he  地di  安an | 孝 xiao  言yan  良 liang  形xing  宋song  君jun  志zhi  忠 zhong  和 he  孟meng  法fa  明ming  宗zong  易yi  金jin  命ming  性xing  非fei  坤kun  肫zhun  者zhe | 政zheng  是shi  柔rou  思si  界jie  信 xin  神shen  勇yong  重 zhong  荀xun  修xiu  悌 ti  格ge  恕 shu  恭 gong  值 zhi  恥 chi  剛gang  秦qin  家jia  哲zhe  倫lun  帝di  氣qi  浩hao | 清 qing  敏 min  庸yong  羞xiu  理li  乾qian  莊zhuang  陰yin | 智 zhi  惠 hui  惡e/wu  極ji  善shan  淵yuan  虛xu  陽yang  惻ce  勤qin | 愛ai  聖sheng  誠cheng  經jing  義 yi  道dao  敬 jing  溫 wen  慎 shen  廉 lian  意yi  慈 ci  詩shi | 寬 kuan  漢han  境jing  實shi  養yang  親qin  論lun  羅luo  隱yin  毅 yi  儉 jian  儒ru  遜 xun  語yu  德 de  禮 li  賢xian  學xue  樂yue/le  端duan  踐jian  體ti  讓 rang  木訥 mu ne |

1. The translation into English of Karol Wojtyła’s ground work on philosophical anthropology, *Ozoba i cyzn*, as “The Acting Person,” by Andrzej Potocki in collaboration with Anna-Teresa Tymieniecka, has been strongly criticized in recent times. Hence, recent scholars think that a better translation is “Person and Act”. Their criticisms are not limited to the translation of the title of the polish work alone, but more so, to the content of the work. For instance, Kenneth L. Schmitz, summing up the criticisms of scholars on the English translation, maintains: “I should remark, in all fairness, that the footnotes added to the English edition are helpful in providing some context for the non-Polish reader. But there can be no doubt that part of the difficulty encountered by a reader of the text of the English edition derives from its overly technical revision, more precisely, from the frequency with which the editor, by differing paraphrases of scholastic Latin terms, has supplanted an older technical language for another more contemporary one, thereby nudging the text in the latter direction. And so the English revision obscures the continuity of the author’s thought with older traditions of thought. This is especially unfortunate in that it misleads the English traditional metaphysics and contemporary phenomenology. In particular, it obscures the vitality which the author still finds in the intellectual traditions of medieval scholasticism, especially in the thought of St. Thomas Aquinas.” Culled from, Schmitz L. Kenneth, *At the Center of the Human Drama: The Philosophical Anthropology of Karol Wojtyła/Pope John Paul II*, Washington D.C: The Catholic University of American Press, 1993, p. 60. Reference to other critics on the English translation includes: Rocco Buttiglione, *Karol Wojtyła: The Thought of the Man Who Became Pope John Paul II*, Paolo Guietti and Francesca Murphy (trans.), Grand Rapids, Mich.: Eerdmans, 1997. 117; Miguel Acosta & Adrian J. Reimers, *Karol Wojtyła’s Personalist Philosophy: Understanding Person & Act*, Washington, D.C: The Catholic University of America Press, 2016, pp. 8-10. In view of this criticisms and remarks, though the writer mainly uses the English translation *The Acting Person,* the studying of it, is greatly complemented by the studying of other works of Karol Wojtyła where he developed most of the ideas raised in *Ozoba i Cyzn*. More so, the works of other scholars and commentators on *Ozoba i Cyzn*, are also studied. Hence, the writer uses the concept of **The Person-revealed-in-action**, in place of **The Acting Person**. [↑](#footnote-ref-1)
2. 羅光，《中國哲學思想史》，台北市：台灣學生書局，民國71年。 [↑](#footnote-ref-2)
3. 「心」is a very important concept in Chinese Philosophy, which is mostly discussed in relation to the concept of 「性」(nature) , sometimes in relation to the concept of「情」(feeling/emotion) and even sometimes in relation to the concept of「欲」(desire). The combination of the three, 「性情欲」is the phenomenon 「心。」 「心」in ordinary day to day language is the Chinese character that means “heart”, both in it anatomical sense and it psycho-emotional sense. But in its philosophical usage, it is one of the concepts in Chinese philosophy that is very difficult to render a translation in English language. It has been often translated as “mind”, but its Chinese philosophical conceptualization references more than the reality of the “mind” as understood in Western philosophy. The writer uses “consciousness” to translate the concept 「心，」 but it is not the narrowed concept of consciousness as understood in phenomenology. But, rather, consciousness understood as the entire non-physical nature of the human person that is the ground for all, moral, mental, emotional and psychical phenomena of the human person. 羅光, maintains that Confucius conceives 「心」as the center of good and evil (「孔子以心為善惡的中心」). See, 羅光，《中國哲學思想史（先秦篇）》，台北市：台灣學生書局印行，民國71年，頁247。 [↑](#footnote-ref-3)
4. The Chinese quotation of this interpretation, according to him is thus: 「古代希臘肯定人為有理性的動物，高出一切物體以上，中國古代哲學肯定人類是一種有道德心靈的動物，人類的特徵在於道德心。」羅光，《人生哲學》，台北：輔仁大學出版社，民81年，36頁。 [↑](#footnote-ref-4)
5. See, 羅光，《中國哲學思想史（先秦篇）》，台北市：台灣學生書局印行，民國71年，頁229-232。 [↑](#footnote-ref-5)
6. 羅光，《人生哲學》，台北：輔仁大學出版社，民81年，37頁。 [↑](#footnote-ref-6)
7. The above reflection is my synthesis of羅光，《人生哲學》，台北：輔仁大學出版社，民81年，37頁。 [↑](#footnote-ref-7)
8. This is the writer’s translation of: 「中國傳統的文化，不僅以人為有理智的動物，更是有倫理的人，生來心裡就有倫理的種子，人之所以為人，不僅在於有知識，而是在於自己主宰，使生活合於規律。」Ibid. [↑](#footnote-ref-8)
9. See, ibid., p. 38. [↑](#footnote-ref-9)
10. See, ibid. [↑](#footnote-ref-10)
11. 陳福濱：〈以「良心」與「仁愛」為內涵的全球化芻議〉in 《智與思》，新台北：輔大書坊，民國105年，頁47-63。 [↑](#footnote-ref-11)
12. 陳福濱：〈孔子的「仁」與基督的「愛」〉 在 《智與思》， 頁491-508。 [↑](#footnote-ref-12)
13. ibid., p. 491-508. [↑](#footnote-ref-13)
14. See, 牟宗三：《心體與性體(一)》，台北：正中書局發行，1968年第一版，頁12-22。And also, 牟宗三，《中國哲學的特質》，台北市：台灣學生書局，民國83年。 [↑](#footnote-ref-14)
15. Karol Wojtyła, *The Acting Person*, Andrzej Potocki (trans.,) Dordrecht: D. Reidel Publishing Company, 1979, p. xiv. [↑](#footnote-ref-15)
16. The quotations from Phaedo are according to: Plato Complete Works, John M. Cooper and D.S. Hutchinson (eds.), Indiana: Hackett Publishing Company, Inc., 1997. [↑](#footnote-ref-16)
17. For a complementary conception of the soul in Plato, especially in respect to the relationship between the soul and the body, see: *Republic* 429-430 and *Timaeus* 35-36, *Laws* X 897a. [↑](#footnote-ref-17)
18. See Plato, *Complete Works*, John M. Cooper and D.S. Hutchinson (editors), p. 49. [↑](#footnote-ref-18)
19. *Phaedo*, 64a. [↑](#footnote-ref-19)
20. ibid. [↑](#footnote-ref-20)
21. ibid., 67d. [↑](#footnote-ref-21)
22. ibid., 65c. [↑](#footnote-ref-22)
23. ibid., 65a. [↑](#footnote-ref-23)
24. ibid., 73 [↑](#footnote-ref-24)
25. ibid., 73c. [↑](#footnote-ref-25)
26. ibid., 92c. [↑](#footnote-ref-26)
27. All the quotations on the work *On the Soul,* are from *The Complete Works of Aristotle*, The Revised Oxford Translation (Vol. 1), Jonathan Barnes (ed.), New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1984. [↑](#footnote-ref-27)
28. *On the Soul*, 402a5. [↑](#footnote-ref-28)
29. Aristotle himself notes that: “up to the present time those who have discussed and investigated soul seem to have confined themselves to the human soul.” Ibid., 402b1-5. [↑](#footnote-ref-29)
30. ibid., 402a20-25. [↑](#footnote-ref-30)
31. In *On the Soul*, 406a1-20, Aristotle critiques movement itself as the essence of the soul and mentions four species of movement—locomotion, alteration, diminution, growth. He holds that the soul only appears to move incidentally by the body, for where the body is there will be the soul. [↑](#footnote-ref-31)
32. ibid., 403a10-15. [↑](#footnote-ref-32)
33. ibid., 403a15-20. [↑](#footnote-ref-33)
34. ibid., 405a5-20. [↑](#footnote-ref-34)
35. ibid., 412a15-25. [↑](#footnote-ref-35)
36. ibid*.*, 414b1-10. [↑](#footnote-ref-36)
37. ibid., 421a20-25. [↑](#footnote-ref-37)
38. ibid., 429a20-25. [↑](#footnote-ref-38)
39. ibid., 432a5-10. [↑](#footnote-ref-39)
40. *Nicomachaen Ethics*, Bk 1, Ch7, 1098a1-15. [↑](#footnote-ref-40)
41. In his *Politcs*, Aristotle cautions that: “The proof that the state is a creation of nature and prior to the individual is that the individual, when isolated, is not self-sufficing; and therefore, he is like a part in relation to the whole. But he who is unable to live in society, or who has no need because he is sufficient for himself, must be either a beast or a god: he is no part of a state.” (Bk1, 1253a25-30) [↑](#footnote-ref-41)
42. This treatise is a part of Boethius collection of work, known as *Opuscula Sacra (short Theological works).* See John Marenbon, *Boethius*, New York: Oxford University Press, 2003, p. 66. [↑](#footnote-ref-42)
43. Eutyches holds that Christ is only one person and thus has only one nature; while Nestorius holds that Christ not only has two natures and that Christ has two persons, divine and human. [↑](#footnote-ref-43)
44. It should be noted that the Aristotelian logic implored by Boethius here is that influenced by Porphyry’s Isagogic system. [↑](#footnote-ref-44)
45. OSV, 1.111-112, 57-58 [↑](#footnote-ref-45)
46. ibid., 3. 171-172, 4-5 [↑](#footnote-ref-46)
47. Boethius did not include demons, but if Satan and demons exist they should also be in the category of rational incorporeal substance. Most religions, belief in the existence of evil beings. The Catechism of the Catholic Church numbers 391-395, clearly state the Catholic Church’s belief in the existence of Satan and demons. However, it is a different matter, asking if the existence of Satan and demons can be philosophically demonstrated. [↑](#footnote-ref-47)
48. For the philosophical thought of Averroes see: Averroes, *Tahafut Al-Tahafut: The Incoherence of the Incoherence Volumes I and II*, Simon Van Den Bergh (trans.), E.J. W. Gibb Memorial Trust, 2016. Also, Averroes, *On Aristotle’s “Methaphysics”: An Annotated Translation of the So-Called “Epitome”*, Rüdiger Arnzen (ed.), Berlin/ New York: Walter de Gruyter, 2010. [↑](#footnote-ref-48)
49. The Latin quotations are from, Sancti Thomae Aquinatis, *Summa Theologica*, (editoris, Theologiae Facultatis Bibliopolae), Parisiis: Sumptibus Andreae Blot, 1926. And the English quotations from the *Summa Theologica,* further abbreviated as ST, in this work shall be according to the *Summa Theologica* (ST) translated by the fathers of the English Dominican Province. [↑](#footnote-ref-49)
50. ST, (Part 1, Que. 28, art. 3) [↑](#footnote-ref-50)
