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Against the Mythological Machine, Towards Decolonial Revolt

Pedro Lebrón Ortiz

Abstract This article seeks to explore the temporal experience of decolonization/decoloniality through Furio Jesi's phenomenology of revolt, using the Puerto Rico summer protests of 2019 as a case study, to suggest that decolonization inhibits the functionality of the mythological machine because in the context of coloniality, revolt is the product of a biological exigency. In addition, I argue that decolonization should not be understood as an inevitable end point, or end goal, known *a priori*, but rather it is an anti-teleological process and subjectivity that at once fuses the time of revolt and revolution; an impossible task in Jesi's framework.

Keywords *temporality, decolonization, revolt, revolution, Puerto Rico*

In his seminal text *Black Skin, White Masks* (1952) Frantz Fanon (1925–1961) stated, in reference to the Anti-French Resistance War in Vietnam (1946–1954), that “It is not because the Indo-Chinese discovered a culture of their own that they revolted. Quite simply this was because it became impossible for them to breathe, in more than one sense of the word.”¹ Here, one can read Fanon as arguing against a “nostalgic and ethnocentric return to traditions”² by rejecting the consecration, and fetishization, of the colonized subject's past. I also read this as the rejection of the subsuming of the struggle for decolonization within historical narratives circumscribed by modern/colonial temporal coordinates. In addition, Fanon's statement underscores decolonization as a biological necessity. In this sense, it could also be argued that Fanon was arguing against the mobilization of what Italian historian and philosopher Furio Jesi (1941–1980) would call “the mythological machine,” which “gives us a powerful insight into some of the deeper determinants of Western political rationality as a whole—whence also the unsettling reversibility of political myth from left to right.”³ In short, the mythological machine is the cultivation of mythology as a way to vulcanize identity and stabilize power. In this article I seek to explore the ways in which Jesi's and Fanon's conceptions of *revolt* and *revolution* diverge in crucial ways.

"I am a man, — Fanon says — and I have to rework the world's past from the very beginning. I am not just responsible for the slave revolt in Saint Domingue."⁴ While this could be read as an invocation for a decolonial reading of history, an urge to "re-experience, re-imagine, and re-think the world based on different epistemic foundations,"⁵ I argue that one could also read Fanon's statement as anticipating Jesi's rumination on revolt, revolution, and temporality in *Spartakus* (1969) by seventeen years, in addition to anticipating the theme of spontaneity which Fanon would explore, its "grandeur" and "weakness," in *The Wretched of the Earth* (1963) (again, anticipating Jesi).

Through a phenomenological analysis of the Spartacist uprising (1919), and inspired by the social uprisings of 1968, Jesi makes the distinction between revolt and revolution by stating that what distinguishes them is a different experience of time.⁶ According to Jesi, a revolt consists of a "suspension" of historical time, while a revolution is immersed in it.⁷ In making this distinction, Jesi made a critical intervention in contemporary Marxist thought inasmuch as he provides an explanation as to how one temporally experiences short term and long term battles in the struggle against capitalism. To be clear, "Jesi positions the grammar and temporality of 'revolution' within the secularized eschatology of historicist Marxism. According to this view, history appears as the development of a contradictory whole in a complex yet ultimately linear temporal schema."⁸ The Hegelian eschatological framework underpinning this will be explored in the following section.

In addition, by positing that the revolt suspends historical time, Jesi concludes that the revolt produces a common language amongst its participants which renders ideology inert; political parties therefore become the antithesis of revolt.⁹ There is a parallel with Fanon on this topic who stated, thinking through the colonial difference, that "Insurrection disorients the political parties. Their doctrine has always claimed the ineffectiveness of any confrontation and their very existence serves to condemn any idea of revolt."¹⁰ I will explore this aspect of Jesi's and Fanon's thought in a later project, but what is of interest here is that reading these two thinkers together serves to tease out the ways in which their thought converges but also differs in crucial ways, inarguably because of Fanon's positionality as *damné* and his understanding of the temporality of revolt and revolution in a colonial context.

While Jesi's reflections on revolution and revolt prove innovative, provocative, and useful, it seems they still are circumscribed by a Judeo-Christian eschatological schema whereby time is thought to be progressive and linear with a finality that is known *a priori* and therefore modifications must be made when thinking through the colonial difference. In addition, Jesi sees a danger in revolt since it is irremediably trapped within the mythological machine such that it can be

coopted by the hegemonic order. As Kieran Aarons stated, “inoperativity of both historical consciousness and the strategic apparatus of the political party exposes revolt to the risk of being leveraged or ‘technicized’ by ruling powers.”¹¹ As such, revolts, according to Jesi, can be mobilized by the ruling order so as to provide an escape valve of sorts in order to preemptively quell uneasiness or unrest. Furthermore, Jesi sees a danger in the temporality of revolt whereby the enemy as the personification of particular social, political, and/or economic relations transforms into a “Manichaeian moral terror in which the enemy suddenly appears as a ‘hideous,’ inhuman, and monstrous negativity to be vanquished *at all costs*.”¹² The problem though—and this is the crucial point of divergence between Jesi and Fanon—is that, for Fanon, “the colonial world *is* a Manichaeian world.”¹³ This means that in colonial contexts, Manichaeism begets revolt rather than revolt begetting Manichaeism. Fanon understood this clearly: “the colonist turns the colonized into a kind of quintessence of evil.”¹⁴ It is when the colonized come to grasp the Manichaeian structure of the colonial context, after which the colonized “discover their humanity,” that “they begin to sharpen their weapons.”¹⁵

I argue that Jesi’s conception of temporality and revolt cannot be directly applied to revolts and revolutions in colonial contexts, in processes of decolonization/decoloniality, due to the racialized/colonized subject’s position as what Michael E. Sawyer denotes *homo liminalis*, which refers to the subject who inhabits the limit between the *Abject/Elemental* subject or the subject who inhabits the limit between the *Elemental/Exalted* subject.¹⁶ In short, *homo liminalis* refers to a being whose subjectivity is in transition. While a detailed discussion of Sawyer’s proposal falls outside the scope of this article, this schema suggests that, in the modern/colonial world, there is a third position (*Elemental*) which mediates between sub- or non-humanity attributed to the colonized (*Abject*) and the God-complex of the bourgeois white male heteronormative patriarch (*Exalted*). As Sawyer puts it, “The Human, as such, is formed from the *Elemental* subject.”¹⁷ This third position is the buffer between both extremes that, in the modern/colonial world, legitimizes heteronormative patriarchal white supremacy while mobilizing white terror. For instance, I read white heteronormative bourgeois womanhood as an example of that third position, the citizen proper, as a symbol of “racial purity meant to be preserved and perpetuated,” where “the body of the white woman signifies the motivations, the justifications, and the culmination of American empire.”¹⁸ Or as African American philosopher Tommy J. Curry has argued, “Patriarchy depends on white femininity for its propagation. [...] Patriarchy evolved to protect white womanhood because white womanhood is not only the foundation on which empire is built but also the nascence of the expendable white male surplus needed for

imperial conquest."¹⁹ The white heteronormative bourgeois woman becomes the human proper inasmuch as she is not relegated to the realm of the sub-human, but not granted the sovereignty of white heteronormative bourgeois manhood (the patriarch proper).²⁰ Decolonial feminists Yuderlys Espinosa Miñoso and Celenis Rodríguez Moreno put it succinctly when they stated that "the ideal remains as white, educated, middle class, heterosexual womanhood, who must be emulated by black women or indigenous women, under the promise of humanity or citizenship."²¹

While Sawyer elaborates his concept of the *homo liminalis* to refer to the subject who inhabits the space between the *Abject* and *Elemental*, as well as the space between the *Elemental* and *Exalted*, I use the term *homo liminalis* here to refer to the subject who seeks to fracture the tripartite schema of modern/colonial subjectivity entirely through a movement into an alternate world, or a *being otherwise*. In this way, I interpret the *homo liminalis* as the subject who comes to discern the colonial logics underpinning modernity and, as such, opts for affirming a distinct world, moving beyond modern conceptions of subjectivity thus fracturing this tripartite architecture. Therefore, I borrow Sawyer's term to refer to the subject who ontologically moves from the world of modernity/coloniality, to another world, although they may still have to materially navigate physical spaces permeated by the logics of coloniality. Put differently, I understand the *homo liminalis* to refer to the subject who finds themselves in the process of decolonization/decoloniality, the subject immersed in *decolonial revolt*.

