

Jesús Padilla Gálvez

University of Castilla-La Mancha, Faculty of Legal and Social Sciences, San Pedro Mártir, s/n, E-45071 Toledo
Jesus.Padilla@uclm.es

Democracy in Times of Ochlocracy

Abstract

For some time now we have noticed an increasing scepticism regarding the effectiveness of democracy, and its ability to represent citizens through elections. Elections are the central mechanism of political decision taking. However, there is a clear tendency to exploit electoral processes by populist politicians. The ancient ideal of paideia was to educate citizens by following a civic program. Its aim was to enable the citizen to exercise the civil rights and duties. Since the 1970s, however, we had observed two contrasting tendencies: a growth of individualization, and a decrease of the level of civic education. In the 1990s populist political parties entered the political scene of European democracies, some of which have managed to establish a mob rule or ochlocracy (ὄχλοκρατία). Since then, ochlocratic parties have systematically intended to win the votes of politically less educated citizens by offering them a simplified political discourse. In fact, these parties have managed to neutralize the two-party system in many European countries. Thus they managed to block majority-based governments, forcing parties to form coalitions with ideologically opposing smaller parties. This has created a situation in which the “punishment vote” becomes the mean to gain the votes of undecided people who may be characterized as rebels without political culture.

Keywords

ochlocracy, democracy, deliberative democracy

Introduction

Our understanding of democracy has undergone significant changes within the last decade (Warren, 2011, 517ff.): Generally speaking, democracy is a political system in which an elected political party acts is given the authority to act as a representative of the majority of the population (Schumpeter, 1942, Chap. 22; Przeworski, 1999, 23ff.). However, a closer look at this definition shows that the concept of democracy is rather vague and this raises several questions. The most obvious question is: what does ‘majority’ of the population mean if we take into account that only part of the population goes to the polls (Dahl, 1989). What does ‘absolute majority’ mean if it just refers to the largest number within a minority of the population? Democracy is a security system whose function is to avoid conflicts.

In the 21st century democracy is confronted with a special kind of risk which derives from ochlocracy (ὄχλοκρατία). Although the phenomenon of ochlocracy is not new, as it was already described in antiquity, its characteristic features are different nowadays. During antiquity, the phenomenon of ochlocracy was incorrectly described and interpreted as “mob-rule”. However, it turns out that the so-called “mob-rule” is not the origin of the problem but rather the result of a process initiated by a group of people forming the source of power, which we will call *institutional players*.

The aim of this paper is, first, to analyse the processes linked to ochlocracy by distinguishing cause from effect, second, to examine the maintenance of power by the institutional players, third, to analyse the strategies that the institutional players used in order to dominate institutions, and to gradually de-activate democratic processes. We will characterize the dangers and risks associated with ochlocracy and show possible ways of solution.

1. Democracy in the New Millennium: Possibilities and Risks

The occidental understanding of democracy is based on a division of powers between legislative, jurisdiction, and executive power. This functional division is supposed to guarantee that public administration acts according to law. A state which is governed by such functional division is designed to both control and support capitalist, market-oriented economy. There are three pre-eminent aspects: first, democracy shall guarantee the citizens' private autonomy as a basis of their self-determination; second, equal treatment of citizens in their communities enhances the importance of citizenship as a whole; and third, the maintenance of an impartial public sphere functions as a binding link on the intersection between opinion-forming (*Meinungsbildung*), and the formation of will (*Willensbildung*) within the civil public and the state.

Any disturbance of this equilibrium may put democracy at risk. Any influence of the representatives of capitalist economy on the state administration may obstruct democracy. The constitution shall guarantee freedom for all citizens and protect people's private spheres. Independent courts are supposed to provide legal protection. Freedom of the press, variety of media, freedom of information, and legally regulated civil society are all essential requirements for democracy. Our occidental understanding of democracy is that of a representative democracy, in which delegates are entrusted to decide on political issues (Rawls, 1999a, 313–318). The representatives are legitimized by the fact that they were elected by voters who are considered the sovereign or highest state authority. They are supposed to act in the voters' interest, and defend them in the respective committees and panels. However, voters do not form a coherent group of people with similar interests but are rather a sum of individuals with sometimes similar but often different singular preferences. Therefore, democratic systems need to counterbalance individual interests by subsuming them under a common interest.

