Abstract
I shall explore in this article the metaphysical possibility of powers’ strongly emerging from relations. After having provided a definition of emergent powers that is also based on the distinction between the possession and the activation of a power, I shall introduce different sorts of Relations that Ground Emergence, both external and internal. Later on, I shall discuss some examples of powers that are grounded on their instantiation. Finally, I shall examine the consequences of accepting such relations within a physicalistic ontology and I shall defend them against two objections based on the notion of bruteness.
This is a preview of subscription content, log in via an institution to check access.
Similar content being viewed by others
Notes
See, for example, van Gulick (2001).
See Michele PP (manuscript-1).
Here I take “in virtue of” and “grounding” as expressing relations of ontological dependence between entities (for their identity, for their existence, for their activation—in the case of powers—, and so on). I do not wish to commit myself to the truth of most contemporary views of grounding, according to which grounding is a primitive and unanalysable relation different from other relevant relations of ontological dependence that are examined in the literature (see, for example, Correia and Schnieder (2012)).
This conflicts with Martin (2008)’s view of dispositions’ activation. According to him, roughly, powers are activated when they meet their mutual manifestation partners. Within Martin’s picture, there are no basic powers, since each power is activated in virtue of meeting its mutual manifestation partner. Anyway, not every power in the universe seemingly is activated in this way: for example, a radioactive atom’s power to decay is spontaneously activated [see Lowe (2013)]. Moreover, what makes it the case that a power meets its mutual manifestation partner, so that they are both activated? If the activation of a third power grounds their “meeting”, then the activation of such a latter power should be grounded on its having met its own mutual manifestation partner (i.e., a fourth power), and so on, ad infinitum.
Moreover, I do not accept so-called passive powers, i.e., powers of undergoing actions, since I think that active powers, i.e., powers of performing actions, are sufficient to explain what happens in the universe in virtue of powers. Finally, within this perspective, actions can be performed by inanimate entities too.
The metaphysical necessity is given here by the nature of emergent powers themselves.
More generally, as a matter of metaphysical necessity, p1 is an emergent power of an entity e1 with respect to all the entities belonging to a certain ontological level l that is just below the level l+1 to which e1 belongs (to be defined, for example, in terms of constitution) iff p1 is possessed by e1 in virtue of the activation of some power(s) possessed by one or more than one entity belonging to level l but p1 can be activated by no entity belonging to l neither directly, nor in virtue of its doing something (i.e., of other powers’—belonging to it—being activated), nor in virtue of some non-active conditions’—involving it—being met.
Of course, the activation of the power of producing p 1 in e 1 is not identical with the activation of the power p1: such powers are different.
In Michele PP (manuscript-2), I refine and clarify this distinction in order to allow for the existence of internal and external relational modes, i.e., particular relations that (also) ontologically depend on their relata (e.g., the particular loving relation between Romeo and Juliet). Here I take whole dependence as a relation between entities or sorts of entities, that can be reduced to other relations (e.g., supervenience, realization, etc.), even though we could also take it as a primitive, irreducible relation. Moreover, I assume that there is a distinction between intrinsic and extrinsic properties, i.e., between the properties that something has regardless of other things and the properties that it has (also or only) in virtue of its being related with other things. See Weatherson and Marshall (2012) for a detailed survey of this distinction.
This distinction is slightly different from the one invoked by Moore (1919). According to Moore, internal relations are somehow entailed by the natures of their relata. If by “natures” one only means the essences of such relata and if she holds that the essence of something does not comprehend all its intrinsic properties, my distinction is stronger than—and non-equivalent-with—Moore’s distinction.
Being fundamental is not the same as being a micro-physical entity. For example, there might be non-micro-physical entities (constituted by micro-physical entities) that are fundamental in virtue of having basic powers. In a similar vein, if we accept that there are emergent basic powers, not all the basic powers in the universe are possessed by micro-physical entities.
Roughly, materialists hold that there are only material entities in the universe; physicalists that there are only physical entities in the universe; microphysicalists, in general, hold that everything in the universe wholly depends on micro-physical entities.
