

HOW PERFORMATIVES EXACTLY WORK

RISHI KANT PANDEY

Language is the medium of communication. However, the most critical question is; how language works? Some eminent contemporary philosophers have argued either in favour of standardization or conventionalization, as down to earth touchstones facilitating the functioning of language. Secondly, when the speaker uses any utterance, does the hearer directly or indirectly infer its performativity?

Austin delineated the nature of utterances in his celebrated book *How to Do things with Words* (1962). He made a clear cut distinction between the constative and the performative utterances, by virtue of description and action respectively. Later on, he himself rejected this distinction and purported as to every speech is an act. In other words, an utterance not only informs or describes something but also performs some act, which is known as speech act theory. By and large, there is no controversy about this issue.

The philosophers, who express their agreement about Austin's doctrine solely, consider this problem in the context of the hearer's perspectives. This approach, however, ignores an indispensable dimension of an utterance, like *the intention of the speaker*, which has a major role in our communication. Lack of consideration of intention causes communication gap between the speaker and the hearer. Although, an utterance is constative and performative both, nonetheless on the basis of the speaker's intention, one can plainly distinguish between the two aspects. *A speaker does not always use a performative sentence for doing; sometimes he simply wants to inform the hearer or listener.* For instance,

at the end of a ceremony, someone announces; *this was the best arrangement*. Of course, this utterance may be simply informative or it may be a sort of stimulation for others to arrange such sort of ceremony. The meaning of utterances relies upon the judgment of the hearer and his interpretation of the intention of the speaker. If we ignore the speaker's intention, we will not be able to judge the actual meaning of this utterance. In my article, *Why to distinguish performative and constative utterances?*, I have argued,

"Thus, the intention of the speaker is critically important in understanding the meaning of utterances. Merely knowledge of the context in which an utterance takes place may not be adequate in understanding the meaning assigned by the speaker. The hearer also attempts to make inference regarding intention of the speaker."¹

Later on, Searle discussed the problems of how performatives work with regard to self-guaranteeing and *self-referential* characters. While considering the self-guaranteeing character, he raised a crucial question; Why is it possible as to in some cases, the performative utterance can't be lie or mistake or false while, some utterances, on the other hand, can be lie or mistake or false. For instance, *Ram promises to come and see you next week*, this utterance may be false or mistake. Whereas, when we say, *I promise to come and see you next week*, this utterance can't be false or mistake. Searle pretended as to when we say, *I promise to come and see you next week*, we emphasise on the force of utterance, i.e., utterance of the sentence and its literal meaning both are identical. Searle called it *self-guaranteeing* character of an utterance.

Searle, further, defined *self-referential* character in terms of the word *hereby*. When a person, for example, utters, *I hereby promise to do so and so*, then he does not describe or report about his promise. Indeed, he promises or he guarantees about his promises, which betoken the real intention of the speaker. Otherwise, an utterance may be confused between *actual intention* and *pseudo intention*. Searle, therefore introduced *hereby* as an useful torchstone, which reveals the self-referential character of the performative. By virtue of the word *hereby*, he, therefor, distinguished between the constative and the performative utterance. Constative utterance underlies merely its literal meaning. However, when we use the word *hereby*, the utterance is treated as performative utterance,

to the extent that, it not only includes its literal meaning but also speaker's intention. as Searle wrote,

“ Performative speaker meaning includes sentence meaning but goes beyond it. In the case of the performative utterance, the intention is that the utterance should constitute the performance of the act named by the verb. The word ‘hereby’ makes this explicit, and with the addition of this word, sentence meaning and performative speaker meaning coincide.”²