A parliamentary democracy is based and oriented on the general public. Debates and discussion on political issues take place in parliament, and can be followed by the public. Parliamentary power balance depends on the distribution of mandates depending on the results of elections. The scope within which voters take decisions is limited by the available number of representatives. It appears that representational democracy has drifted into a crisis of legitimacy.¹ Several factors have led to this crisis. One factor is the somewhat autistic conduct of the political class, and their respective political parties.² We have noticed an increasing alienation between politicians and the general public. The legitimacy that politicians have gained through elections is challenged by the emotional distance and coldness they show when approaching citizens.

Representative systems have long been viewed as unsusceptible to the temporary influences of demagogy, populism or ochlocracy (ὀχλοκρατία). Once

elected, a president is entrusted to decide on the occupation of political posts. The question is who advises the politician in the choice of his ministers? And which strategy does he apply in order to reach his objectives? What we see is that representative democracy seems to have been captured by a group of oligarchs. The question is where this oligarchy is exactly situated, outside or inside the political parties? Do the oligarchs exert influence on the president from outside or are they anchored in the core of political parties? The existence of such oligarchy poses a serious risk for democracy because it tends to produce corruption and lobbyism. The discrepancy that exists, on the one hand, among delegates (political parties), and, on the other hand, voters (general public and the economy) creates serious problems.

Once the voters have authorized the political representatives to take decisions on their behalf, voters' further influence on the actions of political representatives practically becomes impossible. After the election process, the core of militant party representatives takes over power, disregards the promises given to voters, and follows her own individual preferences instead. This group acts in the interests of the president and in their own interests. If the parliamentary system follows a proportional representation it reports directly to the party whips. Deviant behaviour of representatives will be sanctioned by the elimination of their names on the electoral list. The aim of such mechanisms is to delimit the free mandate of delegates.

Such restricted influence of voters bears new risks. The representatives are more and more alienated from the general public. The specific interests of certain political lobby have captured the representational systems. The political scandals of party financing in Germany, Austria, The Netherlands, Italy and recently in Spain clearly show the danger that parliamentary democracy is currently undergoing. The actual danger lies in the gradual erosion of voters' motivation to go to the polls. A decreasing number of actual votes eventually turns the parliamentary system into a pseudo-system. Therefore, it seems pertinent to analyse the ochlocratic processes (“ὀχλοκρατία”) as the most relevant danger to democracy.

2. “Party-democracy” and Corruption

The notorious slogan describing corrupt behaviour clearly reveals the *modus operandi*. Corrupt politicians follow the principle: “You pay me now, and I'll help you later”. Scandals around the problem of party donations raise the suspect that the aim of such donations is to influence politicians in their decision-taking to the benefit of banks and companies. A pre-condition for this process is an elimination of the formal separation of state and economy. This corresponds to a (temporary) cancellation of an essential pillar of democracy. The new scenario is opposed to principles such as transparency, publicness, the power of population and participation. If decisions follow the rationale of personal influences, then they become corrupt in that they trespass against the principles of free competition.

Our critical remarks shall be summarized: political decisions, when granting licenses and offices, are purchasable. Political parties, such as the Christian

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The idea that substantive homogeneity and associated solidarities underlie democracy. See: Schmitt, 1985, 14f.

2

Fractional intrigue and dynastic struggle replaces electoral competition between parties as the way to determine who controls the power to punish, and to extract resources.

Democratic Union (CDU) in Germany,³ or the popular party (PP) in Spain, have held secret bank accounts in Switzerland.⁴ These accounts did not appear in the party's official bookkeeping, and their purpose was to conceal illegal party donations. The financial means deposited in these accounts were destined to finance the electoral campaign, during which the party machine supported particular candidates.

