Virtue Is Knowledge The Moral Foundations of Socratic Political Philosophy
by Lorraine Smith Pangle
University of Chicago Press, 2014
Cloth: 978-0-226-13654-7 | Electronic: 978-0-226-13668-4
DOI: 10.7208/chicago/9780226136684.001.0001
ABOUT THIS BOOKAUTHOR BIOGRAPHYREVIEWSTABLE OF CONTENTS

ABOUT THIS BOOK

The relation between virtue and knowledge is at the heart of the Socratic view of human excellence, but it also points to a central puzzle of the Platonic dialogues: Can Socrates be serious in his claims that human excellence is constituted by one virtue, that vice is merely the result of ignorance, and that the correct response to crime is therefore not punishment but education? Or are these assertions mere rhetorical ploys by a notoriously complex thinker?

Lorraine Smith Pangle traces the argument for the primacy of virtue and the power of knowledge throughout the five dialogues that feature them most prominently—the Apology, Gorgias, Protagoras, Meno, and Laws—and reveals the truth at the core of these seemingly strange claims. She argues that Socrates was more aware of the complex causes of human action and of the power of irrational passions than a cursory reading might suggest. Pangle’s perceptive analyses reveal that many of Socrates’s teachings in fact explore the factors that make it difficult for humans to be the rational creatures that he at first seems to claim. Also critical to Pangle’s reading is her emphasis on the political dimensions of the dialogues. Underlying many of the paradoxes, she shows, is a distinction between philosophic and civic virtue that is critical to understanding them.

Ultimately, Pangle offers a radically unconventional way of reading Socrates’s views of human excellence: Virtue is not knowledge in any ordinary sense, but true virtue is nothing other than wisdom.

AUTHOR BIOGRAPHY

Lorraine Smith Pangle is professor of government at the University of Texas at Austin, where she is also codirector of the Thomas Jefferson Center for the Study of Core Texts and Ideas. She is the author of three books, including, most recently, The Political Philosophy of Benjamin Franklin.

REVIEWS

Virtue Is Knowledge is an extraordinary accomplishment: suffused with insight, gracefully written, and powerfully argued. It will challenge much of the received wisdom about the meaning of the Socratic ‘paradox’ and set down important signposts for students of Socrates who wish to understand the full dimensions of his defense of philosophy and its significance for moral and political life. The book will easily take its place as one of the gems among the books devoted to the Platonic dialogues.”
— Susan D. Collins, University of Notre Dame

“Lorraine Smith Pangle has written an ambitious and important book, one that richly rewards the effort it requires of readers. In it, she advances our understanding of Plato and unravels with remarkable clarity and comprehensiveness an important and enigmatic Socratic teaching. The power of her argument and the fruitfulness of her approach will make her book one with which every serious scholar will have to reckon.”
— Aristide Tessitore, Furman University

“Pangle leads the reader on a thrilling intellectual journey, through Plato’s five most important dialogues on virtue, in search of a clear understanding of the moral character of Socratic philosophy. By demonstrating that Plato combines philosophic intransigence with a consummate moral and political realism, Pangle provides a vital correction to the traditional stereotype of Plato as a hopelessly naïve idealist. Through a remarkable combination of rigorous textual analysis, deft psychological insight, and bold philosophic reflection, Virtue Is Knowledge offers both a singularly illuminating account of the central moral teaching of Socratic philosophy and also a wonderfully vivid account of the life and soul of the philosopher.”
— Peter J. Ahrensdorf, Davidson College

“Read alongside the dialogues, [Pangle’s book] provides compelling analysis of the texts and a frank presentation of the paradoxes of Socratic questioning. She successfully demonstrates the joy of close reading, both through her careful study of rhetoric and through focusing on the political aspects of the dialogues.”
— Bryn Mawr Classical Review

“A fine introduction to an increasingly influential approach to the interpretation of Plato. Pangle’s method is a close reading and exegesis of each of the five dialogues, attending to the place of the political passions in the dialogues and to the distinction between philosophic virtue and civic virtue. The great virtue of Pangle's book lies in this attention to detail, and the presentation of the results of this sort of close reading in a manner that should be palatable to mainstream Platonic scholarship. This book is recommended for readers of Plato at all levels. Recommended.”
— Choice

“Well-worth reading. . . . In this rich and thoughtful work, Pangle tackles several Platonic dialogues in order to explore the sense in which Socrates or Plato regards virtue as a matter of knowledge or wisdom.”
— Polis, The Journal for Ancient Greek Political Thought

"[An] excellent book . . . . All of the readings are rich and provocative.”
— Review of Politics

"Anyone working on the texts described would find them an invaluable aid. Philosophy students who are not reading Greek would also find them helpful gateways into Plato’s and Aristotle’s thoughts on these moral problems. [Pangle] quotes from other scholars generously, including when she disagrees, and her notes and references are extensive. This enterprise is exactly what she has said it is: the fruit of lengthy pondering on two difficult authors, in a notoriously problematic area of moral philosophy, leading to a new and illuminating synthesis between them."
— Colin McDonald, Classics for All (Praise for Virtue is Knowledge and Reason and Character)