51. According to Karol Wojtyła, the discourse of *persona*, though was discussed within a theological problematic, Aquinas, also gives it a philosophical approach thus: “whatever is a true perfection in the created world must be found in the highest degree in God, and so the person, too, which signifies the highest perfection in the world of creatures, must be realized in an incomparably more perfect degree in God.” quoted from, Karol Wojtyła, “Thomistic Personalism,” in *Person and Community: Selected Essays of Karol Wojtyła*, Theresa Sandok (trans.), New York: Peter Lang, 1993, p. 166. [↑](#footnote-ref-51)
52. ST, (Part 1, Que. 29, art 1) [↑](#footnote-ref-52)
53. ibid. [↑](#footnote-ref-53)
54. ibid. [↑](#footnote-ref-54)
55. Charles A. Hart, *Thomistic Metaphysics: An Inquiry into the Act of Existing*, New Jersey: Prentice-Hall, INC., 1959, p. 185. [↑](#footnote-ref-55)
56. ST, (Part 1, Que. 29, art 1) [↑](#footnote-ref-56)
57. See ibid. [↑](#footnote-ref-57)
58. ibid., (Part 1, Que. 29, art 2) [↑](#footnote-ref-58)
59. This review only attempt to strictly investigate Aquinas’s investigation on the concept of the person. His anthropological and psychological discourse on the human being, is not explored in this review. Since our aim, is to clear the ground for the planting of the discussion of the *quiddity* of the person. However, Wojtyła presents a summary on the Aquinas’s general anthropology and psychology, thus: “St Thomas, as I said, uses the term *persona* mainly in his purely theological treatises on the Trinity and the hypostatic union. In his treatise on the human being, on the other hand, he adopts a hylomorphic view, that is, he regards the human being as a composition of matter and form. In his analysis of this *compositum humanum*, St. Thomas presents an especially profound analysis of the human soul, which in this *compositum* performs the role of the substantial form. This is a rational soul (*anima rationalis*), the principle and source of the whole spirituality of the human being, and, therefore, also that by virtue of which the human being may properly be ascribed the character of a person.” This is quoted from, Karol Wojtyła, “Thomistic Personalism,” in *Person and Community: Selected Essays of Karol Wojtyła*, Theresa Sandok (trans.), p. 168. [↑](#footnote-ref-59)
60. Karol Wojtyła, The Acting Person, p. 73. [↑](#footnote-ref-60)
61. Karol Wojtyła, “The Person: Subject and Community”, in *Person and Community: Selected Essays of Karol Wojtyła*, p. 223. Note, words in bracket are mine. [↑](#footnote-ref-61)
62. For, Wojtyła *operari* in the broadest sense, includes the entire human dynamism, both “man-acts” (action) and “something happens” as will be analyzed and explained below. See, ibid., p. 224. [↑](#footnote-ref-62)
63. In his work on, *The Person: Subject and Community*, Wojtyła submits: “This state of research on the human being, and in particular its rather well-defined and differentiated approach to the basic source of knowledge of the human being, that is, to the full and multidimensional experience of the human being, allows us to accept completely the ancient concept of suppositum and, at the same time, to understand it as new way.” Ibid., p. 222. [↑](#footnote-ref-63)
64. ibid. [↑](#footnote-ref-64)
65. ibid. [↑](#footnote-ref-65)
66. ibid., p. 227. [↑](#footnote-ref-66)
67. Karol Wojtyła, wrote his habilitation thesis on moral philosophy influenced by the philosophy of Max Scheler, entitled: *An Attempt to Develop a Christian Ethics Based on Max Scheler’s System*. After which, he became a philosopher of ethics at the Catholic University of Lublin. [↑](#footnote-ref-67)
68. Schmitz L. Kenneth, *At the Center of the Human Drama: The Philosophical Anthropology of Karol Wojtyła/Pope John Paul II*, Washington D.C: The Catholic University of American Press, 1993, p. 31. [↑](#footnote-ref-68)
69. According to Schmitz L. Kenneth, “The question, Why be moral? Is not strictly speaking a matter of ethics proper. At least, not if we understand ethics to be a branch of philosophy and/or theology that sets forth the specific principles and guidelines of right conduct (general ethics) and that examines specific obligations and their relation to one another in the formation of a system of conduct (special and applied ethics). Ethics presupposes that we have answered the question: Why be moral?, or at least that we have provisionally affirmed it, for ethics examines how we ought to act in order to be moral. The question: Why be moral? requires us to step back a half step into the background of conduct and to inquire into the very foundations of morality.” Ibid., p. 33. [↑](#footnote-ref-69)
70. Karol Wojtyła, *The Acting Person*, p. 11. [↑](#footnote-ref-70)
71. Wojtyła critique the attempt in modern philosophy, especially in contemporary philosophical thought, to divorce ethical problems from anthropology. He maintains that “the total elimination of anthropological conclusions from ethics is not possible. The more a philosophical reflection becomes comprehensive, the more the anthropological questions tend to appear.” Ibid., p. 12. [↑](#footnote-ref-71)
72. See, ibid., p. 13. [↑](#footnote-ref-72)
73. Karol Wojtyła, *The Problem of the Will in the Analysis of the Ethical Act*, in “Person and Community: Selected Essays of Karol Wojtyła”, p. 3. [↑](#footnote-ref-73)
74. Stefan Swiezawski, in his review of Wojtyła’s thesis on Max Scheler’s ethics, maintains the following two conclusions: ‘“1. Scheler’s system…basically does not lend itself to a scientific interpretation of Christian ethics… 2. Nevertheless, it can aid us indirectly in scientific work on Christian ethics.” Noting Wojtyła’s view that metaphysical reflection has primacy in developing Christian ethics as a science, but that “the phenomenological method gives ethical works the stamp of experience by relating them to the lived experiences of the concrete human being.” Stefan Swiezawski, *Karol Wojtyła at the Catholic University of Lublin*, in “Person and Community: Selected Essays of Karol Wojtyła”, p. xv. [↑](#footnote-ref-74)
75. Karol Wojtyła, *The Problem of the Will in the Analysis of the Ethical Act*, p. 4. [↑](#footnote-ref-75)
76. ibid., p. 5. [↑](#footnote-ref-76)
77. For a broader understanding of the notion of Free-Will in Aquinas, see, ST, (Part 1, Que. 83.) [↑](#footnote-ref-77)
78. Karol Wojtyła, *The Problem of the Will in the Analysis of the Ethical Act*, p. 5. [↑](#footnote-ref-78)
79. ibid. [↑](#footnote-ref-79)
80. ibid., p. 8. [↑](#footnote-ref-80)
81. For a broader understanding of Max Scheler’s Ethics, especially as its relates to the will, feeling, values and moral norms, see, Max Scheler, *Formalism in Ethics and Non-Formal Ethics of Values*, Manfred S. Frings and Roger L. Funk (translators), Evanston: Northwestern University Press, 1973. [↑](#footnote-ref-81)
82. Karol Wojtyła, *The Problem of the Will in the Analysis of the Ethical Act*, p. 8. [↑](#footnote-ref-82)
83. According to Wojtyła, “When Scheler speaks of the purely emotional experiences of happiness and despair, these experiences already presuppose an action involving the efficacy of the person. These experiences are elicited by the awareness that the ethical value arising from an action remains in the person as a subject, and its presence is for this person a source of happiness if it is a positive value and of despair if a negative one.” Ibid., p. 9. [↑](#footnote-ref-83)
84. ibid., p. 8. [↑](#footnote-ref-84)
85. ibid., p. 9. [↑](#footnote-ref-85)
86. ibid., p. 14. [↑](#footnote-ref-86)
87. ibid. [↑](#footnote-ref-87)
88. Other scholars who have reflected on Thomistic Personalism, includes: Etienne Gilson, *The Spirit of Mediaeval Philosophy*, London: University of Notre Dame Press, 1991. Maritain Jacques, *Person and the Common Good*, Crosby F. John, *The Selfhood of the Human Person*, Washington D.C: The Catholic University of America Press, 1996. W. Norris Clarke, *Person and Being,* Wisconsin: Marquette University Press, 2004. [↑](#footnote-ref-88)
89. This paper was presented by Karol Wojtyła on the 17th of February 1961, during the fourth Annual Philosophy Week at the Catholic University of Lublin. [↑](#footnote-ref-89)
90. Karol Wojtyła, *Thomistic Personalism,* in “Person and Community: Selected Essays of Karol Wojtyła,” p.165. [↑](#footnote-ref-90)
91. W. Norris Clarke, *Person and Being*, Wisconsin: Marquette University Press, 2004, p. 1. [↑](#footnote-ref-91)
92. See, ibid., pp. 2-3. [↑](#footnote-ref-92)
93. ibid., p. 5. [↑](#footnote-ref-93)
94. For a concise understanding of Personalism as a phiosophical movement, see, Mounier Emmanuel, *Personalism*, London: Routledge & Kegan Paul Ltd, 1952. [↑](#footnote-ref-94)
95. Karol Wojtyła, *Thomistic Personalism,* p.165. [↑](#footnote-ref-95)
96. ibid., p. 167. [↑](#footnote-ref-96)
97. ibid. [↑](#footnote-ref-97)
98. ibid., p. 171. [↑](#footnote-ref-98)
99. ibid. [↑](#footnote-ref-99)
100. ibid*.* [↑](#footnote-ref-100)
101. ibid*.*, p. 172. [↑](#footnote-ref-101)
102. For the understanding of the notion of the Common Good, especially as it relates to the Essence of Law, social cohesion and happiness, see, ST, (Part I-II, Ques. 90.) [↑](#footnote-ref-102)
103. Karol Wojtyła, *Thomistic Personalism,* p. 174. [↑](#footnote-ref-103)
104. Heidegger has a problem with the translation of “phenomenon” as appearance. He maintains: ‘Appearance, as the appearance “of something,” thus precisely does *not* mean that something shows itself; rather, it means that something which does not show itself announces itself through something that does show itself. Appearing is a *not showing itself*.’ Thus, he asserts that, ‘phenomena are *never* appearances, but every appearance is dependent upon phenomena. If we define phenomenon with the help of a concept of “appearance” that is still unclear, then everything is turned upside down, and a “critique” of phenomenology on this basis is surely a remarkable enterprise.’ Martin Heidegger, *Being and Time*, Joan Stambaugh (trans.), Albany: State University of New York Press, 2010, p. 28. [↑](#footnote-ref-104)
