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References
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I would like to thank Nathan Salmon for his extensive, and extremely helpful, comments on two earlier versions of this paper. I would also like to thank some readers whose identity remains unknown to me. Finally, since this paper is based on a section of my doctoral dissertation (Attitude Problems, Princeton, 1990), I would also like to thank the people who contributed to the production of that work: Gil Harman, Scott Soames, David Lewis, Richard Holton, Steve Reiber, Len Goddard, Allen Hazen and Bas van Fraassen.
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Oppy, G. A note about a quinean argument against direct reference. Philosophia 24, 157–170 (1994). https://doi.org/10.1007/BF02379951
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/BF02379951