TABLE OF CONTENTS

- Lorraine Smith Pangle
DOI: 10.7208/chicago/9780226136684.003.0001
[Socratic rhetoric, interpretive method, eudaimonism, utilitarianism, hyper-moralism, knowledge, wisdom]
After introducing the themes of the book and discussing some of the rhetorical and educational functions of the Socratic thesis, this chapter defends the book’s method, in which each dialogue is approached as a dramatic whole with special attention to its political dimensions, and the serious core of Socrates’ thought is sought through a dialectical engagement with his often exaggerated and incomplete arguments. The chapter then resolves the Socratic thesis into two basic claims, a claim about the goodness of virtue and a claim about the power of knowledge, cataloguing the most important ways in which each of these claims may be understood. (pages 1 - 10)
This chapter is available at:
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- Lorraine Smith Pangle
DOI: 10.7208/chicago/9780226136684.003.0002
[Socrates, Meletus, trial of Socrates, Apology, corruption, law, punishment, knowledge of ignorance]
This chapter puts the Apology’s discussion of virtue and knowledge in dramatic context. It interprets Socrates’ famously avowed knowledge of ignorance as the more specific claim that Socrates “knows nothing both noble and good” and as a commentary on the confusions of those who think they do. It offers a careful exposition of Socrates’ cross-examination of Meletus on the corruption charge, in which Socrates introduces the thought that no one knowingly does wrong, quietly demonstrates the subversive character of his teachings, and exposes a moral confusion at the heart of the city’s criminal law. The chapter then analyses all the different claims Socrates makes for the goodness of virtue in the Apology--that it is good as a means and an end; that it is the substance of happiness and that it involves a heroic sacrifice of self-interest—thereby introducing us to the self-contradictions that conventional morality is prone to fall into. (pages 11 - 43)
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- Lorraine Smith Pangle
DOI: 10.7208/chicago/9780226136684.003.0003
[Socrates, Gorgias, Polus, rhetoric, power, justice, moral indignation, retribution, punishment]
This chapter begins with an analysis of Socrates’ entrapment of the rhetorician Gorgias, a discussion of Socrates’ interest in and use of rhetoric, and an assessment of Gorgias’ over-estimate of the power of knowledge. It focuses on Socrates’ dialogue with Polus, in which Socrates argues that tyrants have no power and that doing injustice is worse than suffering injustice. Behind these paradoxical claims lies a compelling critique of the confusions inherent in moral indignation and the irrationality of punishment that is retributive rather than aimed at curing the offender’s unhealthy soul. Power, as something good, requires knowledge; true virtue, as the health of the soul, is incomparably valuable, and all who fail to pursue it fail to understand its value. (pages 44 - 80)
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- Lorraine Smith Pangle
DOI: 10.7208/chicago/9780226136684.003.0004
[Socrates, Meno, Daedalus, virtue, knowledge, recollection, wisdom]
This chapter argues that Meno, usually treated as a work of epistemology, is in fact one of Plato’s most important political dialogues, containing probing reflections on the political passions and hopes that drive political ambition and that resist philosophy’s insights, on the difference between political and philosophic virtue and the relation of each to knowledge, on the reasons for Socrates’ interest in politically ambitious young men, and hence on the deepest reasons for the first political philosopher’s conflict with the city of Athens. Offering a detailed commentary on Socrates’ entire dialogue with Meno on the question of whether virtue is teachable, the chapter elucidates the central meaning of virtue as active wisdom, which is not teachable in any ordinary sense because it requires a kind of education that ultimately one can only give to oneself. It explores some of the most important political and moral obstacles to attaining that wisdom, including the factors that make knowledge prone to running away like the statues of Daedalus. (pages 81 - 130)
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- Lorraine Smith Pangle
DOI: 10.7208/chicago/9780226136684.003.0005
[Socrates, Protagoras, Simonides, Prometheus, sophists, unity of virtue, pleasure, hedonism, courage, wisdom]
A full commentary on Plato’s Protagoras, this chapter elucidates the similarities and differences between Socrates’ critique of retribution and those of Protagoras and Simonides, focusing on the question of whether all virtue is ultimately one, or reducible to wisdom. It examines especially the final part of the dialogue, beginning with Socrates’ famous claim that knowledge is sovereign and is never dragged around like a slave by the passions. Although the proof for the power of knowledge that follows rests on Protagoras’ own, half-acknowledged hedonistic premises, it applies equally to Socrates’ more capacious understanding of the human good. It is argued that bad choices always involve cognitive error because passion in a rational being always involves reason, and that not mere knowledge but wisdom is immune to being dragged around. The chapter closes with an argument that Socrates is right in considering courage one part or aspect of wisdom, even if its roots lie deep in the less rational elements of a good and vigorous constitution. For the strength that underlies courage turns out to be much more infused with reason than it at first seems: it is thus an integral part of the active wisdom that Socrates identifies with virtue. (pages 131 - 211)
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- Lorraine Smith Pangle
DOI: 10.7208/chicago/9780226136684.003.0006
[Athenian Stranger, Plato’s Laws, law, punishment, retribution, moral responsibility, virtue, strength of soul, wisdom]
In Plato’s most practical work, the Laws, he combines an extremely frank statement of the radical Socratic thesis that virtue is knowledge and vice is involuntary with a prudential acceptance of the political community’s need for anger and retributive punishment. This chapter examines the complicated and indeed contradictory statements of principle regarding responsibility and punishment in the Laws and compares these with the actual criminal code proposed in Book 9. The result is to show how a radical philosophic insight can be adapted to make ordinary citizens more gentle, thoughtful, and humane without sapping their moral commitments. The chapter ends with reflections on Plato’s suggestions about strength of soul (eupsuchia) as an essential support to and component of active wisdom. (pages 212 - 246)
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