In the public debates this issue has been viewed from different perspective. Leading party members tend to show little sense of guilt and point to the general difficulty of financing a whole electoral campaign. They view it as a trivial offence, and intend to push through an amnesty, which fails the resistance of media and the party base. As a consequence, illegal party financing system provokes loss of public confidence and legitimacy towards political parties. The system of party donations also shows that the parties disrespect legally valid provisions.

3. Resurgence of Ochlocracy

An analysis of the institutional crisis reveals the origin of the term ochlocracy “ὄχλοκρατία”⁵ which was first coined by Polybius in his *Histories*. He enumerated six forms of government, three basic forms and three related forms, such as “despotism” (μοναρχίαν), “oligarchy” (ὀλιγαρχίαν) and “ochlocracy” (ὄχλοκρατίαν). He said:

“So then we enumerate six forms of government – the three commonly spoken of which I have just mentioned, and three more allied forms, I mean despotism, oligarchy and ochlocracy.”⁶

In his definition of ochlocracy Polybius mentioned three relevant aspects which will be of particular interest for our analysis. He says this:

“... which again by its violence and contempt of law becomes sheer ochlocracy.”⁷

Polybius' thesis may be summarized in the following way: the origin of ochlocracy is characterized by three characteristic features, the first of which denotes a form of violence expressed by the word *hybreos* or *hybris* (ὑβρεως), which translates as “pride”, “insolence”, or “outrage”; the second and most relevant aspect is *paranomía* (“παρανομίας”) translated as “illicitness” as a direct contradiction to what is lawful. It literally means “beside the law”, “law-breaking” or “violation of justice”. Third feature is the translation of the Greek word ὄχλοκρατία into “mob-rule”.

The *paranomía* is a clear transgression emphasizing the deliberate defiance against the law. Most scholars opted for a literal translation of ochlocracy as *mob-rule*. In fact, many readers interpreted that Polybius used it to denominate the “pathological” version of popular rule in opposition to a good version of democracy.

In the secondary literature we find a third thesis, ὄχλοκρατία as “mob-rule”. Jean Jacques Rousseau has taken up this notion and pointed to ochlocracy as a degeneration of democracy. He says this:

“Quand l'Etat se dissout, l'abus du Gouvernement, quel qu'il soit prend le nom commun d'*anarchie*. En distinguant, la Démocratie dégénère en *Ochlocratie*, l'Aristocratie en *Olygarchie* ; j'ajouterois que la Royauté dégénère en *Tyrannie*, mais ce dernier mot est équivoque et demande explication.” (Rousseau, 1964, 423)

However, viewing ochlocracy as “degenerative” process neglects other relevant aspects, such as the decline of the innermost character of state. Rousseau de-

scribed ochlocracy as a negative aberration, a motive which was later adopted by James Mackintosh who related it to the danger of despotism (Mackintosh, 1828, 62f). Mackintosh said this of ochlocracy:

“All such governments, therefore, tend towards despotism, and the securities which they admit against mis-government are extremely feeble and precarious. The best security which human wisdom can devise, seems to be the distribution of political authority among different individuals and bodies, with separate interests and separate characters, corresponding to the variety of classes of which civil society is composed, each interested to guard their own order from oppression by the rest; each also interested to prevent any of the others from seizing on exclusive, and therefore despotic power; and all having a common interest to co-operate in carrying on the ordinary and necessary administration of government. If there were not an interest to resist each other in extraordinary cases, there would not be liberty. If there were not an interest to co-operate in the ordinary course of affairs, there could be no government. The object of such wise institutions which make the selfishness of governors a security against their injustice, is to protect men against wrong both from their rulers and their fellows. Such governments are, with justice, peculiarly and emphatically called *free*; and in ascribing that liberty to the skilful combination of mutual dependence and mutual check, I feel my own conviction greatly strengthened by calling to mind, that in this opinion I agree with all the wise men who have ever deeply considered the principles of politics; with Aristotle and Polybius, with Cicero and Tacitus, with Bacon and Machiavel, with Montesquieu and Hume.” (Mackintosh, 1828, 62)

