GADAMER'S CRITIQUE OF HEIDEGGER'S HERMENEUTICS OF FACTICITY [1]

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The primary aim of the paper is to present Gadamer's critical approach to hermeneutics of facticity of Heidegger. Existentiality, facticity and being-fallen are the three aspects of Dasein according to Heidegger. His work, *Being and Time* starts with the examination of the analysis of Dasein and ends with the examination of temporality as the source of the ordinary conception of time. The other important issues like, Being in the world as the basic state of Dasein, the worldhood of the world, Being in the world as being with and being one's self, Being in as such and care as the being of Dasein, the relation between Dasein and temporality, temporality and everydayness, are also disussed by Heidegger. For him, Dasein exists factically. What is the nature of human existence? This is an important question for Heidegger. According to him, the important characteristic of human existence comes from expressions like "I am here" or "I am in this world". In other words, my existence is my own existence. My facticity is a part of the disclosure of ontological anxiety, which presents Dasein to itself as an isolated possibility thrown into the world. Thus facticity is characterized by individuality. Gadamer questions the hermeneutics of facticity of Heidegger by saying that it is paradoxical in nature. This is discussed in this paper. Also the paper examines the criticisms against Gadamer's understanding of the problem.

I

In *Being and Time*, Heidegger's talks of three structural elements that make up human existence. They are : (1) Desein always finds itself

"thrown" into a concrete situation and attuned to a cultural and historical context where things already count in determinate ways. This thrownness makes up Dasein's facticity. (2) Agency is "discursive" *i.e.*, our entire activities take place in language and (3) Dasein is "understanding". Heidegger's fundamental ontology emphasizes our facticity, thrownnees and embeddness in a concrete world. Facticity of human experience in its condition of being is closely bound up with *a priori* givenness of disclosure. Facticity is the human fate of being "thrown" into endless, finite mediation necessitated by difference, without being able to know why this endless mediation is necessary. The tripartite definition which Heidegger gives for Dasein is that it has existentiality, facticity and fallenness. These are the three aspects of Dasein. (1) ahead-of-itself (understanding), (2) already-in (disposition), and (3) alongside. Heidegger gives a temporal interpretation of these three aspects of Dasein. "The primordial unity of the structure of care lies in temporality."[2] The three aspects of care correspond to the three dimensions of time: the future (ahead of itself), the past (facticity), and the present (fallenness). Care is the basic state of Dasein. If death belongs in a distinctive sense to the Being of Dasein, then death must be defined in terms of these characteristics according to Heidegger.

From Husserl's phenomenology, Heidegger has shifted to "hermeneutics of facticity". The transcendental phenomenology, which was developed by Dilthey and Husserl mainly, attempts to elucidate the essential meaning of objects of experience through an investigation of the mode of their appearance. This investigation was to be conducted in a manner free from all presuppositions including presuppositions concerning the existence of material objects. But the epistemological problems, which preoccupy Dilthey and Husserls, were replaced by Heidegger's hermeneutic phenomenology. This is because of the main reason that though both of them attacked the positivism, they have accepted the Kantian epistemology. But Heidegger transcends this by saying that before any object is posited for a subject, the subject and object terms are bound togerther by a fundamental relation of belonging to a world. Thus for Heidegger, what is more important is the ontological inquiry into the nature of that being which is capable of such activities, *i.e.*, into the nature of "Dasein". He says that Dasein is an entity, which does not just occur among other entities. It is peculiar to this entity that with and through its

Being, this Being is disclosed to it. Understanding of Being is itself a definite characteristic of Dasein's Being. Heidegger tries to formulate a "hermeneutics of facticity" or what is known as "existential analytics."[3] He draws a distinction between "factuality" and "facticity". Factuality is that which concerns non-human things. The distinction between these two is explained in this way. Dasein is not its factuality, and hence it is not what it is factually. But it should be known that Dasein is understanding and understanding involves projection into concrete "current world".

