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NATURALISM

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  06 October 2020

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Abstract

I offer a minimal characterization of naturalism, with ontological, epistemological, psychological and evaluative dimensions. I explain why naturalism is attractive. I note that naturalists disagree among themselves about, among other things, the nature of values, beliefs, and abstractions. I close by responding to some standard objections to naturalism.

Type
Research Article
Copyright
Copyright © The Royal Institute of Philosophy, 2020

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References

Note

1 See, for example, Craig, William Lane and Moreland, J. P. (eds.) Naturalism: A Critical Analysis (New York: Routledge, 2000)Google Scholar and Copan, Paul and Taliaferro, Charles (eds.) The Naturalness of Belief (Lanham: Lexington Books, 2019)Google Scholar.