Searle endeavoured to make a clear-cut distinction between the constative and the performative utterance by virtue of the word *hereby*, which is problematic. Firstly, *hereby* is not common language, it is an official language. It has been used in the various offices for various legal proceedings. Secondly, it must demand some written documents. In our conversational talk, therefore, this word may not be used, and if it were used, it would be redundant. Thirdly, the word ‘hereby’ has always been used for continuing the processing, discussed prior. Fourthly, even if a speaker uses the word ‘hereby’ notwithstanding, his intention may be confused between actual and pseudo intention. Nonetheless, without using the word ‘hereby’, a speaker may express his real intention. It rests upon speaker’s personality, sincerity, character, nature and so forth, If the speaker is sincere, he must express his real intention. At that juncture, it is meaningless to consider whether the word ‘hereby’ was used or not. On the other hand, if the speaker is insincerer and cunning, then in spite of using the word ‘hereby’, he may actually hide his real intention and report a pseudo intention, making task of the hearer much difficult. ‘*Hereby*’, therefore, would not be an appropriate touchstone for deciding the actual and pseudo intention. Fifthly, ‘hereby’ may be a sort of information or description. For example, *I hereby inform that professor x is appointed as a vice-chancellor of Allahabad University*. This utterance plainly, is informative. Regarding the above discussion, we may say as to ‘hereby’ is not an accurate criterion for deciding the character of the performatives.

Likewise, when Searle discussed the *self-guaranteeing* character of an utterance, he emphasised on the *force* of an utterance, which underlies that utterance of the sentence and its literal meaning. both are indentical. For example, *I promise to do so and so*. Of course, when the speaker uses the word ‘I’, then he emphasises on the *force* of the utterance,

and it would be awry to say that we emphasis on something, insincerely. Although, Searle's contention appears correct, at first glance, nonetheless, he did not discuss an inevitable dimension of communication, like *the speaker's personality*, i.e., the speaker is sincere or insincere, honest or dishonest and the like. If the speaker is sincere and honest, indeed, his intention and force would be indetical, even if he uses the utterance in the third person. On the other hand, when the speaker is insincere and dishonest, he uses an utterance even in the first person, nonetheless, it would not be the performative, in as much as the speaker may hide his real intention and express pseudo intention. We therefore, argue that even self-guaranteeing character would not facilitate an appropriate criterion for the performatives. Thus, the only way for deciding the constative and the performative *is the intention of the speaker*.

However, it is important to mention that when an utterance is used in conformity with certain convention, the role of intention of the speaker is retrenched in communication. Although, the speaker's intention may be wrong, nevertheless the act must be performed. For example, in the law court, in the law court in front of the Registrar, a man asserts looking at a woman that *I do you my lawful wedded spouse*. In such circumstances, merely utterance of certain words is adequate for the successful performative and in this regard, the question of the intention of the speaker is meaningless. Likewise, on the occasion of inauguration of the seminar the chairperson of the seminar announces as to *I inaugurate this seminar*. This utterance must perform the act of inauguration and what is the intention of the speaker, is irrelevant. While, in the absence of conventionalization, the intention of the speaker plays a major role in communication between the speaker and the hearer. In such circumstances, there are no norms, whereby, the hearer may succeed to judge the real intention of the speaker. He therefore, indirectly endeavours to infer the real intention of the speaker by Gricean mechanism. Apparently, *convention does not reflect the intention and intention may not be easily revealed by convention*. In this regard, we may say as to Searl's contention is untenable, because, he emphasises too much in favour of the intention of the speaker, even in the case of convention, as he wrote;

to the extent that, it not only includes its literal meaning but also speaker's intention. as Searle wrote,

"Performative speaker meaning includes sentence meaning but goes beyond it. In the case of the performative utterance, the intention is that the utterance should constitute the performance of the act named by the verb. The word 'hereby' makes this explicit, and with the addition of this word, sentence meaning and performative speaker meaning coincide."²

Searle endeavoured to make a clear-cut distinction between the constative and the performative utterance by virtue of the word *hereby*, which is problematic. Firstly, *hereby* is not common language, it is an official language. It has been used in the various offices for various legal proceedings. Secondly, it must demand some written documents. In our conversational talk, therefore, this word may not be used, and if it were used, it would be redundant. Thirdly, the word 'hereby' has always been used for continuing the processing, discussed prior. Fourthly, even if a speaker uses the word 'hereby' notwithstanding, his intention may be confused between actual and pseudo intention. Nonetheless, without using the word 'hereby', a speaker may express his real intention. It rests upon speaker's personality, sincerity, character, nature and so forth, If the speaker is sincere, he must express his real intention. At that juncture, it is meaningless to consider whether the word 'hereby' was used or not. On the other hand, if the speaker is insincerer and cunning, then in spite of using the word 'hereby', he may actually hide his real intention and report a pseudo intention, making task of the hearer much difficult. '*Hereby*', therefore, would not be an appropriate touchstone for deciding the actual and pseudo intention. Fifthly, 'hereby' may be a sort of information or description. For example, *I hereby inform that professor x is appointed as a vice-chancellor of Allahabad University*. This utterance plainly, is informative. Regarding the above discussion, we may say as to 'hereby' is not an accurate criterion for deciding the character of the performatives.