According to Heidegger, Dasein's being is care. He brings in the concept of care only at the end of Division I of *Being and Time*. The question here is this: "Why did Heidegger first define Dasein's being as existence, only to show in the end that it really is care? For Heidegger, it is a purely ontological-temporal concept. He avoids the concept of care in the beginning of his inquiry of Dasein because of the main reason that Dasein's being is a complex one. The Dasein which is a difficult concept is introduced by him stage by stage. But Heidegger says that the being of Dasein is to be interpreted as care. It is name for how the whole Dasein is. Dasein is so complex that it can be articulated into three main structures: existence (self), thrownness (facticity) and fallenness (of falling prey or entanglement). He explains the first one, namely, existence in a detailed way in his discussion of "existence". Dasein is constantly beyond itself. In *Being and Time*. Heidegger talks about the existence of Dasein. He says: "Dasein exists". Dasein not only cares, but Dasein's being is care. In the Division I of chapter six of *Being and Time*, Heidegger undertakes a study of the notion of care. He defines Dasein as care. He also deals with the care-structure to show that Dasein has to be interpreted as care. In existence, Dasein is constantly out beyond itself. In this context, Heidegger talks about the disowned existence. It is a movement, he says, "away from...", which actually makes a threat from which Dasein flees. Dasein flees from himself into his occupations with things within the world. The flight of disowned existence is not an occasional, isolated act, but a basic way in which Dasein is in the world. By saying Dasein is care, Heidegger means that being can only be there as care; only as a factually existing being-in-the world, does the illumination of being happened. If care is the name for the "actual" thereness of being, it must be the origination source, the gathering place, of any understanding whatever of being. In the concept

of care, we are considering, the being-together-with means the fundamentally falling way in which Dasein loses himself in his occupations with things. In this mode of existing, Dasein's being-with others like himself has a predominately worldish character.

The notion of care is difficult to grasp. This can be seen in the Greek ontology. All disclosure of reality and world is grounded in and made possible by Dasein's being as care. It is anxiety, the basic state of mind which discloses the primordial totality of Dasein's being. In *Being and Time*, Heidegger says: "The Being of Dasein means ahead-of-itself-Being-already-in as Being-alongside".[4] Care stands for the existential totality of Dasein's ontological structural whole. It is because Dasein's being is "care", it can relate itself to the equipmental world by concern and to the communal world by solicitude. In the phenomenon of care, we arrive at the point of existential analysis of Dasein in its everydayness.

Heidegger's usage of the term "care" is to designate the basic feature in us that constitutes all our involvement in the world.[5] It is the analysis of the structure of care that allows him to claim that our being is at the same time "being-in-the world" as an organised whole. This conception of care must be taken into account in an overall sense we give to our existence as being-in-the-world by virtue of which it is an integrated whole. According to him, we cannot make projections without an existing understanding of the world and ourselves in it. In all our activities, we are tied to the present, because we are in and with the world that absorbs us and ties us down to our everyday activities. This is the structure of our "temporality." Of course, by temporality, he does not mean that we are confined to time. It is being ahead of ourselves in the future, drawing on our past, while being concerned with the present that constitutes our being.

Dasein, according to Heidegger, is concerned primarily with an explication of what it means to be in the world, of how, we find ourselves in relation to things in the world in average everydayness. This "being in relation" is our worldliness. It has two principal structures, namely, understanding and state of mind. We understand ourselves and our world in terms of our practical involvement and projects. Both are nothing but aspects of care, which captures not just one aspect of Dasein but Dasein in its entirety. Thus he defines care as "ahead-of-itself-Being-already-in-(the world) as Being-alongside.[6]

Heidegger explains that the practical dimension of human existence by defining the very being of Dasein as care. To be human, means to be concerned about things and to be in relation with other people. According to Heidegger, Dasein exists factically. He examines whether existentiality and facticity have an ontological unity, or whether facticity belongs essentially to existential. He defines Dasein's average everydayness as "Being in the world which if falling and disclosed, thrown and projecting, and for which its ownmost potentially-for-being is an issue, both in its Being alongside the "world" and in its Being-with Others".[7] Dasein's Being reveals itself as care. Here we must see the basic existential phenomenon. This must be distinguished from phenomena, which might be identified with care, such as will, wish, addiction and urge. But care cannot be derived from these, says Heidegger.[8] Dasein's Being as care is very much essential in order to understand the totality of the structural whole ontologically. For this, the first step is to see whether the phenomenon of anxiety, which is disclosed in it, can give us the whole of Dasein in a way which is phenomenally equiprimordial, and whether they can do so. The entire phenomenon of anxiety clearly shows that Dasein is factically existing Being-in-the world.