In this way, driven by the material conditions of their lived experience, the racialized/colonized subject, as *homo liminalis*, takes up the struggle for decolonization in which their experience of revolt is distinct than as theorized by Jesi inasmuch as they are subjected to a state of permanent war, as Puerto Rican philosopher Nelson Maldonado-Torres has argued.²² This article explores one of the dimensions of what Maldonado-Torres called the *metaphysical catastrophe* of modernity/coloniality, which refers to the fracturing of the various axes which constitute one's *being-in-the-world*. According to Maldonado-Torres, the metaphysical catastrophe "transformed the meaning and relation of basic areas of thinking and being, particularly the self and the other, along with temporality and spatiality, among other key concepts in the basic infrastructure that constitutes our human world."²³ I seek to explore one of the axes fractured by the metaphysical catastrophe—temporality—by proposing a distinct temporal schema which constitutes revolt in the context of coloniality as a process by which the racialized/colonized subject moves from *being-out-of-time* to a *being-in-time* that collapses spontaneity and duration onto themselves, which permeates all aspects of the subject's daily life, and is fundamentally anti-teleological.

The first section of this article consists of an exploration of the modern/colonial conception of temporality and historicity by exploring Manfred Kerkhoff's (1937–2007) interpretation of G.W.F. Hegel's (1770–1831) dialectic and its Judeo-Christian underpinning. The following section consists in elaborating Jesi's phenomenology of revolt as well as his conception of the mythological machine. In the third section this article comes to a head by situating Jesi's understanding of revolt and revolution across the colonial difference to show that it does not quite operate as he theorized. In contrast, and thinking with Fanon, I propose that the temporality of decolonization is to experience a fusion of the time of revolt and revolution as conceived by Jesi. In addition, the experience of revolt/revolution in colonial contexts is free of mythological underpinnings inasmuch as decolonial revolt is a biological necessity, thus it is not necessarily initially driven by a historical or political consciousness. As such, decolonial revolt constitutes the destruction of a "situation that makes [mythological] machines true and productive."²⁴ Finally, I will read the events of the summer of 2019 in Puerto Rico through this framework to show that the protests should not, and in fact cannot, be subsumed into salvific ideological narratives because what is at stake is the instrumentalizing of those protests by the dominant political class, thus stripping them of their decolonial potentiality by reifying "the deeper determinants of Western political rationality as a whole."

Modern/Colonial Temporality

Prior to exploring the modern/colonial understanding of time, the distinction must be made between *time* and *temporality*. Time refers to the relationship between ontic entities and processes. It refers to the scalar measurement of those processes as physical phenomena. According to Enrique Dussel,

Time is the relationship, before a human subject, of movements where one measures the other. We say "a one-hour lecture," with reference to the rotation of the Earth about its axis (a movement) which refers to another movement (the course of the professor's lecture before the students as indicated by the movement of the hands of the clock). It is a known physical fact.²⁵

In this way, one says that a person lived, say, 60 years, to refer to the duration of the entropic biological and chemical processes which constitute aging. Put differently, to say that to write this one sentence took me two hours refers to, following Dussel, the relationship between the process of striking the keyboard on the computer and the Earth's rotation. It is the measurement of the relationship between physical events

and processes, which only denotes magnitude. Hence, for example, certain instances of Newtonian mechanics' usage of time do not indicate directionality (as in Newton's second law, $F = m \frac{\Delta d}{\Delta t}$).

Temporality is a singular or collective subject's interpretation of time mediated by their world. In other words, a singular or collective subject's ontological totality mediates their interpretation of physical events and processes through mythmaking and other symbolic constructions. Dussel highlights this point in the following passage, which will be quoted in full:

Temporality, in turn, is ontological: it is the happening of human *being* arising out of a present world (as the understanding of *being*) from a (remembered) past, retained in that present (the instant of the "today" or the "now"), and open to a future (already contained in that present as potentiality). Human existence develops in the present time (the only possible existent time), but from the tension of a retained past and a projected future. It is then in the very experience of time that human existence is organized.²⁶

While it is certain that temporality is ontological, what exactly characterizes Judeo-Christian temporality and what is its relationship to Hegel's dialectic? Judeo-Christian temporality views time as a flowing progression from past, to present, to future, is typical of the system forged by Christian tradition, in which time is seen as linear and progressive, with a beginning, ending in a fulfilment, and experienced in a tension between formerly (the creation of the world and Adam's sin), already (the passion of Christ), and not yet (waiting for the Parousia). This sequence is seen as a linear and irreversible temporal process, which is caused by and must repair the original sin, and which governs all humanity.²⁷

Put differently, the Judeo-Christian temporal schema is one which continuously moves towards the eventual supplanting of the ephemeral with the eternal in a return to the space-time singularity which constituted human existence prior to Adam's expulsion from the Garden of Eden.²⁸ Nevertheless, this eventual return to the eternal, Parousia, is anticipated in a cyclical manner through the enactment of ceremonies and rituals, which renders Judeo-Christian temporality as spiral in form (i.e., continuous cyclical repetition en route to an inevitable end). As Gauthier puts it, "For Christians and Jews, as well as Zoroastrians, behind this doctrine of a linear time always heading towards an ultimate end lies the periodization through festivals of eschatological value that are linked to different cycles."²⁹ This allows for — according to Gauthier — a perception of this eschatological process as being underway. It follows that Judeo-Christian teleology creates time through its repetition of cycles which seem to progress towards

an inevitable end: the second coming of Christ. It is this framework that Hegel would adopt and secularize in his understanding of time and history, conceptualized as his dialectic.

Hegel's conception of the dialectic, at its core, is the secularization of the Judeo-Christian temporal schema through its cyclical repetition of sublation en route to the revelation—not the creation, but rather *recreation*—of the Absolute Idea. As J.M.E. McTaggart (1866–1925) put it, “For the dialectic process, even if we suppose it to take place in time, is not a mere succession in time, but essentially a logical process.”³⁰ This is the main point: Hegel's dialectic is the logical process by which we interpret temporality and historicity, as the eschatological revelation of the Absolute Idea, who is eternal. To state it differently, the Absolute Idea is eternal, and it reveals itself to us through the logical process of the dialectic, which we temporalize. In this sense, Kerkhoff believed that “Hegel's philosophy concludes philosophy as such.”³¹

According to Kerkhoff, “For Hegel, Christ is not only a historical model of a popular religion founded on love, but—what is more important—the ultimate example of a fully experienced dialectic of separation and union.”³² Hegel saw in the figure of Christ the concrete manifestation of sublation in the coming, death, and resurrection. This led Hegel to believe that philosophy was the mechanism by which one could grasp the experience of inhabiting a world in transition through logical articulation, by subsuming what was and announcing what is to come. “Philosophy—Kerkhoff says—announces and pronounces the epiphany, parousia of that universal power, and in pronouncing it, gives it historical form.”³³

According to Hegel, it is the role of philosophy to give historical (and thus temporal) coherence to the world that no longer *is*, such that the new world can be born, recovering elements of that previous world in the process to show how they were always part of an organic totality. As Kerkhoff put it, “only with the help of past life, now fully conceived, made true, the new epoch is created; for from nothing could not emerge new life.”³⁴ Hegel understood his philosophy, at least in Kerkhoff's view, as an effort to conceptualize “what from the coming of Christ appears as the beginning of history and the (modern) world.”³⁵ Put differently, Hegel sought to secularize Christian teleology. Kerkhoff describes Hegel's project succinctly:

For fear of becoming a popular philosopher or Messiah of his time (which would imply the hated tendency towards positivity), Hegel prefers to think that the level of spirit attained in the modern world demands that religion be surpassed, diluted in philosophy, that the mere representation of the absolute becomes a concept, that sentiment is replaced by speculative contemplation. Thus the “Geist,” the dialectical unity of feeling and thinking, becomes the

model of reconciliation; the earlier sense of love becomes mature “Vernunft” [reason]. In other words, Hegel is placed in God’s place at the end of history (or at the beginning, which is the same), contemplating the suffering of the epoch from the point of view of the absolute.³⁶

It is this conceptualization of temporality and the development or progression of history which would form the cornerstone of Marx’s historical materialism, which in turn would be adopted by many revolutionary thinkers in the twentieth century. Amongst those is Italian historian, philosopher, and mythologist Furio Jesi.

Revolt, Revolution, and the Mythological Machine

In the context of the May 1968 revolts, Italian historian and philosopher Furio Jesi would be working on the text *Spartakus. Simbologia della rivolta*, a phenomenological study of revolt, telling a friend via letter that the manuscript was completed on the night of December 11, 1969. The text would remain hidden for twenty years after its author’s death until recovered from Marta Rossi Jesi by Andrea Cavalletti, who edited the manuscript and worked to get it published in 2000. According to Cavalletti, *Spartakus* is “one of the most beautifully written essays in the Italian language and one of the most original essays of the second half of the twentieth century.”³⁷ While there is much to say about this text, what drives this section of this article is to understand how a singular or collective subject’s experience or interpretation of time – temporality – changes in contexts of revolt and revolution.

