

der GMS, vor allem aber in der KpV. So wird laut Bojanowski auch eine böse Handlung frei vollzogen, insofern die Möglichkeit zur Vernunftbestimmung bereits durch die KrV sichergestellt ist. Zum Schluss seiner Arbeit widmet sich der Verfasser der kantischen Religionsschrift, die seiner Meinung nach einen lediglich explikativen Charakter bezüglich der kantischen Freiheitstheorie hat. So zieht er schließlich das Fazit, dass die Religionsschrift und die kantische Lehre des radikal Bösen nicht zu den Voraussetzungen des kantischen Freiheitsbegriffs gerechnet werden dürfen, sondern diesen in der Argumentation voraussetzen.

Bojanowski liefert eine schlüssige und sachlich fundierte Analyse der kantischen Theorie der Freiheit, die auf viele in der Sekundärliteratur gesehene Probleme eine überzeugende Antwort bietet und auf diese Weise zur Lösung des ersten Teils der selbstgestellten Aufgabe, die kantische Freiheitstheorie zu rehabilitieren, einen wichtigen Beitrag geleistet hat. Auf den zweiten Teil der Aufgabe, nämlich die kantische Theorie für die aktuelle Debatte fruchtbar zu machen, geht der Verfasser leider nicht ausführlich ein. Dabei ist diese Aufgabe doch mit größeren Schwierigkeiten verbunden, als Bojanowski in seiner Arbeit bereit ist zuzugestehen. So stellt er zwar bereits in der Einleitung fest, dass die kantische Form des Determinismus ein Prä-determinismus ist (vgl. KpV, V 99 (A 177–178)), wonach das Verhalten der Menschen „auf die Zukunft mit Gewissheit, so wie eine Mond- oder Sonnenfinsternis“ berechnet werden könne, aber trotzdem müsse darin kein Grund zur Beunruhigung für eine absolute Freiheit gesehen werden. Der Verfasser geht auf dieses Problem leider auch am Ende seiner Untersuchung nicht ausführlich ein, sondern wiederholt nur noch einmal die Ergebnisse der vorhergehenden Diskussion, so dass der Leser mit einem faden Beigeschmack und unbefriedigt mit der Behauptung Kants zurückgelassen wird, derzufolge der Prä-determinismus keine Gefahr für die Freiheit darstelle. Von besonderer Bedeutung ist in diesem Zusammenhang die Auflösung der dritten Antinomie, wie Bojanowski nicht müde wird zu behaupten. Doch hier drängt sich die Frage auf, ob die transzendente Unterscheidung in Dinge an sich und Erscheinungen und die wundersame Vereinigung beider Ursachensphären, Kausalität aus Freiheit und Naturkausalität, in der aktuellen Debatte auf Zustimmung hoffen kann. Um die kantische Freiheitstheorie tatsächlich im vollen Umfang zu rehabilitieren, wäre eine Auseinandersetzung mit der aktuellen Diskussion zu erwarten gewesen, so dass vor diesem Hintergrund der Vorteil der kantischen Theorie hätte aufgezeigt werden können. Doch dieser kleine Makel soll nicht darüber hinwegtäuschen, dass es sich hier um eine wirklich gelungene Arbeit handelt.

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Philip J. Rossi, SJ: *The Social Authority of Reason: Kant's Critique, Radical Evil, and the Destiny of Humankind*. Albany: State University of New York, 2005. xiii + 204 pages. ISBN 978-0-7914-6429-6.

This book challenges those who regard *Vernunft*, and Kant's *Kritik* of it, as abstractions with little or no relation to concrete social realities. While many insights in his noble effort to counteract this tendency are worth affirming, the *way* Rossi argues is as worrying as what he leaves *unsaid*. His argument is often unnecessarily general and ambiguously verbose. Rossi's assessment of Kant's position, as insight-

ful yet “deeply flawed”, thus points back to himself. Fortunately, correcting Rossi’s flaws can strengthen Kant’s position.