105. Heidegger in his analysis of the Greek term logos, comes to the conclusion that, “because the function of λογος lies in letting something be seen straightforwardly, in *letting* beings be *apprehended*, λογος can mean *reason*. Furthermore, because λογος is used in the sense not only of λεγειν but also of λεγομενον (what is pointed to as such), and because the latter is nothing other than the υποκειμενον (what always already lies present at the *basis* of all relevant speech and discussion), λογος qua λεγομενον means ground, *ratio*. Finally, because λογος as λεγομενον can also mean what is addressed, as something that has become visible in its relation to something else in its “relatedness,” λογος acquires the meaning of *relation* and *relationship*.’ Martin Heidegger, *Being and Time*, p. 32. [↑](#footnote-ref-105)
106. Heidegger analysis the concept of “phenomenon” thus: ‘The Greek expression φαινομενον, from which the term “phenomenon” derives, comes from the verb φαινεσυαι meaning “to show itself.” Thus φαινομενον means: what shows itself, the self-showing, the manifest. φαινεσυαι itself is a *middle voice* construction of φαινω, to bring into daylight, to place in brightness. φαινω belongs to the root φα-, like φως, light or brightness, that is, that within which something can become manifest, visible in itself. Thus the meaning of the expression *phenomenon is established as what shows itself in itself*, what is manifest. The φαινομενον, “phenomena,” are thus the totality of what lies in the light of day or can be brought to light.’ ibid, p. 27. [↑](#footnote-ref-106)
107. Heidegger posits, the word “phenomenon” originates with the Wolffian school. See, ibid, p. 27. [↑](#footnote-ref-107)
108. Martin Heidegger acknowledges Husserl as the one who laid the foundation for the development of phenomenology as a method of philosophical investigation. See, ibid, p. 36. [↑](#footnote-ref-108)
109. According to Sebastian Luft, “The term in the Greek original *prote philosophia* is coined, as is known, by Aristotle. Aristotle introduces it in his *Metaphysics* as the discipline that studies “being qua being,” that is, being as such, prior to and vis-à-vis being according to one of the ten categories. Thus, the study of being as being is a proto-scientific discipline, meant to be foundational for all others to follow (in the sense of logically preceding them). But it also studies the highest being (God) as that which goes beyond (*meta*) the physical. Thus, “metaphysics” and “first philosophy” (or “study of wisdom” or “theology”) are more or less synonymous to Aristotle. As such, it is based on his famous claim that “all men suppose what is called wisdom (*sophia*) to deal with the first causes (*aitiai*) and the principles (*archai*) of things” (Met. 981b28). First philosophy studies these first causes and principles, notably of being, of entities. Edmund Husserl, *First Philosophy: Lectures 1923/24 and Related Texts from the Manuscripts (1920-1925)*, Sebastian Luft and Thane M. Naberhaus (translators), Dordrecht: Springer, 2019, p. xxxi. [↑](#footnote-ref-109)
110. Sebastian Luft submits, “With this meditation, historically, the idea of a first philosophy is firstly linked to the thinking substance, the ego cogito or the subject. This is why Kant and Husserl could justifiably call Descartes’ Meditations the (dimly anticipated) origin of transcendental philosophy.” Husserl Edmund, *First Philosophy: Lectures 1923/24 and Related Texts from the Manuscripts (1920-1925)*, p. xxxii. [↑](#footnote-ref-110)
111. In respect to the “first philosophy”, Husserl reflects on Descartes Meditations thus: “In itself it was an act of greatness that Descartes denied all the sciences—not even excluding the mathematical ones—a definitive grounding, that he demanded for them a new method of grounding proceeding from a single absolute source that was to bestow upon them absolute justification. Through it, they were to become mere branches of the one *universalis sapientia*, which as such encompasses all genuine cognition, according to Descartes, and gives it the necessary unity, in virtue, that is, of the unity of reason, from which after all they must all derive. And a further act of greatness was the discovery of the seemingly so trivial *Ego Cogito*, as well as the relation of the required absolute grounding of cognition back to it—the conviction, that is to say, that transcendental self-cognition is the primordial source of all other cognition. We will show that in these most general terms, Descartes discovered the basic form of the beginning of all truly scientific philosophy, however much he misunderstood the sense of this beginning and thereby fell short of the true beginning.” Edmund Husserl, *First Philosophy: Lectures 1923/24 and Related Texts from the Manuscripts (1920-1925),* p. 209. [↑](#footnote-ref-111)
112. ibid., p. 208. [↑](#footnote-ref-112)
113. ibid. [↑](#footnote-ref-113)
114. ibid. [↑](#footnote-ref-114)
115. ibid., p. 210. [↑](#footnote-ref-115)
116. ibid., p. 231. [↑](#footnote-ref-116)
117. Husserl understanding or usage of the term “absolute” and “transcendental subjectivity should not be confused with that of the absolute idealists, like Hegel. According to him, ‘The term “*absolute*” refers, on the one hand, to the unitary source of all cognition whatsoever, to transcendental subjectivity, with which, admittedly, we have to this point become familiar only as a distant idea. On the other hand, the expression *“absolute” justification* is supposed to denote a giving of account that is altogether complete, one that tolerates not the slightest lack of “clarity and distinctness,” of evidence, of intuitive understanding—nothing that could becloud one’s certainty in the least, nothing that could thereafter call one’s cognitive results into question or cast doubt upon them.” ibid., p. 133. [↑](#footnote-ref-117)
118. See, ibid., p. 235. [↑](#footnote-ref-118)
119. ibid., p. 236. [↑](#footnote-ref-119)
120. ibid., p. 237. [↑](#footnote-ref-120)
121. Max Scheler maintains that “self-givenness and evidence (insight) are ideals of cognition which are prior to truth and falsity.” Max Scheler, *Selected Philosophical Essays*, David R. Lachterman (trans.), Evanston: Northwestern University Press, 1973, p. 140. [↑](#footnote-ref-121)
122. Husserl contends that, ‘Nothing is clearer, indeed, than that I, perceiving an object, grasp *it itself*, existing over there, and grasp it *as* itself, and again that I (to take a case of adequation), “seeing” that 2<3, have and grasp the state of affairs that I mean as it itself and that I, grasping in this way, have with my cognitive striving actually reached the goal itself, behind which, in its adequation, there is nothing further to seek. Obviously what has been “seen” is nothing other than the “it itself” in relation to what was meant, which therewith becomes both what is meant and what is self-had, self-grasped, simultaneously.’ Husserl Edmund, *First Philosophy: Lectures 1923/24 and Related Texts from the Manuscripts (1920-1925)*, p. 239. [↑](#footnote-ref-122)
123. Martin Heidegger, *Being and Time*, p. 26. [↑](#footnote-ref-123)
124. See, ibid. [↑](#footnote-ref-124)
125. ibid., p. 29. [↑](#footnote-ref-125)
126. See, ibid., p. 33. [↑](#footnote-ref-126)
127. ibid., p. 32. [↑](#footnote-ref-127)
128. ibid., p. 33. [↑](#footnote-ref-128)
129. Heidegger maintains that, “Philosophy is universal phenomenological ontology, taking its departure from the hermeneutic of Dasein, which, as an analysis of *existence* [Existenz], has fastened the end of the guideline of all philosophical inquiry at the point from which it *arises* and to which it *returns*. Martin Heidegger, *Being and Time*, p. 36. [↑](#footnote-ref-129)
130. Max Scheler, *Selected Philosophical Essays*, David R. Lachterman (trans.), Evanston: Northwestern University Press, 1973, p. 137. [↑](#footnote-ref-130)
131. ibid. [↑](#footnote-ref-131)
132. ibid., p. 138. [↑](#footnote-ref-132)
133. Scheler, distinguishes the sense of the experience in phenomelogy (Erleben), from the sense of experience in empiricism and positivism (Erfahrung). While the former is what is given in lived experience, the latter is what is experienced through the senses (sensation). See, Max Scheler, *Selected Philosophical Essays*, p. 140. [↑](#footnote-ref-133)
134. Scheler maintains that, ‘In this sense, but only in this, phenomenological philosophy is the most radical empiricism and positivism. It looks for a content of lived-experience which “coincides” with all propositions and formulas, even those of pure logic, for example, the principle of identity. And question of the truth and validity of these propositions is suspended as long as this requirement is not fulfilled.’ ibid., p. 138. [↑](#footnote-ref-134)
135. ibid. [↑](#footnote-ref-135)
136. Scheler, clarifying the phenomenological sense of “experience” (*Erleben*) as different from the empirical sense of “experience” (*Erfahrung*), contends: ‘Phenomenology rejects the notion that a “concept” of experience ought to be made its basis and demands that even the concepts “sensation” and “sensible” prove themselves phenomenologically. Certainly everything given rests on experience [*Erfahrung*]; but every sort of “experience of something” also leads to a *given*. The trivial and narrow empiricism of the sensationalists fails to recognize this last principle. That empiricism simply suppresses every given which cannot be made to coincide with an impression or with something derived form an impression, or it explains the given *away*. Thus Hume explains away causality, thing, ego, etc. For Kant the given must be composed of sensations and thought.’ Max Scheler, *Selected Philosophical Essays*, p. 141. [↑](#footnote-ref-136)
137. ibid., p. 142. [↑](#footnote-ref-137)
138. According to Scheler, “fundamental relation between phenomenology and psychology and between the phenomenology of the mental and psychology, excluding, as it does, every so-called psychologistic conception of phenomenology, does not imply that phenomenology need not display the most abundant concrete connections with all that is pursued today under the name “psychology.”’ ibid., p. 149. [↑](#footnote-ref-138)
139. ibid., p. 147. [↑](#footnote-ref-139)
140. ibid. [↑](#footnote-ref-140)