In *Spartakus*, Jesi uses the Spartacist uprising of 1919 as a springboard to phenomenologically explore revolts vis-à-vis revolutions, two words used seemingly interchangeably which, as will be shown, is incorrect because they are two different phenomena. The text starts with a discussion of ideas and ideologies. For Jesi, the idea is equivalent to the epiphany, which refers to “facts that bring novelty, subversive facts, symptoms or determinants – according to how history is understood – of the perennial becoming or of the eternal return.”³⁸ In other words, it refers to the spontaneous irruption of the new within historical time. As time progresses, understood teleologically, the epiphany begins to crystallize, slowly mutating into ideology, which refers to a paradigm. Jesi states that

When ideology begins to exist, the idea has become crystal: of subversive force that was at the beginning, it has become a paradigm, of mobile reality that is lived day after day, it has become a mirror, the only mirror in which, by custom, the bourgeois judges the meaning and value of the conduct of those who have assumed this idea as their center.³⁹

Put differently, the idea as epiphanous refers to an ephemeral thought which manifests and lives in phantasmagoric fashion; it is thought which shape-shifts depending on the context, “of mobile reality that is lived day after day.” The idea can then solidify into ideology in a process which levels it such that all ideologies reside on the same normative plane. This solidification occurs, according to Jesi, through the abstraction of the idea away from the class struggle. This “places Marxism and fascism on the same theoretical plane [...] The unelected bourgeois and the unenlightened bourgeois intellectual may then give their support to the ideology that favors their interests.”⁴⁰ In this regard, Jesi emphasizes that memory has little to do with the emergence of the epiphany. Ideas, as novel irruptions which bring about that which had not existed before, “are not repetitions on the edge of memory or according to the laws of a cyclical history of an ancient precedent. They are rather interferences of extratemporal truth in the existence of one who is believed to be involved in the time of history.”⁴¹ Put differently, the emergence of the epiphany manifests *outside* temporality inasmuch as it refers to a suspension in time, disobeying “the laws of a cyclical history of an ancient precedent” which should be read as a temporality which circumscribes to a Judeo-Christian eschatology.

Jesi then goes on to liken the idea with revolt and ideology with revolution inasmuch as the former refers to the epiphanous and the latter refers to the crystallized. He makes the distinction in the following crucial passage, which is quoted in full:

What most distinguishes the revolt from the revolution is instead a different experience of time. If, according to the usual meaning of both words, the revolt is a sudden focus of insurrection that can be inserted into a strategic design but does not in itself imply a long-term strategy, and revolution on the contrary is a strategic complex of coordinated and relatively long-term oriented insurrectional movements towards the ultimate goals, then it could be said that the revolt suspends the historical time and establishes at once a time in which all that is accomplished has worth by itself, regardless of its consequences and its relationship with the transience or perennially complex in which history consists.⁴²

Referring back to the previous section in which Judeo-Christian temporality was laid out, one can envision Jesi’s conception of revolution as that phenomenon which is mounted on the arrow of time, moving ever forward, which will inevitably reach its end goal as the recreation, or revelation, of the Absolute Idea through the dialectic. It is Marx’s inevitable proletariat dictatorship through class struggle. Revolution implies that thought is given to cause and effect relationships to reach that inevitable goal. For Jesi, revolt, on the other hand, is the suspension of that temporal movement. While the former involves long term

planification and strategizing, the latter is the heat of battle in which every act harbors value in and of itself. In this sense, "revolt brings about a mutation in the experience of time, choice, and meaning that no amount of planning or preparation can fully dampen or circumvent."⁴³

Furthermore, Jesi saw the ways in which the utility, or rather the relevance, of political parties is fractured during the moment of the revolt. This is so because the political party is the concrete manifestation of ideology, thus it becomes suspended during revolt. The same may be said to apply to non-partisan political organizations, which also index ideologies. In addition, Jesi identified the ways in which political parties, as radical as they may be, imitate the symbols, myths, and structures of capital. In Jesi's words, "Class parties and trade unions suffer from the unquestionable fascination of the capitalist counterpart and seek to confront it by transforming themselves into organs formally similar to those that characterize it."⁴⁴ It is useful here to remember Audre Lorde (1934–1992) who famously stated, "the master's tools will never dismantle the master's house."⁴⁵

The temporal suspension in revolt manifests as a perpetual wait. Referring to the Spartacist revolt, Jesi stated that "For four years the war had suspended the usual rhythm of life, each hour became waiting: waiting for the next attack – on behalf of oneself or of the enemy –, all moments of a greater wait, that of victory."⁴⁶ For Jesi, revolt produces a shift in the way one experiences Judeo-Christian temporality. It produces a pause in one's quotidian happenings. In addition, Jesi states that "Most of those who participate in a revolt choose to compromise their own individuality in an action whose consequences they do not know and cannot foresee."⁴⁷ Put differently, the epiphanous idea – revolt – produces a common language and symbology which the participants in the revolt share vis-à-vis revolution which relies on an ideology among ideologies, all of which lay on the same plane.

Nevertheless, Jesi did not see the revolt as something to be celebrated for two principle reasons. Foremost, the revolt, although it consists in a suspension of historical time and ideology, does not wrest itself free of the mythological machine which clouds the political actors' strategic vision, as if producing a fog of war of sorts. As Aarons stated, quoting Jesi, "By their power to wrench us 'outside' of historical time, mythological symbols enclose the perceptual field of partisan action within the symmetrical image of an eternal battle ('the same obstacles... *the same enemy as ever*')."⁴⁸ This mythological machination produces an experience of revolt whereby one fights "not in history but as if on the sacrificial plane of eternity."⁴⁹ For Aarons, this produces what he refers to as the "insurrectional ban," which is defined as "this simultaneous open-and-shut motion, whereby the 'opening' of historical time onto an 'outside' in fact serves to close perception anew within the narrow walls of mythical identification."⁵⁰ Put differ-

ently, the insurrectional ban, in my reading, refers to the dissipation of a consciousness of concrete material conditions, “descending into a dream, trapping participants in a mythologically-inflated image of their own activity.”⁵¹ This is the mythological machine: “a gnoseological apparatus that functions to ‘keep myth constantly separate from history’ while leading us to believe that it ‘comes to us from an “other” world.’”⁵²

The danger this produces, according to Jesi, is a Manichaeism in which the opponent as the embodiment of concrete social, historical, and economic relations is transformed into an absolute evil. In revolt, then, one is “no longer fighting *a* battle but *the* battle, no longer an enemy but *the* enemy (‘the same enemy as ever’)” which produces “a deadly sacrificial lure.”⁵³ As Jesi stated, “The monster reveals itself to be the holder of a power when its adversaries feel the need to counter it with the power of heroic virtue (that is, with the death of the hero).”⁵⁴ But in the case of the racialized/colonized subject who faces a premature death precisely *because* of the Manichaean structure of the colonial order, whether in revolt or not, what option is there but to hurl oneself into the struggle? It is an inevitable paradox which racialized/colonized subjects must wrestle with. For Jesi though, according to Aarons, “the strategic horizon of perception” becomes “transposed onto a plane of moral eternity” in which “partisans suddenly find themselves transformed into sacrificial ‘heroes’” in what could “almost be regarded as a spasmodic preparation for triumph or death.”⁵⁵ Nevertheless, in decolonial revolt there is no requirement for a “strategic horizon of perception.” We just want to breathe, “in more than one sense of the word.” This is the crucial point as to why Jesi’s conception of revolt is irremediably distinct from how we must think through revolt in colonial contexts. While for Jesi, “the symbolization of perception merges with the Manichaean negativity of a ‘battle-against,’”⁵⁶ the racialized/colonized subject already lives in a “Manichaean negativity” and it is that Manichaeism which produces decolonial revolt. While for Jesi, “an inability to dissociate oneself from the suspended time of revolt that neutralizes our strategic awareness of the relativity and contingency of the clash, leaving us incapable of limiting our defeat,” producing a “psychosis of revolt,”⁵⁷ the distinction with the colonial context is that by *not* engaging in revolt, we guarantee our defeat, for we as racialized/colonized beings are subjected to a premature death. It is only through decolonial revolt that we can gain a “strategic horizon of perception” in the sense that through decolonial revolt we can come to grasp the possibility of transforming our existence. In this sense, decolonial revolt does not produce an insurrectional ban for it is only through decolonial revolt that the racialized/colonized subject “discovers reality and transforms it through [their] praxis, [their] deployment of violence and [their] agenda for liberation.”⁵⁸

On the other hand, because revolt operates under the logic of the mythological machine for Jesi, it runs the risk of being instrumentalized or “technicized” by the dominant order. As such, the dominant order can weaponize revolt under favorable conditions such that it becomes an escape valve to release built up frustrations and serves to quell unrest. In other words, “the inoperativity of both historical consciousness and the strategic apparatus of the political party” during revolt can induce “an opportunistic mode of governance which, rather than trying to avert or quell disruption and rebellion, seeks instead to induce manageable crises so as to pilot them in directions strategically opportune for the restoration of ‘normal time’.”⁵⁹ In this sense, revolts, rather than serving as a mechanism for disrupting hegemonic power structures, can in fact serve to reify them: “a premature insurrection can sometimes be the straightest line for the ruling class to re-solidify its dominance, which is anyway nothing other than the ‘bourgeois manipulation of time’ ensuring the ‘calm endurance’ of commodity society.”⁶⁰ Put differently, dominant political actors can mobilize revolts under favorable conditions as a way to produce an escape valve to quell uneasiness and unrest to reestablish historical time, reasserting their dominance.