Rossi’s main thesis, that *Kritik* is “the enterprise of completely socializing the exercise of human reason” (3), would be tenable if presented as one of several features. He admits “this social dimension of critique” becomes fully explicit only when Kant, “in response to the social consequences of radical evil, introduces the idea of ‘an ethical commonwealth’” (3). Finding traces of reason’s social nature within the three *Critiques*, Rossi takes the meaning of *Kritik* to be *determined* by that dimension. He thinks “the dynamics of an emergent globalized culture” pose new problems for implementing Kant’s response to radical evil. Downplaying other aspects of *Kritik*, he claims these developments threaten “the very possibility of forming a shared intent to social union of the kind envisioned by Kant as the basis of an ethical commonwealth” (3–4). Rossi’s goal is to retrieve “Kant’s insight into the fundamentally social character of reason and its authority” (4), thereby laying hold of “the *hope* that critique establishes as the trajectory of our moral endeavors” through a “shared intent to social union that brings about an ethical commonwealth” (5). Postmodern society tells us there is no such hope; the Kantian gospel, says Rossi, is that if we believe we can do it, we *can* do it – pluralism (etc.) notwithstanding. By *just saying no* to the desocializing forces of evil, we *can* construct an ethical community, without appealing to divine grace (6), once we understand the “transformative trajectory of the critical project”. However, the core of Kant’s *Kritik* is reason’s recognition of its own limitations; its “self-discipline” thus requires us *not* to try extra hard to create “social union”, but to realize humbly that such efforts will result in confusion and failure if reason sets itself up as an absolute authority.

Rossi’s frequent complaint, that Kant never specifies “the concrete means” for establishing an ethical community (e.g., 9, 60), overlooks Kant’s main argument on this topic. In Part Three, Division One, Section II, of *Die Religion innerhalb der Grenzen der bloßen Vernunft*, Kant says of this “human duty” (the one Rossi requires us to fulfill *all on our own*) that “we cannot know whether as a whole it is also in our power”, so we *must* presuppose “another idea, namely, of a higher moral being through whose universal organization the forces of single individuals, insufficient on their own, are united for a common effort”. Kant claims we can have rational hope that constructing an ethical community is possible only if we view it as *religious* – i. e., as a *church*. The second half of *Die Religion* is full of concrete details about how the church, as a *partnership* of human and divine powers, can solve some of the very problems Rossi treats as distinctively postmodern.

The promethean task of Rossi’s Kant amounts to building a new Babel, for his ethical community has nothing to do with being religious or constructing a church. Rossi quotes the above argument (51), but conveniently omits Kant’s conclusion, that the possibility of an ethical community is comprehensible *only* if we appeal to God’s assistance. What he presents as “a social goal” that must “be rooted in a form of social dynamics” (53), Kant portrays as a *religious* goal that must be rooted in a *church*. Rossi (ironically, a Jesuit) eventually mentions “the church” in passing (56, 61, 99), with scare quotes suggesting the term should not be taken literally, but is an anomaly in Kant’s text, a metaphor for a *non-religious* reality. For Kant, *only* a church can instantiate an ethical community without succumbing to coercion; but Rossi claims even reason must sometimes employ coercive methods

(12). Thus, he grounds his hope on *political* structures – structures he specifies only in general terms, such as the need for “reasoned public deliberative exchange” (16) – without acknowledging that in *Die Religion* the ethical community must be *religious* in order for hope in its possibility to be rational. Kant’s theory of how the church establishes reason’s social authority deserves at least a full chapter, yet the only section Rossi devotes to the church (99–104) displays an uncanny reluctance to take Kant seriously and never actually examines his claims. Rossi’s conclusion, that Kant’s theory of the church is neither “specific” nor “systematically detailed” (104), is unwarranted for one who simply ignores the details. Kant’s alleged “lacuna” (117) lies not in the text but in Rossi’s failure to examine its contents.

As in his account of *Kritik*, Rossi gets the cart before the horse in assessing the “social consequences” of radical evil. He claims (78) “radical evil arises out of the necessary social conditions of human existence”. Yet Kant’s position is that radical evil is a condition of *human nature*; our “unsocial sociability” is an *outcome* of this condition, not vice versa. Likewise, Kant does not portray *Kritik* as aiming “to put an end to reason’s own inner war with itself” (81); rather, the “inner war” is *inevitable*, both theoretically and practically. *Der Streit der Fakultäten* portrays the solution not as seeking the utopia of a reason *without* such inherent self-conflict, but *disciplining* reason so the inner war produces peace *in spite of itself*. Kant’s *Vernunft* has social authority only when grounded in a “good principle” that is mysteriously “unnoticed to the human eye yet constantly advancing” – a passage Rossi quotes (87) from *Die Religion* yet contradicts by imposing reason’s authority on *all* human actions and intents.