Likewise, when Searle discussed the *self-guaranteeing* character of an utterance, he emphasised on the *force* of an utterance, which underlies that utterance of the sentence and its literal meaning. both are indential. For example, *I promise to do so and so*. Of course, when the speaker uses the word 'I', then he emphasises on the *force* of the utterance,

pitch, intonation, and cadence of the utterance make different meanings of the utterance. So far as, this utterance must be performative, nonetheless, it is hard to decide, where the force in this utterance is.

Likewise, all sorts of *indirect speech* act must be performative. Searle himself uttered,

“In indirect speech acts the speaker communicates to the hearer more than he actually says by way of relying on their mutually shared background information, both linguistic and non-linguistic.Many confusions in recent moral philosophy rest on a failure to understand the nature of such indirect speech acts.”⁵

However, its form is not very clear and overt. Suppose, someone asks his son, *do you know how much is the telephone bill ?* This utterance is a sort of indirect speech act. However, what does he want to say by this utterance, is not very obvious. By and large, this utterance appears like a *question* i.e., the father would like to know about telephone bill. Besides, it may be possible that the father *indirectly instructs his son to avoid unnecessary calls*, on account of too much telephone bill. Indirect speech act, therefore, is not very clear and overt; however, its performativity is undoubted.

Similarly, all sorts of *non-verbal speech acts* are performative. For example, Austin claimed,

“We may accompany the utterance of the words by gesture (winks, pointings, shruggings, frowns & c) or by ceremonial non-verbal actions. These may sometimes serve without the utterance of any words, and their importance is very obvious”⁶

Again, “the situation in the case of actions which are non-linguistic but similar to performative utterances-----”⁷ However, it is very difficult to judge its performativity. For example, If someone asks you about anything but you don't speak and remain silent. What would you like to communicate, by your silence? It is not an easy task for the hearer to judge. It's meaning may be that you would like to ignore this question; it may be that your question is irrelevant in this context; you may express your agreement and disagreement by your silence; apart from this, it may even be possible as to the answer of this question is indescribable, because

it is beyond our mind, intellect and language, so we can't say anything at all regarding your question.

Furthermore, for successful communication, *the intention of the speaker* is very important. However, it is also very difficult to infer the intention of the speaker. Intention may be confused between actual and pseudo intention. More precisely, intention is subjective, lacking objective way to judge it and therefore, nobody can provide any clear-cut touchstones for inferring it. Even a speaker may assert that he is telling his the very intention; however, he may actually hide his real intention and report a pseudo intention.

All the four sorts of utterances, therefore, must be performatives, nonetheless its performativity is not very clear and overt. In so far as,, these are not only bound up with the speaker but also with the hearer's personality, talent, calibre, subtle and extensive thinking and also his skill. If hearer is very dull and layman, then there is less possibility that he would succeed to identify their performativity. So, it would not be appropriate to pretend as to whether performative utterances are explicit and overt.

Later on , Searle endeavoured to distinguish between *linguistic declaration and extra-linguistic declaration*, by virtue of semantic property. Linguistic declaration creates a linguistic fact like, *promise, order* and so forth. Whereas, extra-linguistic declaration creates an extralinguistic fact, i.e., it must perform some act in actual world vis-a-vis merely saying something, for example, *adjourning the meeting, declaring wars* and so forth. Well, Searle claimed as to there are some utterances, which literal utterance is adequate in itself because, "Language is itself an institution"⁸. It quite likely implies that these utterances do not perform any sort of act in the actual world, except saying something. Thus, they work *between word to word and not word to world*. On the other hand , there are enormous utterances, which literal utterance is inadequate in itself. In other words, their success relies upon the performance of some act in the actual world. They, therefore, work *between words to world, not solely word to word*.