141. Though Wojtyła was profoundly influenced by the notion of “lived-experiences” in Max Scheler’s phenomenology, he did not agree with most of Scheler’s philosophical conclusions especially on the relation of experience in Ethics. While he applauds Scheler critique of Kant’s ethics, he however critiques Scheler for limiting the notion of “lived-experience” to the feeling of moral values. See, Karol Wojtyła, “The Problem of the Separation of Experience from the Act in Ethics,” in *Person and Community: Selected Essays of Karol Wojtyła*,” Theresa Sandok (trans.), New York: Peter Lang, 1993, pp. 23-44. [↑](#footnote-ref-141)
142. Kenneth L. Schmitz, notes, that “the phenomenology at work in *The Acting Person* is a modified phenomenology with a realist intent. It is a phenomenology bent upon keeping in touch with the whole person as a distinctive being among other beings, even as it opens doors to the inner experience of the human agent.” Schmitz L. Kenneth, *At the Center of the Human Drama: The Philosophical Anthropology of Karol Wojtyła/Pope John Paul II*, p. 66. [↑](#footnote-ref-142)
143. Karol Wojtyła, “The Personal Structure of Self-Determination*”*, in *Person and Community: Selected Essays of Karol Wojtyła*,” Theresa Sandok (trans.), New York: Peter Lang, 1993, p. 189. [↑](#footnote-ref-143)
144. Karol Wojtyła, *The Acting Person*, p. 133. [↑](#footnote-ref-144)
145. Miguel Acosta & Adrian J. Reimers, *Karol Wojtyła’s Personalist Philosophy: Understanding Person & Act*, p. 115. [↑](#footnote-ref-145)
146. Karol Wojtyła, *The Acting Person*, p. 3. [↑](#footnote-ref-146)
147. ibid. [↑](#footnote-ref-147)
148. Max Scheler distinguishes two senses of the perception of the “self”: *Selbst* and *Ich*, see, Max Scheler, *Selected Philosophical Essays*, David R. Lachterman (trans.), Evanston: Northwestern University Press, 1973, p. 18. [↑](#footnote-ref-148)
149. Karol Wojtyła, *The Acting Person*, p. 3. [↑](#footnote-ref-149)
150. ibid. [↑](#footnote-ref-150)
151. ibid., p. 4. [↑](#footnote-ref-151)
152. ibid. [↑](#footnote-ref-152)
153. The word “human being” in bracket is added by the writer. [↑](#footnote-ref-153)
154. Karol Wojtyła, *The Acting Person*, p. 4. [↑](#footnote-ref-154)
155. ibid., p. 6. [↑](#footnote-ref-155)
156. ibid., p. 8. [↑](#footnote-ref-156)
157. ibid. [↑](#footnote-ref-157)
158. ibid., p. 9. [↑](#footnote-ref-158)
159. In line with this thought, Adrian J. Reimers, notes that “Karol Wojtyła argues that an accurate account of experience demands much more than a materialist or scientific reductionism. Experience is more than the reception and inner cataloging of sensations.” Acosta Miguel & Reimers J. Adrian, *Karol Wojtyła’s Personalist Philosophy: Understanding Person & Act*, p. 45. [↑](#footnote-ref-159)
160. Kenneth L. Schmitz, explains it thus: ‘Because action draws together all of the elements in the experience of the person, the focus of the descriptive analysis is not consciousness but action. Moreover, the basis and source of action is not consciousness but rather the whole person, or as Wojtyła says, “man-acts” (*czlowick dziala*).’ Schmitz L. Kenneth, *At the Center of the Human Drama: The Philosophical Anthropology of Karol Wojtyła/Pope John Paul II*, p. 66. [↑](#footnote-ref-160)
161. Karol Wojtyła, *The Acting Person*, p. 10. [↑](#footnote-ref-161)
162. Karol Wojtyła, “Participation or Alienation,” in *Person and Community: Selected Essays of Karol Wojtyła*, Theresa Sandok (trans.), New York: Peter Lang, 1993, p. 198. [↑](#footnote-ref-162)
163. Karol Wojtyła, *The Acting Person*, p. 11. [↑](#footnote-ref-163)
164. ibid. [↑](#footnote-ref-164)
165. ibid., p. 25. [↑](#footnote-ref-165)
166. Wojtyła, thinks that more accurately, it should be called, *actus personae* (act of person). See, Karol Wojtyła, “The Person: Subject and Community,” in *Person and Community: Selected Essays of Karol Wojtyła*, pp. 219-261. [↑](#footnote-ref-166)
167. Karol Wojtyła, *The Acting Person*, p. 25. [↑](#footnote-ref-167)
168. Ibid. [↑](#footnote-ref-168)
169. Ibid., p. 26. [↑](#footnote-ref-169)
170. Acosta Miguel, argues that, ‘All experiences that are retained in subjectivity and constitute man’s internal world require a “metaphysical assumption,” which is called suppositum and forms part of human nature.’ Acosta Miguel & Reimers J. Adrian, Karol Wojtyła’s *Personalist Philosophy: Understanding Person & Act*, p. 116. [↑](#footnote-ref-170)
171. Karol Wojtyła, *The Acting Person*, p. 27. [↑](#footnote-ref-171)
172. ibid., p. 28. [↑](#footnote-ref-172)
173. ibid., p. 30. [↑](#footnote-ref-173)
174. ibid. [↑](#footnote-ref-174)
175. See, ibid. [↑](#footnote-ref-175)
176. Karol Wojtyła, *The Person: Subject and Community*, in “Person and Community: Selected Essays of Karol Wojtyła,” p. 226. [↑](#footnote-ref-176)
177. Karol Wojtyła, *The Acting Person*, p. 31. [↑](#footnote-ref-177)
178. ibid. [↑](#footnote-ref-178)
179. ibid., p. 32. [↑](#footnote-ref-179)
180. Wojtyła maintains strongly: “While it may be granted that the person and action—or, to put it another way, my own existing and acting self—is constituted in consciousness to the extent that consciousness always reflects the existence (*esse*) and activity (*operari*) of that self, still the experience of the human being (and especially the experience of my own self) clearly reveals that consciousness is always subjectified in the self and that its roots are always the *suppositum humanum*.” Karol Wojtyła, *The Person: Subject and Community*, p. 226. [↑](#footnote-ref-180)
181. Karol Wojtyła, *Participation or Alienation*, p. 198. [↑](#footnote-ref-181)
182. Karol Wojtyła, *The Acting Person*, p. 32. [↑](#footnote-ref-182)
183. ibid., p. 33. [↑](#footnote-ref-183)
184. According to Kenneth L. Schmitz, ‘For purposes of analysis, and by a method of bracketing, Wojtyła disengages consciousness (*swiadomosc*) as an aspect, so that he may consider it through itself (*AP* 13, 19-20). The term “as an aspect” is meant to bring out the relative character of the analysis, that is, the relation of consciousness to other factors in the whole person; it is also meant to stand in contrast to the idealistic term “absolute,” which treats consciousness in a non-relative way (*AP* 29-30).’ Schmitz L. Kenneth, *At the Center of the Human Drama: The Philosophical Anthropology of Karol Wojtyła/Pope John Paul II*, p. 67. [↑](#footnote-ref-184)
185. Karol Wojtyła, *The Acting Person*, p. 33. [↑](#footnote-ref-185)
186. ibid., p. 34. [↑](#footnote-ref-186)
187. ibid. [↑](#footnote-ref-187)
188. ibid., p. 36. [↑](#footnote-ref-188)
189. ibid., p. 37. [↑](#footnote-ref-189)
190. ibid. [↑](#footnote-ref-190)
191. According to the ancient axiom of the Roman law, *persona est sui iuris et alteri incommunicabilis* (it is the incommunicableness of the person). [↑](#footnote-ref-191)
192. Karol Wojtyła, *Subjectivity and the Irreducible in the Human Being*, p. 213. [↑](#footnote-ref-192)
193. ibid., p. 214. [↑](#footnote-ref-193)
194. ibid. [↑](#footnote-ref-194)
195. ibid., p. 215. [↑](#footnote-ref-195)
196. Karol Wojtyła, *The Acting Person*, p. 42. [↑](#footnote-ref-196)
197. ibid., p. 47. [↑](#footnote-ref-197)
198. ibid., p. 60. [↑](#footnote-ref-198)
199. ibid. [↑](#footnote-ref-199)
200. ibid., p. 62. [↑](#footnote-ref-200)
201. ibid., p. 61. [↑](#footnote-ref-201)
202. This dynamism in action can also be understood as that between the voluntary and the involuntary acts. See, ST, (Part I-II, Que. 6.) [↑](#footnote-ref-202)
203. Wojtyła also notes this difference using the concept of *human act* and *act of man*. However, he opines that the content of this difference is merely verbal but not explanatory. See, ibid., p. 66. [↑](#footnote-ref-203)
204. ibid., p. 61. [↑](#footnote-ref-204)
205. ibid., p. 63. [↑](#footnote-ref-205)
206. ibid. [↑](#footnote-ref-206)
207. ibid. [↑](#footnote-ref-207)
208. ibid., p. 64. [↑](#footnote-ref-208)
209. ibid., p. 66. [↑](#footnote-ref-209)
210. See, ibid., p. 67. [↑](#footnote-ref-210)
211. For more analysis of the concept of action, See, Emmanuel Mounier, discussion on “The four dimensions of action.” Emmanuel Mounier, *Personalism*, London: Routledge & Kegan Paul Ltd, 1952, pp. 86-94. [↑](#footnote-ref-211)
212. Miguel Acosta and Adrian J. Reimers, use the word, “operativity,” to translate “*sprawcosc*,” which is translated as “efficacy” in *Acting Person*. See, Acosta Miguel & Reimers J. Adrian, *Karol Wojtyła’s Personalist Philosophy: Understanding Person & Act*, p. 47. [↑](#footnote-ref-212)
213. Karol Wojtyła, *The Acting Person*, p. 67. [↑](#footnote-ref-213)
214. Reimers J. Adrian, notes that: “in this requirement for operativity is a vital element that Kant misses in his ethics when he insists that the goodness of the will does not depend on the intended end of one’s action. Karol Wojtyła, by contrast, holds it to be important that whatever one’s sense-experience may be and regardless of any other inner state, the acting person is trying to accomplish something. This necessarily implies that the person who acts consciously is also an object that has physical properties and capabilities by which he can change things in the world.” Acosta Miguel & Reimers J. Adrian, *Karol Wojtyła’s Personalist Philosophy: Understanding Person & Act*, p. 47. [↑](#footnote-ref-214)
215. Karol Wojtyła, *The Acting Person*, p. 69. [↑](#footnote-ref-215)
216. ibid., p. 68. [↑](#footnote-ref-216)
217. ibid. [↑](#footnote-ref-217)
218. ibid., p. 69. [↑](#footnote-ref-218)
219. ibid., p. 71. [↑](#footnote-ref-219)
220. ibid., p. 72. [↑](#footnote-ref-220)
221. ibid. [↑](#footnote-ref-221)
222. Wojtyła maintains in a different work: “In experience, the human being is given to us as someone who exists and acts. I am such an existing and acting individual and so is everyone else. The experience of existing and acting is something that all human beings, both others and I, have in common; at the same time, all human beings, both others and I, are also the object of this experience.” Karol Wojtyła, *The Person: Subject and Community*, in “Person and Community: Selected Essays of Karol Wojtyła,” p. 221. [↑](#footnote-ref-222)
223. Karol Wojtyła, *The Acting Person*, p. 73. [↑](#footnote-ref-223)
224. ibid., p. 74. [↑](#footnote-ref-224)
225. ibid., p. 77. [↑](#footnote-ref-225)
226. See, ibid., p. 76. [↑](#footnote-ref-226)
227. ibid., p. 78. [↑](#footnote-ref-227)
228. ibid. [↑](#footnote-ref-228)