This book inadvertently illustrates a key theme in Kant’s discussion of radical evil: *self-deception*. Rossi argues (91) that the two “most pertinent” of the “essential features that mark the proper exercise of the social authority of reason” are “first, that it is noncoercive in character and, second, that it most properly functions within the context of an intent to social union.” While “the public use of reason” in “uncoerced argumentative exchange” (107) is a Kantian ideal, it is also part of the *problem*, if not disciplined by *Kritik*: anyone who has participated in philosophical debate knows that it carries no guarantee of establishing “union” between the participants; more often, they end in ever more polarized opposition. *Kritik* reveals this *inherent weakness* of *Vernunft*; yet Rossi’s overemphasis on its “social authority” shrouds reason in a veil of false promises. Only by facing this weakness can we appreciate the power of Kant’s argument that *bloße Vernunft* constrains us humbly to rest our hope in the possibility of partnership with a higher power.

Rossi offers “the public use of reason, a cosmopolitan perspective, and Kant’s project for perpetual peace” (111) as Kantian tools for establishing “the social authority of reason” despite the threat of pluralism, globalization, etc. Religious faith plays no substantive role in this humanized rendition of Kant’s gospel. As a tool of radical evil’s unsocial sociability, postmodern reason calls into question the very possibility of human beings setting up an ethical community by mere force of will (128). Rossi sees this as *the* postmodern challenge to Kant’s ideal; yet his response (that we must *just do it!*) fails to show how “an ethical commonwealth is thus made possible” (129). Neglecting how deeply radical evil cuts into human nature, Rossi here ignores *the* key to Kantian *Kritik*, that human *Vernunft* must acknowledge its finitude, its powerlessness to accomplish this goal. Once reason

(infected by radical evil) becomes aware that it is *not* an absolute authority, hope in an ethical community *as religious* becomes possible.

Identifying *Kritik* with “the social authority of reason” and presenting it as a self-sufficient solution to postmodernism, Rossi’s deception runs deep. “The unfinished task of critique” is to bring all persons “into the ambit of the full sociality of reason” (141) through a “reciprocal relationship of inclusive argumentative exchange in which all interlocutors stand in full mutual accountability to one another [...]. To the extent that we fail to recognize the fully social character of reason [...] we seek to set reason against itself – and in so doing, we set ourselves against one another”. But how could recognizing reason’s social authority save us from radical evil, when our social nature is the expression of our corrupt *Vernunft*? Instead, Kantian *Kritik* calls us to recognize that *reason* is “set against itself” (corrupt at its core) and that we inevitably set ourselves against each other (in unsocial sociability) when we refuse to embrace this paradox about our nature. *Kritik* warns us that humans use reason to defend their own self-interest because reason inevitably polarizes itself; and if reason itself is dialectical, any one-sided use is a *misuse*. Only if we embrace this paradox can an authentic (religious) ethical community emerge.

That Rossi’s gospel is not Kant’s becomes clear when he asks: “Can human agents freely form a concrete intent to a social union that is fully universal?” and responds that an affirmative answer “is fundamental for the establishment of the social authority of reason” (148). *Vernunft* disciplined by *Kritik* realizes that *we do not know* whether we can take hold of human destiny in this way, that reason empowers itself only by humble faith in a power transcending its own limits. To make his position appear Kantian, Rossi imputes to Kant “a confidence in the power of human reason” (153) of the very sort *Kritik* makes untenable for *bloße Vernunft*; that nowadays such confidence “seems to many to be at least out of proportion, if not out of place” is a step in the right direction, not the matter of grave concern Rossi takes it to be. For Kant calls critical reason to take a step toward religious faith – a step whose *necessity* (at least in *Die Religion*) Rossi ignores. Just as the possibility of “the project of perpetual peace” rests for Kant on the willingness of Europe’s sovereign monarchs to act “in accord with such [rational] hope” (164), so also Kant grounds the possibility of constructing an ethical community on the hope that God might regard us as worthy partners in such a project.

Rossi the Jesuit seems ironically blind to this parallelism. He sets out to frame “a new horizon for our human interaction”, whereby we conduct “reasoned argument aimed at reaching agreement about matters of fundamental common concern” (166–167). Yet Kantian *Kritik* demonstrates such raw polemics to be *hopeless*, especially when focused on our allegedly “common interests” (168). “It makes no sense to deliberate”, Rossi claims, “unless we expect the outcome of deliberation to bring agreement”; for otherwise our debates are but “a mask for the interplay of power” (170). The goal of Kant’s *Kritik*, however, is not agreement (forced on us by a new tyrant, Reason) but *harmony*, whereby we seek to understand and appreciate different perspectives, without forcing all into one univocal mold.

