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Discussion of J. Kevin O’Regan’s “Why Red Doesn’t Sound Like a Bell: Understanding the Feel of Consciousness”

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Acknowledgments

Kevin O’Regan wishes to thank Jan Degenaar, Erik Myin and Oliver Kauffmann for extensive help in his responses.

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Correspondence to Ned Block.

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O’Regan, J.K., Block, N. Discussion of J. Kevin O’Regan’s “Why Red Doesn’t Sound Like a Bell: Understanding the Feel of Consciousness”. Rev.Phil.Psych. 3, 89–108 (2012). https://doi.org/10.1007/s13164-012-0090-7

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