Up until this point, I have discussed Judeo-Christian temporality as the foundation of Hegel’s conception of the dialectic and the advancing of history as linear and progressive, the phenomenological distinction between revolt and revolution, and the mythological machine constitutive of both phenomena. In the following section I will explore how the colonized/racialized subject enacts decolonial revolt, which constitutes a departure from Jesi’s conception of revolt. Following Fanon’s ruminations on decolonization as a biological necessity, this leads me to conclude that the racialized/colonized being, as a being whose subjectivity is in transition in the process of decolonization/decoloniality, lives in a state in which the temporality of revolt and revolution are *fused*.

This is where I see Fanon’s departure from Jesi. This notion of fusion responds to the fact that the racialized/colonized subject lives in a state of permanent war; their very existence does not respond to modern/colonial temporality in the sense that the racialized and the colonized are subjected to a premature death. As such, I suggest a departure from Jesi who understood “permanent revolution” as “the will to be able to suspend at any time the historical time in order to find collective shelter in the symbolic space and time of the revolt.”⁶¹ In turn, I liken decolonization to a state in which the time of revolt and revolution are fused, and which inhibits the possibility of a mythological machine. As such, decolonial revolt cannot be subsumed in nationalist, salvific narratives with their heroic figures, symbols, and myths. When understood this way, one can conceive the struggle for

liberation as the political praxis that must range from macropolitical struggle to the decolonization of the ways in which we navigate social spaces and relationships.

Revolt and Revolution Across the Colonial Difference

As quoted in the opening paragraphs of this text, the metaphysical catastrophe proposed by Maldonado-Torres constitutes a fracture in the racialized/colonized subject's notion of temporality. Inasmuch as the racialized/colonized subject becomes the location in which war and death are normalized, they effectively become subjects constituted outside of time as conceived by modernity/coloniality. In saying this I do not intend to reify racist notions of time, advanced by Hegel, in which "The planet was all of a sudden living in different temporalities, with Europe in the present and the rest in the past."⁶² What I mean is that racialized/colonized subjects are "out of time" in the sense that we suffer a premature death. Therefore, subscribing to modern/colonial temporality as a framework through which to articulate the struggle for decolonization is ineffective for two reasons. The first is related to the ways in which decolonization struggles are mistakenly subsumed into narratives which subscribe to the Hegelian dialectic, elaborated above. These narratives also have Judeo-Christian teleological underpinnings inasmuch as they allude to decolonization as "inevitable." As Fanon had realized, colonial contexts are anti-dialectical in the Hegelian sense.⁶³ This means that decolonization and decoloniality cannot subscribe to politics of recognition nor can they subscribe to Judeo-Christian temporal schemas. What is at stake is that by framing the struggle for decolonization/decoloniality in this way, we would not be compelled to act, for decolonization/decoloniality will happen...eventually. As such, the struggle for decolonization cannot be articulated through notions of a "pre" and "post," or as Silvia Rivera Cusicanqui stated, "There is no 'post' or 'pre' in a vision of history that is neither linear nor teleological, that moves in cycles and spirals, that marks a course without ceasing to return to the same point."⁶⁴ Put differently, the struggle for decolonization cannot be articulated through the tripartite framework of past/present/future, precisely because that is a framework which does not apply to colonized subjects. We have been stripped of our past—to a certain extent—through genocide, enslavement, and colonization, and we have been stripped of our future, in the biological sense of the term, through permanent war and premature death. All we have is *now*.

In his exploration of temporality, Sawyer looks at social contract theory, particularly Rousseau's notion of the General Will, through the concept of time.⁶⁵ Sawyer concludes that the *Exalted* subject, as the white supremacist heteronormative bourgeois Christian patriarch, the

lawgiver, the sovereign, is the one who establishes a collective time signature as a mechanism through which to synchronize individual time signatures. This is analogous to the subordination of the individual will to the will of the collective which forms the basis of social contract theory. Through this lens, one can understand the centrality of the church bell tower, for example, as the mechanism through which to establish a normative time signature which was typically located at the center of the newfound settler colony. The *Exalted* subject, while they establish the collective time signature, is not subordinated to it.⁶⁶ Or in Sawyer's words, the *Exalted* subject is "in the unique position to give time to the other while having no place within the time that is given."⁶⁷ The *Elemental* subject, as the third position which serves as a buffer between the *Abject* subject and the *Exalted* subject, is the citizen proper. It is the subject who forms the bulwark of the Western civil societal order and is subjected to the collective time signature established by the *Exalted* subject.

The *Exalted* subject, according to Sawyer's theorization on temporality as graphed over Rousseau's thought, is also responsible for the enforcement of the social contract through the punishment of those subjects whose individual temporalities fail to fall in line with that of the collective. As Sawyer puts it,

Upon electing to violate the strictures of societal order, the *Exalted* figure who has established the duty to relinquish individual time and the unified perception that replaces it punishes the transgression of the regime of law with death, forcing the former *Elemental* Citizen into the status of the *Abject* with a new time that is marked as death.⁶⁸

Viewed in this light, the colonized/racialized subject—or in Sawyer's terms, the *Abject* subject—is expelled from the collective time of Western society with "a new time that is marked as death." If we assume the temporal schema of Western society as subscribing to Judeo-Christian teleology, it becomes evident that decolonization *cannot* be circumscribed to the temporal schema implicit in Hegel's dialectic, thus reifying it. In this regard, I am in complete agreement with Maldonado-Torres when he states that decolonization, indeed decoloniality, "is a *direct challenge* to the *temporal*, spatial, and subjective axis of the modern/colonial world and its institutions."⁶⁹ The question, then, becomes, what is at stake?

I suggest that the framing of the struggle for decolonization within a temporal schema with Judeo-Christian underpinnings produces what Angela Davis critiqued in her 2013 speech at Birkbeck University, entitled "Closures and Continuities." Circumscribing the struggle for decolonization to Judeo-Christian temporal schemas (whether in

the form of the Hegelian dialectic or Marx's historical materialism, for example), enacts "historical closures,"⁷⁰ since time is framed as progressive and linear through a series of cyclical events of eschatological value, and which provide a perception of this teleological process as being underway with particular historical agents at the fore. This leads Davis to ask the question, "And I wonder, will we ever truly recognize the collective subject of history that was itself produced by radical organizing?"⁷¹ To recognize the "collective subject of history" would necessitate the deactivation of modern temporal schemas which monumentalize social and political events and lead to the reinstatement of the mythological machine.

These modern/colonial frameworks, particularly Hegel's theory of history as the re-creation of the Absolute Idea through the dialectic, has two implications that relate to notions of temporality. If the dialectic is the logical process by which the Absolute Idea is made explicit and experienced in time and thus historicized, then the dialectic does not apply to non-Europeans because non-Europeans are "irrational." On the other hand, it is the job of the (European) philosopher, according to Hegel, to elaborate the proper symbols through which higher order valid categories manifest, which then the Great Man uses to carry out historical change.

Davis realized that the struggle for decolonization—surely the Civil Rights Movement could be understood as part of a process of internal decolonization/decoloniality—is a quotidian affair. Put differently, Davis realized that decolonization/decoloniality consists of a process by which the *Abject* subject seeks to alter its subjectivity, floating in the liminal space between abjection and the realm of the human proper as *homo liminalis* by fracturing the modern/colonial architecture of subjectivity, a process which subscribes to an alternate temporality; namely, a state of decolonial revolt whereby even the act of staying alive is seen as an attempt against the white supremacist colonial order. The structure which makes abjection a possibility, once seen as rigid, came to be understood as something which can be torn down. In Davis's words,

Regimes of racial segregation were not disestablished because of the work of leaders and presidents and legislators, but rather because of the fact that ordinary people adopted a critical stance in the way in which they perceived their relationship to reality. Social realities that may have appeared inalterable, impenetrable, came to be viewed as malleable and transformable; and people learned how to imagine what it might mean to live in a world that was not so exclusively governed by the principle of white supremacy. This collective consciousness emerged within the context of social struggles.⁷²