Since Being-in-the-world is essentially care, Being-alongside can be taken as concern. Heidegger says that Being-alongside something is concern, because it is defined as a way of being-in by its basic structure--care. Care does not characterize just existentially, says Heidegger.[9] It embraces the unity of these ways in which Being may be characterized. This means that care cannot stand for some special attitude towards the Self, for the Self has been characterized ontologically by "Being-ahead-of-itself", a characteristic in which the other two items in the structure of care--Being-already-in and Being-alongside have been jointly posited. Care, is always concern and solicitude. Care according to Heidegger, is not yet become free though it first makes it ontologically possible for Dasein to be urged on by itself. The urge to live is not to be annihilated. But while explicating care, Heidegger is not forcing it under an idea of our own contriving, but is conceptualizing existentially what has been disclosed in an ontic-existential manner. Thus by saying that care is to be understood just ontically as worry or grief, Heidegger explains that it is preontological in character.[10]

Interpretation is grounded in understanding. Understanding is an

existential and expressive of Dasein's existence, of its being ahead of itself, project. But Dasein is a thrown project. This according ot Heidegger is the "existential state" or "state of mind". or "condition."[11] This ontologico-existential structure is expressed in "mood." "A mood, Heidegger contends, makes manifest how one is, and how one is faring"[12] State of mind and mood are expressive of Dasein's facticity. Heidegger's following remarks are important: "Facticity is not the factuality of the factum brutum of something present-at-hand, but a characteristic of Dasein's Being -- one which has been taken up into existence, even if proximity it has been thrust aside."[13]

In our analysis so far, we have shown that Dasein is something neutral or even explicitly as inauthentic Dread or anxiety provides the access to the authentic self. Because dread alone fetch man back from the falling down upon the world. The unity of existential structures is care. This is present in the formal determination of man as a being who is for the sake of himself, i.e., man's for-the-sake-of or relationship to his own being. Thus Dasein always appears as an absolutely individualized creature, concerned about its own Being and threatened from two sides, from within by the deep stratum of fundamental moods, and from without by the mass which swallows up the individual.

II

Hans-Georg Gadamer, the exponent of philosophical hermeneutics, has offered new modes of interpretation. He gave a twist to Heidegger's hermeneutics of facticity by reinterpreting it. Born in Marburg, Germany, in 1900, he studied philosophy, and classical philology in 1920s' at Marburg and Freiburg, under teachers like Paul Natorp, Heidegger and Paul Friedlander. He completed is doctorate on Plato in 1922 and served in Marburg from 1927 to 1937, Leipzig from 1938 to 1937, Frankfurt from 1947-1949 and later at Heidelberg from 1949 to 1968, i.e., till his retirement. he delivered lectures as a guest professor in American, Canadian and German Universities after his retirement. He died in 2002. When Heidegger was given rectorship of Freiburg University in 1933 and became the supporter of National Socialism, Gadamer broke off his relation with Heidegger.[14] He renewed his relation with Heidegger in the late 1930's, after Heidegger had given up the rectorship and political life. This relation