Social and economic systems are exposed to certain risks which may produce anomalies. Despotism is created through “distribution of political authority” concerning personnel policy and institution. Mutual control is the only antidote that prevents degeneration. Nowadays rejection of legality is responsible for the emergence of ochlocracy in occidental democracies. We shall mention two other relevant aspects for what we call a delegitimization of democracy and that have received little attention until now.

The first phenomenon is a particular form of violence called *hybreos* or *hybris* (ὑβρεως) that denotes unrespectful offensive behaviour towards political opponents. In ancient Greece *hybris* referred to a conduct in which a person liked to humiliate others. These strategies of denigration and offence put the fundamental values of democracy at risk. Nowadays *hybris* often refers to a person in higher position who suffers from immoderate self-esteem. Typical characteristics of such person are arrogance, and an inclination to overconfidence. Fundamental rights are questioned if legality of people, institutions,

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For CDU scandal see: “CDU-Spendenaffäre”, available at: <http://de.wikipedia.org/wiki/CDU-Spendenaff%C3%A4re> (accessed on March 16, 2016).

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For PP scandals see: “Caso Gürtel”, available at: http://es.wikipedia.org/wiki/Caso_G%C3%BCrtel (accessed on March 16, 2016); and “Caso-Bárceñas”, available at: http://es.wikipedia.org/wiki/Caso_B%C3%A1rceñas (accessed on March 16, 2016).

5

Aristotle’s classification is *kingship*, *aristocracy*, *πολιτεία*, *democracy*, *oligarchy*, *tyranny*. See: Aristotle, *Pol.* 4.2. This was derived from Plato (Plato, *Pol.* 302c) who arranged the six (besides the ideal polity) in pairs, kingship, tyranny–aristocracy, oligarchy–democracy, good and bad. Plato had no

distinct name, except *δημοκρατία παράνομος* for bad democracy which Polybius called *ὀχλοκρατία*, “mob-rule”. Polybius’s arrangement is the following: kingship (arising from a natural despotism or monarchy) degenerates into tyranny. Aristocracy degenerates into oligarchy. Democracy degenerates into mob-rule.

6

“τρία μὲν ἅ πάντες θρυλοῦσι καὶ νῦν προεῖρηται, τρία δὲ τὰ τούτοις συμφυῆ, λέγω δὲ μοναρχίαν, ὀλιγαρχίαν, ὀχλοκρατίαν.” See: Polybius, 1893, *Histories*, 6.4.6.

7

“ἐκ δὲ τῆς τούτου πάλιν ὑβρεως καὶ παρανομίας ἀποπληροῦται σὺν χρόνοις ὀχλοκρατία.” See: Polybius, 1893, *Histories*, 6.4.10.

and provisions are exposed to verbal violence. If people trespass the limits of the law, then ochlocracy is likely to emerge.

4. New Forms of Life in Society

At the beginning of the 21st century the rapid change of the forms of life that go along with the new forms of communication are noticeable. Within a relatively short period mobility has increased significantly. Until recently, a traveller making a trip had to overcome long distances to participate, for instance, in a conference. Nowadays it is possible to participate by giving an online-lecture through video-conference from one's place of residence. I have recently given a video-transmitted talk in a conference in Norway while I was sitting in my study at home. On the other hand, it has become possible to participate in projects located in Mexico or Brazil without actually going there. Mobility is no longer linked to a change of place but rather to the transfer of knowledge.