The above distinction is untenable. Every utterance is bound up with action rather than limited to its literal meaning. For example, Searle purported as to I promise, it does not create any extra-linguistic fact. However, the

question is; *May I promise by saying literally that 'I promise'*. Of course, 'I promise' must insinuate some action, i.e. 'promise about something. Suppose, we utter that *I promise to come and see you next week* but my intention may not be fair and vehemently, I would not like to meet with you. In those circumstances, we may not say that I have promised. Secondly, If we suppose that this utterance does not create any extra-linguistic fact, then the second part of this utterance, i.e. *come and see you next week* would be redundant, which is incorrect. Likewise, *I order you to leave the room*. However, the question is *what sort of order?* Indeed, *order* is bound up with *leave the room*, which is not merely literal but also actual. We therefore, can't lay down that language is in itself an institution and its literal utterance is adequate, in itself. instead, we may distinguish between linguistic and extra-linguistic declaration, regarding following grounds:

-*Extra-linguistic declaration* directly bound up with action, whereas, *linguistic declaration* does it indirectly.

- The former is *past-oriented*, while, the later is *future-oriented*.

Searle's puzzle is, therefore, unnecessary when he utters,

"-----how could any verbs have such remarkable properties just as a matter of semantics? I can't fix the roof by saying, "I fix the roof" and I can't fry an egg by saying, "I fry an egg," but I can promise to come and see you just by saying, "I promise to come and see you" and I can order you to leave the room just by saying, "I order you to leave the room. Now why the one and not the other?""

Another crucial question is; *whether the hearer directly or indirectly infers the speech act?* viz., the performative sentence is direct speech act or indirect speech act. A group of philosophers like *Lewis, Genet, Bach* and *Harnish* pretended as to an utterance is primarily statement and the hearer indirectly infers its performativity by Gricean mechanism. Performative utterances are, therefore, treated as an indirect speech act. If someone utters, for example, *can you pass the salt?*, then the speaker is indirectly requesting to pass the salt. The hearer directly uptakes it as a statement, and indirectly, he judges its performativity. Likewise, when a person comes from outside and alleges, *I feel suffocation in this room*. This utterance directly is a statement and indirectly, it is a performative, inasmuch as, the speaker wants to open the door and windows of this

room. These utterances are, therefore, directly a statement and indirectly performatives. As Bach and Harnish argued,

“ On our account , a performative sentence when used performatively is used literally, directly to make a statement and indirectly to perform the further speech act of the type (an order, say) named by the performative verb ('order')In our view, the performative formula is but one of a wide variety of forms of words which have become standardized for specific indirect uses, forms which serve to streamline or compress the audience's inference process. Familiar examples include “ Can you.....?”, “I'd like you to” and “It would be nice if you would”, not to mention a hedged performative like “ I must ask you”, each standardly used to make a request indirectly.”¹⁰

They , therefore, defined performative utterances as *standardized indirect* speech acts.

Obviously, there are two specific terms *Standardlization* and *Indirection*. While defining the Standardization, Bach and Harnish wrote,

“(sentence form) T is standardly used to F in group G if and only if :
(1) It is mutually believed in G that generally when a member of G utters T, his illocutionary intend is to F, and (ii) Generally when a member of G utters T in a context in which it would violate the conversational presumptions to utter T with (merely) its literally determined force, his illocutionary intend is to F.”¹¹

With regard to the above definition, an utterance may be used standardly; firstly, when it is rested upon *mutual belief* between the speaker and the hearer, in a certain context. Secondly, it must avoid the *conversational presumptions*. For example, *I order you to leave the room*, here the word order has always been used for *order* by English speakers, because it is rested upon mutual belief and secondly, it also ignores the *conversational presumption* and therefore, it must be treated as an order. Whereas, indirection means, an utterance is a direct statement and indirect speech act.