I read Davis as establishing the moment in which the colonized/racialized subject, the *Abject* subject, begins to fracture the architecture of subjectivity which makes abjection a possibility by moving into this zone of transition, effectively altering its subjectivity into the *homo liminalis*. “Ordinary people” come to grasp the colonial logics which underpin the society they are forced to navigate. In other words, they come to discern the colonial logics inherent in modernity. I argue that this comes to be so, at least in part, because the racialized/colonized subject sees, elsewhere, that alternate worlds are indeed possible. We can think of the pedagogical importance of the Cuban Revolution for the Civil Rights Movement, for example. Or in Davis’s words, “people learned how to imagine what it might mean to live in a world that was not so exclusively governed by the principle of white supremacy.” This is the beginning of the process of decolonization, in which the coloniality of being becomes unsettled—albeit not necessarily permanently—from a colonized subject’s conception of its being.⁷³ As such, quotidian acts—phrases, gestures, modes of interacting with *others* and the cosmos—become altered. Put differently, decolonization is an ontological presupposition which must be assumed and thus a quotidian affair which permeates all aspects of one’s relations to the *self*, to the *other*, and to the environment. As Rivera Cusicanqui stated, “The possibility of a profound cultural reform in our society depends on the decolonization of our gestures, our actions, and the language with which we name the world.”⁷⁴

If the *Abject* subject faces premature death in the modern/colonial world, which implies to “Be(ing) Out of Time,”⁷⁵ the *homo liminalis* as a subject in the process of decolonization is also to *be(ing)-out-of-time* inasmuch as it is a subjectivity which resides outside the collective time of the modern/colonial world which exerts physical control over their bodies through various technologies (i.e., mass incarceration). The *Abject* is the dehumanized subject who is a “problem”⁷⁶ for the modern/colonial world; the *homo liminalis* is the human par excellence in, though not for, the modern/colonial world who becomes a threat to the power structure through their agency and thus must be eliminated. This brings about the paradox highlighted in Huey P. Newton’s conception of *revolutionary suicide*, which is “an eschatological mandate”⁷⁷ holding that when faced with “premature death”—read: *be(ing)-out-of-time*—, “it is better to oppose the forces that would drive me to self-murder than to endure them.”⁷⁸ This opposition can take the form of armed resistance, radical autonomous organizing,⁷⁹ or any other mode of organizing which may produce (inter)subjectivities which fracture the (inter)subjectivities brought about by the metaphysical catastrophe.

In this way, decolonial revolt first manifests as a “now or never” to hinder the premature death imposed by the colonial order, although

it may in fact bring about a premature death in the form of revolutionary suicide. The main difference between revolt as theorized by Jesi and decolonial revolt is that there is no mythological machine at work. Decolonial revolt is a struggle to just *breathe*. It is in this sense that I understand Fanon when he stated that “The density of History determines none of my acts. I am my own foundation.”⁸⁰

Therefore, decolonial revolt is guided by a fundamental will to live, but to live in a world free of colonial logics. When decolonial revolt erupts, “spontaneity rules,”⁸¹ in which the racialized/colonized subject is “willing to feel the shudder of death, the irreversible extinction, but also the possibility of impossibility.”⁸² Here, Fanon alludes to Martin Heidegger (1889–1976) (“possibility of impossibility”) to argue that the struggle for decolonization can result in premature death, which is guaranteed for the racialized/colonized subject (regardless of whether they are immersed in revolt or not), but also has the potential to transform death into a mere possibility. Death then, for Heidegger, remains a possibility among other possibilities. However, for Fanon the death of the racialized/colonized subject is not something that is “distinctively impending”⁸³ but a guarantee, and the struggle for decolonization has the capacity to dispel premature death and transform it into mere possibility. Therefore, there is no “sacrificial lure” in decolonial revolt as there is for Jesi in mere revolt. It is in this sense that I interpret the following passage by Fanon:

The structure of the present work is grounded in temporality. Every human problem cries out to be considered on the basis of time, the ideal being that the present always serves to build the future. And this future is not that of the cosmos, but very much the future of my century, my country, and my existence. In no way is it up to me to prepare for the world coming after me. I am resolutely a man of my time. And that is my reason for living. The future must be a construction supported by man in the present. This future edifice is linked to the present insofar as I consider the present something to be overtaken.⁸⁴

I think what Fanon is arguing here is a notion of temporality as it relates to decolonial revolt in which the future, past (with his comment “The density of History determines none of my acts. I am my own foundation.”), and present collapse into the present inasmuch as one’s actions *today*, as *now or never*, opens the possibility for futurity. Therefore, during the opening moments of decolonial revolt, “the cult of spontaneity is triumphant.”⁸⁵ One comes to grasp one’s *being-in-time* inasmuch as the racialized/colonized subject shakes off the coloniality of their being. It is only *after* the initial stage of revolt, for Fanon, that the racialized/colonized subject realizes that “revolt, even on a grand scale, needs control and guidance. [The leaders of the insurrection],

therefore, must transform the movement from a [...] revolt into a revolutionary war."⁸⁶ It is in this sense that Fanon's thoughts on revolt and revolution differ from Jesi's:

Nonbeing blocks dialectical motion, making explosive appearance the subjective and objective prerequisite to individual and collective struggle. At some point, the violence of colonialism is so "atmospheric" that resistance "breaks out sporadically" in a rebellion/massacre/rebellion-prime dialectic that constantly ups the stakes. And in fact, we could even say that the broad arc of Fanon's *The Wretched of the Earth*—grasping first the "grandeur" then the "weakness" of spontaneity—is precisely analogous to the transition from explosion to duration.⁸⁷

Decolonial revolt, understood through Fanon, then implies the binding of the Jesian notions of temporality during revolt and revolution. Decolonial revolt as spontaneity is a response to the Manichaeic structure of modernity/coloniality, contra Jesi who understood revolt as producing Manichaeism. Once the racialized/colonized subjects are inserted in the temporality of decolonial revolt as spontaneity, as explosion, they come to grasp that 1) another world is in fact possible, free from the logics that produce a premature death thus constituting themselves, for themselves, "in time" and 2) decolonial revolt as spontaneity must then be transformed into decolonial revolt as duration. George Ciccariello-Maher beautifully describes "the dialectical moment that Fanon identified so well" as

doing slow work but doing it constantly, intensely, and urgently; binding the riot to occupation, momentary upsurge to long-term movement-building; stabilizing revolutionary energy in everyday practices; and building the counter-power necessary to ground future explosions, future leaps into the unknown.⁸⁸

Fundamental here is an understanding of the temporality of decolonial revolt, as spontaneity or duration, as anti-teleological. While Hegel understood the dialectic as a logical movement by which the Absolute Idea is revealed, and its Marxist interpretation understood the dialectic as a movement in time produced by class conflict en route to the inevitable fall of capitalism, "[w]e cannot know a priori what a 'decolonized' world will look like because our actions and those of others create the possibilities for what the world will be."⁸⁹ Therefore, while revolt for Jesi implies the loss of a historical and material consciousness in favor of mythology, decolonial revolt produces an anti-teleological historical consciousness in which "the utopia of the damnés will need revision and redirection depending on what the relationships reveal"⁹⁰ during the process of movement building towards decolonization/decolonial-

ity. This means that the transition of decolonial revolt as spontaneity to duration “has more to do with the coalescence of solidarities already present in practice, mutual inspirations and rebounding resonances, and the contagious expansion of guiding ideas rather than a singular *Idea*.”⁹¹ In addition, decolonial revolt constitutes a way of *being-in-the-world* and a *being-with-others* which should be understood as always already a possibility we can assume or take up, through which we can “stabiliz[e] revolutionary energy in everyday practices,” rather than be understood as a project always postponed or set out into the future.

In this sense, Jesi’s conception of “permanent revolution,” described above, does not apply to racialized/colonized beings, nor does it apply to the process of decolonization/decoloniality as Fanon realized. Jesi, as an Italian writing in France, assumes that one can carry on with one’s life in tranquility, immersed in historical time as “normal time.” As Cavalletti stated, “In ‘normal time’, in daily life regulated by work and directed breaks, they are instead alone, each immersed in their dream.”⁹² At will, Jesi believed one can suspend historical time to become immersed in the time of the revolt. But while for Jesi, the time of revolt suspends “the usual rhythm of life. Every hour [becomes] an hour of waiting—waiting for the next move (one’s own or the enemy’s),”⁹³ the “usual rhythm of life” is already interrupted for the racialized/colonized subject through the logics of coloniality; every hour becomes an hour of waiting for one’s death. As beings subjected to a premature death, outside of the modern/colonial conception of temporality, each and every act has value in and of itself and contributes to the struggle for decolonization. There is no rest, no “dream,” for those of us who “were never meant to survive.”⁹⁴

While I do not seek to undermine the importance of macropolitical struggle which includes, but is not limited to, armed struggle, in the process for decolonization and decoloniality, I argue that it is fundamental to understand that for decolonization one must come to interpret seemingly unimportant or mundane acts as equally important for decolonial revolt for they form the cornerstone for the “coalescence of solidarities” that Ciccariello-Maher sees as crucial for transforming spontaneity to duration. In this way, one can come to see the multiple fronts in which decolonization/decoloniality must be carried out. This allows us to conceptualize the ways in which “ordinary people,” to use Davis’s phrase, came to view the seemingly rigid structure of modernity/coloniality as “malleable and transformable” if applied pressure. I conclude with a reflection on the summer of 2019 in Puerto Rico.