This new form of life allows for a change of communicative patterns. Hearing lectures is no single unique experience but may be transmitted to a wider audience, and may be reproduced repeatedly. Written or spoken information depends on visual depiction. These new techniques have an impact on democracy. Many of the new forms of life and its related language games allow for decisions which should undergo a system of checks and balances. A bank director's inappropriate remark can destabilize the whole bank, and thereby irrevocably destroy clients' savings of a lifetime. A probable consequence is that affected voters may reject the political party which the bank director belonged to. In other words, an impertinent remark of a senior manager may produce serious consequences for the citizen who loses his securities.

The change of paradigm concerning forms of life and forms of communication requires a change of generation. However, the neglect of this new paradigm by leading representatives may lead to a decline of society.

5. Ochlocratic Structures nowadays

Comparing the recent incidents in Italy, Austria and Spain, we can observe the typical patterns that occur in ochlocratic systems. The political programs in these three countries show certain similarities which produce degeneration of democratic systems over time. We shall give an outline of these patterns and similarities.

First, party leaders intend to weaken parliamentary control. In order to achieve this, the leading party governs by numerous decrees and enactments rather than by proposing new laws. The government prefers decrees to avoid that new proposals are discussed in Parliament and possibly rejected. In fact, governing parties use economic crises as an excuse for a restructuring of the state administration. The party makes changes to the benefit of the party members. The motive for these changes is often an attempt to centralize the state administration. In a second step, the function of Parliament is put into question by the leading party. The aim is to weaken the judicial power, which is carried out by the way of the early retirement of legal practitioners, and staff shortage. Under the pretext of modernization and an excessive national deficit, the governing party refuses to fill new posts. Consequently, judges and a reduced number of staff have to deal with more workload. This leads to a partial blockage of the judicial system whereby deadlines are exceeded and legal

proceedings suffer delay. As a direct consequence, formal mistakes are likely to happen whereby legal proceedings may come to an end before they have even started. Independent judges and legal staff are accused of committing mistakes, and are often replaced by legal practitioners who hold a party membership. At this stage the original objective of the party is nearly completed: new staff who are linked to the party carry out the political program of this party by obstructing any proceedings against party members.

The same technique is applied to the executive branch, whose function and efficiency is diminished by a reduced staff and early retirement. Part of the restructuring is that the staff receives the order to leave apart crime investigation, and to dedicate time to a less crucial issue – street and traffic control. This has turned out to be an effective way to disregard big illegal deals and serious crimes, and leave them without any legal sanctions. In fact, statistics show a significant increase of financial crimes and tax evasion, human trafficking and drug dealings. There is a recurring pattern in all these processes: due to the shortage of personnel the big crimes cannot be investigated, and are put on the shelf. One alarming consequence is a significant increase of the informal economy (cf. Buehn, Schneider, 2012, 139–171).

Our working hypothesis is this: a high amount of ochlocratic reforms produces automatically a rise in black economy. We assume that the weakening of democratic institutions leads to an increase of informal sector. Another relevant aspect in this context is the fact that there is a continuous decrease of voters' participation in the elections. Political parties have become aware of the danger that goes along with this development, and intend to change the electoral system. Some parties intend to integrate more communities within a constituency, and thereby weaken the importance of the individual vote. At the same time, this produces a reduction of the total amount of constituencies, and leads to the reduction of delegates in local parliaments. It has become more and more difficult for voters to 'punish' politicians for their inadequate policies. In fact, any correction of an unsuitable political program by the voter has become nearly impossible. Political parties have set up the conditions in which the informal sector flourishes, and politicians are not compelled to give any justification.

Another consequence is that an unqualified worker participating in black economy receives more income compared to his honest colleague who pays tax and contributes to social security, health insurance, and pension funds. In fact, the black economy worker has more available income which permits him to spend more money, and thereby contributes to economic growth. There are clear indicators in our environment that reveal this perverse economic development. This happens in communities in which the general infrastructure appears extremely basic but citizens own luxury goods that do not correspond to their income. There is a striking gap between the poor state of streets, schools, and hospitals of a region, and the amount of high quality goods (such as cars, electronic devices etc.) that inhabitants of this region own. Such region has a high level of black economy.