continued until Heidegger's death in 1976. Heidegger invited Gadamer to write an introduction for the publication of the second edition of the essay, "Origin of the work of Art" in 1960. Till then, Gadamer did not write anything on Heidegger directly. The book *Truth and Method* was published in 1960, but in 1950 itself Heidegger requested him to write a substantial book. But Gadamer says that he always felt that Heidegger was "looking over his shoulder". *Truth and Method* was written when Gadamer was at the age of sixty. Gadamer in his lifetime, has written only three books. (1) *Plato's Dialectal Ethics*. This book is on Gadamer's habilitation in 1931 on Plato's *Philebus*. (2) *Truth and Method* and (3) *The Idea of Good in Platonic-Aristotelian Philosophy*. All other writings of Gadamer are the collection of essays by him on various occasions. Some of his other important works include: *Philosophical Hermeneutics*, (1976) *Dialogue and Dialectic: Eight Hermeneutical Studies on Plato*, (1980) *Reason in the Age of Science*, (1981) *Hegel's Dialectic: Five Hermeneutical Studies*, (1982) *Philosophical Apprenticeship*, (1985) *The Relevance of the Beautiful and Other Essays*, (1986) *Heidegger's Ways*, (1994) and *Literature and Philosophy in Dialogue* (1984).

Gadamer's teacher Paul Natorp gave him a manuscript from Heidegger to read. It was about an introduction to Aristotle from the phenomenological side. Gadamer read Heidegger's essay on Aristotle, which hit him like "a charge of electricity."[15] This essay made Gadamer to join under Heidegger. In Freiburg, he attended lectures by Heidegger on Aristotle, Husserl's *Logical Investigations* and Lectures on "The Hermeneutics of Facticity", which is a lecture on ontology. Both for Heidegger and Gadamer, understanding is the origian form of the realization of our existence. Every interpretation presupposes understanding because every interpretation is guided by anticipations. For Heidegger, the understanting is mainly to know one's way around, to be up to a task, whereas for Gadamer it is to agree on the thing itself. Moreover, for Heidegger, the prestructure of understanding consists of an anticipation of existence in fore-sight, preacquisition and pre-conceptuality, whereas for Gadamer, it is prejudice. The perspective of *Truth and Method* is the perspective of philosophical hermeneutics. Gadamer says how his "revival" of hermeneutics is different from the earlier hermeneutics. "If there is any practical consequence of the present investigation, it certainly has nothing

to do with an unscientific 'commitment': instead, it is concerned with the 'scientific' integrity of acknowledging the commitment involved in all understanding. My real concern was and is philosophic: not what we do or what we ought to do, but what happens to us over and over our wanting and doing."[16]

Gadamer asks the question namely, "Is Heidegger's 'hermeneutic of facticity' really only an answer to a transcendental limiting problematic"?[17] Gadamer feels that Heidegger's project in *Being and Time* does not completely overcome the sphere of the problematic of transcendental reflection. He believes that under the name of a "hermeneutic facticity" Heidegger confronted Husserl's eidetic phenomenology, together with the distinction between a fact and essence on which it depended, with a paradoxical demand. Gadamer explains the difficulties with regard to facticity in the following way: "The facticity of there-being, existence, which cannot be based on or derived from anything else and not the pure cogito as the essential constitution of typical universality, should represent the ontological basis of the phenomenological position--a bold idea, but difficult to carry through," says Gadamer.[18]

In his essay, "The Phenomenological Movement",[19] Gadamer examines the role played by Husserl and Heidegger on the movement. Here, Gadamer explains the errors in Heidegger's hermeneutics of facticity as conceived by Husserl. Also Gadamer explains how these errors are rectified by Husserl. He says as follows: "...it seems to me, those in Husserl's eyes it is a question of the difficulties he had perceived long ago in the selfreferential character of phenomenology, namely that the phenomenological basis of all philosophy in apodictic certainty must itself have application on this basis too. And it is his conviction that these difficulties had led to fateful errors in Heidegger's 'hermeneutic of facticity."[20] Gadamer says the *Crisis* makes an attempt to remove such errors by giving an answer to *Being and Time*. No doubt, *Being and Time* had influenced Gadamer in his theory of interpretation. But in *Truth and Method*, Gadamer clearly says that though there are inadequacies of Heidegger's language, he accepts the development throughout Heidegger's thinking. But he explains how he differs from him. He says: "Our thoughts on the significance of tradition in historical consciousness took off from Heidegger's analysis of the hermeneutics of facticity and sought to apply

it to a hermeneutics of the human sciences."[21] In the hermeneutical theory, the role of ontological significance is something very important. The uniquencess of Gadamer is that he had worked out the implications, which Heidegger had provided as the starting point For example, it can be said that Heidegger talks about Dasein as thrown projection. This is the starting point for Gadamer. Understanding is always related to the future into which Dasein continually projects itself. "Understanding is thrown, that is, situated by the past as a heritage of funded meanings that Dasein takes over from its community."[22] This definitely implies that Heidegger's understanding of facticity had influenced Gadamer to a great extent in the theory of interpretation.