229. ibid., p. 81. [↑](#footnote-ref-229)
230. ibid., p. 82. [↑](#footnote-ref-230)
231. See, ibid. [↑](#footnote-ref-231)
232. ibid. [↑](#footnote-ref-232)
233. ibid. [↑](#footnote-ref-233)
234. Emmanuel Mounier, emphasizing the existence of the human person in respect to action, maintains: “That existence is action, and that the most perfect existence is the action that is the most perfect, and yet is still active; this is one of the leading intuitions of contemporary thought…. A theory of action therefore is not an appendage to personalism, but is of essential importance in it.” Emmanuel Mounier, *Personalism*, London: Routledge & Kegan Paul Ltd, 1952, p. 83. [↑](#footnote-ref-234)
235. Karol Wojtyła, *The Acting Person*, p. 83. [↑](#footnote-ref-235)
236. ibid. [↑](#footnote-ref-236)
237. ibid. [↑](#footnote-ref-237)
238. ibid. [↑](#footnote-ref-238)
239. ibid., p. 84. [↑](#footnote-ref-239)
240. Wojtyła in his later reflection on, *The Personal Structure of Self-Determination*, maintains: “In order to grasp the personal structure of self-determination, we must start from the experience of the human being. This experience obviously cannot be understood phenomenalistically, for such an understanding presupposes a theory of cognition that accepts an inner division between the functions of the senses and the intellect and also between sensory and intellectual contents.” Karol Wojtyła, “The Personal Structure of Self-Determination,” in *Person and Community: Selected Essays of Karol Wojtyła*, p. 188. [↑](#footnote-ref-240)
241. Karol Wojtyła, *The Acting Person*, p. 115. [↑](#footnote-ref-241)
242. ibid., p. 121. [↑](#footnote-ref-242)
243. ibid., p. 115. [↑](#footnote-ref-243)
244. Wojtyła maintains, ‘The will is the person’s power of the self-determination. This becomes evident upon closer examination of the person’s acts, both the simple act of will, “I will,” and the complex act, of the process of will.’ Karol Wojtyła, *The Personal Structure of Self-Determination*, p. 190. [↑](#footnote-ref-244)
245. ibid., p. 193. [↑](#footnote-ref-245)
246. Karol Wojtyła, *The Acting Person*, p. 116. [↑](#footnote-ref-246)
247. Karol Wojtyła, *The Personal Structure of Self-Determination*, p. 190. [↑](#footnote-ref-247)
248. Etienne Gilson, reflecting on freedom as the essence of personality, maintains: “To designate the individuality proper to a free being we call him a person. This the essence of personality is one with that of liberty; on the other hand liberty has its root in rationality, and since it is this very rationality that lies at the basis of the subsistence of the soul, and the subsistence, therefore, of the man, it follows that, in us, the principle of individuality and the principle of personality come back in the end to the same thing. The actuality of the reasonable soul, in communicating itself to the body, determines the individual soul possesses personality as by definition.” Etienne Gilson, *The Spirit of Mediaeval Philosophy*, London: University of Notre Dame Press, 1991, p. 202. [↑](#footnote-ref-248)
249. Karol Wojtyła, *The Acting Person*, p. 84. [↑](#footnote-ref-249)
250. ibid., p. 116. [↑](#footnote-ref-250)
251. ibid. [↑](#footnote-ref-251)
252. ibid. [↑](#footnote-ref-252)
253. ibid. [↑](#footnote-ref-253)
254. ibid., p. 117. [↑](#footnote-ref-254)
255. See, ibid. [↑](#footnote-ref-255)
256. ibid., p. 118. [↑](#footnote-ref-256)
257. ibid., p. 119. [↑](#footnote-ref-257)
258. Acosta Miguel & Reimers J. Adrian, *Karol Wojtyła’s Personalist Philosophy: Understanding Person & Act*, p. 52. [↑](#footnote-ref-258)
259. Karol Wojtyła, *The Acting Person*, p. 124. [↑](#footnote-ref-259)
260. ibid., p. 119. [↑](#footnote-ref-260)
261. ibid. [↑](#footnote-ref-261)
262. ibid., p. 120. [↑](#footnote-ref-262)
263. Acosta Miguel & Reimers J. Adrian, *Karol Wojtyła’s Personalist Philosophy: Understanding Person & Act*, p. 53. [↑](#footnote-ref-263)
264. Karol Wojtyła, *The Acting Person*, p. 179. [↑](#footnote-ref-264)
265. ibid., p. 121. [↑](#footnote-ref-265)
266. Kenneth L. Schmitz, explains, “at the center of the personal project of each human being is the individual’s conscious agency (*AP* 156). Because his action arises out of his free self-determination, in his acting the individual transcends himself as *suppositum*, even as he transcends his subconscious and the complex of dynamisms operating within him.” Schmitz L. Kenneth, *At the Center of the Human Drama: The Philosophical Anthropology of Karol Wojtyła/Pope John Paul II*, p. 81. [↑](#footnote-ref-266)
267. Karol Wojtyła, *The Acting Person*, p. 121. [↑](#footnote-ref-267)
268. Acosta Miguel and Reimers J. Adrian, translates “*moge—nie musze*,” as “I can, but I do not have to.” They, give it in italian as, “*Posso ma non sono costretto*,” in Spanish as, “*Puedo, pero no tengo que*,” See the footnote, in Acosta Miguel & Reimers J. Adrian, *Karol Wojtyła’s Personalist Philosophy: Understanding Person & Act,* p. 55. Whereas, Kenneth L. Schmitz, translates “*moge—nie musze*” as: “I could but I need not.” Schmitz L. Kenneth, *At the Center of the Human Drama: The Philosophical Anthropology of Karol Wojtyła/Pope John Paul II*, p. 83. [↑](#footnote-ref-268)
269. Karol Wojtyła, *The Acting Person*, p. 122. [↑](#footnote-ref-269)
270. On analyzing the concept of freedom in relation to power, Kenneth L. Schmitz, observes, ‘It is significant here that the author uses a specific Polish word to designate each person’s control over his or her properly human acts. He does not use the general term for power (*moc*). Instead, he uses the term for executive power (*wladza*), which is equivalent to the Latin actus humanus and means “the voluntary rational exercise of power” (AP 122). The personal project, then, is carried out through self-determining actions grounded in self-possession and self-governance.’ Schmitz L. Kenneth, *At the Center of the Human Drama: The Philosophical Anthropology of Karol Wojtyła/Pope John Paul II*, p. 81. [↑](#footnote-ref-270)
271. Karol Wojtyła, *The Acting Person*, p. 122. [↑](#footnote-ref-271)
272. Acosta Miguel & Reimers J. Adrian, *Karol Wojtyła’s Personalist Philosophy: Understanding Person & Act*, p. 55. [↑](#footnote-ref-272)
273. Though willing is an intentional act, Wojtyła, notes, “that an analysis that conceives this reality in the phenomenological categories of intentional act is inadequate. To conceive the will merely as a “wanting” that is directed toward a corresponding object (i.e., toward a value that is also an end) does not fully explain its dynamism. Such an analysis points to only one aspect of the will and one aspect of the transcendence proper to it.” Karol Wojtyła, *The Personal Structure of Self-Determination,* p. 190. [↑](#footnote-ref-273)
274. Karol Wojtyła, *The Acting Person*, p. 126. [↑](#footnote-ref-274)
275. ibid. [↑](#footnote-ref-275)
276. ibid. [↑](#footnote-ref-276)
277. ibid. [↑](#footnote-ref-277)
278. ibid., p. 127. [↑](#footnote-ref-278)
279. ibid. [↑](#footnote-ref-279)
280. ibid., p. 128. [↑](#footnote-ref-280)
281. ibid., p. 148. [↑](#footnote-ref-281)
282. See, ibid., p. 129. [↑](#footnote-ref-282)
283. ibid. [↑](#footnote-ref-283)
284. ibid. [↑](#footnote-ref-284)
285. ibid., p. 132. [↑](#footnote-ref-285)
286. ibid., p. 133. [↑](#footnote-ref-286)
287. ibid., p. 134. [↑](#footnote-ref-287)
288. ibid., p. 137. [↑](#footnote-ref-288)
289. Reimers J. Adrian, maintains: “Because truth is this correspondence, it can neither be reduced to nor be founded exclusively upon consciousness. The reality of operativity (or efficacy—sprawcosc) or the efficient causality of the human act, upon which Karol Wojtyła had insisted in his Person and Act, demands that the person attain to the truth concerning his actions and their consequences. Without truth, properly understood as the correspondence between the mind and the object of its thought, he cannot act effectively in the real world. The intention to act effectively, that is, to complete a human act, implies an understanding of reality. In this way, Karol Wojtyła/John Paul II shows himself to be a philosophical realist.” Acosta Miguel & Reimers J. Adrian, *Karol Wojtyła’s Personalist Philosophy: Understanding Person & Act*, p. 67. [↑](#footnote-ref-289)
290. Karol Wojtyła, *The Acting Person*, p. 138. [↑](#footnote-ref-290)
291. ibid. [↑](#footnote-ref-291)
292. ibid., p. 142. [↑](#footnote-ref-292)
293. ibid. [↑](#footnote-ref-293)
294. See, ibid., p. 143. [↑](#footnote-ref-294)
295. See, ibid. [↑](#footnote-ref-295)
296. ibid., p. 69. [↑](#footnote-ref-296)
297. ibid., p. 70. [↑](#footnote-ref-297)
298. Karol Wojtyła intends this work to be a continuation of the work on, Person and Act. The concept of morality he factored out in Person and Act, he now in this work intends to give critical and profound attention. See, Karol Wojtyła, *Man in the Field of Responsibility*, Kenneth W. kemp and Zuzanna Maslanka Kieron (translators), Indiana: St. Augustine Press, 2011, p. 5. [↑](#footnote-ref-298)
299. ibid., p. 4. [↑](#footnote-ref-299)
300. ibid., p. 5. [↑](#footnote-ref-300)
301. ibid., p. 7. [↑](#footnote-ref-301)
302. ibid. [↑](#footnote-ref-302)
303. Wojtyła maintains, on the “experience of the human being” and the “experience of morality,” that, the two experiences, “can really never be completely separated, although we can, in the context of the overall process of reflection, focus more on one or the other. In the case of the former, philosophical reflection will lead us in the direction of anthropology; in the case of the latter, in the direction of ethics.” Quoted from, Karol Wojtyła, *The Personal Structure of Self-Determination*, p. 189. [↑](#footnote-ref-303)
304. Karol Wojtyła, *Man in the Field of Responsibility*, p. 8. [↑](#footnote-ref-304)
305. Kenneth W. Kemp and Zuzanna Maslanka Kieron, are both translators of, Karol Wojtyła’s work, *Man in the Field of Responsibility.* [↑](#footnote-ref-305)
306. Translators comment in the footnote of, Karol Wojtyła, *Man in the Field of Responsibility*, p. 8 [↑](#footnote-ref-306)
307. See, Karol Wojtyła, *Man in the Field of Responsibility*, p. 10. [↑](#footnote-ref-307)
308. Karol Wojtyła, *The Acting Person*, p. 151. [↑](#footnote-ref-308)