Conclusion: On the Summer of 2019

In this article I have argued against the framing of decolonial struggles within a dialectical framework, in the Hegelian sense, and consequent-

ly within a Judeo-Christian temporal schema. First, I elaborated the Judeo-Christian temporal schema and showed how Hegel's dialectic is the secularization of Judeo-Christian eschatology. As such, Hegel views the unfolding of history as the re-creation of the Absolute Idea through which the human subject experiences the passing of time as linear and progressive. This results in a temporal schema that is understood as moving towards an inevitable end: Parousia in Judeo-Christian theology or the dictatorship of the proletariat in Marx, for example. I argued against framing decolonization within this logic.

In addition, I explored Jesi's phenomenological analysis of revolt and revolution. Jesi distinguishes one from the other by asserting that a revolution is immersed in historical time and as such consists of a long-term strategy. On the other hand, Jesi categorizes the revolt as a suspension in historical time, as a moment in which each act has value in and of itself, whereby ideologies and political parties are rendered inert. In addition, I explored Jesi's conception of the mythological machine. I then situated Jesi's thought on revolts across the colonial difference, concluding that while for Jesi revolt begets Manichaeism, in the colonial context Manichaeism begets decolonial revolt. As such, the subject who finds themselves immersed in the struggle for decolonization does so out of biological necessity, thus wrenched free from the mythological machine, and finds themselves in the process of altering their subjectivity by moving from the world of modernity/coloniality to (an)other world; they become a subject in transition, *homo liminalis*. As such, they enter a temporal schema and embody a *being-in-the-world* and a *being-with-others* constituted by a state of decolonial revolt. I will briefly look at the protests in the summer of 2019 in Puerto Rico as a case study of these notions of revolt and decolonial revolt.⁹⁵

On July 24, 2019, Ricardo Rosselló Nevares, of the New Progressive Party (PNP), announced his resignation from the governorship of Puerto Rico after two weeks of protests across the archipelago and the diaspora.⁹⁶ In short, the protests came in response to a leaked chat from the Telegram messaging application which revealed symptoms of an order characterized by white supremacy, heteronormativity, Christocentric patriarchy, capitalism, and Eurocentrism. As the protests were unfolding, and in the immediate weeks after, writers, researchers, and academics were trying to make sense of what had occurred. In the process, the events of the summer of 2019 have been circumscribed to a modern/colonial temporal schema.

For example, in a hastily published book on the summer of 2019, Silverio Pérez elaborates a timeline of events—ensuring to highlight dates in bold letters—which, according to him, represent “the passage of time accelerating towards that *inevitable* summer of 2019.”⁹⁷ In addition to his highlighting of dates to arbitrarily attribute importance to them, Pérez, for no significant reason, does the math to make the

connections between the dates for the reader. For example, regarding the news that broke out in 2018 that then governor Rosselló Nevares had authorized the procurement of a \$245,000 bulletproof SUV, he says that “370 days later”⁹⁸ he would have to make a more drastic decision—resign—as if there were any logical connection between those two events. Pérez views the events of the summer of 2019 through a modern/colonial temporal schema which deems them as inevitable. There was nothing “inevitable” of the summer protests; the chat being leaked, which was the catalyst for the events, was contingent. In addition, and potentially fittingly so, Pérez subscribes to a Hegelian notion of historicity and great man theory when he states that “These two well-known artists [René Pérez and Bad Bunny] would lead the calls for street protests in July that would culminate in the departure of Rosselló Nevares.”⁹⁹ In the process, Pérez obfuscated the fact that many of the protests were *auto-convocado* (self-convened), and also invisibilized the work done by local activists, particularly decolonial feminist activists from the Colectiva Feminista en Construcción (who were arguably the most politically active organization during the year leading up to the summer of 2019), while also, even if unconsciously, asserting that only rich, light-skinned, heterosexual men have political agency. Pérez also invisibilized the work of other activist organizations during the summer of 2019, such as Jornada Se Acabaron Las Promesas, who were the first, or at least one of the first, to organize against the imposition of the dictatorial fiscal control board imposed in 2016.¹⁰⁰ Pérez mentions neither organization in his text because it seems that for him, it was the political acumen of these two wealthy light-skinned men who organized the masses in protest. This is categorically untrue.

Pérez also builds a problematic narrative which places the “seed,” as he at least hesitatingly calls it, in Rosselló Nevares’s father’s governorship. During Pedro Rosselló González’s governorship (1993–2001), then-US President Bill Clinton made the decision to eliminate the benefits provided by Section 936 of the US Internal Revenue Codes, which caused a downturn in the manufacturing industry in Puerto Rico because the local government did not establish an economic plan to deal with the ramifications of that piece of legislation. In the process, Pérez fails to address the colonial structures and matrix of power of US imperialism which have been asphyxiating the people for over a century. In addition, the role of the opposition—the Popular Democratic Party (PPD)—and of the local capitalist class—the “Criollo bloc”¹⁰¹—in the archipelago’s financial troubles are also ignored. Nevertheless, he denotes the summer of 2019 as inevitable, which in addition to ascribing a Judeo-Christian teleological underpinning to those events, also enacts a historical closure. Herein lies the danger of trying to subsume the struggle for liberation within a modern/colonial

historicality: one reduces, obfuscates, transfigures, erases, minimizes, or disavows what one pleases, constructing a narrative to accommodate into one's ideological inclinations. The epiphanous moment of the summer of 2019, which erupted from the quotidian struggles of those living in the Puerto Rican archipelago and its diasporas, although it is not always legible as such, crystallizes to form an ideology which strips the events of its revolutionary immanence. Decolonial revolt is stripped of its radicality, celebrated as some inevitable event, while completely disavowing the grueling groundwork necessary to fuse spontaneity with duration.

While some have argued that the protests were not spontaneous in the sense that they did not erupt "out of the blue," I would like to further characterize statements that they were necessarily built upon architectures of anti-colonial, nationalist, environmentalist, and feminist resistance. Taken at face value, this also results in co-opting the narrative of the summer protests, subsuming them into a particular discourse, sterilizing them of their immanence, and subscribing them to a Judeo-Christian temporal schema which subjects the moment to a singularity that conceals other dialectical elements at play. In other words, to understand the summer of 2019 through these discourses would be to ensnare it within the mythological machine. This would result in the enactment of a historical closure since one could construct a timeline of historical events all leading up to that "inevitable" summer of 2019. This would subsume the events of the summer of 2019 into a specific ideology which, following Jesi, is rendered on the same normative plane as any other ideology. In addition, one could argue that the fundamental catalyst for the events of the summer of 2019 were not the racist and misogynist comments of the Telegram chat but rather jokes made in relation to those that died during or after Hurricane María in September 2017, and whose bodies had not been processed by the Institute of Forensic Sciences due to lack of resources, which led to their storage in wagons as they decayed.¹⁰² Christian Sobrino Vega, who held a variety of positions in Rosselló Nevares's administration, disgustingly asked in that chat if "there weren't any cadavers to feed our vultures," which referenced the number of cadavers that had not been processed.¹⁰³ The biological necessity of decolonization/decoloniality was made crudely explicit. It is for this reason that we must heed the warning Ciccariello-Maher puts forth:

If we are to grasp the real, historical importance of such moments, we must suspend judgment still further, privilege an inductive sensibility to "the signal" over pure deductive reason, seek out longer and occasionally subterranean dialectical chains that are only visible in retrospect, and defer the Philosopher's quest for the Idea by granting a proper generativity to the "negative growling of pure rebellion."¹⁰⁴

Because of some intellectuals' failure to understand decolonial revolt as anti-teleological, the aftermath of the summer of 2019—corruption scandals related to ventilators during the present COVID-19 pandemic,¹⁰⁵ the government's failure to adequately handle the earthquake swarm that started in December 2019 and was ongoing at least until mid-2020,¹⁰⁶ the unwillingness of the administration established after Rosselló Nevares's resignation to sign an executive order declaring a state of emergency to address gender-based violence,¹⁰⁷ the fact that Pedro Pierluisi, who swore into office as governor unconstitutionally after Rosselló Nevares's resignation and who's governorship lasted some three days,¹⁰⁸ won his party's primary elections defeating incumbent governor Wanda Vázquez and subsequently went on to win the governorship during the 2020 general elections,¹⁰⁹ the fact that first-time senator-at-large Joanne Rodríguez Veve, from the newly founded party Project Dignity (PD), a right-wing Christian conservative party, accrued the second-most number of votes,¹¹⁰ to name a few—must have been completely unexpected. The beauty of the summer of 2019 was the collective subject that emerged across ideological differences for that moment (e.g., pro-statehood, pro-commonwealth, pro-independence, atheists, Christians, anti-colonial, feminist, queer, etc.). While it is certain that the summer of 2019 changed us in some way, its effects on an intersubjective level are unknown.