Rossi’s insights are often clouded by jargon (peculiar terms like “vector” and “dynamic(s)” abound), giving the impression that *something* deep is being said, if only its content could be specified. Such abstractions, along with complex sentence structure and frequent repetition, thinly veil the author’s failure to provide the

details that would add meat to the bones of his plan. Rossi's verbosity reaches its height when he analyzes "the intent to social union" in a lengthy section (113–120) that could be condensed to a page. (Frequent typos suggest the publisher's failure to provide the services of a skilled editor is partly to blame for the obscurity of the book's message, based on material from eight previously published essays.) Ironically, Rossi accuses Kant of making the same error that plagues his book: focusing on broad strokes of theory but shying away from taking *concrete* steps. He never considers that the recent "philosophical practice" movement could provide real material for such application (see *Kant and the New Philosophy of Religion*, Ch.12). Long on rhetoric, short on details, full of high ideals, empty of concrete applications – these are flaws that would be more readily forgivable in a book packed with valid insights, were it not for the fact that Kant himself provided more detailed applications (and less rhetoric) than Rossi acknowledges.

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Nikolai F. Klimmek: Kants System der transzendentalen Ideen. Berlin/New York: de Gruyter 2005. IX und 237 Seiten. ISBN 978-3-11-018349-8. [KSEH 147].

Zu Beginn (1–13) skizziert Vf. das „Thema der Arbeit“, den „systematischen Ort der kantischen Ideenlehre“ und „Begriff und Aufgabe der ‚subjektiven‘ Deduktion der transzendentalen Ideen“. Im Hintergrund steht wohl Michael Wolff: *Die Vollständigkeit der kantischen Urteilstafel* (Frankfurt am Main 1995). Im ersten Teil will Vf. den ‚logischen‘ und den ‚realen Vernunftgebrauch‘ klären (‚Zwischenergebnis‘: 51–54). Im zweiten Teil entwickelt er eine ‚Hypothese zur Struktur der subjektiven Deduktion der transzendentalen Ideen‘ (57–74), danach das System der kosmologischen (75–116), der psychologischen Ideen (117–162), anschließend geht es um das transzendente Ideal (163–223). Am Ende stehen ‚Zusammenfassung‘, ‚Anlagen‘ (229f.: Kategorientafel; Tafel der kosmologischen Ideen; Topik der rationalen Seelenlehre; Tafel der psychologischen Ideen), Literaturverzeichnis und Personenregister. Auffällig ist, daß die Grundgliederung nicht der KrV folgt, sondern mit den ‚kosmologischen Ideen‘ beginnt und die ‚psychologischen‘ nachschiebt. Das ‚obere Erkenntnisvermögen‘ wird ohne Diskussion unter den Begriff des ‚Verstandes im weiteren Sinne‘ subsumiert (4; mit Bezug auf A 130f./B 169). Unbeachtet ist damit z.B. B 863: „Ich verstehe hier aber unter Vernunft das ganze obere Erkenntnisvermögen und setze also das Rationale dem Empirischen entgegen“ (vgl. B 355f.; 362; 574f.; 671f.; 692f.; 873).

Thema ist *der konstruktive Kern* der transzendentalen Dialektik, „die Lehre von den so genannten ‚transzendentalen Ideen‘“ (1). Vf. meint, Kant trage mit ihr „der über zweitausendjährigen Geschichte *vorkritischer* Metaphysik Rechnung“ (1), mißachtet aber die oft gestellte Frage, ob die vorneuzeitliche ‚Metaphysik‘, die Kant nicht authentisch und explizit zur Kenntnis genommen hat, ‚vorkritisch‘ zu nennen ist. Kenner werden Verweise wie den auf Anselm (221) für oberflächlich halten (Anselm fehlt zudem im Personenregister). Mit Bezug auf A VII vertritt Vf. die These, Kant deute „die Mißverständnisse der natürlichen Metaphysik [scil. der frühen Neuzeit] nicht als Produkte der Gesellschaftsgeschichte, sondern ahistorisch als Produkte *der Natur* der menschlichen Vernunft“ (2). Der Vorwurf mangelnder