In Part II, of *Philosophical Hermeneutics*, Gadamer takes up three important themes for discussion, namely, Phenomenology, Existential Philosophy and Philosophical Hermeneutics. He wrote these essays between 1960 and 1969. He explains how Dasein comes upon itself as radically finite and temporal "being-in-the-world." Thus the effect of "Heidegger's analytic of Dasein was to render unsuspendable precisely the life-world Husserl intended to reduce and to replace the transcendental ego with the being whose facticity reflection could not set aside."[23] Gadamer argues that Husserl acknowledges being-in-the world as a problem of horizon intentionality of transcendental and the absolute historicity of transcendental subjectivity had to be able to demonstrate the meaning of facticity. Further he says that Husserl's understanding goes against the Heidegger's meaning of facticity is itself an eidoes, that it belongs essentially to the eidetic sphere of universal essences.[24]

Gadamer feels that although *Being and Time* criticised the lack of ontological definition of Husserl's concept of transcendental subjectivity, it still formulated its own account of the question of being in terms of transcendental philosophy. Gadamer says: "In his (Heidegger) grounding of the hermeneutics of 'facticity' he went beyond both the concept of spirit developed by classical idealism and the thematic of transcendental consciousness, purified by phenomenological reduction."[25] Heidegger examines the question whether existentiality and facticity have an ontological unity or whether facticity belongs essentially to existentiality.[26] He says that his thrownness belongs together with that which is projected.

The main point of the hermeneutics of facticity is that no freely chosen relation towards one's owns being can go back beyond the facticity of this being. Gadamer supports Heidegger by saying that the hermeneutical situation explains that the human beings are thrown into a history. In his famous essay on "Text and Interpretation"[27] Gadamer says that the Being that can be understood is language. Based on Heidegger's facticity, Gadamer also argues that Being is that which is questionable. Heidegger's break with Husserl led to beginning of the hermeneutics of facticity. Even before the publication of *Being and Time*, Heidegger was interested in the notion of facticity. It is something that points to everything about our experience that resists understanding and is a clear and precise conception. Facticity highlights Dasein's existence as interplay between motivation and anticitpation. Gadamer no doubt made use of Heidegger's hermeneutics of facticity to overcome aesthetic, romantic, and historical consciousness. Heidegger's study of facticity developed in *Being and Time*, severely attacks Husserl and also the Idealist transcendental subjectivity. Gadamer's *Truth and Method* tries to answer this.

Gadamer says that Heidegger pursued the inner inextricability of authenticity and inauthenticity, of truth and error, and the concealment that necessarily accompanies all disclosure and shows the internal contradiction in the idea of total objectifiability. According to Gadamer the notion of hermeneutics of facticity of Heidegger is paradoxical. He says as follows: "The slogan that the young Heidegger proclaimed was itself paradoxical enough, and it was critical of all factions."[28] To speak of a hermeneutics of facticity is to speak of something like "wooden iron".[29] "Facticity", contends Gadamer, "means precisely the unshakable resistance that the factual puts up against all grasping and understanding, and in the special phrasing in which Heidegger couched the concept of fgacticity, it meant the fundamental determination of human Dasein".[30] Is it consciousness or self-consciousness by nature? Gadamer says that this is certainly not merely consciousness or self-consciousness." "The understanding of Being, which distinguishes the human Dasein by compelling it to question the meaning of Being, is itself in the highest degree of paradox."[31] It is mainly because of the reason that the meaning of Being is not like any other question concerning meaning.