Later, Searle admitted that he thought like most of his colleagues for many years. He, however, changd his position when he observed certain problems in this argument. “ The mistake is that the argument confuses being committed to having an intention with actually *having the intention*.”¹²

Suppose, if a person utters 'I promise to come and see you next week,' then it may be possible that he made his promise insincerely and there are no such criteria which plainly distinguish between actual intention and expressed intention. Expressed intention may not be actual intention of any person, while for successful communication, actual intention is inevitable. Searle, therefore argued that we can't derive the performative from a statement. A statement or an assertion does not guarantee the actual intention of any speaker. However, when an assertion is self-referential, it must indicate assurance of actual intention. As he argued, "I have come to the unfortunate conclusion that any attempt to derive performatives from assertives is doomed to failure because assertives fail to produce the self-guaranteeing feature of performatives, and in failing to account for the self-guaranteeing feature, the analysis fails to account for performativity." ¹³ Accordingly, Searle has shown that the performative is primarily speech act and an assertion bound up with such an utterance is derived from it.

Kent Bach and R.M. Harnish, later, refuted Searle's contention as to there are differences between actual intention and expressed intention or pseudo intention. "But there is no question about his being sincere in the communicative intention itself- what one can be insincere about is actually having the attitude one is expressing."¹⁴ They, further, argued that a speaker firstly thinks and then he expresses it, in words. It is not correct as to a speaker firstly speaks and then he thinks, whatever, he spoke. The distinction between actual and pseudo intention is, therefore, blurred. As they admitted, "As Humpty Dumpty evidently appreciated, you choose your words to fit your intention, not your intention to fit your words"¹⁵ However, when we subtly consider the above discussion, we feel some mistake in Bach and Harnish's contention. Although, Bach and Harnish's endorsement is uncontroversial that a person firstly thinks and then he expresses it, in appropriate language and not vice-versa. *Our thinking, however, may be distinguished between actual thinking and hidden thinking. A person may hide his actual thinking and report his hidden thinking and there is nothing wrong in it. For example, I promise to do so and so, however my actual thinking may not be do so and so. Thus, it is not appropriate to say that intention may not be confused between actual intention and pseudo intention.*

Moreover, Bach and Harnish argued that an utterance is primarily a statement and speech act indirectly derives from it. It is argued that the seminal point of an utterance is securing uptake, implying that the hearer must understand the speaker's intention. If securing uptake is indispensable, then the question is, "*Does the hearer uptake speech act, indirectly?*" So far as the hearer uptakes those things, which are inevitable for his job, viz., hearer's job is to achieve his goal whatever, the speaker expresses by his utterance. At that juncture, it would be redundant to argue that the hearer firstly uptakes it as a statement and then he indirectly infers its performativity by Gricean mechanism. For instance, if the landlord of the house commands his rentier that *I order you to leave this house* then the rentier ipso facto uptakes it as an order. He does not think that primarily this is a statement and indirectly he infers its performativity, i.e., *order*, which is the seminal point of this utterance, not only from the speaker's point of view but also from the hearer's point of view.

Secondly, if we pretended that an utterance is a direct statement and indirect speech act, then on what ground, we will be able to distinguish between *direct speech act* and *indirect speech act*. For example, we consider two utterances; Firstly, *I order you to leave the room* and secondly, *I feel suffocation in this room*. Superficially, both utterances appear similar. However, when we consider it subtly, we observe that the former instance is a sort of direct speech act, while the latter instance is a sort of *indirect speech act*. Whereas, on account of Bach and Harnish's contention, both instances would be a sort of *indirect speech act*, because, the hearer indirectly infers it performativity. The dichotomy between direct speech act and indirect speech act is, therefore, blurred and it would be more difficult for the hearer to judge; whether this utterance is direct speech act or indirect speech act.

Moreover, if every meaningful utterance is a statement, then it would be redundant to think that primarily this is a statement and then it is a performative. Regarding this issue, we may argue that by virtue of Occam's razor or law of parsimony, we should not consider irrelevant things, which are not inevitable for our jobs. By and large, an utterance is treated by the hearer as speech act. However, sometimes, it may fail to give concrete result according to its inwardness and then the hearer indirectly endeavours to judge its performativity. Thus, they treat it as an indirect speech act. In

addition, there are a number of utterances, which directly behave like indirect speech act, for example, *can you pass the salt ? " It would be nice....." ,* and so forth, which are known as indirect speech act.