In closing, I suggest that in Puerto Rico, as colonized subjects who recognize the colonial logics of the structures which operate upon our bodies, asphyxiating us, our experience is one ordered by the temporality of decolonial revolt inasmuch as any and all of our actions may or may not build up and produce seemingly spontaneous "discharges"¹¹¹ which manifest on a macropolitical dimension as we saw in the summer of 2019. But more crucially, there is a connection to the ways in which we relate to one another as *damnés* in the process of building decolonial futures collectively.

In this sense, the *now or never* is folded upon the strategic work necessary to bring forth potential, unknown futures. This is consonant with Maldonado-Torres's statement in a 2016 interview, when he stated that "as they say in Mozambique and South Africa: 'a luta continua'—the struggle continues—, a phrase that points to a temporality of decolonization, different from the temporal framework of nation-States, inscribed in their founding myths and homogenizing—another example of the continuity of decoloniality today."¹¹² Davis hits upon the same theme in her quoting of a song sung in the southern United States during the twentieth-century freedom movement, "*they say that freedom is a constant struggle.*"¹¹³ When decolonization is viewed temporally as a fusion of the temporality of revolt and the temporality of revolution, in the Jesian sense, it reveals the ways in which the colonized body becomes a site and instrument for the struggle.

When temporally conceived in this way, the subject who embarks on the struggle for decolonization can recognize that the struggle must be carried out on any and all fronts, collectively, because certainly the struggle never ends.

Notes

1. Frantz Fanon, *Black Skin, White Masks*, trans. Richard Philcox (New York: Grove Press, 2008), 201.
2. Claire Gallien, "A Decolonial Turn in the Humanities," *Alif* 40 (2020): 31.
3. Alberto Toscano, "The Ignoble Savage: Racism, Myth, and the Anthropological Machine," *Theory & Event* 22, no. 4 (2019): 1106.
4. Fanon, *Black Skin, White Masks*, 201.
5. Gallien, "A Decolonial Turn in the Humanities," 33.
6. Furio Jesi, *Spartakus. Simbología de la revuelta*, trans. María Teresa D'Meza (Buenos Aires: Adriana Hidalgo Editora, 2014), 63. For the purpose of this article, I have decided to use the Spanish translation. All translations from Spanish are my own.
7. Jesi, *Spartakus*, 63.
8. Kieran Aarons, "Cruel Festivals: Furio Jesi and the Critique of Political Autonomy," *Theory & Event* 22, no. 4 (2019): 1021.
9. Jesi, *Spartakus*, 76.
10. Frantz Fanon, *The Wretched of the Earth*, trans. Richard Philcox (New York: Grove Press, 2004), 79.
11. Aarons, "Cruel Festivals," 1021.
12. Aarons, "Cruel Festivals," 1034.
13. Fanon, *The Wretched of the Earth*, 6. My emphasis.
14. Fanon, *The Wretched of the Earth*, 6.
15. Fanon, *The Wretched of the Earth*, 8.
16. Michael E. Sawyer, *An Africana Philosophy of Temporality: Homo Liminalis* (London: Palgrave Macmillan, 2018), 20.
17. Sawyer, *An Africana Philosophy of Temporality*, 7. Italics in the original.
18. Meghan Johnston Aelabouni, "White Womanhood and/as American Empire in Arrival and Annihilation," *Religions* 11, no. 3 (March 2020): 5, <https://doi.org/10.3390/rel11030130>.
19. Tommy J. Curry, *The Man-Not: Race, Class, Genre, and the Dilemmas of Black Manhood* (Philadelphia: Temple University Press, 2017), 42.
20. In this context, one could understand the white bourgeois feminist struggle of the late-nineteenth, early-twentieth century as the struggle of the white woman to take, alongside the white man, the position of the *Exalted*; to take her proper place as colonizer.
21. Yuderkys Espinosa Miñoso and Celenis Rodríguez Moreno, "Hacia la recuperación de una memoria de resistencia afrocaribeña en República Dominicana," *CLACSO* (blog), March 13, 2020, 7., <https://www.clacso.org/hacia-la-recuperacion-de-una-memoria-de-resistencia-afrocaribe-na-en-republica-dominicana/>

22. Nelson Maldonado-Torres, *Against War: Views from the Underside of Modernity* (Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 2008), 4.
23. Nelson Maldonado-Torres, "Outline of Ten Theses on Coloniality and Decoloniality," *Caribbean Studies Association*, October 23, 2016, 11, http://caribbeanstudiesassociation.org/docs/Maldonado-Torres_Outline_Ten_Theses-10.23.16.pdf.
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26. Dussel, *14 tesis de ética*, 35.
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29. Gauthier, "Temps et Eschatologie (English Translation)," 132.
30. J. Ellis McTaggart, "Time and the Hegelian Dialectic," *Mind* 2, no. 8 (1893): 497.
31. Manfred Kerkhoff, "El Tiempo Del Concepto," in *Kairos. Exploraciones ocasionales en torno a tiempo y destiempo*. (San Juan: Editorial de la Universidad de Puerto Rico, 1997), 48.
32. Kerkhoff, "El Tiempo Del Concepto," 54.
33. Kerkhoff, "El Tiempo Del Concepto," 51.
34. Kerkhoff, "El Tiempo Del Concepto," 51.
35. Kerkhoff, "El Tiempo Del Concepto," 47.
36. Kerkhoff, "El Tiempo Del Concepto," 54–55.
37. Quoted in Jesi, *Spartakus*, 7.
38. Jesi, *Spartakus*, 38.
39. Jesi, *Spartakus*, 38–39.
40. Jesi, *Spartakus*, 39–40.
41. Jesi, *Spartakus*, 42.
42. Jesi, *Spartakus*, 63.
43. Aarons, "Cruel Festivals," 1020.
44. Jesi, *Spartakus*, 87.
45. Audre Lorde, *Sister Outsider: Essays and Speeches* (New York: Penguin Books, 2020), 102.
46. Jesi, *Spartakus*, 64.
47. Jesi, *Spartakus*, 70.
48. Aarons, "Cruel Festivals," 1037.
49. Aarons, "Cruel Festivals," 1037.
50. Aarons, "Cruel Festivals," 1037.
51. Aarons, "Cruel Festivals," 1037.
52. Aarons, "Cruel Festivals," 1037.
53. Aarons, "Cruel Festivals," 1034.

54. Quoted in Aarons, "Cruel Festivals," 1035.
55. Aarons, "Cruel Festivals," 1035.
56. Aarons, "Cruel Festivals," 1035.
57. Aarons, "Cruel Festivals," 1035.
58. Fanon, *The Wretched of the Earth*, 21.
59. Aarons, "Cruel Festivals," 1032.
60. Aarons, "Cruel Festivals," 1032.
61. Jesi, *Spartakus*, 71.
62. Walter D. Mignolo, *The Darker Side of Western Modernity: Global Futures, Decolonial Options* (Durham & London: Duke University Press, 2011), 151.
63. See Adebayo A. Ogungbure, "Dialectics of Oppression: Fanon's Antocolonial Critique of Hegelian Dialectics," *Africology: The Journal of Pan African Studies* 12, no. 7 (2018): 216–30.
64. Silvia Rivera Cusicanqui, *Ch'ixinakax utxiwa: una reflexión sobre prácticas y discursos descolonizadores* (Argentina: Tinta Limón Ediciones / Retazos, 2010), 54.
65. Sawyer, *An Africana Philosophy of Temporality*, 107.
66. In a similar vein, the *Exalted* subject, as the lawmaker, is not subordinated to the law. They set the rules to the game, but do not have to abide by them. In the context of the current COVID-19 pandemic we have seen this logic play out as well, where the *Exalted* seem to believe they are above the possibilities of contagion.
67. Sawyer, *An Africana Philosophy of Temporality*, 112.
68. Sawyer, *An Africana Philosophy of Temporality*, 113.
69. Maldonado-Torres, "Outline of Ten Theses on Coloniality and Decoloniality," 4. My emphasis.
70. Angela Davis, *Freedom Is a Constant Struggle. Ferguson, Palestine, and the Foundations of a Movement*, ed. Frank Barat (Chicago: Haymarket Books, 2016), 64.
71. Davis, *Freedom Is a Constant Struggle*, 66.
72. Davis, *Freedom Is a Constant Struggle*, 66–67.
73. On the coloniality of being, see Nelson Maldonado-Torres, "Sobre la colonialidad del ser: contribuciones al desarrollo de un concepto," in *El giro decolonial. Reflexiones para una diversidad epistémica más allá del capitalismo global.*, ed. Santiago Castro-Gómez and Ramón Grosfoguel (Bogotá: Siglo del Hombre Editores / IESCO-UC / Pontificia Universidad Javeriana, 2007), 127–67.
74. Rivera Cusicanqui, *Ch'ixinakax utxiwa*, 70–71.
75. Sawyer, *An Africana Philosophy of Temporality*, vii.
76. Lewis R. Gordon, *Existencia Africana: Understanding Africana Existential Thought* (New York: Routledge, 2000), 62–95.
77. Curry, *The Man-Not*, 187.
78. Huey P. Newton and J. Herman Blake, *Revolutionary Suicide*, Penguin Classics Deluxe Edition (New York: Penguin Books, 2009), 3.