Inhabitant of such region will most probably give his vote to the political party that permits such kind of personal economic improvement. This has created a vicious circle from which to escape seems very difficult. In other words, less democratic political interference creates an incentive to participate in the informal sector. Another side-effect of such paradoxal development is that it is easier for the governing political party to control the illicit worker by prohibiting any political action of trade unions in the labour market. The worker

who takes advantage of black economy is not interested in anyone to interfere in his illegal activities.

Designed target of politicians who support such development is the privatization of education, the health sector, and the traffic system. Political parties play a crucial role in the privatization process, namely in that they create a system of party financing, and in that they fill posts with party-related personnel. Consequently, the whole privatization process turns out more expensive for the citizen than if it were carried out by a private agency.

6. Objectives of Ochlocratic Reform

Summarizing what was outlined, ochlocratic reforms aim at weakening democracy institutions in order to establish a black economy. D. Teobadelli and F. Schneider have described the interrelation that exists between democracy and the informal sector (Teobaldelli, Schneider, 2003, 5ff). This relation is characterized in the following way: states with an improved democracy have less shadow economy – but only at initially low or intermediate levels. Politicians tend to implement distortionary policies that maximize their gains. At the same time, they are interested in keeping the democratic structure of institutions on a low level. An improvement of institutions enables the citizens to influence policy more easily. Moreover, better policies reduce the incentive for citizens to participate in the informal sector. When democratic institutions are well developed, however, the politician is kept in check by citizens and so his behaviour is unlikely to be affected substantially by further increases in the quality of these institutions.

As we have described above, shadow industry produces a certain kind of balance which the participants intend to maintain. We shall highlight how democratic institutions interact with this equilibrium of shadow economies. Electoral systems which are based on larger districts tends to reduce political competition. It is more difficult for citizens to respond to politicians' detrimental decisions. Conversely, well-functioning democratic institutions play more of a role in correcting bad policies.

7. Deliberative Democracy: Strategy, Tactics and Logistics

An attempt to reduce legitimacy can also be seen in the example of media. New communication technologies, such as cyberspace, internet, and information transfer hold the risk of putting politicians' legitimacy at risk. Nearly every citizen has a mobile telephone which allows for a rapid exchange of information and publication on the internet. If a citizen suffers an arbitrary act of state authorities he can immediately share his experience with a wider public. The possibilities, risks, and dangers associated with media require a new reflection of our democratic systems. There is a tendency in political parties to control and sometimes delimit the scope of media. When Joseph M. Bessette published his book entitled *Deliberative Democracy* (Bessette, 1980; Bessette, 1994) he certainly was not aware of the fact that he would initiate a new discourse within politics. Even scholars such as Jon Elster (Elster, 1998, 97ff.) or Jürgen Habermas (Habermas, 1998, 349ff.) have commented on his writings. Bessette's proposals seem to be an alternative to parliamentarism. Deliberative democracy claims for an active participation of all citizens in democracy.⁸ An essential element is the legitimization of public debate on political questions

(Cohen, 1997, 143–155). The liberal approach to democracy is criticized especially because it involves a transfer of the market model to politics.

When an (Austrian) minister was secretly recorded by a journalist while he expressed his willingness to receive bribes in exchange for interfering with European policies, his career ended abruptly. The simple imagination what would have happened, had he not been recorded, shows the importance of control in politics. Without any proof his party could not have dismissed him. Compared to the internet, the traditional media, such as newspaper, radio and television seem to have lost their core position. A change of paradigm in forms of life goes along with rapid changes in the field of media. The obvious decline of newspapers, whose journalists have informed and shaped the opinion of generations goes along with the rise of internet and its chaotic information flow. Decline and rise of media reflect the general need for new forms of deliberative democracy. Until now it is still not clear whether the internet is a means to promote direct forms of democracy.