Bach, further, attempted to make a nuance distinction between *hedged performatives* and *embedded performatives* on the basis of certainty, which must be inherent with the intention of the speaker. By and large, when a person utters something in the normal sense, then it does not force the hearer to perform the act regarding this utterance. On the other hand, when the speaker utters something forcefully then it does not endow with any sort of relaxation for the hearer, i.e., it must underlie compulsion or certainty for the hearer to do as per the utterance. For instance, *I order you to leave the room*; this utterance has two dimensions; firstly, *hedged performative like I order you to leave the room* and *embedded performative like I must order you to leave the room*. Although, both utterances have plainly shown,

"-----it is necessary for the speaker to order the hearer to leave. That is the belief the speaker is expressing in making the statement. Notice that in these cases this belief is distinct from the belief associated with the order itself, namely, the belief that the speaker is ordering the hearer to leave. The latter belief is not expressed, but it is implicated in the speaker's intention to be ordering ."¹⁶

Well, on the one hand, Bach made a subtle distinction between hedged performative and embedded performative by virtue of the certainty or compulsion, because, it must underlie the intention of the speaker. On the other hand, he emphasised *standardization*. I think that both approaches are contradictory to each other and it would not be acceptable anyhow. In the case of standardization , speaker,s intention is redundant, because, in such circumstances language works as per certain norms, which are objective and also observable. For example, in the law court , in front of the Registrar, someone signs on the written documents as to *I give and bequeath my house to my sister*, at that place, the question of the intention of the speaker is meaningless, even without intention, the act must be performed. Apparently, there is a standardized form of language, which are used in various contexts and must perform some acts. Indeed, this is not the characteristic of language, but the characteristic of standardization,

which is determined by society and culture. It does not happen simply that intention is not considerable or it is redundant. It may be considerable, in the absence of standardization. Apparently, in the absence of standardization language works as per intention of the speaker. Thus, standardization does not demand intention, viz., it is adequate in itself to perform some acts. On this account it would be untenable to distinguish between *hedged performatives* and *embedded performatives*. In the case of standardization, for example, the director of the institute utters as to *you are hereby suspended*. This utterance does not provide any sort of relaxation for the hearer to distinguish between hedged performative and embedded performative. It is quite likely implied that *you must be suspended*. The distinction between the hedged performatives and the embedded performatives is, therefore, away. However, it may be useful in the absence of standardization.

The above discussion highlights the fact that Bach and Harnish's contention as to performatives work as per standardized indirect speech act, is problematic. So far as, standardization and indirection both are contradictory to each other. In the case of standardization, which is rested upon *mutual belief* and *avoidance of conversational presumption*, as defined by Bach and Harnish, the hearer directly conceives the speech act. However, in the absence of standardization, the hearer endeavours to infer the intention of the speaker indirectly, inasmuch as there are no standardized touchstones which facilitate the inference process. So, when Bach and Harnish pretended that even in the presence of the standardization, the hearer indirectly infers the speech act. It simply unfolds that *even standardization is not very clear, viz., standardization is also confused, unclear, equivocal, complex, vague, and the like. The hearer, therefore, indirectly endeavours to take away this confusion by inference process.*

It does not imply that Searle's argument is appropriate, i.e., an utterance is primarily performative and an assertion derives from it. This argument is also worth considerable from a certain point of view. Of course, in the presence of conventionalization, the hearer directly infers the speech act. Thus, an utterance is directly treated as a speech act. However, in the absence of conventionalization, performatives work regarding the intention of the speaker or mutual understanding between the speaker and

the hearer. In these circumstances, an utterance is directly treated as an assertion or a statement and the hearer, indirectly infers the intention of the speaker. Thus, an utterance is direct statement and indirect speech act.