79. See Gabriela Quijano and Paul Dill Barea, *Autogestión Radical: perspectivas económicas y agrícolas. Reflexiones en torno al 1ro de mayo*. (Red Teorizando el Giro Decolonial, 2020), 12–18.
80. Fanon, *Black Skin, White Masks*, 205.
81. Fanon, *The Wretched of the Earth*, 83.
82. Fanon, *Black Skin, White Masks*, 193.
83. Martin Heidegger, *Being and Time*, trans. John Macquarrie and Edward Robinson (Oxford: Blackwell Publishers Ltd., 2001), 294.
84. Fanon, *Black Skin, White Masks*, xvi–xvii.
85. Fanon, *The Wretched of the Earth*, 82.
86. Fanon, *The Wretched of the Earth*, 86.
87. George Ciccariello-Maher, “The Time of the Commune,” *Diacritics* 46, no. 2 (2018): 85.
88. Ciccariello-Maher, “The Time of the Commune,” 89.
89. Daphne V. Taylor-Garcia, *The Existence of the Mixed Race Damnés: Decolonialism, Class, Gender, Race* (London: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, 2018), 33.
90. Taylor-Garcia, *The Existence of the Mixed Race Damnés*, 116.
91. Ciccariello-Maher, “The Time of the Commune,” 75.
92. Written in the introduction to Jesi, 22.
93. Ricardo Noronha, “The Myth of Spartacus and the Tradition of the Oppressed,” *Theory & Event* 22, no. 4 (2019): 1098.
94. Audre Lorde, *The Collected Poems of Audre Lorde* (London; New York: W. W. Norton & Company, 2000), 256.
95. While I wrote this article thinking of the summer of 2019 in Puerto Rico, the same may be said of the uprisings that manifested across the United States after the extrajudicial killings of Ahmaud Arbery, Breonna Taylor, and George Floyd in 2020.
96. For a wonderful compilation of essays which explore these events, see Marisol LeBrón and Joaquín Villanueva, eds., “The Decolonial Geographies of Puerto Rico’s 2019 Summer Protests: A Forum,” *Society & Space*, February 25, 2020, <https://www.societyandspace.org/forums/the-decolonial-geographies-of-puerto-ricos-2019-summer-protests-a-forum>. Also of interest may be the “reVolucionA” series by the press Editoria Educación Emergente, <https://www.editoraemergente.com/en/5-revolucion>.
97. Silverio Pérez, Pedro Reina Pérez, and Ana Teresa Toro, *Somos Más. Crónicas del verano del '19* (Columbia: Marullo El Podcast, 2019), 48. My emphasis.
98. Pérez, Reina Pérez, and Teresa Toro, *Somos Más*, 39.
99. Pérez, Reina Pérez, and Teresa Toro, *Somos Más*, 50.
100. “Se Acabaron Las Promesas” can be translated as “the promises are over.” The term “Promesa” is a direct reference to the Puerto Rico Oversight, Management, and Economic Stability Act (PROMESA) signed into law by President Barack Obama on June 30, 2016, which imposed a dictatorial fiscal control board.

101. Joaquín Villanueva, Martín Cobián, and Félix Rodríguez, "San Juan, the Fragile City: Finance Capital, Class, and the Making of Puerto Rico's Economic Crisis," *Antipode* 50, no. 5 (2018): 1415-37, <https://doi.org/doi:10.1111/anti.12406>.
102. Osman Pérez Méndez, "Ciencias Forenses vuelve a guardar cadáveres en vagones," *Primera Hora*, January 4, 2019, <https://www.primerahora.com/noticias/gobierno-politica/notas/ciencias-forenses-vuelve-a-guardar-cadaveres-en-vagones/>.
103. Maricarmen Rivera Sánchez, "Una 'burla inaceptable' lo que dijo Sobrino sobre los muertos de María," *El Vocero de Puerto Rico*, July 16, 2019, https://www.elvocero.com/gobierno/una-burla-inaceptable-lo-que-dijo-sobrino-sobre-los-muertos-de-mar-a/article_b5dd0f68-a7ee-11e9-8a2b-77f623bd868a.html.
104. Ciccariello-Maher, "The Time of the Commune," 75.
105. "Nuevo escándalo en compra de ventiladores, otorgan \$2.2 millones a organización que opera un colmado," *Periódico El Sol de Puerto Rico*, April 15, 2020, <https://periodicoelsolpr.com/2020/04/15/nuevo-escandalo-en-compra-de-ventiladores-otorgan-2-2-millones-a-organizacion-que-opera-un-colmado/>.
106. Yaritzta Rivera Clemente, "Gobierno no evalúa si escuelas son resistentes a terremotos," *El Vocero de Puerto Rico*, January 17, 2020, https://www.elvocero.com/educacion/gobierno-no-eval-a-si-escuelas-son-resistentes-a-terremotos/article_8097d6c0-38d1-11ea-8646-33ab33b56921.html.
107. Ricardo Cortés Chico, "Wanda Vázquez emite estado de alerta ante violencia contra la mujer," *El Nuevo Día*, September 4, 2019, <https://www.elnuevodia.com/noticias/locales/notas/wanda-vazquez-emite-estado-de-alerta-ante-violencia-contra-la-mujer/>.
108. "Tribunal Supremo de Puerto Rico declara inconstitucional la juramentación de Pierluisi como gobernador," *CNN Español*, August 7, 2019, <https://cnnespanol.cnn.com/2019/08/07/tribunal-supremo-de-puerto-rico-declara-inconstitucional-la-juramentacion-de-pierluisi-como-gobernador/>.
109. Jennifer A. Marcial Ocasio and Dánica Coto, "Primarias en Puerto Rico: Pierluisi gana el PNP y Carlos 'Charlie' Delgado gana el PPD para enfrentarse a la gobernación en noviembre," *Orlando Sentinel*, August 16, 2020, <https://www.orlandosentinel.com/espanol/os-es-elecciones-primarias-puerto-rico-segunda-vuelta-20200817-cdxj3gyonnda3bs6hc7d-35dw3q-story.html>.
110. See Comisión Estatal de Elecciones, "Divulgación Resultados Electorales: Elecciones Generales 2020," https://elecciones2020.ceepur.org/Noche_del_Evento_92/index.html#es/pic_bar_list/SENADORES_POR_ACUMULACION_Resumen.xml. It must be noted that Rodríguez Veve is currently spearheading legislation and espouses rhetoric that threaten gender-based liberation efforts. The party which she belongs to, which is right-wing, Christian, conservative, and hetero and cisnormative, was founded on March 24, 2019 according to their website and the protests

during that summer served as fertile grounds for the party to gather support. See for example José Karlo Pagán, “Proyecto Dignidad convencido en que captará el voto joven con la ‘firmeza en sus valores,’” *Primera Hora*, August 23, 2020, <https://www.primerahora.com/noticias/gobierno-politica/notas/proyecto-dignidad-convencido-en-que-captara-el-voto-joven-con-la-firmeza-en-sus-valores/>. This means that the summer of 2019 not only produced other ways of being, but also vulcanized those logics of modernity one seeks liberation from. In other words, by monumentalizing moments like the summer of 2019 in Puerto Rico, we miss dialectical undercurrents which we must remain attuned to in our struggle for liberation. The relationship of the Project Dignity to the summer of 2019 could make for an interesting analysis at a later time.

111. I borrow the term from the French *décharge* as used by Patrick Chamoiseau in *Slave Old Man* (New York: The New Press, 2018), 24. Chamoiseau describes this “discharge” as the sudden impulse for revolt which would take over the enslaved. He states, “The old slaves knew about this: it was a bad sort of impulsion vomited up from a forgotten spot, a fundamental fever, a blood clot, a *dé-sursaut pas-bon*: a not-good jump, a shivering summons that jolted you *raide* off the tracks. You went around being taken to pieces by an impetuous inner presence. Your voice took on a different sound. Your gait grew gently grotesque. A religious flutter set your cheeks and eyelids trembling. And your eyes bore the customary fiery marks of awakened dragons.”
112. “Descolonizando. Diálogo con Yuderkys Espinosa Miñoso y Nelson Maldonado-Torres,” *Iberoamérica Social: revista-red de estudios sociales* VI, 2016, 12.
113. Davis, *Freedom Is a Constant Struggle*, 61.