What we do notice, especially in times of economic crisis, is the attempt of political parties to dominate economic and social processes. However, citizens have become reluctant to pay for losses caused by speculation. There is a tendency to socialize losses but to privatize profits. High positions in the economic and financial sectors are filled with incompetent candidates whose only interest is to make profit. If we ask who admitted an incompetent person into such high position we are confronted with a network of political corruption with economy, politics and media. Party financing, electoral media support, corruption and abuse of power are events of the day. There is hardly any day without a scandal in this field.

In the general public, on the other hand, we observe an expansion of social networks. People, who are opposed to the political, economic, and media representatives mobilize other people via internet. This new form of mobilization has produced at least four effects: first, the events in the context of Arabian spring shows that corrupt governments may be forced to dismiss; second, a Counter-movements in China and Iran manage to control the internet and inhibit any form of mobilization; third, movements such as 15-M in Madrid or Occupy Wall, who are against power abuse, managed to temporarily occupy public spaces; and fourth, the latest news on the spy affair in the USA and GB have revealed that governments are creating more and more networks pretending to control the danger of terrorism. In fact, they use this argument in order to trespass the law and interfere in the private sphere of personal communication. All four cases are examples of how the freedom of citizens is restricted.

The idea of deliberative democracy derived in the context of lobbyism where it was used as an effective tool for consensus-building and strategy formation. It was assumed that free and equal citizens reached a decision by discussion and cooperation (Elster, 1998, 1). However, it turns out difficult to implement deliberative democracy in our parliamentary democracy for the following three reasons. First, who does the denomination “free and equal citizens” refer to in a scenario in which one fifth of the population is unemployed. Second, the labour market has an impact on the citizen’s form of life, especially when he is in constant fear of being made redundant. This has a demotivating effect on citizens’ voting behavior. And third, political themes and discussions are controlled and transmitted by a politically determined media.

Conclusions

Democracy is a way of making collective decisions. Alexis de Tocqueville supposed that participation includes activity in associations, especially those that have no specific political objective (Tocqueville, 1966, 243). Democracy is an instrument to control the dangers and risks by which it is threatened. One of the most dangerous threats to democracy is politicians' strategy to abuse the votes of citizens for their own purposes. We have shown how the debilitation of parliamentary power allows corrupt behaviour, a growing shadow economy and ochlocracy to enter politics. The danger associated with ochlocracy can be fought by raising public awareness on this issue and by implementing a control system. Deliberative democracy may play a relevant role in this process. A higher level of democracy reduces the incentive for citizens to participate in the shadow economy.

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Jesús Padilla Gálvez

Demokracija u vrijeme ohlokracije

Sažetak

U posljednje vrijeme moguće je primijetiti porast skepticizma prema efektivnosti demokracije i njene mogućnosti zastupanja kroz sustav glasovanja. Izborni sustav središnji je mehanizam političkog odlučivanja. Međutim, očigledno je postojanje namjere zloupotrebljavanja mehanizama glasovanja od strane populističkih političara. Drevna ideja paideje bila je obrazovati građane kroz građanski program. Cilj je bio omogućiti građanima izvršavanje građanskih prava i obaveza. Nakon 1970-ih godina, međutim, promatramo dvije oprečne tendencije: rast specijalizacije građana i opadanje općeg građanskog obrazovanja. Tijekom 1990-ih godina populističke političke stranke došle su na političku scenu europskih demokracija, među kojima su neke oblikovale vladavinu mase, odnosno ohlokraciju (ὀχλοκρατία). Otada, ohlokratske stranke sistematski osvajaju glasove na temelju politički slabije obrazovanih građana obraćajući im se pojednostavljenim političkim diskursima. Štoviše, takve su stranke uspjele neutralizirati dvostranačke sisteme u mnogim Europskim zemljama. Uspjeli su blokirati vlade koje se zasnivaju na većini tjeranjem stranaka da oblikuju koalicije s ideološki suprotstavljenim manjim strankama. To je stvorilo situaciju u kojoj »kazneni glas« postaje način pridobivanja glasova neodlučnih ljudi koje se može opisati kao pobunjenike bez političke kulture.