Various arguments presented in this paper identify conventionalization and standardization as two major dimensions for understanding the nature of performative utterances. The question of relative importance of conventionalization and standardization appears irrelevant. Standardization of performative utterance is a gradual process taking place in a socio-cultural context. By and large, conventionalized forms of performative utterances have been prevalently accepted and used. Later on, certain forms of conventional performative utterances acquire standardized form. Conventional performative utterances, therefore, evolve as standardized performative utterances. It may not be understood as to standardized performative utterances are perfect and ossify. The process of standardization of performative utterance is dynamic and continuous. When it has been used in our daily life, it becomes an indispensable fraction of conventionalization. Of course, conventionalization and standardization may not diametrically be converse aspects. Conventionalization underlies all sorts of standardization. It may not deem that conventionalization is ultimate, static and ossified. Socio-cultural contexts endowed with strength and fecundity, which facilitate the process of conventionalization and standardization. Due to *variation in socio-cultural contexts, convention may vary. Plainly, the functioning of performatives is relative to a socio-cultural context.* For example, I promise to do so and so, there may be a culture, wherein you can promise by saying merely that *I promise* while, in the same culture, in case of conventionalization and standardization, *you can't promise by saying solely that I promise. In such circumstances, you can promise, by signing some special legal documents.* Of course, the realm of standardization is very limited, which betoken solely formal and legal situations. The whole society, therefore, doesn't work as per the norms of standardization. Broadly, standardization is an aspect of conventionalization whereas, conventionalization relies upon socio-cultural contexts. *We, therefore, conclude that performatives work as per socio-cultural contexts. Conventionalization and standardization are embedded in the larger socio-cultural context to the extent that they*

become inseparable fragment of it.

Socio-cultural contexts, however, should not be taken as static and ossified. It is dynamic and continuous, like conventionalization and standardization. When a culture comes in contact with other culture, it leads to the process of *acculturation*. For example, when some persons of a culture interact with persons of another culture, they extensively observe nuances of the other culture and compare it with regard to their own culture. This process of acculturation leads to evolution of some novel values and norms, adopted by the persons involved in such process. Gradually, these logical, rational and congruent novelties become an inevitable aspect of their culture and eventually, get adopted as a standardized form. These innovations through the medium of conventionalization are standardized. *The process of acculturation is unique and amenable for introducing dynamism in socio-cultural contexts.*

Another cardinal process of *rationcination* also affects the socio-cultural contexts. In every culture, some persons of intellectual class belong to peer-groups. On the basis of logical and intellectual thinking, they dissent conservatism, fundamentalism and obscurantism, prevalent in their society. They, therefore, organize and participate in various intellectual discourses, meetings, seminars, etc., and argue against the fundamentalism; in as much as, these are obstacles for the development of the society. While criticizing negative aspects of the society, they introduce some novel values and norms for its betterment. Although, fundamentalists always vehemently dissent such sort of innovations, so that obscurantism continues in minds and actions of people. They fail to provide some logical argument in favour of obscurantism. They, therefore, endeavour to use and arouse emotions and feelings of masses, asserting that the founder of the society, i.e., religious Gurus desire us to be like of obscurantism. They never accept that those norms may become irrelevant in the context of changing society and contemporary world. With the advent of information technology, the world is converting into a global village. In such circumstances, it is very difficult to lay by stereotypes of obscurantism, which are noxious for the development of the society. So, majority of the people endeavour to adopt these innovations in their behaviours. Thus, innovations and changes gradually evolve as an indispensable fragment of the society and eventually it achieves the status of conventionalization and standardization, respectively. Such

sort of societal phenomena may be observed even in contemporary society. Nowadays, Pakistan and Afganistan are good examples of such societal phenomena. Lately, General Parvez Musharruf proclaimed numerous reforms, which uptake as a radical step towards the reform in Pakistan. Likewise, in Afganistan, with the establishment of the new government, numerous traditional values, which were imposed by fundamentalists are assuaged and replaced by some innovations. Apparently, performatives work as per socio-cultural contexts, which may change with regard to acculturation. Conventionalization and standardization, therefore, must be deemed with reference to dynamic character of socio-cultural context.

However, in the absence of socio-cultural contexts of conventionalization and standardization, language may work as per following grounds. Firstly, mutual understanding between the speaker and the hearer may develop to facilitate functionality of a specific linguistic communication. Suppose two persons belonging to different cultures, meet each other. Obviously, their languages and cultures would be different. In such circumstances, they may not have common standardized and conventionalized form of language required for their communication. However, in such situation, they may evolve mutual understanding regarding language including signs, symbols etc. for their communication. Thus, mutual understanding is an outstanding phenomenon for communication.

Secondly, job orientations are also cardinal factor for performing the work in lack of conventionalization and standardization. Job orientation is bound up with common interest, goal and purpose. Thus, even if the speaker and the hearer differ in their calibre and mental status, however, due to similarity of job, they succeed in communicating their ideas, without ambiguity. In such circumstances, performatives work by virtue of the common purposes between the speaker and the hearer, i.e., *language works between words to work*.