309. Karol Wojtyła, *The Personal Structure of Self-Determination*, p. 192. [↑](#footnote-ref-309)
310. Karol Wojtyła, *The Acting Person*, p. 151. [↑](#footnote-ref-310)
311. Karol Wojtyła, *The Personal Structure of Self-Determination*, p. 189. [↑](#footnote-ref-311)
312. Karol Wojtyła, *The Acting Person*, p. 151. [↑](#footnote-ref-312)
313. ibid. [↑](#footnote-ref-313)
314. Wojtyła explains using the analogy of algebra, the concept of “bracketing” or “factoring out”, thus: “We place outside brackets those factors of an algebraic expression which in one way or another are common to all the terms of the expression, that is, which are somehow common to everything that remains within the brackets. The aim is to simplify subsequent operations and not to reject what is withdrawn or to sever the relations of what is outside to what remains in brackets. On the contrary, the operation underlines and enhances the significance of the factor isolated from the expression.” ibid., p. 13. [↑](#footnote-ref-314)
315. ibid., p. 14. [↑](#footnote-ref-315)
316. ibid., p. 264. [↑](#footnote-ref-316)
317. ibid. [↑](#footnote-ref-317)
318. ibid., p. 153. [↑](#footnote-ref-318)
319. ibid. [↑](#footnote-ref-319)
320. ibid., p. 154. [↑](#footnote-ref-320)
321. ibid., p. 155. [↑](#footnote-ref-321)
322. See, ibid. [↑](#footnote-ref-322)
323. ibid. [↑](#footnote-ref-323)
324. Wojtyła observes that, “In Christian thought, theological personalism is prior to humanistic personalism.” Karol Wojtyła, *Thomistic Personalism,* p. 166. [↑](#footnote-ref-324)
325. Ibid. [↑](#footnote-ref-325)
326. Karol Wojtyła, *The Acting Person*, p. 156. [↑](#footnote-ref-326)
327. ibid. [↑](#footnote-ref-327)
328. ibid. [↑](#footnote-ref-328)
329. ibid., p. 160. [↑](#footnote-ref-329)
330. ibid., p. 165. [↑](#footnote-ref-330)
331. See, Immanuel Kant, *Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals*, Mary Gregor (trans & ed) and Introduction by Christine M. Korsgaard, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1997. [↑](#footnote-ref-331)
332. Karol Wojtyła, *The Acting Person*, p.165. [↑](#footnote-ref-332)
333. ibid., p. 168. [↑](#footnote-ref-333)
334. ibid., p. 177. [↑](#footnote-ref-334)
335. ibid., p. 181. [↑](#footnote-ref-335)
336. ibid., p. 182. [↑](#footnote-ref-336)
337. ibid., p. 184. [↑](#footnote-ref-337)
338. ibid., p. 191. [↑](#footnote-ref-338)
339. ibid. [↑](#footnote-ref-339)
340. ibid., p. 192. [↑](#footnote-ref-340)
341. See, ibid., p. 193. [↑](#footnote-ref-341)
342. ibid., p. 194. [↑](#footnote-ref-342)
343. See, ibid., p. 195. [↑](#footnote-ref-343)
344. ibid., p. 196. [↑](#footnote-ref-344)
345. ibid., p. 197. [↑](#footnote-ref-345)
346. ibid., p. 198. [↑](#footnote-ref-346)
347. In his discourse on the *Psychological Analysis of Love*, one can see how Wojtyła employs the epistemic fruits of the empirical sciences especially psychology in analyzing the experience of love. See, Karol Wojtyła, *Love & Responsibility*, H. T. Willetts (trans.), San Francisco: Ignatius Press, 1993, pp. 101-118. [↑](#footnote-ref-347)
348. Karol Wojtyła, *The Acting Person*, p. 200. [↑](#footnote-ref-348)
349. ibid., p. 201. [↑](#footnote-ref-349)
350. ibid. [↑](#footnote-ref-350)
351. ibid., p. 221. [↑](#footnote-ref-351)
352. In his earlier work, Wojtyła asserts, ‘To the structure of the person belongs an “interior”, in which we find the elements of spiritual life, and it is this that compels us to acknowledge the spiritual nature of the human soul, and the peculiar perfectibility of the human person.’ Karol Wojtyła, *Love & Responsibility*, p. 121. [↑](#footnote-ref-352)
353. See, Karol Wojtyła, *The Acting Person*, p. 223. [↑](#footnote-ref-353)
354. ibid., p. 244. [↑](#footnote-ref-354)
355. ibid., p. 245. [↑](#footnote-ref-355)
356. ibid., p. 203. [↑](#footnote-ref-356)
357. ibid., p. 204. [↑](#footnote-ref-357)
358. ibid. [↑](#footnote-ref-358)
359. ibid., p. 205. [↑](#footnote-ref-359)
360. By “objectification of the person,” the functional use of the person as a thing of a means toward an end, should not be understood. For this will be totally contrary to the personalistic value of the person as strongly maintained by Wojtyła. And not only the person as a whole, but the body as a part of the person should not be used as a mere thing. Thus, he maintains, “a human person, as we know, cannot be an object for use. Now, the body is an integral part of the person, and so must not be treated as though it were detached from the whole person.” Karol Wojtyła, *Love & Responsibility*, p. 107. [↑](#footnote-ref-360)
361. Karol Wojtyła, *The Acting Person*, p. 206. [↑](#footnote-ref-361)
362. ibid. [↑](#footnote-ref-362)
363. ibid., p. 208. [↑](#footnote-ref-363)
364. Karol Wojtyła, *Love & Responsibility*, p. 121. [↑](#footnote-ref-364)
365. Karol Wojtyła, *The Acting Person*, p. 208. [↑](#footnote-ref-365)
366. ibid., p. 209. [↑](#footnote-ref-366)
367. See, ibid. [↑](#footnote-ref-367)
368. ibid. [↑](#footnote-ref-368)
369. ibid., p. 210. [↑](#footnote-ref-369)
370. Wojtyła contends, his “notion of participation does not have much in common with the Platonic or Scholastic notion. It serves, instead, to satisfy and express what it is that safeguards us as we exist and act together with others in different systems of social life.” Karol Wojtyła, “Participation or Alienation,” in *Person and Community: Selected Essays of Karol Wojtyła*, Theresa Sandok (trans.), New York: Peter Lang, 1993, p. 200. [↑](#footnote-ref-370)
371. Karol Wojtyła, *The Acting Person*, p. 261. [↑](#footnote-ref-371)
372. ibid., p. 262. [↑](#footnote-ref-372)
373. In a paper presented in a conference of which the general theme was, *I—other*, before the translation of Osoba i czyn into English, he maintains thus: “It seems that in the very positing of the problem *I—other* (*soi—autrui*) we proceed simultaneously from two cognitive situations. One is the ascertainment of the fact of the existence and activity of a concrete human being, designated by the pronoun *I*, who exists and acts in common with other human beings. The *other* is one of them, someone who lives alongside me, and who is both *another* and *one of the others* who exists and acts in common with me.” Karol Wojtyła, *Participation or Alienation*, p. 198. [↑](#footnote-ref-373)
374. Karol Wojtyła, *The Acting Person*, p. 263. [↑](#footnote-ref-374)
375. ibid., p. 268. [↑](#footnote-ref-375)
376. See, ibid., p. 272. [↑](#footnote-ref-376)
377. ibid., 272. [↑](#footnote-ref-377)
378. ibid., p. 273. [↑](#footnote-ref-378)
379. Remy C. Kwant, presents a critical historical analysis on the ideology of Individualism in the work: Remy C. Kwant, *Phenomenology of Social Existence*, Pittsburgh: Duquesne University Press, 1965, pp. 1-53. [↑](#footnote-ref-379)
380. Karol Wojtyła, *The Acting Person*, p. 273. [↑](#footnote-ref-380)
381. Karol Wojtyła, *Participation or Alienation*, p. 206. [↑](#footnote-ref-381)
382. Karol Wojtyła, *The Acting Person*, p. 276. [↑](#footnote-ref-382)
383. ibid., p. 277. [↑](#footnote-ref-383)
384. ibid. [↑](#footnote-ref-384)
385. See, ibid., p. 279. [↑](#footnote-ref-385)
386. ibid. [↑](#footnote-ref-386)
387. ibid., p. 283. [↑](#footnote-ref-387)
388. Wojtyła states that, “The consciousness that the *other* is another *I* stands at the basis of what in *Osoba i Czyn* I defined as participation.” Karol Wojtyła, *Participation or Alienation*, p. 200. [↑](#footnote-ref-388)
389. Karol Wojtyła, *The Acting Person*, p. 283. [↑](#footnote-ref-389)
390. ibid. [↑](#footnote-ref-390)
391. ibid. [↑](#footnote-ref-391)
392. ibid. [↑](#footnote-ref-392)
393. Karol Wojtyła maintains “This, however, in no way alters the fact that we are dealing here with a certain choice and that participation in the humanity of others is a certain task. This task can and should be placed at the basis of the strictly ethical order and strictly ethical appraisal. And although this task seems to have a primarily personalistic meaning, the strictly ethical order of values nevertheless depends in large part upon it. Kant’s second categorical imperative may be regarded as a confirmation of this thesis.” ibid. [↑](#footnote-ref-393)
394. For brief explanation, see: 吳康，《孔孟荀哲學（上冊）》，台北市：台灣商物印書館股份有限公司，民國56年，頁3-4 。 [↑](#footnote-ref-394)
395. For a more comprehensive and historical analysis and explanation of the character 「儒」and as it relates to Confucianism (儒學), see, 謝祥皓 & 劉宗賢，《中國儒學》，成都市：四川人民出版社，1993，頁16-24。 [↑](#footnote-ref-395)
396. The writer’s translation of: 「儒家思想雖以道德及政治為主要題材，但一開始就有了形上學的基礎：儒家的主要代表者孔孟二人更有很突出的形上思想。」項退結，《現代中國與形上學》，台北縣新莊市：輔仁大學出版，民國93年，頁180。 [↑](#footnote-ref-396)
397. Aristotle maintains that: “All things are either contraries or composed of contraries, and unity and plurality are the starting-points of all contraries.” *Metaphysics*, Book IV, 2, 1005a1. [↑](#footnote-ref-397)
398. A detailed exposition on the Ultimate contraries could be found in: Bartholomew Abanuka, *Reality and Individuation: An Examination of Appearance*, Onitsha: Spiritan Publications, 2014. pp. 100-112. [↑](#footnote-ref-398)
399. ibid., p. 100. [↑](#footnote-ref-399)
400. 《道德經》 begins thus: “The Tao that can be trodden is not the enduring and unchanging Tao. The name that can be named is not the enduring and unchanging name.” According to James Legge’s translation. [↑](#footnote-ref-400)
401. 羅光contends that these (the writer adds the nomenclature used in most of the Chinese classics) are names of the Ultimate reality that is by nature Spiritual substance (「最高最大的精神體」). See, 羅光，《中國哲學思想史（先秦篇）》，台北市：台灣學生書局印行，民國71年，頁27-32。 [↑](#footnote-ref-401)
402. Andrew Chih, observes: “This ultimate source is variously called Heaven, the Ultimate, the Grand Terminus, the Universal Principle (Tao).” Andrew Chih, *Chinese Humanism*: *A Religion Beyond Religion*, Hsin-Chuang: Fu Jen Catholic University Press, 1981, p.53. [↑](#footnote-ref-402)
403. The Chinese people since the ancient times before Confucius have always had an apprehension of the Ultimate reality that is of transcendental nature. Up to the period of the 殷 (Yin) period, it has always be named 「上帝」 or simply 「帝.」 The same Ultimate reality by the 周(Zhou) period, the name 「天」 becomes more popular for it. Though the change of the nomenclature, nevertheless, the contend of the conception of the Ultimate reality remained largely the same as of a religious nature and categories. It is gradually during the period of Confucius that though with the same nomenclature, 「天」, however, that the content of the conception of the Ultimate reality, gradually started assuming a more philosophical nature. [↑](#footnote-ref-403)