III

· Habermas in his *Knowledge and Human Interests*, calls Gadamer's method "hermeneutic-historical science." Harbermas says that in the hermeneutic-historical science, there is a pre-understanding of tradition. It cannot do a complete justice to the study of social phenomena because of their claim to self-sufficiency and universality. Habermas is of the view that in Gadamer, the growing of all knowledge in tradition cut him off from appreciating the system of social labour and power potentially distort consciousness. Habermas criticizes Gadamer for his dependence on tradition.[32] Similarly in the *Consequences of Pragmatism*, Rorty charges Gadamer as a "weak textualist."[33] Gadamer's reply to Habermas is that he has misunderstood and distorted the fundamental character and the aim of philosophical hermeneutics. It must be remembered that the project in *Truth and Method* is ontological. Habermas shows the limitations of the philosophical hermeneutics. Gadamer derives his philosophy of hermeneutics mainly from Heidegger's hermeneutics of facticity discussed by him in part I of *Being and Time*. The philosophical hermeneutics of Gadamer is transcendental and phenomenological like the fundamental ontology of Heidegger in *Being and Time*. Gadamer says: "I received impetuses for thinking from Heidegger very early on, ... However, as is always the case when one is attempting to find one's own position, some distance was needed before I was able to present Heidegger's ways of thinking as his; I first had to distinguish my own search for my ways and paths from my companionship with Heidegger and his ways."[34] It is said that a fundamental empathy with Heidegger prevails in all Gadamer's writings.[35] Gadamer's hermeneutics of facticity is that which he had derived largely from Heidegger. But there is a distance and the distance is to be understood as the "creative distance."[36]

Caputo in his *Radical Hermeneutics : Repetition, Deconstruction and the Hermeneutic Project* argues that the "hermeneutics of facticity" of Heidegger was betrayed by Gadamer. Caputo says that Gadamer's thinking is "historical" but not "epochal". But Caputo fails to note that by being historical rather than epochal, Gadamer's approach acts as a check on the Heidegger's narrative of the relation between philosophy and the destiny of the west. Caputo attacks Gadamer for breaking away from

Heidegger's hermeneutics. But it must be kept in mind that in some respects Gadamer goes beyond Heidegger. Our participation in the tradition is not eminently epochal, as it is for Heidegger. We participate in the tradition which carries the values when we read particular texts. Thus it is not epochal, but historical according to Gadamer. There is also another place where Gadamer goes beyond Heidegger. Tradition, for Heidegger is a fixed cannon of names or a stabilized cast of characters. But for Gadamer, tradition is the play of conversation with others. This generates meanings and it is how tradition becomes an ongoing process. By virtue of the openness and inclusion of conversation, all those who appreciate it retain tradition. For Gadamer, hermeneutics is centered on a theory of interpretation, of the transmission of the stored up riches of the tradition, of the dynamics of that transmission. Tradition is the finite unfolding of an infinite content, a history of finite actualization of an essentially inexhaustible, or infinite, truth. Gadamer does not see the tradition as a given and an "inescapable facticity". He puts the history of philosophy by means of "tradition" back on a more modest, human limit, built up out of meetings between the text and the reader.

Caputo also claims that in the philosophical hermeneutics of Gadamer, radical elements are absent. By radical what he means is not to lay any philosophical problems to rest.[37] "If there is anything that we learn in radical hermeneutics, it is that we never get the better of the flux", says Caputo.[38] But it should be understood that Gadamer is more radical than others hermeneuticians. His explication of the historicality of human understanding and his effort to show the historical conditions under which the understanding operates, proves that Gadamer is more radical than others are. Another criticism of Caputo is that in the Gadamerian analytic of finitude, there is a shift from Heidegger to Hegel and a radical Heideggerian facticity has been subverted from within by a creeping Hegeliamism. This in short, means that Gadamer reinterprets hermeneutics in a more Hegelian way that undermied the radicality of facticity of Heidegger. But this criticism of Caputo is not valid at all for the main reason that a close study of Heidegger would reveal that the later Heidegger himself, who replaces it with Being, betrayed the hermeneutics of facticity than Gadamer.