Thirdly, in this regard, *hearer's motivation* and *propensity* are unavoidable. In several cases, it has been seen that the hearer uptakes the meaning of an utterance, according to their propensity. For instance, when a person utters that we should not beat our wife. Obviously, regarding their propensity or motivation and even intellect, the hearers adopt it in various manners. Some persons may think that we should beat others, besides our

wives, while, on the other hand, some person think that we should not beat anybody including our wives. Another example may be; someone of the family members utters as to *it is Sunday today*. This utterance may be taken in various ways by various family members depending upon their motivations. Firstly, someone may think that it is Sunday today, so we should go to the Church. Secondly, someone may think that today is holiday, so there is no ere long, viz., we should take rest too much vis-a-vis other days. Thirdly, some others may think that Kṛṣṇa T.V. Serial will come today at 8.30 A.M. because ; it is Sunday today; while, if you have commenced a meeting on Sunday, then you will uptake it in other manner.

Likewise, Upaniṣadik statement, '*Eko Brahman Dvitiyo Nasti*' Śamkara interpreted it, Brahman is the only real and everything except Brahman is unreal, appearance, Māyā, Avidyā etc. On the basis of this interpretation, he sets forth his noteworthy theory of *non-dualism*. On the other hand, Ramanuja interpreted this statement in different way. He argued that it does not mean as to Brahman is the only real. Apart from Brahman, Jiva (Chit) and Matter (Achit) are also real , eternal and independent of each other, however, their existence rely upon God. It may imply that in addition to God, Chit and Achit are also real but these are not on a par with God. God is substance while, Chit and Achit are attributes of god. Ramanuja, therefore, laid down his cardinal theory of *Vishistadvaita*. Thus, the nature, propensity, motivation, etc. of the hearer are also very important for our communication. In addition, we can't deny the intention of the speaker, which we have discussed earlier, for successful communication.

Eventually we may attempt recapitulate our seminal ideas in foregoing discussion. Prevalently, performative sentences are directly treated as a speech act. Sometimes, it may fail to produce some consequential result regading its inwardness, then the hearer, indirectly endeavours to infer its performativity. These utterances are' therefore, treated as indiredct speech act. On the other hand, there may be some utterances, which are, naturally, indirect speech act. Secondly, performatives work as per socio-cultural contexts. Conventionalization and standardization are, embedded in the larger socio-cultural context, inasmuch as they become an inseparable fraction of it. However, in the absence of conventionalization and standardization, performatives work with regard to follwing grounds:

- Mutual understanding between the speaker and the hearer.
- Job orientations among the person.
- Motivations and propensities of the hearer.
- The intention of the speaker.

NOTES

1. Pandey , R.K. (2001) : Why to distinguish performative and constative utterances? *Indian Philosophical Quarterly*, vol XXVIII No 3.P. 361.
2. Searle J. R. (1989) : How Performatives Work, *Linguistics and Philosophy*, vol 12.P. 552.
3. *Ibid*. P. 548
4. *Ibid*.P. 554
5. Searle, S.R. (1979) : *Expressions and Meaning* , P.P. 31-32.
6. Austin, J.L.(1982): *How to Do Things with Words*, edited by J.O. Urmson and Marina Sbisa, P. 76.
7. *Ibid* P.69.
8. Searle,J.R. (1989) : How Performatives Work, *Linguistics and Philosophy*, vol 15.P.98.
9. *Ibid* P. 535.
10. Bach, K and Harnish, R.M. (1982) : How Performatives Really Work, *Linguistics and Philosophy* , vol 15.P.98.
11. Bach, K and Harnish, R.M. (1979) : *Linguistic Communication and Speech Acts*, M.I.T. Press, Cambridge, Mass, P.19.
12. Searle, J.R> (1989): How Performatives Work, *Linguistics and Philosophy* vol 12 P. 546.
13. *Ibid* P.P. 546-47.
14. Bach, K and Harnish, R.M. (1982) :How Performatives Really Work, *Linguistics and Philosophy*, vol 15 P. 96.
15. *Ibid* P. 105
16. Bach, K (1995): Standardization Vs Conventionalization, *Linguistics and Philosophy*, vol 18. P. 680.