404. Some scholars tend to distinguish, 「意志之天」or 「主宰之天」 from 「人格之天」 and 「自然之天」 from 「形上之天」. But the writer thinks that strictly speaking the difference is not substantial, it is merely a matter of nomenclature. For example, see, 孫小金，《孔子》，香港：中華書局，2001，頁106-109。 [↑](#footnote-ref-404)
405. See《詩經·周頌》第二篇。 [↑](#footnote-ref-405)
406. See, 勞思光，《中國哲學史（一）》，香港：友聯，民國69年，頁6。 [↑](#footnote-ref-406)
407. 傅佩榮, summarizes Confucius’s conception of 「天」 in four points, thus: 1. 以天為自然界, 2. 以天為關懷人世的主宰, 3. 以天為孔子使命的本源, 4. 以天為命運. See, 傅佩榮，《儒家哲學新論》，台北市：業強出版社，1993，頁129-132。 [↑](#footnote-ref-407)
408. This is a reflected-translation of his thought that goes thus:「關於「形上天」觀念，有兩種說法最為流行；一說以為「形上天」觀念屬於孔子後的道家思想，其根據是孔子不言天道，而道家思想中之「道」，即屬「形上天」。另一說則以為形上天觀念乃儒家之「正統」思想，因此將儒學之根源上推至極遠之古代，而認為此種「形上天」觀念即是孔子學說之中心，儒學精神之中心。」勞思光，中國哲學史（一），頁7。 [↑](#footnote-ref-408)
409. A reflected translation of: 「嚴格論之，此二說均不確。因為我們一方面知道周初有此種「形上天」觀念，則不可說形上天觀念必在孔子後之道家思想中方出現；另一面，我們確知孔子至孟子一系的先秦儒學，確以道德主體性為中心，並不以『形上天』為最高觀念；而且孔孟說中，就理論結構看，亦完全無此需要。因此，我們亦不可說『形上天」是孔孟哲學的觀念。換言之，「形上天」必不是先秦儒學的中心所在。進一步說，孔子為最早建立儒學理論的人，孔子既無形上天理論，則孔子前縱有形上天之想像，亦不能算作儒學原有的觀念。」勞思光，《中國哲學史（一）》，頁7。 [↑](#footnote-ref-409)
410. Andrew Chih, conceives 「陰」and 「陽」, as centrifugal and centripetal force respectively. See, Andrew Chih, *Chinese Humanism*: p. 52. [↑](#footnote-ref-410)
411. *Metaphysics*, Book I(A), 1. [↑](#footnote-ref-411)
412. Philosophical works by contemporary Chinese philosophers and scholars on the Philosophy of life is in abundance. In Taiwan, philosophical scholars of Fu Jen Catholic University, has produced numerous work on this theme. And the exemplar is the pioneer philosopher 羅光, of the named university. [↑](#footnote-ref-412)
413. See, 梁啟超，《儒家哲學（金一冊）》，台北市：中華書局股份有限公司，民國48年，頁2。 [↑](#footnote-ref-413)
414. See, ibid（同上）， 頁2-3。 [↑](#footnote-ref-414)
415. In the history of Western philosophy, we find similar philosophical problematic, especially during the latter period of the Medieval Philosophy. The problem of the universals, on understanding the being of universal concepts and their relationship with particular entities, was intensively debated among the Scholastics. This led to the intellectual divide between the realist, mid-realist and the nominalist. [↑](#footnote-ref-415)
416. See, 傅佩榮，《儒家哲學新論》， 頁58。 [↑](#footnote-ref-416)
417. Richard Wilhelm, Confucius and Confucianism, George H. Danton, and Annina Periam Danton (translators into English), New York: Harcourt Brace Jovanovich, Inc., 1931, p. 143. [↑](#footnote-ref-417)
418. See, 勞思光，《中國哲學史（一）》，頁47。As well as, 葉經柱，《孔子的道德哲學》，台北市：正中書局印行，民國66年，頁33。 [↑](#footnote-ref-418)
419. 孫小金, maintains it occurs 109 times. See, 孫小金，《孔子》，香港：中華書局，2001，頁88. 葉經柱, also maintains it appears 109 times. See, 葉經柱，《孔子的道德哲學》， 頁239。 [↑](#footnote-ref-419)
420. See, ibid（同上）， 頁240。 [↑](#footnote-ref-420)
421. See, Wing-Tsit Chan, 1963, p. 40. [↑](#footnote-ref-421)
422. See, Richard Wilhelm, *Confucius and Confucianism*, George H. Danton, and Annina Periam Danton (translators into English), New York: Harcourt Brace Jovanovich, Inc., 1931, p. 143. [↑](#footnote-ref-422)
423. See, Richard Wilhelm, *Confucius and Confucianism*, p. 143. [↑](#footnote-ref-423)
424. Julia Ching, *The Religious thought of Chu Hsi*, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000, p. 106. [↑](#footnote-ref-424)
425. 勞思光，《中國哲學史（一）》，頁48。 [↑](#footnote-ref-425)
426. See, 孫小金，孔子， 頁96。 [↑](#footnote-ref-426)
427. See, 李祥俊：〈儒家仁觀念的思想內涵、超越路徑及其批判反思〉在《中國哲學》，2019年5期，40-48頁。 [↑](#footnote-ref-427)
428. This explains while the concepts of 【周】禮and 樂 occur so many times in the Confucius Analects. Confucius was bent on rediscovery them as the principles to restore both personal moral order and social political order. [↑](#footnote-ref-428)
429. 《論語˙里仁》 [↑](#footnote-ref-429)
430. ibid. [↑](#footnote-ref-430)
431. ibid. [↑](#footnote-ref-431)
432. ibid. [↑](#footnote-ref-432)
433. ibid. [↑](#footnote-ref-433)
434. ibid. [↑](#footnote-ref-434)
435. ibid. [↑](#footnote-ref-435)
436. It should be noted however, that scholars like 張岱年, disagrees with the idea of 「仁」as 「全德」. He rather thinks that the idea of「仁」 is 「最高德」. See, 李祥俊：〈儒家仁觀念的思想內涵、超越路徑及其批判反思〉在《中國哲學》，2019年5期，頁40-48。 [↑](#footnote-ref-436)
437. Wing-Tsit Chan, 1963, p. 40. [↑](#footnote-ref-437)
438. 《論語˙雍也》。 [↑](#footnote-ref-438)
439. This is the writer’s translation of:「孔子把人的生命和宇宙的萬物聯合一起。山水在宇宙的變易中，山代表靜，水代表動，山水的動靜象徵宇宙的生命。人中的知者和仁者，能夠把自己的生命和宇宙的生命相配合，在自己的生命中，乃取得『樂』、取得『壽』。孔子沒有説知者取得知識，仁者取得道德，卻說知者樂和仁者壽，直接深入人的生命中，樂和壽乃是生命的表現。」羅光，《中國哲學思想史（先秦篇）》， 頁261。 [↑](#footnote-ref-439)
440. 《中庸第二十章》。 [↑](#footnote-ref-440)
441. ibid. [↑](#footnote-ref-441)
442. ibid [↑](#footnote-ref-442)
443. 《中庸第二十五章》。 [↑](#footnote-ref-443)
444. Julia Ching, *The Religious thought of Chu Hsi*, p. 110. [↑](#footnote-ref-444)
445. 《中庸第三十二章》。 [↑](#footnote-ref-445)
446. 《孟子˙公孫丑章句上第七章》。 [↑](#footnote-ref-446)
447. 《孟子˙盡心章句下第十六章》。 [↑](#footnote-ref-447)
448. 繁錄卷Quoted in 馮友蘭，《中國哲學史（下）》，台北市：台灣商務，民國82，頁515。 [↑](#footnote-ref-448)
449. 繁錄卷Quoted in 馮友蘭，《中國哲學史（下）》，頁519。 [↑](#footnote-ref-449)
450. 通書：誠幾德第三。 [↑](#footnote-ref-450)
451. 通書：道第六。 [↑](#footnote-ref-451)
452. 通書：順化第十一。 [↑](#footnote-ref-452)
453. 定性書。 [↑](#footnote-ref-453)
454. 識仁說。 [↑](#footnote-ref-454)
455. 識仁說。 [↑](#footnote-ref-455)
456. 識仁說。 [↑](#footnote-ref-456)
457. 【宋】 黎靖德（編）、王星賢點校，《 朱子語類（第二冊）》，北京：中華書局，1999。論語二，學而篇上。 [↑](#footnote-ref-457)
458. ibid. [↑](#footnote-ref-458)
459. ibid. [↑](#footnote-ref-459)
460. See, ibid. [↑](#footnote-ref-460)
461. 羅光，《中國哲學思想史（先秦篇）》，頁272。 [↑](#footnote-ref-461)
462. Julia Ching, *The Religious thought of Chu Hsi*, p. 106. [↑](#footnote-ref-462)
463. Julia Ching, *The Religious thought of Chu Hsi*, p. 106. [↑](#footnote-ref-463)
464. The writer’s translation of: 「仁的哲學是孔子全部思想的總綱，在倫理學上，仁為內容，禮為形式。在政治學說上，仁政是根本原則，在教育上則實行有教無類，體現仁愛的原則。孔子在建構自己思想體系時，其就在仁，並把仁的內容進一步充實和提高，最終成為他的哲學核心。」孫小金，《孔子》， 頁99。 [↑](#footnote-ref-464)
465. See, 孫小金，《孔子》， 頁101。 [↑](#footnote-ref-465)
466. The writer’s translation of:「孔子的仁有主德、源德、全德三種主要含義，涵蓋了道德生活、價值評價中的主要領域，也成為後世儒家仁學發展的基本視閾。」李祥俊：〈儒家仁觀念的思想內涵、超越路徑及其批判反思〉在《中國哲學》，2019年5期，頁40-48。 [↑](#footnote-ref-466)
467. 孫小金, clearly maintains that, “「仁」在孔子看來是愛人愛別人。” (in the view of Confucius to love humanity, to love the other.) 孫小金，《孔子》， 頁88。 [↑](#footnote-ref-467)
468. 論語˙公冶長 [↑](#footnote-ref-468)
469. The writer’s translation of: 「仁愛的範圍推到天下的人，仁愛的工作則是對於天下人的生命予以協助，使能發育。」羅光，《中國哲學思想史（先秦篇）》， 頁265。 [↑](#footnote-ref-469)
470. 《中庸˙第二十章》。 [↑](#footnote-ref-470)
471. See, 羅光，《中國哲學思想史（先秦篇）》， 頁271。 [↑](#footnote-ref-471)
472. See, 葉經柱，《孔子的道德哲學》， 頁33。 [↑](#footnote-ref-472)
473. See, 羅光，《中國哲學思想史（先秦篇）》， 頁274。 [↑](#footnote-ref-473)
474. The writer’s translation of:「孔子的仁道和生活緊相聯繫，既為生活的基礎，又為生活的精神，仁道雖很高深，然很近人，人性雖本來是仁，但應努力追求。」同上(ibid)., 頁305。 [↑](#footnote-ref-474)
475. 論語述而第六章。 [↑](#footnote-ref-475)
476. The writer’s translation of: 「『志於道』的道，必是孔門認為人人應該遵循的大道。人類並生並育並進化，一定有應該遵循的道理。不僅人類，天地萬物與人類並存並育並進化，也必有其應該遵循的道理。天地萬物與人類並存並育並進化的道理，簡稱為天道，即自然之道。」葉經柱，《孔子的道德哲學》， 頁33。 [↑](#footnote-ref-476)
477. See, 孫小金，《孔子》， 2001，頁91。Also see, 葉經柱，《孔子的道德哲學》， 頁212。 [↑](#footnote-ref-477)
478. 孫小金，《孔子》， 頁91。 [↑](#footnote-ref-478)
479. 葉經柱，《孔子的道德哲學》， 頁216。 [↑](#footnote-ref-479)
480. See. 孫小金，《孔子》， 頁 91。 [↑](#footnote-ref-480)
481. The list of these virtues in Confucian philosophy are being derived from the work of葉經著. See, 葉經柱，《孔子的道德哲學》， 頁175 &頁 203。 [↑](#footnote-ref-481)
482. The writer’s translation of: 孔子「不以禮義為德，而是為德的條件，沒有禮義，便沒有德。」 羅光，《中國哲學思想史（先秦篇）》， 頁281。 [↑](#footnote-ref-482)
483. 羅光，《中國哲學思想史（先秦篇）》， 頁274。 [↑](#footnote-ref-483)
484. The writer’s translation of: 「德不是理，德是仁按天理所行的善行。」羅光，《中國哲學思想史（先秦篇）》， 頁274。 [↑](#footnote-ref-484)
485. It should be noted, fairly, as exposed in the part one of this research, that the Greeks also did not have the notion of person, *persona*. The introduction of this concept to philosophical discourse is one of the many big contribution of Christian philosophy to Western philosophy and philosophy in general. [↑](#footnote-ref-485)
486. The “brother-brother” relationship, should be understand today as the relationship between siblings, which includes sisters. [↑](#footnote-ref-486)
487. 中庸第二十章。 [↑](#footnote-ref-487)
488. 朱子云：「善事父母為孝」。 See, 論語˙學而第二章朱子註。 [↑](#footnote-ref-488)
489. 朱子云：「善事兄長為弟」。See, 論語˙學而第二章朱子註。 [↑](#footnote-ref-489)
490. See, 林安弘，《儒家孝道思想研究》，台北市：文津出版社，民國81年，頁1。 [↑](#footnote-ref-490)
491. The writer’s translation of: 「沒有孝，則正常的父子關係不能維持，生命的延續必瀕於斷絕，而社會敬老尊賢的倫理行為必然消失；沒有悌，則正常的兄弟關係不能鞏固，生命必瀕於狹隘，而社會友愛之情的人際關係，也必趨淡薄，整個家庭和社會的倫理道德，也就不再存有了。」林安弘，《儒家孝道思想研究》， 頁1。 [↑](#footnote-ref-491)
492. 論語．學而 [↑](#footnote-ref-492)
493. See, 朱子語類（第二冊），{宋} 黎靖德（編），論語二，學而篇上。 [↑](#footnote-ref-493)
494. 羅光, posits his thought on the relationship between 「孝」and 「仁」thus: 「孔子的孝道，由仁道出發。不單單因為仁道為愛，愛由愛親開始；而是因為整個的孝道，以生命為中心。生命為仁，孝為生命發揚的見證，也就是仁道的見證。孝子仁人，兩者為一，不孝即不仁，仁者必孝。」羅光，《中國哲學思想史（先秦篇）》， 頁322。 [↑](#footnote-ref-494)
495. In respect to the concept 「孝」, 葉經柱, maintains：「孝是最重要最根本的仁的表現。」葉經柱，《孔子的道德哲學》， 頁51。 [↑](#footnote-ref-495)
496. See, ibid. [↑](#footnote-ref-496)
497. 論語˙學而。 [↑](#footnote-ref-497)
498. The writer’s translation of: 「人的修身不在對於自己私人，而在於孝親尊賢。孝親尊賢乃成為儒家兩項最重要的善德，即是孝和忠，一為齊家，一為治國。孝用之於家庭生活，忠用之於國家生活。」羅光，《中國哲學思想史（先秦篇）》， 頁315。This thought of 羅光, is obviously a reflection of the thought in〈禮記·祭義〉: 「身也者，父母之遺體也。行父母之遺體，敢不敬乎。居處不莊，非孝也；事居不忠，非孝也；蒞官不敬，非孝也；朋友不信，非孝也；戰陣無勇，非孝也。五者不遂，栽及於關，敢不敬乎！」 [↑](#footnote-ref-498)
499. See, 孟子˙公孫丑章句上第六章。 [↑](#footnote-ref-499)
500. 中庸˙第二十章 [↑](#footnote-ref-500)
501. 孟子˙公孫丑章句上第七章。 [↑](#footnote-ref-501)
502. 孟子˙盡心章句下第十六章。 [↑](#footnote-ref-502)
503. 朱熹《論語集注》。 [↑](#footnote-ref-503)
504. 羅光，《中國哲學思想史（先秦篇）》， 頁312。 [↑](#footnote-ref-504)
505. This statement in the Analects shows how practical Confucianism is: “Though a man may be able to recite the three hundred odes, yet if, when entrusted with a governmental charge, he knows not how to act, or if, when sent to any quarter on a mission, he cannot give his replies unassisted, notwithstanding the extent of his learning, of what practical use is it?” Analects Book XIII, translated by James Legge. [↑](#footnote-ref-505)