My conception of RGE-Ps should be distinguished from Lloyd Morgan (1927)’s and C. D. Broad (1925: 61–81)’s views of the connection between relations and emergence. Lloyd Morgan maintains that relations themselves are emergent, while I think that they play a fundamental role in grounding the emergence of another sort of entities (i.e., emergent powers). Broad notoriously claims that emergent properties of certain complexes can be predicated (at least in principle) by taking into accounts the constituents of those complexes and certain relevant relations holding between those constituents. Whereas I maintain that the emergence of a power can be predicted (at least in principle) in such a way, I do not assert that the activation of that power is thus predictable—and I do not consider the emergence of properties, but only the emergence of powers. In sum, my view of emergent powers is somehow stronger than Broad’s view.
This constitution relation can be seen in turn as an external relation between certain micro-physical entities. The holding of such an external relation gives rise to an emergent substance, i.e., to a substance that possesses emergent powers with respect to those micro-physical entities, following (EP). See the next note for the relation between emergent substances and emergent powers. On emergent substances, see also O’Connor and Jacobs (2003).
It is worth noticing that a power is not emergent in virtue of its being exercised by an emergent substance and that an emergent substance is not emergent in virtue of possessing emergent powers. I do not think that there are such dependence relations between emergent powers and emergent substances for their being emergent. Yet, emergent powers are strictly connected with emergent substances and emergent substances are strictly connected with emergent powers. In fact, the possession of an emergent power is a distinctive feature of an emergent substance—with respect to other substances. In turn, an emergent power (with respect to other powers) can be only activated by an emergent substance—and this fact represent a distinctive feature of that emergent power.
The levels of entities with respect to other entities might be defined by appropriate constitution or dependence relations between them.
Even if internal relations seemingly are non-fundamental entities (given that they wholly depend on their relata), they could ground the possession of certain powers insofar as their relata (or their intrinsic properties) are taken together. Here is an example of an internal relation between properties—and not between substances (in principle, nothing excludes the existence of relations between properties too): a conjunction P & Q of certain properties P and Q. I assume that P and Q are instantiated by the same micro-physical entities, so that P & Q is instantiated by those entities too. P & Q wholly depends, for its existence, on the existence of P and Q taken together and it wholly depends, for its being instantiated by certain micro-physical entities, on P’s and Q’s being instantiated by those same entities. Yet, P & Q could nevertheless confer to those entities (or to the non-micro-physical entities constituted by them) certain powers that can neither be conferred by P alone, nor by Q alone—but only by P and Q taken together. Thus, P & Q could ground the possession of certain relevant (emergent and non-emergent, basic and non-basic) powers.
Structures are seemingly invoked by Cartwright and Pemberton (2013) in order to explain the behaviours of powers within complex and stable configurations.
The probability of finding a certain electron within a certain portion of space at a certain distance from the nucleus of an atom also depends on the distance between that portion of space and the nucleus, i.e., on an external spatial relation between that portion and the nucleus. If we do not aim at taking portions of space as relata of distance relations, we can nevertheless suppose that there is a distance relation between the electron and the nucleus and that such a relation is external, since it does not wholly depend for its holding on intrinsic properties of the relata (the electron and the nucleus), nor on their essences, nor on their existence. In order to defend this latter thesis, one should obviously deny that spatial positions are intrinsic properties of entities. Anyway, within my framework, the electronic structure of an atom turns out to be a relatively stable, complex external relation between electrons. Let me explain. If we have an atom with two orbitals and with two electrons in the first orbital and six electrons in the second orbital, we have two instances of external relations: (i) concerning the first orbital, an instance of the external relation of being in the same orbital as (place to fill) or of having almost the same probability of being at a certain distance from the nucleus as (place to fill), that relates the two electrons in the first orbital; (ii) concerning the second orbital, an instance of the same external relation, that now has more places to fill, since it relates the six electrons in the second orbital. Yet, there will also be external relations between the electrons of different orbitals, such as the relation of being in the outer orbital with respect to (place to fill), that plausibly relates an electron of the second orbital (in the first place of the relation) with an electron of the first orbital (in the second place of the relation). The electronic structure of the atom can be seen as a complex relation between the eight electrons, that wholly depends for its holding on the holding of the external relations that I have now mentioned. It is an external relation, since it does not wholly depend for its being holding on the intrinsic properties of the electrons, nor on their essences, nor on their existence.
