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Loving My Neighbour, Loving Myself

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  30 January 2009

Oswald Hanfling
Oswald Hanfling
Affiliation:
The Open University
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Extract

The biblical injunction to love one's neighbour has long been regarded as a central pillar of morality. It is taken to be an ideal which gives direction to our moral aspirations, even though most of us find it difficult to live up to, owing to our selfish natures. But the difficulties I wish to raise are of a logical kind, as distinct from those depending on personal character. They fall under three headings: the first concerns the scope of ‘my neighbour’, the second the injunction to love, and the third the idea of loving oneself. The first will probably be the most familiar.

Type
Articles
Information
Philosophy , Volume 68 , Issue 264 , April 1993 , pp. 145 - 157
Copyright
Copyright © The Royal Institute of Philosophy 1993

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References

1 There is also a curious reversal in the story. The question asked by the lawyer was ‘Who is my neighbour?’, and one might expect the answer to be: anyone in need of help, even if he is not related to you. But the question that is posed and answered at the end of parable is ‘Who proved neighbour to the man who fell among the robbers?’

2 Butler, Joseph, Fifteen Sermons, (Bell, 1967).Google Scholar

3 Glover, Jonathan, Causing Death and Saving Lives (Penguin, 1977).Google Scholar

4 This point was well expressed by Hume in a passage quoted by Glover, , p. 294.Google Scholar See Hume, 's Treatise, Selby-Bigge (ed.) p. 481.Google Scholar

5 Descartes maintained, contrary to this, and for other reasons as well as the above, that belief is subject to the will. I have discussed Descartes' position in ‘Can There be a Method of Doubt?’, Philosophy, 1984.Google Scholar

6 A similar difficulty affects the injunction to forgive. Here again we must distinguish forgiving from acting as if one had forgiven. In this case, however, there is also a ‘performative utterance’ to be considered. Just as one can make a promise by saying ‘I promise’, so one can, in a sense, forgive by saying ‘I forgive’. A person who said this might properly be reported as having forgiven. And one can, of course, be enjoined to perform this speech-act. There is, however, another aspect of forgiving which concerns the heart and not the mouth, what is felt as opposed to what is said. Thus it may happen that one no longer feels resentment against the person who offended. Does the injunction to forgive mean merely that we should behave or speak as if we had forgiven? Or does it enjoin a change of heart? If the latter, then the same difficulty arises as in the case of love and belief.

7 The Moral Law, Paton, H. J. (ed.) (Hutchinson, 1948).Google Scholar

8 Ethics, Barnes, J. (ed.) (Penguin, 1976).Google Scholar According to the editor the question is taken up again later in the text, but this does not seem to be so.

9 I have discussed Aristotle's view in The Quest for Meaning (Blackwell, 1987), 183ff.Google Scholar

10 Wilde, Oscar, in Lady Windermere's Fan:Google Scholar ‘It is absurd to divide people into good or bad. People are either charming or tedious.’

11 My third difficulty would also be avoided by the original Hebrew injunction as translated by E. Ullendorff. According to him, the correct translation is not the usual one, but: ‘Thou shalt love thy neighbour, for he is as thou’. (In Studies in Rationalism, Judaism and Universalism, Loewe, R. (ed.) (Routledge, 1966).Google Scholar

12 Though he will not agree with my conclusions, I am grateful to Gerhard Zecha for stimulating my thoughts on the topic of this paper. I also wish to thank Lars Hertzberg for helpful comments and suggestions.