506. Julia Ching, *The Religious thought of Chu Hsi*, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000, p. 108. [↑](#footnote-ref-506)
507. 孟子．離婁章句上第十章。 [↑](#footnote-ref-507)
508. Julia Ching, The Religious thought of Chu Hsi, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000, p. 105. [↑](#footnote-ref-508)
509. The writer’s translation of: 「人的生活由仁而出發，在仁以內而發育。在倫理方面一切善德和仁相連，沒有仁不能完成人。」羅光，《中國哲學思想史（先秦篇）》， 頁306。 [↑](#footnote-ref-509)
510. 論語．為政篇第二。 [↑](#footnote-ref-510)
511. 「孝悌」is very important for the regulation of the family, and thus very important for the regulation of the state. For as the Great Learning, 大學, maintains: “In order rightly to govern the state, it is necessary first to regulate the family,” For it argues, “It is not possible for one to teach others, while he cannot teach his own family. Therefore, the ruler, without going beyond his family, completes the lessons for the state. There is filial piety: therewith the sovereign should be served. There is fraternal submission: therewith elders and superiors should be served. There is kindness: therewith the multitude should be treated.” The Great Learning IX, translated by James Legge. [↑](#footnote-ref-511)
512. In the Analects, as regards the principle of 「禮」, translated as “propriety”, Confucius maintains: “Respectfulness, without the rules of propriety, becomes laborious bustle; carefulness, without the rules of propriety, becomes timidity; boldness, without the rules of propriety, becomes insubordination; straightforwardness, without the rules of propriety, becomes rudeness.” Analects Book VIII, translated by James Legge. [↑](#footnote-ref-512)
513. Analects Book XX, translated by James Legge. [↑](#footnote-ref-513)
514. 孟子．梁惠王章句下第八章。 [↑](#footnote-ref-514)
515. 論語集注。 [↑](#footnote-ref-515)
516. 孟子．公孫丑章句上第四章。 [↑](#footnote-ref-516)
517. See, 孟子．滕文公章句上第三與四章。 [↑](#footnote-ref-517)
518. See, 孟子．離婁章句上第二章。 [↑](#footnote-ref-518)
519. The Works of Mencius, Book II, Part I: IV, translated by James Legge. [↑](#footnote-ref-519)
520. In a way these understandings of the philosophical concept 「仁」are sustained in 牟宗三 conception of the concept 「仁」as: 「仁體」(as ontological substance), 「仁理」(as metaphysical principle), 「仁道」(as the ultimate reality of all things), 「仁心」(as the universal consciousness of all things). See, 牟宗三，《心體與性體 （二）》，台北市：正中書局，民國57年，頁219。 [↑](#footnote-ref-520)
521. 羅光, clarifies this assertion thus: “生命哲學在中國哲學史上沒有這個名字，在西洋哲學史裏也祇有在現代纔有這種哲學；但是在中國哲學思想裡，生命的思想充滿了儒家的哲學。”See, 羅光，《中國哲學思想史（先秦篇）》， 頁258。 [↑](#footnote-ref-521)
522. Karol Wojtyła, *The Personal Structure of Self-Determination*, pp. 187-195. [↑](#footnote-ref-522)
523. Miguel Acosta & Adrian J. Reimers, *Karol Wojtyła’s Personalist Philosophy: Understanding Person & Act,* Washington, D.C: The Catholic University of America Press, 2016, p. 115. [↑](#footnote-ref-523)
524. 林安弘，《儒家孝道思想研究》， 頁19。 [↑](#footnote-ref-524)
525. Karol Wojtyła, *The Acting Person*, p. 3. Note, that the Chinese character in bracket is the writer’s. [↑](#footnote-ref-525)
526. 孟子告子上第六章。 [↑](#footnote-ref-526)
527. 孟子告子上第十一章。 [↑](#footnote-ref-527)
528. For a broader understanding of the concepts of 「仁心」and 「仁道」, see, 牟宗三，《心體與性體 （二）》，台北市：正中書局，民國57，頁218-233。 [↑](#footnote-ref-528)
529. 孟子告子下第三章。 [↑](#footnote-ref-529)
530. 孟子盡心下第十六章。 [↑](#footnote-ref-530)
531. Karol Wojtyła, *The Acting Person*, p. 3. [↑](#footnote-ref-531)
532. ibid., p. 4. [↑](#footnote-ref-532)
533. ibid., p. 6. [↑](#footnote-ref-533)
534. ibid., p. 8. [↑](#footnote-ref-534)
535. ibid., p. 9. [↑](#footnote-ref-535)
536. ibid., p. 10. [↑](#footnote-ref-536)
537. See, 「仁者何？以粗淺之今語釋之，則同情心而已。……再以今語釋之，則仁者人格之表徵也。……二人以上相偶，始能形成人格之統一體。同在此統一體之中，而彼我痛癢不相省，斯謂之不仁 ，反是斯謂仁。是故仁不仁之概念可得而言也，曰不仁者，同類意識覺醒而已矣。」 梁啟超quoted in葉經柱，《孔子的道德哲學》， 頁242。 [↑](#footnote-ref-537)
538. 葉經柱，《孔子的道德哲學》， 頁243。 [↑](#footnote-ref-538)
539. 林安弘，《儒家孝道思想研究》， 頁18。 [↑](#footnote-ref-539)
540. Usually in Chinese philosophy this understanding of self-actualization and perfection of the human person, is being discussed from the perspective of self-cultivation (「自身修養」or 「修養工夫」。) See, for instance: 葉經柱，《孔子的道德哲學》， 頁243。 [↑](#footnote-ref-540)
541. Karol Wojtyła, *The Acting Person*, p. 31. [↑](#footnote-ref-541)
542. ibid., p. 206. [↑](#footnote-ref-542)
543. ibid., p. 70. [↑](#footnote-ref-543)
544. Karol Wojtyła, *Participation or Alienation*, pp. 197-207. [↑](#footnote-ref-544)
545. Karol Wojtyła, *The Acting Person*, p. 33. [↑](#footnote-ref-545)
546. Karol Wojtyła, *Subjectivity and the Irreducible in the Human Being*, pp. 209-217. [↑](#footnote-ref-546)
547. ibid. [↑](#footnote-ref-547)
548. Julia Ching, *The Religious thought of Chu Hsi*, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000, p. 105. [↑](#footnote-ref-548)
549. On the debate on becoming 「聖人，」Julia Ching explains: “Many questions have been raised in this regard. For example, are sages born or made? If they are born, are they not superhuman? Would they have emotions—the occasion for evil? If they are made (self-made), why are they so few? Why did they exist only in the remote or historical antiquity? Generations of Chinese thinkers have grappled with these questions.” See, Julia Ching, *The Religious thought of Chu Hsi*, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000, p. 105. [↑](#footnote-ref-549)
550. For a broader exposé of the notion of 「聖人境界」, see, 牟宗三，《心體與性體 （二）》，台北市：正中書局，民國57，頁332-333。 [↑](#footnote-ref-550)
551. On the union of the human person with 「天，」Andrew Chih, avers: “Man can reach his self-realization as he realizes his unity with the whole, and as he constantly endeavors to let the divine love operate through him. All is one. Divine love is infinite and ubiquitous. It is the source of the good and the beautiful.” Andrew Chih, *Chinese Humanism*: A Religion Beyond Religion, Hsin-Chuang: Fu Jen Catholic University Press, 1981, p. 219. [↑](#footnote-ref-551)
552. The writer’s translation of: 「人本來是天地間生命的延續，所以他應該師法天地的陰陽柔剛，而修養仁義之道，因為不仁不義是違反天地的好生之德，也就是違反天命。人如果實行道德使命，它就成為聖人、君子，會『動天地』而與天地合德；反之就是天人所不齒的小人。」 項退結，《現代中國與形上學》，台北縣新莊市：輔仁大學出版，民國93年，187頁。 [↑](#footnote-ref-552)
553. Karol Wojtyła, *The Acting Person*, p. 119. [↑](#footnote-ref-553)
554. ibid. [↑](#footnote-ref-554)
555. Wojtyła maintains that: “The grasping of truth is connected with a special striving in which truth as a value is the end that is sought. Man strives for truth and in his mind the ability to grasp it as a value—by distinguishing it from nontruth—is combined with the urge to search and inquire…. It is the surrendering of the mind with regard to truth that conditions the transcendence of the person.” ibid., p. 159. [↑](#footnote-ref-555)
556. ibid., p. 153. [↑](#footnote-ref-556)
557. ibid. [↑](#footnote-ref-557)
558. ibid., p. 156. [↑](#footnote-ref-558)
559. ibid., p. 127. [↑](#footnote-ref-559)
560. ibid., p. 129. [↑](#footnote-ref-560)
561. ibid., p. 138. [↑](#footnote-ref-561)
562. ibid., p. 276. [↑](#footnote-ref-562)
563. ibid., p. 280. [↑](#footnote-ref-563)
564. ibid., p. 281. [↑](#footnote-ref-564)
565. On the correlation between the notion of the person and that of the common good, Jacques Maritain, maintains: “There is a correlation between this notion of the *person* as social unit and the notion of the *common good* as the end of the social whole. They imply one another. The common good is common because it is received in persons, each one of whom is as a mirror of the whole. Among the bees, there is a public good, namely, the good functioning of the hive, but not a common good, that is, a good received and communicated.” Maritain Jacques, *The Person and the Common Good*, John J. Fitzgerald (trans), Indiana: University of Notre Dame Press, 1966, p. 49. [↑](#footnote-ref-565)
566. This is implied in Wojtyła’s assertion: “We can conceive of the common good as being the goal of acting only in that double-subjective and objective-sense. Its subjective sense is strictly related to participation as a property of the acting person; it is in this sense that it is possible to say that the common good corresponds to the social nature of man.” Karol Wojtyła, *The Acting Person*, p. 282. [↑](#footnote-ref-566)
567. ibid. [↑](#footnote-ref-567)
568. ibid., p. 283. [↑](#footnote-ref-568)
569. ibid., p. 282. [↑](#footnote-ref-569)
570. Wojtyła conceives solidarity thus: ‘a constant readiness to accept and to realize one’s share in the community because of one’s membership within that particular community. In accepting the attitude of solidarity man does what he is supposed to do not only because of his membership in the group, but because he has the “benefit of the whole” in view: he does it for the “common good.”’ ibid., p. 285. [↑](#footnote-ref-570)
571. ibid., p. 288. [↑](#footnote-ref-571)
572. ibid. [↑](#footnote-ref-572)
573. ibid., p. 289. [↑](#footnote-ref-573)
574. ibid., p. 290. [↑](#footnote-ref-574)
575. ibid., p. 294. [↑](#footnote-ref-575)
576. See, ibid. [↑](#footnote-ref-576)
577. On notion of “neighbour”, Wojtyła contends: ‘The notion of “neighbor” is strictly related to man as such and to the value itself of the person regardless of any of his relations to one or another community or to the society at large. The notion takes into account man’s humanness alone, that humanness which is concretized in every man just as much as it is in myself. It thus provides the broadest basis for the community, a basis that reaches deeper than estrangement; it unites human beings, all human beings who are even members in different human communities. Although membership in a community or society presupposes the reality that is referred to in the notion of “neighbor,” it also limits and in some respect removes to a more distant plane or even overshadows the broader concept of “neighbor”; it puts into the forefront man’s relation and subordination to a given community-while when speaking of a neighbor we stress, on the contrary, only the most fundamental interrelations of all men in their humanness.’ ibid., p. 293. [↑](#footnote-ref-577)
578. ibid. [↑](#footnote-ref-578)
579. ibid., p. 295. [↑](#footnote-ref-579)
580. *Analects* Book XIV, translated by James Legge. [↑](#footnote-ref-580)
581. See, Leviticus 19:18; Matthew 19:19; Matthew 22:39; Mark 12:31; Luke 10:27; Romans 13:9; Galatians 5:14, James 2:8. [↑](#footnote-ref-581)