Ključne riječi

demokracija, ohlokracija, deliberativna demokracija

Jesús Padilla Gálvez

Demokratie zu Zeiten der Ochlokratie

Zusammenfassung

In letzter Zeit ist es möglich, den zunehmenden Skeptizismus gegenüber der Effektivität der Demokratie und ihrer Repräsentationsmöglichkeit durch das Abstimmungssystem zu bemerken. Das Wahlsystem ist der zentrale Mechanismus der politischen Entscheidungsfindung. Allerdings besteht offensichtlich die Absicht, dass die Wahlmechanismen seitens der populistischen Politiker missbraucht werden. Die uralte Idee der Paideia war, die Bürger durch ein bürgerliches Programm zu bilden. Ziel war es, den Bürgern die Ausübung von Bürgerrechten und Bürgerpflichten zu ermöglichen. Nach den 1970er-Jahren beobachten wir jedoch zwei gegensätzliche Tendenzen: die zunehmende Spezialisierung der Bürger und den Rückgang der allgemeinen staatsbürgerlichen Bildung. In den 1990er-Jahren traten die populistischen politischen Parteien auf die politische Bühne europäischer Demokratien, unter denen einige eine Pöbelherrschaft bildeten, bzw. eine Ochlokratie (ὀχλοκρατία). Seitdem erhalten die ochlokratischen Parteien ihre Stimmen systematisch auf der Basis politisch untergebildeter Bürger; indem sie ihre Wählerschaft mit vereinfachten politischen Diskursen ansprechen. Darüber hinaus ist es solchen Parteien gelungen, Zweiparteiensysteme in vielen europäischen Ländern zu neutralisieren. Sie haben es geschafft, Mehrheitsregierungen zu blockieren, indem sie die Parteien dazu drängten, Koalitionen mit ideologisch entgegengesetzten kleineren Parteien einzugehen. Dies hat eine Situation geschaffen, in der „Strafstimmen“ eine Art Stimmengewinnung von unentschlossenen Menschen werden, die sich als Rebellen ohne politische Kultur hinstellen lassen.

Schlüsselwörter

Demokratie, Ochlokratie, deliberative Demokratie

Jesús Padilla Gálvez

La démocratie à l'époque de l'ochlocratie

Résumé

Ces derniers temps, il est possible de remarquer une montée de scepticisme quant à l'effectivité de la démocratie et à ses possibilités de représentation par le système de vote. Le système électoral est le mécanisme central de la prise de décision politique. Toutefois, il est évident qu'il existe une intention d'exploiter de manière abusive ce mécanisme de vote de la part des politiciens populistes. La conception ancienne de la « paideia » consistait dans l'idée d'éduquer les citoyens grâce à un programme de citoyenneté. Le but était de donner la possibilité aux citoyens d'accomplir leurs obligations et d'exercer leurs droits civiques. Toutefois, après les années 1970, on observe deux tendances opposées : un accroissement dans la spécialisation des citoyens et un appauvrissement de leur éducation civique générale. Au cours des années 1990, sont arrivées sur la scène politique les démocraties européennes des partis politiques populistes, parmi lesquels certains ont façonné la règle de la foule, à savoir l'ochlocratie (ὀχλοκρατία). Depuis, les partis ochlocratiques gagnent des voix de manière systématique sur la base d'un discours politique simplifié destiné à des citoyens dont l'éducation politique reste modeste. De plus, ces partis ont réussi à paralyser le système bipartite dans de nombreux pays européens. En effet, en incitant les partis à former une coalition avec de petits partis idéologiquement opposés, ils ont réussi à bloquer des gouvernements formés à partir d'une majorité électorale. Ce qui a créé une situation au sein de laquelle « la voix de la condamnation » devient un moyen de gagner les voix des personnes encore indécises, que l'on peut décrire comme des insurgés sans culture politique.

Mots-clés

démocratie, ochlocratie, démocratie délibérative