NOTES

1. This paper is dedicated in memory of Hans-Georg Gadamer who passed away recently.
2. Heidegger, *Being and Time*, John Macquarrie & Edward Robinson (tr.) Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1978, p.375.
3. *Ibid.*, p. 490, n.1.
4. *Ibid.*, p. 237.
5. *Ibid.*, Division I, Chapter Six.
6. *Ibid.*, p.237.
7. *Ibid.*, p.225.
8. *Ibid.*, p.227.
9. *Ibid.*, p.237.
10. Heidegger's expalins Dasein's intrerpretation of itself as care in an ancient fable as follows:
    " 'Care' was once crossing a river, she saw some clay. She took up a piece and began to shape it. Jupiter comes that way. Now Care asks him to give it spirit and he did it. They were quarreling over the name to be given to it. Then, Earth desired that her own name be conferred on the creature, because she had furnished it with part of her body. They went to Saturn for justice. he said as follows: "Since you, Jupiter, have given its spirit, you shall receive that spirit at its death; and since you, Earth, have given its body, you shall receive its body. But since "care" first shaped this creature, she shall possess it as long as it lives. And because there is now a dispute among you as its name, let it be called "*homo*", for it is made out of *humus* (earth)".
    This very clearly shows that care should be seen as that to which human Dasein belongs for its lifetime. The priority of care emerges in connection with the familiar way of taking man as compounded of body and spirit. See *Being and Time*, p.242.
11. *Ibid.*, p. 172,n.
12. *Ibid.*, p. 173.
13. *Ibid.*, p. 174.
14. Heidegger's support to Nazis is Gadamer's first disappointment with Heidegger. There was also second disappointment when Heidegger failed to recognize the *Truth and Method*. It seems that Gadamer sent a copy of his book when it first came out and waited for a response from Heidegger and it did not come at all. The book, *Truth and Method* Gadamer says, is an attempt, among other things to open the way for readers to the work of the

later Heidegger.

15.   Gadamer, *Heidegger's Ways*, John W. Stanley (tr.) Introduction by Dennis
      J. Schmidt, Albany: State University of New York Press, 1994, p. 113.

16.   Gadamer, *Truth and Method*, William Glen-Doepel, (tr.) London: Sheed and
      Ward, Gadamer's Foreword to the Second Edition, 1979, p. xvi

17.   Gadamer, *Philosophical Hermeneutics*, David E. Linge, (tr.) London:
      University of California Press, 1977, p. 169.

18.   *Truth and Method*, p. 225.

19.   *Philosophical Hermeneutics*, Chapter ix.

20.   *Ibid.*, p. 161.

21.   *Truth and Method*, p. 276.

22.   *Philosophical Hermeneutics*, p. xlvii.

23.   *Ibid.*, p. xlvi.

24.   *Truth and Method*, p. 226.

25.   *Ibid.*, p. 229.

26.   *Being and Time*, p. 225.

27.   Gadamer, "Text and Interpretation" in *Dialogue and Deconstruction: The
      Gadamer-Derrida Encounter*, Diane P. Michelfelder and Richard E. Palmer
      (ed. & tr.) Albany: SUNY Press, 1989.

28.   *Heidegger's Ways*, p. 55.

29.   *Ibid.*

30.   *Ibid.*

31.   *Ibid.*

32.   Harbermas, *Knowledge and Human Interests*, Jeremy J. Shapiro, (tr.)
      London: Heinmann, 1972, p. 309.

33.   Rotry, *Consequences of Pragmatism*, Great Britain: The Harvester Press
      Ltd., 1982, p. 153.

34.   *Heidegger's Ways*, p. vii.

35.   *Ibid.*, p. xvii.

36.   *Ibid.*, p. xviii.

37.   John D. Caputo, *Radical Hermeneutics: Repetition, Deconstruction and
      the Hermeneutic Project*, Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1987, p. 2.

38.   *Ibid.* p. 258.