This project has been carried on thanks to a grant by the Durham Emergence Project, generously funded by the John Templeton Foundation and Durham University. I wish to thank Alexander Carruth, Sophie C. Gibb, Stephen D. Mumford, Francesco Orilia, John Pemberton and Peter Wyss for their useful philosophical remarks.
References
Bedau Mark (1997) Weak Emergence. Philosophical Perspectives 11:375–399
Bedau Mark (2002) Downward causation and autonomy in weak EMERGENCE. Principia 6(1):5–50
Bedau Mark (2008) Is weak emergence just in the mind? Mind Mach 18:443–459
Broad Charlie Dunbar (1925) The mind and its place in nature. Kegan, Trench, Trubner & Co, London
Cartwright Nancy, Pemberton John (2013) Aristotelian powers: without them, that would modern science do? In: Greco John, Groff Ruth (eds) Powers and capacities in philosophy: the New aristotelianism. Routledge, London, pp 93–112
Chalmers DJ (2006) Strong and Weak Emergence. In: Clayton P, Davies P (eds) The re-emergence of emergence. The emergentist hypothesis from science to religion. Oxford University Press, Oxford, pp 244–254
Correia F, Schnieder B (2012) Grounding: an opinionated introduction. In: Correia F, Schnieder B (eds) Metaphysical grounding. Understanding the structure of reality. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, pp 1–36
Fine Kit (2000) Neutral Relations. Philos Rev 109(1):1–33
Gaskin Richard, Hill Daniel J (2012) On Neutral Relations. Dialectica 66(1):167–186
Hochberg Herbert (1987) Russell’s early analysis of relational predication and the asymmetry of the predication relation. Philosophia 17(4):439–459
Kim Jaegwon (1999) Making sense of emergence. Philos Stud 95:3–36
Koslicki Kathrin (2008) The structure of objects. Oxford University Press, Oxford
Lloyd Morgan C (1927) Emergent evolution. Williams and Norgate, London
Lowe E Jonathan (2013) Substance causation, powers, and human agency. In: Gibb SC, Lowe EJ, Ingthorsson RD (eds) Mental causation and ontology. Oxford University Press, Oxford, pp 153–172
MacBride Fraser (2007) Neutral relations revisited. Dialectica 61(1):25–56
MacBride Fraser (2014) How involved do You Want to be in a non-symmetric relationship? Australas J Philos 92(1):1–16
Martin Charles Burton (2008) The mind in nature. Oxford University Press, Oxford
Michele PP (manuscript-1) Substance causation
Michele PP (manuscript-2) Non-symmetrical relations, O-roles and modes
Moore George Edward (1919) External and Internal relations. Proc Aristot Soc 20:40–62
Mulligan Kevin (1998) Relations—through thick and thin. Erkenntnis 48:325–353
O’Connor Timothy, Jacobs Jonathan D (2003) Emergent individuals. Philos Q 53(213):540–555
Orilia Francesco (2000) Argument deletion, thematic roles, and Leibniz’s logico-grammatical analysis of relations. Hist Philos Log 21(2):147–162
Orilia Francesco (2011) Relational Order and Onto-Thematic Roles. Metaphysica 12:1–18
Russell Bertrand (1913). In: Theory of Knowledge. The 1913 Manuscript. Published in 1992. London–New York: Routledge
Russell Bertrand (1938) The principles of mathematics, Second revised edn. Norton, New York
Santos Gil C (2015a) Upward and downward causation from a relational-horizontal ontological perspective. Axiomathes 25(1):23–40
Santos Gil C (2015b). “Ontological emergence: how is that possible? Towards a new relational ontology”. Found Sci
Strawson Galen (2008) Real materialism and other essays. Oxford University Press, Oxford
van Gulick Robert (2001) Reduction, emergence and other recent options on the mind/body problem. a philosophical overview. J Conscious Stud 8(9–10):1–34
Weatherson Brian, Marshall Dan (2012). “Intrinsic vs. Extrinsic Properties”. In: Zalta EN (ed.), Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy on-line
Author information
Authors and Affiliations
Corresponding author
Rights and permissions
About this article
Cite this article
Paolini Paoletti, M. How Powers Emerge from Relations. Axiomathes 26, 187–204 (2016). https://doi.org/10.1007/s10516-015-9280-0
Received:
Accepted:
Published:
Issue Date:
DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s10516-015-9280-0